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A bstract
This research is based on one year of anthropological fieldwork in a well-established 
vertical shantytown with a population of around 200,000 located between the two 
most affluent residential neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro. The thesis addresses 
the question of the political organisation of this shantytown’s population and aims 
to understand this question by looking at how these people are divided among 
themselves at all levels of organisation.
Chapter 1 provides the context. It portrays the infrastructural development of 
the shantytown and investigates its population’s economic well-being, and traces 
the significance of both of these factors for its political potential. The remainder 
of the thesis consists of two parts. In the first part (Chapters 2-4) I examine 
what organisational principles are at work at local levels and the degree to which 
they can ultimately play a part in group formation. The analysis starts with an 
examination of these principles at the most local level (i.e. in the household) and 
then expands to wider levels. Thus Chapter 2 sets out the form kinship relations 
take in the household, and traces their importance in larger group formations. 
Chapter 3 examines relations between neighbours and the degree to which locality 
and regionality is articulated. Chapter 4 looks at the shantytown as a whole, 
questioning to what extent and in what ways its population expresses itself as a 
social unit, a “community”. This chapter also explores other potential principles 
on which this population bases its identity (e.g. rural associations, skin colour, 
religious persuasion), the degree to which these are articulated and can serve as a 
basis of mobilisation. The first part of the thesis provides a basis for the second 
part (Chapters 5-8), which examines in detail the development and dynamics of 
political activity in the shantytown.
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The form that the political activity takes depends partly on the resource struc­
ture and the wider national political context. These are developed in the first two 
historical chapters of the second part. The purpose of these chapters is to identify 
the major developments in national politics at federal and local level, the policies 
that governing bodies implemented which directly affected this shantytown pop­
ulation, and how these shaped the power structure in the shantytown. Chapter 
5 develops the story during the repressive years, while Chapter 6 takes it from 
there. The emphasis of the thesis falls on the final two chapters, which portray 
the workings of the political activities in the shantytown at the time of fieldwork, 
drawing together all previous chapters. The first of these examines in detail how 
leadership in action groups is established and maintained, it spells out the organ­
isational models according to which they operate, and the relations between the 
groups. The problematic nature of relations with the political party structure and 
the resident drug traffickers causes them to be articulated in a different hidden 
sphere. Their examination forms the subject of a separate last chapter.
The picture that emerges is one of constantly changing group formations that 
exist as a result of temporary individually-motivated interests at all levels. Locally, 
kinship, locality and other sources of identity are not well articulated as organising 
principles. For example, in the case of kinship, residential units are largely formed 
on the basis of primary kin relations, though in actuality, their composition is 
easily transformed and there is little evidence of larger kinship networks. Similarly, 
in the case of locality, there are action groups which present themselves as local 
neighbourhood centres, but these draw political support from all parts of the 
shantytown and their leaders cannot be said to represent their own neighbourhood. 
These principles do not by themselves account for group formation at higher levels 
of shantytown organisation and they do not play a significant part in mobilisation 
for action group activity.
The resulting sense of flexibility and division is reflected in the action groups 
which are highly competitive, short-lasting affairs. This is partty because resources 
are scarce, short-termed and unreliable and individuals rise and fall in response 
to these initiatives. The same individuals monopolise these resources and act
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as patrons who gather around them a temporary clientele. A case study of two 
particular groups shows that there is a contradiction between the groups’ ideals 
(largely defined by the national political context) as formulated in the language 
of their activists, on the one hand, and their actual workings (a clear example of 
the old-style patronage politics, criticised in the national rhetoric) on the other 
hand. This contradiction is particularly apparent in the groups’ relationships with 
the political party structure and the drug traffickers. These are therefore denied 
in public, yet both are important elements in the shantytown’s power structure. 
The resulting picture is a complex one in which different organisational principles 
interrelate and play differing parts.
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Introduction
In this thesis I address the question of the political organisation of Rocinha, a shan­
tytown in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. I discuss how the residents of this shantytown 
organised themselves to improve their living conditions, the type of leadership 
that arose (the kind of links these leaders had with their following and how they 
recruited and maintained these). The ultimate challenge is to account for the kind 
of social groupings visible at community level. These are described in the second 
part of this thesis. This question ultimately touches on all areas of social life 
(e.g. people’s aspirations, their loyalties to different categories of people around 
them, the stability of their practical arrangements, their attitudes towards official 
structures), and I attem pt to answer this question in its full complexity, within 
the tradition of anthropological holism. It was my aim to immerse myself into all 
aspects of these people’s lives, by setting up a meaningful personal relationship 
with as many people as I could, by learning their “language” in its full sense and 
by living their lives as much as I could (Okely 1983).1 In line with this aim, I 
spent one year (from June 1985 to June 1986) living in Rocinha.
Few authors on the subject of the political organisation of the urban poor have 
approached their subject m atter in this way. A handful of case studies of shanty­
towns were written in the mid-1970s (e.g. Peattie 1968, Roberts 1973, Cornelius
1This is radically opposed to a quantitative method in which the researcher aims to 
distance him/herself from the subject in an attempt to gather “objective” data. As in 
both these approaches the researcher aims to “understand” the subject, the opposed 
direction of these methods appears as a curious paradox (Roberts 1976). In this respect,
I opt for participant observation as I side with Cesarain distinguishing “doing science” 
from “understanding” (Cesara 1982).
1
Introduction 2
1975, Lomnitz 1977, Lobo 1982). Since then, there has been a tendency for re­
searchers to move into higher-level theoretical concerns. A clear example of this is 
Roberts (1978). The Brazilian literature on shantytowns is similarly almost exclu­
sively concerned with the question of Urban Social Movements (e.g. Santos 1981). 
This can partly be explained by the reluctance of researchers to do conventional 
anthropological fieldwork (i.e. participant observation) in a shantytown. In Brazil 
particularly, this is reinforced by the general claim among people who do not live 
in shantytowns, that shantytowns are “dangerous” places, to be avoided at all 
times. In line with this, many expressed concern about my safety, some about 
my sanity. The portrayal of shantytowns in the popular press (the constant em­
phasis on extreme violence especially associated with the drug traffickers and the 
stereotypical associations of o marginal (the marginal)) supports and encourages 
this reluctance.2 All this confirms the fact that in Brazil, the poor and the rich 
live in separate worlds, a veritable cultural apartheid, with little communication 
between the two.
The resulting lack of detailed data about shantytown political processes shows 
up in the quality of the material produced in the literature. Authors draw con­
clusions about “popular politics” often based on formal interviews with leadership 
alone leading to claims which do not stand up against evidence from more local 
levels of activity. I deal with this question explicitly in my conclusion.
I recognise that the method I am advocating has its limitations. It is worth re­
calling Worsley’s observation that methodology chapters in sociological textbooks 
are invariably incomplete and idealistic (Worsley 1987). Advocated methods in­
evitably fall down both in view of the complexity of the subject m atter (i.e. human 
beings (Worsley 1987)), and the complexity of the research process itself (the role
2It is interesting to note that some journalists (and even academic authors) still find 
it necessary to stress the existence of orderly behaviour in shantytowns periodically to 
counteract the negative image of the marginal shantytown resident portrayed elsewhere. 
This, in view of the fact that marginality theory and the “culture of poverty” stereo­
types were widely criticised and condemned almost twenty years ago. (I am thinking 
particularly of a series of articles printed in Jornal do Brasil written in collaboration 
with some sociologists (JB 29/7/1990 to 3/8/1990).)
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of the researcher, as fieldworker and author, in the interpretive exercise in a spe­
cific historical (socially and politically) situation (Clifford & Marcus 1986, Geertz 
1988, Clifford 1988)). In comparison with most anthropologists, my problems were 
enlarged because of the size and the nature of the population I was addressing. 
Rocinha had an estimated population of 150,000 to 200,000.3 It was also extremely 
heterogeneous (in terms of people’s background and economic capacity), and this 
was clearly visible to anyone who merely visited the place. It was therefore not a 
well-defined “community” of which I could get to know a large proportion of its 
people well. I was dealing with a city-sized population of which all but a tiny part 
remained anonymous to me.
I did my fieldwork as follows. I contacted a social worker who introduced me 
to a group of residents by arranging for me to meet them in an action group 
meeting in Rocinha. At that meeting I expressed a wish to live in Rocinha and 
several of the groups’ members approached me with an interest in my cause and 
apparent willingness to help me. With their help, finding a suitable place to 
stay proved easy. There was a wide range of accommodation available to rent. 
I moved into a 3 by 2 m room on top of a three-story building, with the use of 
a separate (1 by 2 m) bathroom about a quarter of the way up the hill in the 
centre of Rocinha. Living there proved difficult, as I faced all the problems these 
residents usually faced: intense summer heat with little wind, continual plagues 
of insects of all kinds, chronic water shortage, an almost total lack of privacy and 
noise from neighbours all around me for a minimum of 20 hours a day, intolerable 
stench, and especially, fear of drug traffickers who did their business (literally) 
on my doorstep. Additionally, I suffered (in the first six months especially) from 
loneliness and anxiety about my role as a researcher, especially in the context of 
the extremely urgent needs of my surroundings. These problems were painful at 
the time, but were alleviated as I got more used to them, and (more importantly) 
as I had some neighbours on whom I could rely for some emotional support as we 
shared many of these problems.
3See Chapter 1 for the confusion about population figures.
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To give myself a role, I worked in various action groups (first daily in one 
daycare centre, then also in two others (run by very different organisations) on al­
ternate days), getting to know the work and work relations as I became personally 
involved in all aspects of these groups’ activities. Gradually I developed friend­
ships with some of my colleagues who introduced me to their homes, also in other 
parts of Rocinha. As I familiarised myself with these surroundings, I gradually 
expanded my horizons both socially and geographically by following up contacts 
outside this environment. At work in the action groups, I gradually spent more of 
my time with group members on trips to bureaucratic contacts outside Rocinha, to 
meetings of other groups and other political events, both in and outside Rocinha, 
and less time actually working in the groups, while maintaining regular contact. 
This allowed me to follow up other connections independently to gain access to 
other parts of Rocinha and zoom into certain events and conflicts from different 
angles. In this way, towards the end, I spent more time with officials (police, 
bureaucrats), various kinds of social workers and other shantytown activists.
To all but a tiny proportion of people in Rocinha, I went by unnoticed. Of those 
I did get to know, some (especially some of my neighbours) regarded me as a po­
tentially useful patron. To some of these, after discovering how little I had to offer, 
I then became a well-meaning gringa (Lit: foreigner, often used in a derogatory 
way) who either irritated them with continual questioning, amused them when 
blundering about, or threatened them as I was seen as spying for another group 
or some external concern. By outside social workers, I was occasionally (espe­
cially towards the end) approached to comment on seemingly insolvable problems 
of group dynamics, and I had to actively stop myself from taking a substantial 
role in the running of the groups (chairing meetings, organising events, sorting out 
problems as they arose) and them from delegating these tasks to me. It proved 
impossible (and undesirable) to take a passive “observer’s” role, even in a very 
minimal sense of the word, and it was difficult to know where to draw the line 
between responding to the needs of my “informants”, and on the other hand doing 
“what was good” for my job as a researcher.
Becoming personally involved with a selected number of people posed prob­
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lems of access to information, especially as the topics I examined were sensitive. 
The way this shantytown was divided meant that close contact with one group 
threatened members of another group. In this sense, my activities were restricted, 
although the size of the place, and my relative anonymity, worked to my advantage 
in this respect. As I was not restricted to a certain particular informant, I could 
weave my way into situations through more than one channel. Literary material 
(biographical accounts, community journals, newspapers) in this respect was also 
useful to me in overcoming this problem.
There was one additional problem peculiar to my fieldwork which continually 
plagued me. This was the almost total inaccessibility to inside data about the 
operation of drug traffickers and leaders’ politically sensitive personal contacts 
with authorities. These, for obvious reasons, were hidden from the public, yet 
they loomed large in my search for patterns. The traffickers were, for example, a 
major political force to be reckoned with in Rocinha and I conclude in my study 
(especially Chapter 8) that every other group had politically consequential con­
nections of the kind mentioned, which they hid from the “public sphere”. If an 
analysis is to attain its desired complexity, it will not do to simply ignore this fact, 
nor to simplify it by writing up just what was claimed in public. So, I question 
why I do not know of one study about shantytown politics that addresses the 
important influence of traffickers in its internal affairs. And, what happened to 
the widespread gossip about dirty dealing of electoral politics, in these studies? 
W hat of the obvious contradictions between rhetoric and practice in the so-called 
“left-wing” “grassroots” “movements”? Instead, I have made an attem pt to ac­
commodate this data seriously and in its entirity. W ith regards to the traffickers 
and other “irregular” dealings especially, I have overcome some problems by us­
ing supporting material from sources such as popular newspapers, gossip or by 
speculation based on knowledge of the structural position of the different parties 
involved. Believing fully in the motto (so well summed up by Barrington Moore) 
that those in power have a lot to hide, I have also been guided by my “sympathy 
with the victims of historical processes and scepticism about the victors’ claims”,
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and I have used these emotions, hints and intuition fully as part of my research 
equipment (Barrington Moore 1966:523).
In the end, the findings with which I came back were full of holes, particularly 
where it directly involved the traffickers or electoral politics. However, I had a 
wealth of detail from diverse experiences. From numerous detailed case studies 
I had gathered, I could later deduce “what must have been the case” to fill in 
some of the holes. It was this detail (or “deep play”, “thick description” (Geertz
1973)) which hinted at patterns which gradually emerged. My research situation 
in Rocinha was therefore much like the child sitting under the table in one room, 
trying to understand what went on in the house (Peattie 1968). Comparing the 
results of this kind of analysis with others, I conclude that this method was at least 
as valuable and certainly much more comprehensive than that of those who never 
entered the house at all, but talked to people as they came out (taking Peattie’s 
analogy a little bit further). I opted for working on the bits of which I was sure 
(and I have acknowledged in my writing where my data came from) and have 
brought enough detail into my description that the reader can ultimately judge 
the validity of my case from the internal coherence of the evidence.
Chapter 1
The Context
According to the 1980 census, Rio de Janeiro had a population of over five million. 
Estimates in 1985 were 5,615,149 (Encyclopaedia Britannica, Book of the Year 
1987). The Zona Sul (the South Zone) and Centro (Centre) of the city were 
inhabited by the better off and their main commercial and business activities 
took place there. These parts are world-famous for their beautiful beaches and 
many tourists all year round admire the spectacular views over the city from 
the top of one of many steep green mountains, like the Corcovado (on which 
the enormous statue of Christ is situated) or Pao de Agucar (the Sugar Loaf 
Mountain). These parts of the city contrast sharply with the suburbial North, 
North-West and Eastern zones, which have an industrial character and house the 
large low-income population in shantytowns and housing estates. Most of their 
inhabitants commute for several hours daily in overcrowded buses and trains to 
the Centro and Zona Sul to work.
The steep mountains of the Zona Sul and Centro, however, also house a large 
number of poorer people. Their shantytown homes are piled up densely against 
the green and rocky slopes on terrain which was in earlier years considered least 
suitable for the building of residential apartment blocks. Because these sites were 
so near the beaches, Rio’s best restaurants and other recreational sites, numerous 
boutiques and shops of all kinds and one of the largest national business centres, 
their value has become greatly inflated in this desperately overcrowded city. Most
7
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cariocas (Lit: inhabitants of Rio de Janeiro) refer to these with the term morro 
(Lit: hill) or the less specific term favela (best translated into shantytown).1
Rocinha was one such morro in the Zona Sul of Rio de Janeiro. It covered an 
area of between 450,000 and 550,000 square meters and was situated between the 
peaks of two neighbouring mountains: Morro Dois Irmaos (which separated Gavea 
and Alto-Leblon from Sao Conrado) and Morro do Laboriau (located further into 
Sao Conrado) (see Figure 1-1).2 Rocinha covered the steep North-West slope of 
Morro Dois Irmaos right down to its foot in Sao Conrado, and then crawled up 
the even steeper South-East slope of Morro do Laboriau into a large protected 
National Park, Floresta de Tijuca. At the bottom of the morro, a very busy dual 
carriage way, providing the link between Leblon/Jardim Botanico and Sao Con- 
rado/Barra de Tijuca and cutting through Morro Dois Irmaos in two long tunnels, 
marked the end of Rocinha. Rocinha was therefore most visible from Sao Conrado 
and interacted most with its residents. Sao Conrado spread out West along the 
dual carriage way, parallel to the beautiful beach, Praia Pepino. Sao Conrado was 
a largely residential bairro (Lit: district, neighbourhood), relatively recently built 
and consisted of a long stretch of some of the most luxurious high-rise apartment 
blocks of Rio de Janeiro. It was also the location of two of Rio’s five most ex­
pensive hotels (Hotel National and Hotel Intercontinental) situated no more than 
five minutes walking distance from the bottom of Rocinha. At the top of the 
morro, enormous boulders and a steep rock wall (Pedra Dois Irmaos) provided a 
natural boundary to Rocinha (see also the topographical map of Rocinha, Figure 
1-2). Part of Rocinha spread over the top of the slope connecting the two moun­
tains a little way down the other side into Gavea. Here, its residents were close 
neighbours with the very affluent mansions of Gavea’s richest residents and Rio’s
1Some of their residents objected to the use of this last term to describe their neigh­
bourhood since it had negative connotations (see Chapter 4). Since it is the most 
commonly used term, however, I will use it as a general reference term throughout this 
thesis.
2FEEMA (1980:16) gives 453,440 m2, while IPLANRIO (1982:4) 543,360 m2.
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Source/Year Population Residences Area in m 2
SMP 1979 97,945 19,589 453,440
SMD 1979 150,000 30,000
FL XIII 1979 200,000 23,000
Veja 1978 145,000
IBGE 1980 32,960 8,453
IPLANRIO 1981 543,360
Table 1—1: Population Estimates for Rocinha (IPLANRIO 1982:4)
Escola Americana (the American School) with its tennis courts, baseball pitches 
and outdoor swimming pools.
How many people resided in Rocinha at the time of fieldwork remained unclear. 
The numbers quoted in the most recent Cadastro das Favelas do Municipio do 
Rio de Janeiro 043/019 of IPLANRIO (1982) (a municipal organisation whose 
task it was to survey and compose databases for all favelas within the boundaries 
of the city of Rio de Janeiro) are set out in Table 1-1. These represented the 
most authoritative sources recorded before 1982, including the estimate taken from 
the most recent census carried out by IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e 
Estatistica) in 1980. IPLANRIO repeated IBGE’s conservative estimate of 32,960 
in their most recent document on population data of favelas in the city of Rio de 
Janeiro (IPLANRIO 1984), and lists Rocinha here as the largest favela in Rio de 
Janeiro.
To show Rocinha’s size relative to other morros of the same region of the city 
for comparison, I have listed the population figures for most of the other morros 
of the Zona Sul in Table 1-2. Since these figures were taken from the same source 
(IPLANRIO 1984), they can be taken to be roughly equally inaccurate as the fig­
ures quoted for Rocinha. From these figures it was clear how much larger Rocinha 
was than the other morros in the Zona Sul. More recent estimates were found in 
Light’s documentation (the company responsible for the installation of electricity 
networks in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro). Light claimed to have installed a to-
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REGIAO ADMINISTRATIVA FAVELA POPULATION
VI Lagoa Chacara do Ceu 655
Morro do Cantagalo 2,974
Rocinha 32,966
Vidigal 5,721
Vila Parque da Cidade 1,371
V Copacabana Babilonia 958
Cabritos 2,306
Chapeu Mangueira 1,089
Pavao-Pavaozinho 2,938
IV Botafogo Morro Santa Marta 5,356
Morro Azul 844
XXIV Barra da Tijuca Vila Canoa 780
T able 1—2: Population of Largest Favelas in Zona Sul per Regiao Administrativa 
(IPLANRIO 1984:14-20) (Most of these morros are shown on Figure 1—1.)
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tal of 9,634 connections in Rocinha over the years, which they considered to be 
roughly equal to the total number of residences.3 The Light director I interviewed, 
however, was not aware of the scale on which “irregularities” from the old days 
were still occurring.
Multiplying this number by 7 (which they took to be the average number 
of occupants per residence), they came to a total population number of around 
70,000 to 77,000 for Rocinha. CEDAE (Companhia Estadual de Aguas e Esgotos, 
responsible for the installation of water networks in Rocinha) used Light’s number 
of 9,634 estimated residences, but they multiplied this number by 5 to calculate 
its population, concluding that it lies around 50,000 (CEDAE 1985:26). Quotes I 
came across in the media during the time of my fieldwork ranged from 150,000 to 
300,000, averaging at about 210,000.
This large variation in population estimates is explained firstly by the differ­
ence in the sources and procedures used to obtain the data (aerial photography, 
different sampling techniques, estimates from data on electricity and water net­
work installations and from claims made by local groups). Disagreements in these 
calculations occurred about the average number of occupants per residence.4 Sec­
ondly, and more importantly, it is explained by the different purposes which the 
population numbers were to serve when quoted in combination with the interests 
of the investigating body by whom the quotation was given. The fact that the 
quotations from the president of one of Rocinha’s Residents Associations varied 
considerably according to the context in which he was quoting, illustrates what I 
mean. On one occasion he quoted 150,000 in my presence, warning me that it was
3Quoted in a more recent progress report of PROFACE (Programa de Favelas da 
CEDAE (CEDAE 1985:26)). PROFACE was created in 1983 to install water networks 
in some favelas.
4Whereas IBGE came to a conservative average of 3.9 people per residence for its data 
on Rocinha (IPLANRIO 1984:15), the number 4.37 was quoted by IPLANRIO as the 
average number of people per privately owned occupied residence in the favelas of Rio de 
Janeiro (IPLANRIO 1984:11). In contrast, the Secretaria Municipal do Planejamento 
(SMP) used an average of 5 people per residence, as did CEDAE (1985), while Fundagao 
Leao XIII used an even higher estimated average of 8.69 (IPLANRIO 1982:4). Light used 
an average of 7 occupants per residence (personal communication with Light director).
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in his interest in this particular situation to provide an underestimated number. 
On many occasions I heard a number as high as 300,000.
Reconsidering the numbers quoted by government and government-related 
agencies in this light, and considering the fact that they were considerably out 
of date given Rocinha’s rapid growth in recent years, I suggest that these offi­
cial numbers were highly underestimated and conclude that they can therefore 
not be considered as an accurate indicator of Rocinha’s population at the time of 
fieldwork. Judging from the quotations I came across from different sources with 
different purposes, I would settle for a number somewhere between 150,000 and 
200,000.
Rocinha grew to that size mainly because of a dramatic increase in the number 
of rural Brazilians migrating from relatively underdeveloped parts of Brazil to the 
more affluent cities. Rio de Janeiro was one of the fastest growing cities in the 
country. In the period between 1950 and 1960, for example, its population grew 
with an annual rate of 10.3% (Valladares 1978a). According to Parisse (1969), 7% 
of this growth occurred in the favela population. The large majority of Rocinha’s 
residents had originally come from the Northeast (and particularly from Ceara 
and Parafba) but there were also a large number of people from Minas Gerais.
The growth of Rocinha was also caused by the drastic favela removal politics 
which the government implemented especially in the late 1960s. (I elaborate on 
these policies in Chapters 5 and 6.) Between the years 1962 and 1965, the res­
idences of almost 42,000 people were demolished, and after a period of relative 
inactivity (from 1965-1968), proposals were drawn up to eliminate all of the re­
maining favelas from the city centre by 1976 in a giant anti-favela movement which 
involved the “resettlement” of a proposed annual average of 92,000 favelados (in­
habitants of favelas). According to COHAB’s records, they actually succeeded in 
removing 97,260 people from 53 different favelas in the city centre by March 1974 
(Valladares 1978a).
Large low-income housing blocks were built in far away suburbs in which the 
favelados whose houses had been destroyed were meant to be resettled. However, 
most of these housing projects proved inadequate for their prospective inhabitants’
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needs.5 The ultimate effect was that the remaining favelas in the city centre (of 
which Rocinha was one) grew enormously, and many new favelas cropped up in 
other previously unoccupied parts of the city.6
Rocinha’s recorded history goes back to the 1920s. At that time, its population 
was small and its wooden shacks were spread widely over the side of the morro, 
giving it a distinctly rural character. The name “Rocinha” (Lit: little roga, roga 
being the Brazilian word for “small garden”, “cleared land”) was said to stem from 
the fact that many of its people at the time made a living by growing fruits and 
vegetables, breeding hens, goats, sheep and even cattle, and selling these products 
in markets in the city (Varal 1983). The land had little commercial value since the 
city limits were still a long way away and its main development was in a different 
direction. In the late 1920s, a company which owned the land made an attempt 
to divide part of it into plots and sell them to some of their occupants. These 
were people of low income (small traders and manual workers with jobs in small 
nearby factories). By the end of the next decade, 80 plots had been sold. However, 
these sales were not officially recognised by the city administration since there was 
no urban infrastructure in the area. The only way of access to the area at the 
time was by an unpaved road, Estrada da Gavea. The company had no means to 
legalise the situation and when it went bankrupt, and later the owner died, the 
inheritors lost interest in the land.
When, in 1938, the government decided to asphalt and illuminate Estrada 
da Gavea (it became part of the public road network), the area rapidly grew
5The most serious complaints were that mortgages were well above what its clientele 
could afford to pay, the estates were situated far outside the city centre so that the 
residents had to commute to their work in a transport network which was inadequate 
as well as very expensive for their small incomes. Basic infrastructure (such as schools, 
medical facilities, daycare centres, shops, but also sewage drainage, a regular water and 
electricity supply) was non-existent or else inadequate. The list of serious complaints is 
long and well documented (e.g. Valladares 1978a, Perlman 1976).
6During the years of the government’s most intensive removal programmes (1970 to
1974), the number of favelas in Rio de Janeiro grew from 162 to 283, while Rio de 
Janeiro’s favela population grew by just over 200,000 people. (Data from IBGE and 
FLXIII quoted in Valladares 1978a:43.)
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1950-60 1960-74 1974-80 1950-80
% of Population Growth 228 128 190 2,070
% of Residences Growth 883 149 160 6,248
Table 1—3: Rocinha’s Population Growth between 1950-80 (FEEMA 1980:20)
denser. From the figures listed in Table 1-3, it can be seen how rapidly Rocinha’s 
population grew between the years 1950 and 1980 (Table 1-3).
A big change occurred in 1964, when a company divided part of the area (now 
known as Bairro Barcelos, situated along the then still non-existent dual carriage 
way at the bottom of the morro) into plots of about 80 square meters and imposed 
a grid of streets onto it. The plots were sold to individuals, largely poor people 
who were residing on them at the time. The development of this area was further 
stimulated by the construction of a tunnel in 1968 through Morro Dois Irmaos 
to make room for a dual carriage way to link Gavea/Leblon with Sao Conrado. 
The immediate consequence of this was the removal of the population settled on 
this part of the morro (known as Pombal at the tim e).7 W ith the construction of 
the tunnel, Rio de Janeiro’s development took off in the direction of Sao Conrado 
(and beyond it towards Barra de Tijuca). In 1969, the construction of a luxurious 
hotel (Hotel Nacional) was a significant mark in its growth in this direction which 
affected Rocinha. With these developments, the market for jobs (especially in 
the service and construction industry) grew increasingly and Rocinha especially 
benefited from this owing to its privileged location. This was also the reason why 
many households forced to move from other favelas in the Zona Sul settled in 
Rocinha and it accounted for the rate at which it was still growing at the time 
of fieldwork. At this time, its main commercial centre, until then located along
7Many were resettled on the few larger open spaces left further uphill, which were 
used as public leisure ground (e.g. Rocinha’s only football pitch was filled in in this 
way).
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Estrada da Gavea, now gradually shifted towards the area closer to the new dual 
carriage way.
Most documentation on Rocinha8 and indeed the residents themselves, talks 
of Rocinha as consisting of different bairros (see Figure 1-3). These bairros were 
named after the original road network which connected different parts of Rocinha. 
They were further subdivided into smaller areas (e.g. Noventanove and Teirreirao 
were areas in Rua Um). Their names referred to some physical landmark in or 
near the area, or some historical event that had taken place in the area (e.g. Faz 
Depressa (Lit: Do Quickly) referred to a period in which new residents built their 
huts quickly overnight to avoid the inspection of supervising authorities. Roupa 
Suja (Lit: Dirty Clothes) referred to the continual lack of water in this area.) They 
differed, among other things, in density, construction patterns and availability of 
public services.
But, although heterogeneity was the first characteristic that strikes the visitor 
to Rocinha, there were also several general characteristics that applied to Rocinha 
as a whole. As its population settled more or less randomly, controls on settlement 
imposed by authorities proved largely ineffective (e.g. supervising bodies were 
bribed and settlements were constructed over night out of sight of the supervising 
bodies (see Chapters 5 and 6)). As a result, the area rapidly transformed into 
an enormous mass of houses, constructed chaotically around each other. The 
original road network which gave access from Estrada da Gavea (Rua Um (Lit: 
Street One), Dois (Two), Tres (Three) and Quatro (Four)) were transformed out 
of all recognition from main ruas (streets) into small becos (alleyways) varying on 
average from 1 to 2 meters in width, becoming part of an enormous labyrinth. 
In most places one was obliged to walk in single file and squeeze to let oncomers 
go by. Only those that were thoroughly familiar with a certain area could avoid
8 A list of documentation about Rocinha is listed separately in the Bibliography.
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getting stuck in dead-end becos and circling around trying to find a way out. Most 
ruas were transformed in this way.9
There was therefore no vehicular access to most of Rocinha. As firebrigades 
were also barred from entering, this obviously posed a severe security threat. Dur­
ing fieldwork, a large number of houses burned down on several occasions as people 
watched helplessly, and, at the time many talked about a similar incident a few 
years before. This also created obstacles to proposals for large infrastructural im­
provements, as it prevented the entry of building equipment and, besides, there 
was no room to build any structures without the removal of a large number of ex­
isting houses.10 The lack of vehicular access also meant that people were restricted 
to walking, except for along one direction; along the side of Rocinha, Estrada da 
Gavea. Since 1965, an extremely overcrowded bus ran along Estrada da Gavea (a 
badly paved road with many sharp S-curves, starting at the bottom of the hill in 
Sao Conrado, climbing steeply along the North-West side of Rocinha, over the top 
of the hill down into Gavea on the other side) to the city centre.
The most serious problem resulting from the lack of vehicular access into 
Rocinha was the presence of household waste. A small number of waste con­
tainers (lixeiros) were only recently provided along main roads in Bairro Barcelos 
and along Estrada da Gavea. These were emptied infrequently and served for 
the whole population of Rocinha. In practice, they were located too far for most 
residents (some areas were as much as 15 minutes walk from a main road of ac­
cess). As a result, waste was dumped on unoccupied terrain (under and between 
the houses) piling up over time. Rocinha’s population was therefore continually
9The upper half of Rua Dois and Bairro Barcelos, at the bottom of the hill, which 
still offered vehicular access into a part of Rocinha, were an exception to this.
10For example, when the government built a sewage canal through Campo do Es- 
peranga in 1981, the residences of 76 families, most of whom were small traders, had to 
be removed. After a long protest campaign (these families were not easily going to give 
up their houses and livelihoods), they managed to persuade the government to rehouse 
these people in Rocinha, in the forest at the highest point of Estrada da Gavea, later 
known as Laboriau. Seventy six units were built (and rebuilt after some of them fell 
down in landslides) and finally inaugurated in 1982.
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plagued by the strong stench of household waste rotting in the hot sun, blocking 
drains (causing serious flooding and the consequent mud slides in some parts of 
Rocinha in which houses fell over like stacks of cards in times of heavy rains), 
attracting vermin (enormous rats and infestations of insects of all kinds). In re­
cent years, the waste removal company (COMLURB) employed a small team of 
local workers to remove rubbish from public spaces around the lixeiros (where the 
waste was especially a problem to the local residents). However, their workload 
far exceeded their capacity and the equipment they had available to do their job 
was inadequate. Another small attem pt to alleviate this waste problem was made 
a few years ago, when the government built an “elevador do Hxo” (Lit: eleva­
tor for waste) a conveyor-belt-like system to transport waste in buckets from the 
highest part of Roupa Suja (one particularly high and problematic bairro) down 
to be emptied into the waste containers at the bottom of the morro. In the past, 
residents aware of the hygiene and other hazards of the abundance of this uncol­
lected waste, had made attempts to organise clean up campaigns in some areas. 
However, it was soon recognised that a problem of this size and nature could not 
be handled in this way; the problem is insolvable without the regular access of 
vehicles to empty lixeiros regularly in all parts of Rocinha.
Claims by development reports and community workers that inadequate fa­
cilities for rubbish disposal account for the extremely high infant mortality rates 
in shantytowns, were visibly substantiated. Infants crawled along filthy alleyways 
and local rubbish dumps were practically the only open spaces for slightly older 
children to play. There were always some individuals (frequently small children) 
sifting through waste left in public spaces and at lixeiros in search for usable scraps 
and/or edible remains.
Vehicular access was also the key to the solution for many other problems. 
This was particularly clear when looking at Bairro Barcelos, at the bottom  of the 
hill, which contrasted sharply with the rest of Rocinha. Vehicular access to this 
bairro existed at several points. In almost all respects it was much better serviced
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in terms of infrastructure than other areas.11 The grid of streets (laid out by the 
above-mentioned company in 1964) had been roughly preserved and, at the time of 
fieldwork some of these streets were still wide enough for access with small cars in 
one direction and there were even two badly paved main streets, which provided 
direct access from Estrada da Gavea and the dual carriage way. In single file, 
even small trucks could pass along these main streets. This had facilitated the 
construction of higher buildings, the installation of water and electricity networks, 
the digging of drains and other infrastructure. Partly for this reason too, Bairro 
Barcelos had become Rocinha’s centre of commercial activities: there was a large 
variety of shops (bakeries, small supermarkets, shops selling clothes, furniture 
and construction materials, butchers, barbers, a newsagent, several garages and 
numerous biroscas (Lit: bars, cafes)). Every Sunday morning, market stalls selling 
fresh fruit and vegetables, meat, fish, clothes and religious articles filled up the 
narrow muddy main street.
As a result, in recent years Bairro Barcelos had grown vertically in a dramatic 
way. Increasing demand for accommodation encouraged many residents to expand 
their houses to rent out parts of it, and some individuals took the opportunity to 
develop this into a large-scale profitable business (JB 24/11/1985). The highest 
apartment block in Bairro Barcelos reached 7 floors at the time of fieldwork, while 
their average height was around 2-3 floors in this part of Rocinha. According to the 
secretary of AM ABB (the Residents Association of Bairro Barcelos), an estimated 
85 to 90% of the population of Bairro Barcelos lived in rented accommodation and 
its population was thus highly mobile. The area was said to accommodate about 
10 to 15% of Rocinha’s population.
This had also allowed Bairro Barcelos to negotiate the regularisation of its land 
titles (AMABB was looking into this problem at the time of fieldwork). In recent
11 The differences between the different bairros could also partly be explained by their 
topographical characteristics. While some of Rocinha’s terrain was very steep (eleva­
tion levels varied from 10 to 235 m), it also had some level areas, which facilitated 
the construction of infrastructural facilities. Without vehicular access, however, these 
possibilities were much more restricted (see Figure 1-2).
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years, pressure groups had pressed for the need to grant favelados an official title to 
their land, since the sales contracted in 1964 were not officially recognised. Many 
legal obstacles had to be resolved before such process could begin. For example, 
local and national laws about the minimum width of the streets, certain building 
requirements, minimum size of plots in Rocinha, requirements of infrastructural 
facilities (including water and electricity, drainage of sewage, public illumination, 
vehicular access, and public services such as a school per certain number of people, 
public telephones and medical facilities) had to be wholly or partly revised. The 
regulations which dictated tax contributions, also presented a major problem for 
Rocinha in this respect, as it was located in an affluent residential area where rates 
were well above what favelados could afford. Although still a long way from being 
“regularised”, Bairro Barcelos was less problematic to authorities in these respects 
than the rest of Rocinha, which in turn encouraged them to press ahead with their 
demands.12 So, for example, an electricity network covered the whole of Bairro 
Barcelos, and Light had also installed public illumination in this area, unlike in 
the rest of Rocinha, where the residents themselves were responsible for installing 
lights to illuminate their public spaces.13 Most of the public telephones were also 
installed here (there were three in Bairro Barcelos). The others were found along 
Estrada da Gavea and one along Rua Dois. Most of the time, however, none of 
them were in working order.14 As the first bairro of Rocinha, Bairro Barcelos also 
received a piped water system to each house. Its residents supplied CEDAE with
12 According to the president of AMABB, the owners of about 30% of the property in 
Bairro Barcelos had already started paying imposto predial (Lit: tax on buildings) and 
imposto territorial (land tax i.e. equivalent to the British rates system), while AMABB 
was negotiating arrangements for amnesty for those that had not started to contribute 
in time and would have to pay large amounts.
13The cost of this, however, was added onto the residents’ electricity bills which was 
not the case for the residents of other bairros of Rio de Janeiro.
14I have noted the importance of a telephone for Rocinha’s residents as a way of 
contacting officials outside the favela (e.g. about job applications, information about 
funding and meetings), especially in the face of its isolation from Rio’s administrative 
and commercial centre and the expense of local transport for a low-income population 
(see Chapter 4).
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all the material needed for the extension of the existing network from Sao Conrado 
in 1977.15
Rocinha’s second major problem was water provision for the rest of the shan­
tytown. Until 1981, people in the largest part of Rocinha relied on various natural 
springs and wells dug at several points by the residents themselves, supplying them 
with water which people knew to be contaminated. At the bottom of the hill, some 
individuals clandestinely extended the network from Bairro Barcelos after 1977. 
Those individuals were known to charge extortionate prices (and cut off those that 
refused or could not afford to pay), and were widely condemned at the time (see 
Chapters 5 and 6). After much pressure group activity, the government finally 
installed a temporary network which consisted of a few public water points (bicas 
publicas) in 1982, located along Estrada da Gavea and Rua Um and Dois. Later 
that year, they succeeded in the approval of a project which would extend this 
provisional network to cover interior parts of the morro including Rua Tres and 
Quatro. Residents themselves, in voluntary workgroups, then worked to extend 
this network of bicas publicas to supply water directly into people’s houses in these 
areas, as well as extend it to areas so far not covered further into the morro.
In this same way, at the initiative of one resident, another independent network 
was installed in Rua Quatro and Cidade Nova (both very densely populated areas) 
to solve the desperate shortages in these areas. A large reservoir was built and 
daily filled up by CEDAE water trucks from outside. This system was privately 
owned and operated, and again high rates were charged to the users of this highly 
unreliable service. During the time of my fieldwork, CEDAE was working on a 
project to solve some of these problems by extending the existing network to cover 
the houses of about 35,000 people (with about 7,000 connections). Again, this was
15According to CEDAE (in a progress report of PROFACE (CEDAE 1985)), a total 
of around 2,000 water connections were installed in Bairro Barcelos then, serving a 
population of around 20,000 people. If these figures were correct, the population of 
Rocinha would fall between 150,000 and 200,000, taking Bairro Barcelos to accommodate 
around 10 to 15% of Rocinha’s population.
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a contract between CEDAE and the residents of the area themselves who had to 
pay a negotiated sum of money over the period of one year in monthly installments.
Many problems seriously disrupted the working of these improvised uncoordi­
nated water networks. There were cases of water donos (Lit: owners; exploiters 
selling water to third parties) and the absence of a supervising body to maintain 
these precarious systems which led to much water going to waste. In some cases 
the leaks caused serious long-term flooding of areas downhill.
By the end of my fieldwork, there were still some areas of Rocinha outside the 
reach of these partial “solutions”. The residents of the highest parts of Cachopa 
and Rua Dioneia, for example, were still relying mainly on public water bicas and 
natural springs in the area. The precariousness of these networks also meant a 
continual shortage of water in most areas throughout Rocinha. Even in the areas 
which were supposed to be “regularised” as far as CEDAE was concerned (such 
as the area in which I lived), the number of users far outweighed the capacity of 
the system, resulting in long times of the day in which there was no water at all. 
There were weeks during which we had to get up during the night (2-5 a.m.) to 
take a shower or collect water for cooking and washing. These experiences taught 
me that the importance of an adequate water supply in this context (of extreme 
heat and population density) cannot be overestimated. These problems were also 
common for Bairro Barcelos’ residents whose water supply was erratic since the 
system was not built to support so many users, and especially not to accommodate 
the irregular extensions. It was a great deal better supplied than many other areas 
of Rocinha, though.
The bairros of Rocinha can thus be described with reference to their location in 
relation to the main roads of access which largely determined the extent to which 
they were serviced. The bairros just above Bairro Barcelos (known as Cidade Nova 
and Rua Quatro) were, after Bairro Barcelos, the most densely populated areas of 
Rocinha. This was obviously due to their privileged location; next to Estrada da 
Gavea, and at the same time close to the bottom of Rocinha which gave them easy 
access to the services of Sao Conrado (the supermarket, the bus stops, the beach). 
Except for a few large trees, greenery had largely disappeared in this area, making
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room for the construction of houses and narrow, concreted steep pathways. These 
bairros were characterised by a mixture of different types of housing, largely brick, 
but still some remaining wooden constructions. Most buildings were several floors 
high and here also a large (unknown) percentage of the population lived in rented 
accommodation. Serious flooding in the area had been mostly resolved by the 
digging of drains, largely done by voluntary work groups in the mid-1970s.
In the same way, the poorest areas of Rocinha (Roupa Suja and Macega) were 
situated furthest away from access by Estrada da Gavea, on very steep terrain 
above the mouth of the tunnel. Roupa Suja could only be reached through long, 
steep and slippery narrow paths. Only recently has the construction of steep 
narrow concrete steps facilitated direct access to these areas. The areas still had 
a large number of wooden houses, whose height in the highest parts of the area, 
did not exceed one floor. The lower parts of the area were densely populated, 
with becos narrower than in most parts of Rocinha. Most were still unpaved and 
hence bumpy and slippery (from free-flowing waste water). Its water supply was 
irregular and did not cover the whole area and many people were still relying on 
water from bicas publicas (those installed by CEDAE in 1982) or natural springs 
and contaminated wells dug by the residents themselves.
The bairros situated nearest to the rock top of Morro Dois Irmaos (Capado and 
the higher parts of Rua Um) were furthest away in terms of access from the main 
roads. Some of these areas were some 20 minutes walk from Estrada da Gavea or 
Bairro Barcelos. Consequently, they still retained their relatively rural character. 
Many larger wooden constructions, some of them with small gardens, still existed 
in these areas, and some rearing of animals (chickens, a goat) was even visible. 
Some of the residents of the higher parts of Rua Um looked out over the top of 
the morro East over Rio de Janeiro, a spectacular view across the beaches. At 
this altitude a fresh wind blew, unlike the other parts of Rocinha further downhill 
where the lack of ventilation led to humidity (the cause of serious respiratory 
problems for many people), the presence of a constant suffocating bad smell, and 
intense heat exacerbated through the absorption of the concrete structures and 
the lack of trees which provided natural shade from the hot sun. Due to their
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location, waste disposal in these areas was a major problem. At several places 
large dumps were growing on unoccupied terrain, too steep for other purposes. 
These greener areas also attracted many mosquitos which were a serious health 
hazard to the residents. These areas, extremely steep in places, were also most 
vulnerable to dangerous mudslides. Water here was gathered mainly from natural 
sources and public taps lower down the hill. As one approached Estrada da Gavea 
from here, the area (known as Rua Um) became more densely populated and 
the constructions were higher and largely brick. Vertical expansion was more 
frequently seen and the area closest to the main road was another secondary 
commercial centre of Rocinha. Shops of all kinds lined its most frequented becos 
on both sides.
As a general rule, therefore, the further away from access roads, the less dense 
the population, the lower the buildings, the more variety in their construction 
materials, and the less greenery. Also, as a rule, these areas had the poorer 
population and were the least well serviced. These rules applied also to the centre 
of Rocinha.16
The areas along the North-West side of Estrada da Gavea, built into the Flo- 
resta da Tijuca (Cachopa, Vila Uniao, Almir and Dioneia), had been steadily 
growing vertically in recent years, even though their terrain rose steeply. The 
buildings were largely brick and the areas were fairly densely populated. Again 
this could be partly explained by the fact that they were partly accessible by small 
vehicles by steep badly paved roads branching off Estrada da Gavea. Their highest 
parts were not covered by the existing water networks. The residents relied on
16Rua Dois, for example, had a main road of access from Estrada da Gavea, which 
allowed small vehicles in for a small distance. That part of Rua Dois was therefore 
more densely populated and constructions were generally higher. Some small traders 
serving the local population operated in the area. In the lower, poorer parts of Rua 
Dois (Campo do Esperanga), there was a high diversity of buildings. Some parts of the 
area were much like Roupa Suja, in that becos were narrow and difficult to walk, largely 
unpaved, and lined with large quantities of waste. Campo do Esperanga was largely flat 
and situated near the bottom of the morro. However, its topography and location within 
Rocinha meant that it seriously flooded each year at times of rain. The building of a 
large sewage canal in 1981 (mentioned above) solved this problem only in some parts of 
the area.
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natural springs and/or bicas publicas located further downhill along Estrada da 
Gavea. There was confusion about rights to settlement in this part of Rocinha, 
which caused violent conflicts in the past (see Chapters 5 and 6) and was still a 
long way from being resolved.
This rough sketch of Rocinha’s physical context gives us some important pro­
visional clues about its political organisation. One major point to note is its 
marginality. Its location (it stood so visibly apart from its affluent neighbours) 
and size partly accounts for its isolation from official structures in Rio de Janeiro. 
It was an anomaly in almost all respects. Its almost total lack of infrastructure 
violated all local specifications and most of its inhabitants did not have access to 
state education, health provision and other services, including policing and other 
state institutions to keep “order” . To fill these gaps, some of Rocinha’s people 
mobilised themselves periodically to protest against these desperate deficiencies in 
basic services. Officially, the burden of this was supposed to fall on the Residents 
Association (it was formed at the initiative of the government in the early 1960s 
(see Chapters 5 and 6)), which were held accountable by the authorities for the 
favelas’ political organisation and other matters of internal order. One would as­
sume that this common marginality to the establishment, would provide the basis 
for a certain political unity of this population.
However, we have also seen from this sketch (and this is the second major 
point to note), the appearance of heterogeneity within Rocinha, and the resulting 
different priorities of political demands. The population of different bairros was 
faced with very different problems according to the topographical characteristics 
and spatial arrangements of the terrain on which it was located (e.g. possibility 
for vehicular access and distance from main access roads) and each had developed 
within these limits. Thus, while Bairro Barcelos’ population’s main preoccupation 
was now with land titles, rent controls and the safety of high building structures, 
people in Macega were struggling with chronic water shortages, mosquito control 
and mudslides. These different pressures predictably encouraged political divisions 
within this population which, as will be clear below, were enforced by the structure 
of external resources which they confronted.
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A third point that comes out of this superficial description, is Rocinha’s eco­
nomic heterogeneity expressed in the diversity of the building structures visible in 
Rocinha, among other things. People’s economic well-being is a point which needs 
closer examination since, for obvious reasons, it is of crucial importance to their 
political potential.
In general terms, Rocinha’s location was privileged economically, in that it 
was very close to an area of Rio de Janeiro where the demand for jobs of all 
kinds was high. Rocinha could be seen as an infinite supply of cheap labour, 
readily available to the neighbouring residential and commercial areas. In this 
respect, Rocinha’s population represented the elite of Rio’s “urban poor” . Detailed 
information on the occupational structure and standard of living of Rocinha’s 
population at the time of fieldwork was not available to me. The only survey I 
came across that included economic data was a questionnaire distributed in 1980 
by a group working for FEEMA (FEEMA 1980).17 Its results confirmed many 
claims generally held about Rocinha. For example, that its working population 
was mainly employed in the tertiary sector (service industry and commerce). In the 
questionnaire, the occupations most frequently mentioned included: salesperson, 
construction worker, porter/nightwatchman, hairdresser, a job in transport (like 
taxidriver, bus driver, mechanic), in private residence (like nanny, gardener, driver, 
cleaner, cook), in the catering industry and hotels, in a shop, in an office (like 
cleaner, servant) or as a biscateiro (a general term to describe someone who is self- 
employed doing a large range of odd jobs (e.g. ranging from sweets salesperson to 
self-employed decorator)). This term could therefore include many of the above 
mentioned occupations and the phrasing of the questionnaire was confusing at this 
point.
17The questionnaire was drawn up for a project which aimed towards the elimination 
of the large rat population in a particular area of Rocinha. It only covered 91 houses 
situated in specific becos in Rua Dois, Tres and Quatro, Campo do Esperan^a and Bairro 
Barcelos, the areas in which the project was intended to be implemented. No families 
from the higher situated and generally poorer areas of Rocinha were therefore included 
in the questionnaire.
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Those with a guaranteed salary in the tertiary sector were entitled to at least 
one salario minimo (Lit: minimum salary). The salario minimo was first deter­
mined in Brazil by president Vargas in 1940 and was defined to be “ . . .  a minimum 
pay owed to every full-time adult worker, to satisfy his/her normal needs of food, 
housing, clothing, hygiene, and transport.” (Saboia 1985:19).18 The item food 
was calculated on the basis of a determined list of products from different nutri­
tional groups, forming essential elements in the diet of one adult for one month. 
In the calculations of the salario minimo 50 to 60% of the total monthly pay was 
reserved for this item (Saboia 1985:27).
The low salaries of Rocinha’s main income providers, meant that the largest 
part of their income was normally spent on essential domestic items. After bus 
fares to and from work and some pocket money had been deducted, there remained 
little to spend on household materials.19 In households with monthly incomes, 
monthly supplies of staple foods and a few essential cleaning materials were often 
bought when the salary came in and it was then the mother’s responsibility to 
make sure that supplies lasted until the end of the month.20 Highly valued staple 
foods such as rice, beans (comida forte (Woortmann 1986)), cooking oil, sugar and 
salt21 were purchased first. Part of the rest was kept aside to buy essentials like 
milk, bread, margarine, a few cloves of garlic, or an onion to season the rice and 
beans, a few eggs or some common fruits (like oranges and bananas). Extras, like
18Note that the needs of his/her family were not mentioned and not included in the 
calculation of its total value.
19Note Chant’s comments on the inegalitarian distribution of income within the house­
hold due to the male’s control over his earnings (Chant 1985a). There was ample evi­
dence that this also happened in Rocinha and also that female income providers were 
guilty of appropriating a disproportionate share of the household’s total income (see also 
Chapter 2).
20For diaristas dependent on irregular daily incomes, budgeting became even more 
difficult. Moreover, diaristas lost also out because they were forced to buy staple foods 
in smaller quantities and therefore at higher prices.
21 Coffee prices had risen so sharply that coffee was con sid ered  a, luxury item. For 
most it was replaced with mate (a green tea) taken with large amounts of sugar.
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potatoes, aipim (mandioca), or other vegetables were only considered when the 
budget allowed more generous spending, or for the special Sunday lunch, when 
even a bit of chicken, second-rate beef or a sausage could be included.
Any remaining income had to cover the gas supply (for cooking), the electricity 
bill or other household items essential for the running of the house (e.g. matches, 
lightbulb, other repairs and replacements). More personal items (e.g. clothing) 
for dependents of the household, including the sick, elderly, small children or 
temporary dependents from other households were generally included as a lower 
priority, and those considered capable of earning their own wages were expected to 
cover those costs themselves. I examine the distribution of income from different 
earners below.
The acquisition of highly valued domestic electrical appliances (refrigerator, 
TV, iron, liquidiser, stereo equipment, in that order) required careful planning 
over a long time. They could be bought on credit at extremely high interest rates. 
They were proudly exhibited in the livingroom, where guests were received and 
neighbours could look in. Often, the household head saved money for these items 
by secretly putting some aside from the monthly budget (into a savings account, 
or simply hidden in the house) or even by taking on extra temporary work. The 
little money saved this way also had to cover emergencies which were a regular 
occurrence in the average household’s life. The threat of running short before 
the end of the month was very real, considering the tightness of the budget for 
most households. Supplementary expenses easily left holes in the carefully planned 
budget and often resulted in the foregoing of food which made up by far the largest 
part of the budget for many. In this light, the idea of going hungry towards the 
end of the month as a reality for iiiany, becomes easily understandable.
Over the years, the real value of the salario minimo fluctuated according to the 
policies of successive governments and the bargaining power of the trade unions. 
The purchase value of the current salario minimo was considerably smaller than it 
was at the time of its installation (Saboia 1985). During the time of fieldwork, the 
salario minimo in Rio de Janeiro was readjusted every six months (in May and 
November) roughly in line with the inflation rate. In March 1986, however, the
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Sarney government overnight implemented O Plano Cruzado, declaring the annual 
inflation rate to be zero on March, 1 1986, and replacing the national currency (the 
Cruzeiro) by the new Cruzado (worth 1,000 Cruzeiros). All prices were frozen. 
The salario minimo was fixed at $Cz 800 (the average rate it would have gone 
to three months before, if it had been kept in line with inflation) while prices 
were frozen at their current rate (Folha de Sao Paulo 1/3/1986). Additionally, 
as a result of the freezing of the prices, many products (e.g. milk and meat) 
rapidly disappeared from the market, creating urgent shortages and a growing 
black market to substitute the missing products at much inflated prices.
The argument that the minimum salary was merely a standard, but, in practice, 
people earned multiples of the minimum salary, was true for some I knew, but 
was certainly not the rule. Many of my friends were biscateiros, whose income 
was extremely irregular and hard to define in terms of minimum salaries. Other 
informants, such as the coordinators of the action groups, raised their salaries to 
the equivalent of one minimum salary per month during the time that I was there. 
Their economic well-being, however, varied considerably, since some were the only 
income provider in their household (some with many dependents), while others 
had earning partners. Even in the last case, however, they were visibly struggling 
to make ends meet. It becomes obvious that the number of income earners in each 
household was therefore a crucial determinant of its well-being.
The survey mentioned above supplied figures on the number of income providers 
in the households it interviewed. It found just over two people per residence to be 
working.22 These figures are problematic, in that they do not mention the fact that 
there may be members of the household contributing to the total budget irregu­
larly (e.g. small children who make a little money by doing odd jobs like watching 
cars, washing the windscreens, polishing shoes, selling sweets at the doors of cin­
emas, theatres, traffic lights or on city buses, sorting and selling waste (paper, 
iron, wood or food) or simply begging). Such occupations could be described by
22Out of total 435 residents (living in 91 houses or 4.8 per house) interviewed, 189 
people were found to be working (FEEMA 1980:99-100).
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the term “biscateiro” by some respondents, and included in the total number of 
“workers” of the household in the above figure, while not by others. This data 
alone also tells us little about the size of the households’ total income. More spe­
cific information is needed on the type of work people engaged in, especially seeing 
how variable this was within, this economic sector.
As far as the number of income earners per household went, the main income 
provider of the household was usually considered to be the male head of the house­
hold if present. His female partner and others in the household worked outside the 
house ideally only at times when his income could not cover expenses, which was 
the case in many households, and the income they contributed (even if significant 
in proportion to total household earnings) was considered to be mere ajuda (Lit: 
help) (also confirmed by other authors such as Woortmann (1986)). (See also 
Chapter 2 on the division of labour within households.) The number of earners 
in the household was obviously also affected by the availability of work, and the 
economic recession resulted in the general public claim that work was not easily 
available at the time of fieldwork (less easily than, for example, in 1980, when 
the survey was done). Looking for work was expensive and time-consuming and a 
frequent topic of conversation. According to my neighbour, a respected spiritual 
consultant in the area, a large number of his clients came to him in search for 
spiritual help for this difficult task of finding regular employment. The claim that 
people’s standard of living had been falling sharply over recent years as a result 
of the scarcity of decent jobs, or work at all, was frequently expressed.
Additionally, there was another important complicating factor affecting the 
economic well-being of Rocinha’s people. This was the number of dependents, 
which varied considerably from time to time within each household. This was 
partly because the Brazilian state’s support for the disabled, elderly, orphans, 
unemployed or others unable to provide for themselves reached very few individuals 
in the lower economic sectors, and these were usually provided for within a local 
structure (family or neighbourhood). Support for the unemployed, for example, 
was still non-existent, though in discussion at the time of fieldwork. However,
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even under the proposed scheme only very few of the total number of people out 
of work in Rocinha would qualify for this benefit.
Additionally, many of Rocinha’s main income providers were diaristas, i.e. they 
worked for daily wages with no long-term contract or job guarantees of any kind. 
Their wages were low and irregular and they often worked longer hours than those 
on a more regular monthly income. Since each day off was at the cost of a total 
loss of income for that day, these were minimised (this included the weekends). 
In times of special need there were often no reserves to draw on, since working 
hours and other resources had already been maximised to get by during normal 
times. At such times, they became temporarily dependent on other households. 
These times (such as sickness, causing possible loss of income as well as medical 
expenses, or temporary unemployment, causing loss of income as well as extra 
bus fares and other resources looking and applying for jobs) were common for 
households in Rocinha. Health problems, for example, were very common and 
were not surprising considering the lack of sanitation, the demanding workload to 
which the workers were submitted daily and their often limited diet (Bohadana et 
al. 1983). Temporary unemployment was also a consequence of the structure of 
the labour market for this population. For most, there was an almost total lack 
of job security (e.g. Johnson k, Bernstein 1982).
Total household income and the number of dependents was also largely related 
to the household’s stage in the lifecycle. (This has been recognised in the literature 
(e.g. Murphy & Selby 1985; Selby et al. 1981)). For example, a family with small 
children tie the mother to the home, preventing her from contributing financially. 
As children grow older, they could themselves start earning to contribute to their 
upkeep. As they become teenagers, they were expected to make contributions to 
the household budget. The household then entered a phase of relative affluence, 
lasting until children left their parents’ -home to set up their own. The case study 
below is an example of a family going through that stage. It also illustrates 
the relative contribution from different income earners in a household and the 
allocation of responsibilities of household matters.
Sergio [fictitious name] is 22 and works in an administrative job in
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one of Rio’s most expensive hotels. He lives with both of his parents, 
his two sisters and his girlfriend. His father is a chauffeur for a foreign 
diplomat, his younger sister (10) is still at school, his older sister (24) 
works in a supermarket and her 3 year-old daughter lives with them 
too. His girlfriend (19) works part-time in a restaurant and studies at 
night. Sergio has been trying to save enough to set up house with his 
girlfriend for a number of years. They have already acquired several 
pieces of second hand furniture, now in use in Sergio’s parents’ house. 
Although he does not pay his parents for rent or board, he does make 
contributions towards the purchase of larger household items and bills.
He and his father discuss together the purchase of larger items, needed 
urgently (e.g. a large saucepan, a reserve gas tank for cooking, a new 
shower head). On his own initiative, he will also occasionally treat the 
household to luxury items such as a chicken for a Sunday lunch, or a 
bottle of shampoo for his mother. His mother will sometimes approach 
him for extras (bus fares to appointments in hospital, a school book 
for his younger sister, part of the electricity bill), when his father’s 
salary has fallen short. He covers his own more personal expenses 
(clothes, bus fares) and subsidises his girlfriend’s studies as much as 
he can. The main income provider of the family is considered his 
father, whose entire salary (not exceeding Sergio’s) goes towards the 
running of the house. His older sister’s lower wages go towards her 
own personal expenses (bus fares, clothes), while the rest is spent on 
further maintenance of her child (medication, toys, clothes).
There were other complicating factors affecting household income, not ac­
counted for by figures such as those presented in the questionnaire results. For 
example, one way in which many people of Rocinha contributed to their earn­
ings, was by investing their savings into expanding their property, parts of which 
they sold or rented out to others, as I mentioned above. Some individuals (in 
Bairro Barcelos especially) did this on a large scale. Many buildings were trans­
formed into large blocks subdivided into quartos (rooms), kitchenetes (bedsits), 
or apartamentos (flats) which were rented out individually. Most kitchenetes I 
visited consisted of one room (measuring about 3 by 4 m or smaller) with built-in 
sink (“kitchen”) and access to “bathroom” (a space of about 1.5 to 2 m 2 with 
fitted WC and sometimes shower point above it) sometimes shared with others. 
This type of accommodation was commonly rented by young families with small 
children. Quartos were cheaper and often smaller with no private water supply. 
There were no controls over the rent charged for such accommodation, and the 
monthly rates had been rising sharply in response to the acute shortage of low-
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income housing especially in the centre of Rio de Janeiro. Indeed, rent rises had 
been so steep that this type of accommodation (especially kitchenetes) was not af­
fordable to the poorest of Rocinha.23 Additional difficulties were the requirement 
of the two to three month deposit paid at entry, and commonly contracts ran to 
a maximum of six months after which they had to be renewed and thus monthly 
rates could rise indiscriminately. Needless to say, the quality of most of this type 
of accommodation left much to be desired and offered tenants no security of any 
kind.
Whether or not one owned or rented what kind of property in Rocinha, there­
fore greatly affected one’s living standard. As a general rule, recent arrivals got 
the worst deals. They were vulnerable to being forced into renting the worst qual­
ity of accommodation at extortionate rates. Some of those who had arrived early 
in Rocinha’s history had had the opportunity to expand their property, either to 
accommodate relatives, and/or to rent it out temporarily for extra income. The 
uncontrolled rises in rent charged in Rocinha were visibly giving rise to a pro­
cess of substituting the poorest population by a slightly better off one, especially 
in the better serviced bairros like Bairro Barcelos and along Estrada da Gavea 
where most of the residents rented their accommodation. In the rest of Rocinha, 
this same trend was becoming apparent, although recently small property owners 
opted increasingly for selling their property or part of it (as opposed to renting it 
out), since the payment of rent at these rates could never be guaranteed.24
23The monthly rate commonly charged for a kitchenete in Bairro Barcelos (the main 
rental market in Rocinha), was about $Cz 400 to $Cz 600 (equivalent to 1/2 to 3/4 
monthly minimum salaries). Larger apartamentos were rented out for as much as $Cz 
800 to $Cz 900, while there were also cheaper quartos available for about $Cz 300 to 
$Cz 400.
24These practices added up to an extremely complex property “ownership” structure. 
The building in which I stayed, for eixample, was three stories high and had been ex­
panded vertically by the original owner who lived on the ground floor with a brother and 
nephew who shared a bed (they worked on alternate shifts) in a temporary arrangement. 
The rest of the ground floor was rented out to a couple with a child. The first floor was 
bought by another couple, and at the top, there were two small rooms of which I rented 
one, and a tiny bathroom. My immediate neighbour was an elderly person who had been 
staying there rent-free (as a respected religious expert and friend of the owner) for some
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The two main messages we get from this rather rough sketch of various factors 
which affected people’s economic well-being, were firstly, that although we were 
dealing with a relatively privileged population of urban poor within Rio de Janeiro, 
the general level of income was low, had been falling, and except for a few extremely 
rich individuals (e.g. those who cashed in on the property market), it was a daily 
struggle to make ends meet for most.
On the other hand, within this general characterisation, it was also very clear 
that Rocinha was extremely heterogeneous economically. The large range of jobs 
in which its population engaged accounted partly for this high degree of economic 
diversity. Living conditions ranged from an economic situation commonly associ­
ated with the lowest middle classes in Brazil to one of absolute poverty and very 
serious deprivation. This heterogeneity was immediately visible from the different 
types and sizes of the houses one found in Rocinha (brightly painted and some­
times externally tiled bungalows visibly equipped with electrical appliances, were 
situated next to heavily overcrowded shaky wooden structures). And from the 
different ways in which the inhabitants dressed (fashion-conscious cheap imita­
tions of middle-class dress walked next to bare-footed ragged individuals) relative 
affluence was obvious. It was also obvious from the development of specialised 
commerce (like the beauty parlours, newsagent, furniture shops, the large range 
of goods one could buy in the grocery stores and stalls) in parts of Rocinha.
Like any establishment of this size and heterogeneity, Rocinha had also devel­
oped a job market of its own, and a considerable number of people found ways of 
making a living inside Rocinha. Apart from such jobs as running shops of all kinds, 
there was a large number of people with jobs in the service sector, like construc­
tion workers, handy people (such as plumbers, electricians, carpenters), painters 
and decorators, outside washing and child minding, small removal companies and 
even hiring out wedding dresses and other clothing for special occasions. Many
time. An attempt to “regularise” the land title of this building alone, would therefore 
involve negotiation between at least five parties, two of whom claimed “ownership” over 
the building.
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walking street vendors sold small household articles and food door-to-door, while 
others contributed to their earnings by producing crafts at home like hammocks, 
pots and pans, clothing (school uniforms, wedding dresses, everyday clothing), 
furniture, handbags, dolls, jewelry, religious articles, pieces of art. Due to the 
difficulty of access to Rocinha, there was a demand for people to carry goods up 
and down the narrow becos for a pittance all over Rocinha. Adults, teenagers 
and small children were hired to carry bags of cement, piles of bricks, and other 
materials to and from building sites, groceries from supermarkets at the bottom of 
the hill to residences located in the further removed parts of Rocinha, products to 
stock the many biroscas selling in the interior of the morro and many were hired to 
carry water to supply those outside'the reach of the water networks or temporarily 
without reserves.
If we think about the consequences these observations have for Rocinha’s poten­
tial for political organisation, we can provisionally conclude firstly that, in terms 
of the productive process, the diversity of employment meant that few worked 
in the same or even similar places. Their income widely diverged, and working 
conditions differed considerably. In this sense, there was no common suffering or 
common “enemy” against whom complaints could be directed. Additionally, and 
partly because of this, the well-documented point about the “informal” sector is 
that it is politically “unorganisable” at any level (Roxborough 1979, Gugler 1988). 
Moreover, the fact that Rocinha had its own labour market, showed especially how 
diverse people’s interests were, if one takes their position in the productive process 
to be a major determinant of these. The conventional Marxist concept of “class” 
did therefore not have much analytical value for this study. The overwhelming 
impression was that of heterogeneity and orthodox Marxist terminology was not 
useful in the examination of political interests and groupings (c.f. Lloyd 1982).
At this abstract level, what these people did have in common was their de­
privation from basic infrastructure and other basic services. Again, this kind of 
deprivation was extremely diverse within Rocinha, as is clear from the first half of 
this chapter. Despite this heterogeneity organisations did exist around these resi­
dential issues. The context in which this political activity took place favoured the
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emergence of this activity in some ways, but dampened it in other ways. Briefly,25 
a military dictatorship had installed itself with a coup in 1964. Its subsequent 
policies ensured that by the early 1970s most spontaneous grassroots political ac­
tivity had ceased. The only voices which survived the regime’s atrocities were 
some professional organisations concerned with human rights violations (e.g. the 
OAB, a national association of lawyers, and the ABI, a national press association) 
and the Catholic Church, which had gathered around it most remaining popu­
lar initiatives. When the regime’s language changed in the second half of the 
decade, a large wave of new political activity emerged suddenly in response, such 
as independent labour and neighbourhood organisations, and mass demonstrations 
around explosive issues such as transport costs and basic wage levels. Reforms to 
the partidary system encouraged the creation of new parties such as the Workers 
Party (the PT) in 1979. A lot of the earlier activities especially were initiated by 
the Church whose language had become politicised (partly in response to develop­
ments elsewhere) and whose presence among the poor made it a valuable resource 
to potential activists in practical terms. In some areas it closely collaborated with 
the PT (e.g. the strikes and protest movements of 1979-1980 in the state of Sao 
Paulo (Kowarick 1988)).
In Rio de Janeiro, at the time of fieldwork, a lot of this activity had been 
incorporated and hence was defused into traditional local political processes. The 
political context was dominated by a strong political machine with widespread 
clientelistic connections which had established itself firmly in the shantytowns by 
co-opting its leaderships. In the presence of these strong links, the PT succeeded 
in recruiting only very little support in popular sectors in Rio de Janeiro. Tactics 
of subsequent governments ensured the continuity of traditional clientelistic meth­
ods in this state undermining the effectiveness of grassroots initiatives and the 
potential of new initiatives in party politics (Gay 1988). These tactics, for exam­
ple, included the creation of a separate municipal channel for launching large-scale
25In Chapters 5 and 6 I set out the political context and its effects on Rocinha’s 
political activists in detail.
Chapter 1. The Context 39
urbanisation programmes in the early 1980s (e.g. “Cada fami'lia um lote!\ which 
promised to sort out land titles for shantytown residents; large projects for water 
piping and electrification in some of the largest city centre favelas), and other 
efforts by the state government (e.g. the building of a large number of enormous 
schooling complexes and the promise of increased popular participation in all sec­
tors of government). Much of the grassroots leadership was employed into these 
programmes or their support in the shantytowns depended in some way or other 
on these programmes. As far as the Church initiatives were concerned, though 
politicised and encouraging, contradictions within the conservative Rio de Janeiro 
hierarchy (Mainwaring 1986, Gay 1988) limited the impact of its activists (e.g. 
those in the Pastoral de Favelas, which cooperated closely with Associations of 
favela leaderships (FAFERJ) and other residents associations (FAMERJ)).
Such tactics and problems therefore ensured the continuity of clientelistic struc­
tures (Gay spells this process out in detail (1988)), and in many ways shaped the 
form and potential of this grassroots political activity. Exactly what form this 
kind of activity took and the effects it had on the population of Rocinha, became 
the focus of my thesis.
Chapter 2
Kinship
In this chapter, I will look at people’s immediate social surroundings; their re­
lations with the members of their household. In the following chapters, I will 
look at wider social circles. (Chapter 3 will examine the neighbourhood, Chap­
ter 4 the “Community” as a whole.) At each of these levels I will look at the 
quality of people’s social relations, the intensity of interaction, the stability of 
practical arrangements and so on. This sets the background for discovering the 
social morphology of this population. By asking to what extent these principles 
(of kinship, locality and community) are articulated in the social organisation of 
Rocinha’s people in these chapters, I am setting the scene for the examination of 
the operation of the politics of Rocinha’s action groups.
FamUia was an important organising concept for the people of Rocinha. It func­
tioned as an ideal pattern to which people aspired, but few actually experienced 
this ideal in practice. This situation appears as a contradiction and creates for 
the analyst the acute problem of how to generalise about kin relations in Rocinha. 
The contradiction is immediately clear from a collection of “Stories of Rocinha”, 
collected from Rocinha’s community schools (Picole, Picole 1983).1 The first sto-
1The pupils were asked to tell each other short stories and/or draw pictures on one 
of many topics answering the question: “0  que e que a Rocinha tem, pessoalf” (Lit: 
“What does Rocinha have, kids?”) The stories were compiled by social workers funded 
mainly by the Brazilian Ministry of Culture (MEC/SEC) under the project “Interagao
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ries in the booklet are entitled respectively: “Casa” (Home/House) and “Familia” 
(Family), marking the centrality of these topics in the children’s minds.
CASA
Esta casa aqui e da mamae e do pa- 
pai. Eles brigam todo dia e nem dao 
comida para nos. Os nossos irmaos 
ficam todinhos com fome. Eles nao 
dao dinheiro para comprar cafe, leite 
e agucar. Tem um sol Undo e bonito e 
nos vamos a praia. La na praia tinha 
um arco-iris. Na minha casa tem um 
pe de jaca. A gente todo dia come 
jaca. Meus irmaos todinhos sobem la 
na laje e soltam pipa. Na minha casa 
tem um cachorro. E  acabou.
HOUSE
This house here is my mother’s and 
father’s. They fight all day and don’t 
even give us food. Our brothers and 
sisters are hungry all the time. They 
don’t give money to buy coffee, milk 
and sugar. The sun shines really 
pretty and we are going to the beach. 
There was a rainbow on the beach. 
There is a jack tree at my house. 
We eat jack fruit every day. All my 
brothers and sisters climb on the roof 
to fly a kite. We have a dog at home. 
And finished.
(Picole, Picole 1983:5)
FAMILIA
Na minha casa estava todo mundo 
reunido. Eudes, meu irmao, meu 
pai Pedro, minha mae Teresa, minha 
irma Marlucia, minha irma Vera, o 
nosso cachorro Pupi e o nosso pa- 
pagaio Louro. A gente estava con- 
versando coisa bonita sobre a familia 
da gente que ainda esta no Ceara. 
Nos pensamos nas coisas bonitas que 
a gente vai fazer quando for para la. 
A gente estava conversando sobre a 
saudade do Ceara.
FAMILY
Everybody was united at home. Eu­
des, my brother, my father Pedro, my 
mother Teresa, my sister Marlucia, 
my sister Vera, our dog Pupi and our 
parrot Louro. We were saying a lot 
of nice things about our relatives who 
are still in Ceara. We thought about 
all the nice things we will do when 
we go there. We were talking about 
how homesick we were for Ceara.
(Picole, Picole 1983:6)
entre educagao basica e os diferentes conteztos culturais existentes no pais: memoria 
social da favela e educagao basica.” (Lit: Interaction between basic education and the 
different cultural contexts existing in the country: social memory of the favela and basic 
education.)(Picole, Picole 1983:4).
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The second story clearly represents the ideal picture of the little girl’s family. 
She expresses the unity of parents and siblings (and pets), and the desire to unite 
the rest of the family in Rocinha (“. . .  our relatives who are still in Ceara.”). It 
brings to mind a picture of well-established and active kinship networks in which 
each knows their place and all help each other survive in the adverse conditions 
of poverty (Lomnitz 1977, Das & Jesser 1980, Pollard &; Wilburg 1978, Lomnitz 
Sz Perez-Lizaur 1984). It confirms the much emphasised idea that these networks 
are even maintained across distances and serve to help rural migrants adapt in 
urban conditions (Leeds &; Leeds 1970). Furthermore, the family here is portrayed 
as nostalgically reminiscing about their rural roots (“We were talking about how 
homesick we were for Ceara”) suggesting that they in fact feel themselves belonging 
there more than in the city; suggesting the image of the “peasant in the city” 
(Mangin 1967, 1970; Kemper 1977).
The first story creates the reverse image; of total family breakdown ( “They 
fight all day and don’t even give us food”) and social disorganisation in the face 
of poverty. Not the house interior but the roof space and the beach (both in 
public space (see also Chapter 3)) are described favourably and the only member 
of the household who deserves special mention in a positive light is the dog. The 
suggested image here is Lewis’ picture of the “Culture of Poverty” (Lewis 1966, 
1968, especially well assessed in Perlman 1976:114-118) in which even the most 
basic bond between kin (that between parents and children) has disintegrated.
These are two extremes which both existed, at least in the minds of Rocinha’s 
children. It is my intention to clarify which of these extremes represented the real 
situation in Rocinha best. I propose to do this by investigating the ideals expressed 
by Rocinha’s people, the composition of the co-residential unit, the allocation of 
roles within these households and the type of relations maintained with parentes 
(relatives) who resided outside the household.
Parentes are all those persons descended from one’s four grandparents. All 
cognatic relatives as far as the degree of first cousin were usually recognised. One 
knows one’s parentes as extensions of the nuclear family, the main unit towards
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which obligations and interests were directed. The ideal familia in Rocinha had a 
wider meaning than this. It reminded me of the clan-type parentela which Wagley 
described to exist in rural Brazil (Wagley 1963). It included all members of this 
wider extended kin network, and often also others (strictly speaking not parentes) 
who were effectively incorporated into it.
The parentela is a large “ancestor-oriented” group of followers collected around 
a powerful personality on whom it depends for patronage, without which one could 
not get by in Brazil. Members were not only kin, but also associated agregados 
(Lit: those gathered together; servants and their relatives adopted into the par­
entela). Relations were strengthened and extended by the ritual kinship bonds 
of the compadrio system and the sharing of the clan surname. The parentela was 
amorphous and more a series of ideal patterns which stated how an individual 
ought to act as member of a kinship group. “Perhaps more than any other Brazil­
ian institution these ideal patterns provided points of reference throughout an 
individual’s life.” (Wagley 1963:193). The actual parentela was only realised in 
the circles of a very small elite. Yet Wagley argues: “The image of the traditional 
parentela persists in Brazil as an ideal pattern for people of various classes in the 
cities, the towns, and even the countryside.” (ibid:203).
In Rocinha, the ideal familia existed in a similar way. In schools, the idea 
of family solidarity (uniao) was emphasised to its little pupils. There was strong 
disapproval of those that were not loyal to family obligations (i.e. “bad” fathers 
and mothers, and “ungrateful” children). Pity was expressed towards those who 
had lost family connections. A phrase often heard in this situation was: “ . . .  que 
nao tem familia, nao tem ninguemn (Lit: “[people] who don’t have relatives, have 
nobody.”) (Bohadana & Pego 1981:16).
This magical uniao between family members was celebrated on occasions like 
birthdays, Easter and Christmas, and occasional special Sunday lunches, in which 
relatives visited each other. On these occasions elaborate meals were prepared 
with many ingredients not normally available during the week. Pieces of meat 
were even barbecued on rooftops and other dishes (such as salads) not considered
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“real food” appeared.2 Cheerful and loud music was played while adults caught 
up on the latest news and children played with each other. Small presents were 
exchanged and bonds between sisters, brothers, and cousins were renewed. For 
many families such visits, even if they were within Rocinha, were a major expe­
dition, long planned in advance and a high-light in their routine life, which rarely 
involved travelling anywhere beyond the work-home journey.
A small elite in Rocinha in fact maintained a kinship network similar to the par­
entela. These families had established themselves in the early stages of Rocinha’s 
development, when space was abundant (see also Chapter 5), and other resources 
(water, jobs, building materials) were shared between only a small number of peo­
ple. They claimed their best share, infiltrating the different institutions as they 
appeared as time went on. As more relatives arrived, they built up their little em­
pire in numbers and space claims and gained a following of people, who relied on 
their patronage as Rocinha became more crowded and resources became scarcer.
In cases where these managed to establish themselves in one locality, often more 
cooperation and contact existed. This was especially true for those members of 
the kin group for whom family bonds were strongest, such as between mothers and 
their daughters and between the oldest sister and the rest of her siblings. Mothers 
perhaps visited married daughters several times a week, went shopping together 
or helped each other out in daily activities, even though they did not share the 
same household any more. In larger concentrated families, younger siblings ate 
and stayed in the houses of their older married siblings, and helped each other out 
at work. Very intimate relations between kin like this were seen, but they were by 
no means the rule.
The family of the little girl telling her story above is an example of such a 
parentela-like elite family in Rocinha. Her father was one of the main characters
2Words to designate greenery often appeared in their diminutive form (saladinha, 
verdurinha), a sign that they only served to decorate the meal. They were just “coisinhas 
que nao enchem barriga” (Lit: thingamies that don’t fill the stomach) (c.f. Zaluar 
1985:106-7), or, comida fraca (Woortmann 1986).
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involved in the Residents Association (see later chapters), her mother ran a sowing 
workshop with several other women, two of her sisters had important roles in 
other action groups and her brother ran a birosca (cafe, corner shop) helped by 
two other younger siblings. The parental house served as a focal point for family 
get-togethers, despite the fact that several of her siblings were married and had 
their own households elsewhere.
There were several such families with a large number of children (some of whom 
were adopted into them) and a noticeable presence in Rocinha, although these 
were the exceptions rather than the rule. There were few of them (only a handful 
or so), and their solidarity did not last. The reasons for this were that large 
families of recent rural origin were generally the poorest in Rocinha nowadays. 
They were not the elite, and those who did well were not large any more in terms 
of offspring. Both these facts were confirmed by Wahl de Medeiros Valle 1980, 
quoted in Bohadana Sz Pego 1981 (see also later in this chapter). The offspring of 
those who did do well had a chance to move out of Rocinha (often with the help of 
educational qualifications, see also Chapter 4). Unlike in the parentelas, relatives 
could provide economic help for each other in the form of recommendations to 
a good patron, or the borrowing and lending of small tools or capital to start 
up, but one rarely saw lines of specialisation passed on from parents to children. 
There were few family businesses and the number of people they employed was 
very small. Each went his/her own way as far as making a living was concerned. 
Power and status was therefore not passed on through families. This was also the 
reason why there were no more mafia-style “ruling families” in Rocinha.
The involvement of the same family in so many different institutions rooted in 
Rocinha (as the one described) was also unusual. To “get ahead” in the world, 
residents more often involved themselves in outside activities rather than in those 
rooted in Rocinha itself. This was indeed already visible in the example described: 
the two sisters active in action group activities were both talking of leaving out of 
financial necessity, despite the fact that they enjoyed high status in the organisa­
tions and were appointed to the most important jobs since “they know so many 
people and so much about Rocinha”.
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Furthermore, solidarity within these large families disintegrated also for reasons 
which applied to all families in Rocinha: the geographic and economic mobility 
of its population. Resulting differences in the standards of living between related 
households resulted in the deterioration of their relationship as exchange between 
them became less balanced over time. Relationships were in danger of becoming 
increasingly exploitative and/or paternalistic rather than egalitarian and recipro­
cal as a result.
Relatives were also increasingly less concentrated geographically, even those 
who established themselves in Rocinha first. Differences in living standards caused 
relatives to move apart geographically. But also, owing to the fact that Rocinha 
was becoming extremely densely populated with no space to expand existing ac­
commodation (e.g. to accommodate a newly married couple). It was increasingly 
difficult to find anywhere to live in Rocinha at all, let alone in the same neighbour­
hood. The members of the family described in the example were widely spread all 
over Rocinha. And it is easy to see how most kin ties became inactive across ge­
ographical distances. Personality differences, political, and economic differences, 
or simply a lack of resources (both time and money) and the difficulty of commu­
nicating with someone who did not live in one’s immediate neighbourhood (see 
also Chapter 3 on communication problems inside Rocinha), were all factors which 
facilitated the splitting up of members of the same kin group.
Family links across distances were perhaps more regarded for insurance pur­
poses, i.e. links to be drawn on in times of severe need, such as accommodation 
when temporarily homeless, a place to put small children when taking on a day­
time job, or a place to stay when single and too old to look after oneself. However, 
for coping in daily routines, neighbours would and often did, take on a role at least 
as important as members of the kin group. Neighbour relations could grow at least 
as intimate and all-embracing as relations with relatives. The use of fictitious kin 
terms perhaps illustrated this. The terms tio, tia (uncle, aunt) were easily used to 
refer to a well-respected unrelated adult, expressing intimacy and approval. For 
example, the children and their parents used these terms to address the staff of the 
daycare centre and the teachers at primary-level education. Parents encouraged
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children to use these terms to address adult neighbours. The term irmao (brother) 
was often used to express and encourage friendship between men. It was also often 
used in political dialogue.
W hat emerges from the above is that the familia (like the parentela) existed as 
an ideal pattern, a model of the desirable form of behaviour. This model organised 
the way people behaved as members of a family, even though in practice few 
actually experienced the institution of the large well-integrated familia. Secondly, 
and this partly follows from the first point, what was important for Rocinha’s 
residents was not the working of this system strictly according to its ideals. What 
was striking was the flexibility of their practical arrangements: the ease with 
which this institution incorporated members like neighbours, for example, who 
often took on the same importance as relatives. This is confirmed by Wagley 
quoting a Brazilian author on the subject of parentela: “[parentela] expresses less 
the tie of filial relationship than participation in a vast kinship system.” (op. 
cit.:189, quoting Candido 1951:299).
More evidence to support this observation, was the ease with which Rocinha’s 
residents adopted members of other households into their own. Cardoso confirms 
this in data from a Sao Paulo favela (Cardoso 1984). The reasons for adoption 
could be various. The original family could be in no economic condition to bring 
up the child, there could be no one to look after it during the day, they could not 
want the child, or simply the adoption took place because the new parents lived 
in an environment considered somehow better for the baby (financially or simply 
near a daycare centre or a school). The host household could simply need helpers 
in domestic work or an additional income provider.
Permanently adopted children were normally incorporated into their foster 
families and their socialisation was not considered any more problematic than the 
socialisation of their own children. (Also confirmed by Cardoso 1984.) By virtue 
of their socialisation within the new kinship group, these children were considered 
on par with other members of the hosting household. The pervasiveness of the 
terms filho de criagao, irmao de criagao, mae de criagao and so on, (Lit: son-, 
brother-, mother-“through bringing up”, i.e. foster-son, brother, mother) clearly
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illustrates this. Babies were often adopted into the households of the mother’s 
relatives (like the mother’s sisters’ or the mother’s mother’s) but also into the 
households of neighbours, good friends or even patrons.3
These arrangements were much more readily undertaken than by, for example, 
U.K. middle-class foster parents, who insist on going through extremely lengthy 
procedures to ensure the legality and permanence of the adoption. It is not done 
lightly.4 By contrast, Cardoso (ibid:197) argues that in the favelados ’ definition of 
kinship “consanguinity is only part of the definition and not an essential part at 
tha t.” and “The relation between ascendants and descendents is conceptualised 
as a m atter of the educational process [where educagao in Brazil refers to the 
socializing of children in manners, morals, obedience, respect, etc. Translator’s 
note.] within the family, rather than as depending on continuity of blood lines 
alone.” (ibid:200). Socialisation was therefore at the basis of real kinship ties. 
Blood ties alone did not define who had what obligations to whom. These ties 
could only be exploited effectively if they had been activated somehow for some 
length of time. It is for this reason that I will elaborate extensively on other factors 
which influenced the realisation of kin ties. Among others, these were residential 
patterns, the role of the parents and other relatives in the socialisation of the 
children and marital arrangements.
As far as household composition was concerned, the nuclear family was proba­
bly the most widespread residential unit in Rocinha. Even though data on house­
hold composition was not available to me at the time of fieldwork, the literature on 
low-income urban settlements confirms that this was the case elsewhere in Brazil. 
For example, Zaluar found about 70% of her sample in a Rio de Janeiro low-income
3The ease with which adoption took place took on a terrifying reality for me when 
a young local single mother repeatedly tried to persuade me to take on her newborn 
(since, in her opinion I could provide it with a better home than she could), and others 
told me of finding abandoned babies on their door steps.
4Cardoso confirms that a class difference exists in Brazil: “the middle classes lay 
primary stress upon the family as a biological unit, and in these classes there is a 
correspondingly less frequent incidence of adoption.” (Cardoso 1984:202).
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housing estate to be “complete nuclear” (Zaluar 1985:96). Caldeira found 60% in 
Sao Paulo (Caldeira 1984:91). Merrick & Schminck give different data, but again 
show a clear majority of nuclear families in their sample in a Belo Horizonte favela 
(Merrick &; Schminck 1983). This is also the case for low-income settlements else­
where in Latin America (e.g. in Mexico: Ward 1976, Garcia, Munoz & de Oliveira 
1982). And this (both parents and children cohabitating as a complete indepen­
dent residential unit) was indeed the ideal for Rocinha’s residents. However, this 
ideal appeared to both the analyst and residents in contradiction with people’s 
preferences and in many cases contradicted practical arrangements. This will be 
apparent from the ethnographic evidence below. The ideal of the nuclear family 
(as with the ideal of the grand integrated familia) in many cases no more than a 
guide to behaviour in a world where many failed to live up to this ideal.
The ideal can be spelled out as follows: In the “proper” course of events, an 
engaged couple saved up to be able to start a new household independently at the 
time of marriage. The woman was supposed to be a virgin, and the wedding cele­
brations were a major occasion for the members of both families. Girls married at 
an early age and being single was seen as a transitional stage. Marriage, in turn, 
was expected to lead towards offspring. A couple without children could never 
be considered to constitute a complete “family” . Cardoso mentions that “when 
a woman is pregnant it is said that she is uesperando familia”” (Lit: expecting a 
family) (Cardoso 1984:199), i.e. the word for “family” in this commonly used ex­
pression is in fact synonymous with “children”. This ideal did not go unchallenged, 
however. Women expressed the wish to control the number of children they bore 
(also confirmed in Rocinha’s literature: Bohadana Sz Pego 1981, Morro Mulher 
1984, Rocinha, Maes e Vidas 1985). This was largely in response to economic 
conditions based on the belief that a family should be consciously planned, in line 
with the economic potential of the household. Topics such as the inadequacy of 
sexual education for most women in Rocinha, the taboo about discussing such 
matters as contraceptives and their cost and unavailability, were widely discussed. 
(In the literature they are the women’s main concerns.)
Abortions were officially not allowed in Brazil, but were commonly undertaken
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by private clinics. The expenses involved, were well beyond the budgets of most 
households in Rocinha, especially of women who undertook them without their 
husbands’ knowledge. Instead, back street alternatives were tried out and most 
women knew stories of others who failed horrifically at such attempts. (This is 
also confirmed by Rocinha, Maes e Vidas 1985 and Bohadana Sz Pego 1981.) In 
fact, the average number of children per woman between the ages 20 and 30 in 
Rocinha was recorded to be 2, and 4 for women over 30 years of age in that study. 
Women with more than 5 children were generally resident in the higher/poorer 
parts of Rocinha, and had been resident in Rio for less than 5 years (Bohadana &; 
Pego 1981, quoting data from a PhD by Wahl de Medeiros Valle, Frankfurt 1980).
This data supports my impressions that families with a larger number of chil­
dren were poorer in Rocinha, and also that poverty was related to the time of 
arrival in Rio de Janeiro. This is because poverty is related to stages in life cycles 
(Gonzalez de la Rocha 1984a, Murphy Sz Selby 1985, Garcia, Munoz &; de Oliveira 
1982) and those who migrated were in or coming up to the “expansion stage” of 
the family (Gonzalez de la Rocha 1984a, 1988).5
This also corresponds to Caldeira’s findings on people’s expectations. She 
found that the inhabitants of the low-income settlement expected to climb the 
ladder gradually as they got older and as they found their niche in the labour 
market. This fact may in itself have implications for the actual standard of living 
of a household (Caldeira 1984). (See also Chapter 4.)
Ideal roles within the nuclear household were as follows: The mother was the 
main socialiser of the children. It was her, often sole, responsibility to look after 
them, care for them and educate them. Ideally, she stayed with them during the 
day, taught them manners and morals, as well as found them a place in school to 
prepare them for the future. The mother was largely to blame for a teenager who
5This was not because of the difference in psychological and other characteristics 
between rural and urban people (as assumed by many earlier writers on the subject 
e.g. Ray 1969, Redfield 1947, 1956; Foster 1965). The implications of these latter 
assumptions are ably assessed by Long (1977), and Leeds Sz Leeds clearly demonstrated 
the non-rural nature of urban favela residents (Leeds & Leeds 1970).
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became involved in the drug trade or petty crime and it was not uncommon to hear 
women question the solitude of the mother in the education and orientation of their
children:
[o pai] se liga na televisdo, vai dormir 
e nao quer saber mais de nada. Nos 
sabados e/e da algum dinheiro para 
os meninos, mas vai para a praia 
jogar bola e nao chama eles para 
irem tambem. Volta, almoga, e vai 
dormir. Quando acorda, fica vendo 
televisdo.
[their father] sits in front of the T.V., 
sleeps and does not want to know 
about anything else. On Saturdays 
he gives the kids some money, but 
goes to the beach to play football and 
does not invite them along with him. 
He comes back, eats his lunch, and 
falls asleep. When he wakes up, he 
continues to watch T.V.
(Rocinha, Maes e Vidas 1985:117)
The father (pai de familia) was regarded as the principal income provider of 
the family, the one who reproduced the family unit (Fausto Neto 1982).6 All 
other contributions were merely regarded as ajuda (Lit: help). Many men did 
not like their wives to work outside the house, allowing them to compete with 
their status as the income provider of the family. (Also confirmed by Zaluar 1985, 
Caldeira 1984, Rocinha, Maes e Vidas 1985.) On the night of the last day of the 
month, the supermarket at the bottom of the morro was crowded with fathers, 
surrounded by their children, shopping for the month’s supply of staple foods, 
soap, and other frequently used household essentials. Whereas the father, almost 
literally, “bota comida pra dentro da casa” (Lit: gets the food into the house), it 
was the mother’s task to budget and control its consumption (as discussed in the 
previous chapter). (Also confirmed by Zaluar 1985 and Caldeira 1984.) A good 
father was proud of his work, and maximised his hours in order to satisfy the needs 
of his household. He was respected in this light, and his identity as the head of
6Fausto Neto describes in detail the workers’ family as a reproductive unit, its internal 
role division and its consumption patterns.
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the household unit depended on his role as the “worker” . Vice versa, others were 
classified as subordinate to him (Woortmann 1986, Fausto Neto 1982).7
Owing to his status as a “worker”, he enjoyed many privileges in the house. 
He was exempted from all household tasks such as cooking, cleaning and washing 
clothes. His food had to be ready and served to him when he got home from work 
(a reserved best and largest share of the pot)8 and his clothes had to be clean 
and ironed. He could not be disturbed when resting, and the programme of the 
mother’s household activities completely centered around his timetable. (This is 
also illustrated by the quotation above.) He was also the main authority figure 
in the household, often enforced by his role as the main income provider of the 
household. He decided who could stay in the house (even if it was not his) and 
made other major decisions. In the case of an absent father, the oldest resident 
male (often the oldest son or the mother’s brother, depending on their age) took 
his place. Children knew that he could not be contradicted for their own good, 
and often this applied to his female partner too. Married men frequently engaged 
in affairs with other women, which their wives often knew and accepted. The 
reverse however (of women having lovers and publicly being known to do so) was 
severely punished and also highly disapproved of by both sexes.
It is clear from the above that in the nuclear family a sharp division of labour 
existed between the sexes. This division of roles was such that nuclear households 
in practice were decidedly matrifocal: the mother’s role was central to the internal 
organisation and continuation of the unit.9 As seen above, it was the mother who
7The decline in the real value of wages damaged the status of the income provider, 
who was no longer able to provide for the needs of the family with his wages alone (c.f. 
Zaluar 1985).
8This touches on another point made by several other authors, that priorities of food 
consumption in the household reflect ideas and practices around food production (e.g. 
Woortmann 1986, Zaluar 1985, Fausto Neto 1982, Caldeira 1984).
9The term matrifocality has been defined in many ways. (For a synopsis of different 
definitions: Solien de Gonzales 1965,1970a. Also: Safa 1974, Blumberg & Garcia 1977, 
Chant 1985a.) I take the term in a wider sense to mean a tendency for the role of 
the mother to be articulated strongly. It is she who is the stable figure within the
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carried ultimate responsibility for the socialisation of the children and often this 
led to the development of intimate relations between mothers and their children, 
especially female. The mother’s role was automatically carried on to the oldest 
daughter, to whom a working mother commonly left most household tasks (such 
as cooking, cleaning and washing clothes). The practice of leaving small children 
in the care of their only barely older sister while both parents were at work was 
also common. Relations between mothers and their daughters, and between their 
daughters and the rest of the children were therefore often particularly articulated. 
The mother and/or older sister were often the main source of advice and informa­
tion, the person to confide one’s problems in, the first person to draw on in times 
of need, and often the person cited as one’s best friend (Rocinha, Maes e Vidas 
1985, Morro Mulher 1984, Picole, Picole 1983). The fact that these relations lay 
at the basis of the organisation of the kinship system was further evident from the 
fact that one rarely saw a household consisting of a father with children alone, 
where the female partner was absent. The reverse, a single parent female-headed 
household was much more common.
The strong sexual division of roles, the authority of the male household head 
and the resulting strong bond between the mother and her offspring (particularly 
daughters) in nuclear families, are a potential threat to their stability. They led 
to communication problems between husbands and wives. These were evident 
from the common topics of conversation between women. They complained of 
feeling trapped by their male partner’s dominance. To fulfill their own needs for a 
more independent life, they talked of having to undertake things in secret. They 
complained of the restrictions their husbands imposed on their movements outside 
the house, in particular the prohibition against working in paid employment which 
threatened their status and power as the only income provider and allowed women 
to come into contact with a wider social circle.
household and she makes all the major domestic decisions. It is also her kinsmen that 
often dominate within the household as opposed to those of her husband. (Also used 
in this sense by Safa 1974, Solien de Gonzales 1970b.) I differ here with definitions 
used elsewhere which restrict its usage to families in which the father is absent in the 
residential unit altogether (e.g. Chant 1985a:28, Chant 1985b:636).
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In practice, however, many of Rocinha’s women did work in paid employment 
outside the house. This was increasingly recognised to be necessary as the real 
value of wages had declined sharply and households found it increasingly difficult 
to manage on one income alone. Within nuclear households, women were a labour 
reserve to be drawn upon in times of need. This was also confirmed to be the 
case in studies of other low-income settlements (e.g. Safa 1986, Schminck 1986, 
Gonzalez de la Rocha 1988). I differ here from Chant who makes the point that 
the prohibition on working outside the house imposed by male household heads 
in nuclear families results in situations in which the members of these households 
see themselves as living in unnecessary poverty (Chant 1985a). In Rocinha, this 
was only so in extreme cases.10
This data added to my impression that the ideal of the happy self-sufficient nu­
clear family preferably with lots of children posed a contradiction of which women 
(who formed the backbone of this household structure and who were responsible 
for budgeting and organising it), especially, were acutely aware. It is evidence for 
the fact that the accepted “normal” course of events and, in a way, the ideal fam­
ily structure towards which Rocinha residents strove, was inherently unstable in 
practice, especially in this economic climate which challenged the traditional roles 
within the household. It is not surprising that the nuclear household transformed 
into alternative structures. These variations should be seen as positive responses 
to changing practical circumstances.
Some households were female-headed single parent households, which some­
times led to a pattern of serial monogamy where the female head cohabitated with 
several partners in succession. The children resulting from each union usually 
remained with their mother. More commonly, the household was an extended 
version of the nuclear family, either male or female headed, in which case all or
10Many of Rocinha’s community groups were run by women. They complained about 
their husbands’ attempts to restrict their participation in these “male” activities and 
their accusations of neglecting their household duties. However, these complaints did not 
stop most of them from spending a lot of time in community-related activities outside 
their homes.
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part of a nuclear family was adopted into the household. In the literature, a lot 
of speculation exists about the workability and/or desirability of these alternative 
household structures (Buvinic, Lycette Sz McGreevey 1983, Lenero-Otero 1977, 
Chant 1985a, 1985b, 1987, Chant Sz Ward 1987). As has been pointed out by 
Chant especially, the trend has been to consider any form other than the nuclear 
household to be inefficient or otherwise undesirable. They have been analysed 
in this light as a result. Female-headed single parent families, for example, are 
assumed to be “so hard-pressed financially that they have to find economic sup­
port from another male” (Chant 1985b:638). Their assumed temporary character 
meant that they could be ignored for the purpose of analysis and/or explained 
away as exceptions arising in response to the male’s conditions (Chant 1985b). 
Similar assumptions are made about extended households: that they are made 
up out of a nuclear family hosting others who are temporarily accommodated, in 
response to an emergency situation. The added members are assumed to be an 
undesirable burden to the hosting unit (Das Sz Jesser 1980, Kemper 1977, Pollard 
Sz Wilburg 1978, Lomnitz 1977). With this in mind, how did these alternative 
household structures work, and how were they regarded by Rocinha’s people?
Female-headed single parent households were regarded as the households which 
were economically least well off in Rocinha. It was generally held to be true by 
social workers and acted upon: creches often targeted single parent female-headed 
households for this reason: they were “os mais carentes” (the most vulnerable).11 
It was noticeable that many of those households were resident in Rocinha’s poorest 
accommodation (high rent, temporary accommodation especially in Bairro Barce- 
los and/or owner-occupants in the poorer parts of Rocinha (least well serviced 
and poorer construction)). Data from different low-income settlements supports 
the fact that female-headed single parent households were economically less well 
off than nuclear or extended households in shantytowns elsewhere (Lomnitz 1977,
11 They claimed that they assessed the actual living standard of their potential clien­
tele, but in fact, these home visitors discussed at length the difficulties of doing so, not 
in the least because they found it too embarrassing to ask questions relating to eco­
nomic well-being. Note also that their assessment was carried out before the child(ren) 
was/were accepted into daycare. (See also Chapter 7.)
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Pollard & Wilburg 1978, Selby et al 1981). The reasons for this were: in com­
parison with males, women’s economic potential in the labour market (especially 
single mothers) was much lower. In the Brazilian labour market, women were 
discriminated against. Fewer jobs were available for them and these were concen­
trated in the worst paid sectors. Even where the jobs were the same as for men, 
their pay did not match the male equivalent (Merrick & Schminck 1983, Caldeira 
1984). This has been observed to be true for other Latin American and Third 
World countries in general (e.g. Gonzalez de la Rocha 1988). Women (especially 
single parents) also had the additional burden of domestic duties and were avail­
able for more restricted work hours. The availability of daycare for the younger 
children and education for the older ones, is here a crucial determinant of the living 
standard of a single parent female-headed household. In Rocinha, the provision 
of both of these was inadequate. From this point of view, therefore, the relative 
poverty of female-headed single parent households was not surprising.12
As far as the situation in extended households was concerned, it was true that 
the Brazilian state’s support for those that were somehow unable to provide for 
themselves only reached a very restricted number of families of the lower classes. 
The family therefore often took on these functions. Related orphans, sick, disabled 
or elderly people were provided for in this way, and one could often see families 
putting up unemployed or homeless relatives and their families. Thus, many others 
in some way related to the family were often incorporated into the residential 
unit. The existence of the extended household in Rocinha was encouraged by 
the acute shortage of accommodation (there were simply not enough houses to 
support each potentially independent nuclear household). This was due to its 
privileged location in the centre of Rio (as pointed out in the previous chapter) 
which attracted outsiders, worsening the condition and the quality of existing
12 Chant argues against this position by pointing out that female-headed single parent 
households often have a higher number of income contributors which, she argues, offers 
more economic security to the household members. This is firstly because it is more 
secure in an unstable labour market to depend on more than one income. Secondly, in­
come distribution within these households was more equitable (Chant 1985a). I evaluate 
both of these points below.
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accommodation (sub-standard, and no guarantee of being able to stay long term), 
which forced people to move around.
This is not the only reason for which extended households were formed. They 
could just be formed out of a positive decision by the individuals involved. In 
practice, extended households often worked out to the advantage of their members. 
Childcare and other domestic work (which is especially time-consuming in badly- 
serviced low-income settlements), for example, was shared out between several 
people, in extended households. Childcare especially could be shared when there 
were more adults around. This allowed more adult members of the household 
to work outside the home, thereby increasing the number of income contributors 
and maximising their income potential more effectively.13 There was no reason 
to assume therefore that extended households were made up of large numbers of 
unproductive dependents (see also Chant 1985a:21). In fact, and this is supported 
by Caldeira (1984): new members either contributed to the hosting household’s 
income and/or budgeted their expenses separately from the hosting household. 
Indeed, to examine the way in which these alternative household structures worked, 
we need to look more closely at how traditionally male and female roles (of income 
provider and socialiser, respectively) were distributed in these households.
The same pattern of role division existed in nuclear households and extended 
households. Male adults took on the role of income providers. Even if he was not 
the husband of the key female in the household (he could be her brother or oldest 
son), he took on this role. He took major economic decisions and was regarded 
as the father figure in the household. (This is also supported by Zaluar 1985:97.)
13Households that relied on the income of more than one income earner were not 
necessarily better off in terms of total household income. This was especially true if 
none of these additional income earners were adult males. Such “secondary” earners 
(and they included female household heads) were marginalised in the labour market to 
such an extent (and especially if they were young children) that the total of their incomes 
often did not match the income of an adult male. Nevertheless, one could argue that 
the members of these households were still economically better off, since the number 
of income earners was more important to a household’s economic well-being than the 
size of the main income provider’s wage per se. The former offered more security to the 
household, especially important in a labour market which was unstable for all workers 
(Chant 1985a).
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Women and very young children only worked to contribute to the household budget 
if this was perceived as economically necessary. I am not here including the odd 
jobs many children in Rocinha did to earn their own spending money. Even though 
this money could be substantial, it was not seen as part of the household budget 
(confirmed by Valladares 1989). Women and children were drawn on in times of 
need, as they were in the nuclear household. The same rules applied for female­
headed households. I disagree here with Chant (1985a, 1985b, 1987) who claims 
that in extended households, compared with nuclear households, the number of 
workers is higher.14 I would argue that in non-nuclear households more members 
worked only in response to the economic needs of the household. Additionally, I 
saw no evidence for the claim Chant makes that the authority of the male was 
less articulated in non-nuclear households. As I argued above, in the absence of 
a husband, this role was taken by another male (usually the oldest son or the 
mother’s brother).15
The way income was pooled within these households is a final point which has 
to be considered as it clarifies the different roles within these household struc­
tures. The internal distribution of total household income is also an important 
factor for assessing the economic well-being of the members of these different 
household structures (Chant 1985a, 1985b, 1987, Chant k  Ward 1987). Accord­
ing to Chant “male heads are apt to retain some of their wages” (ibid:25), and 
argues that this is particularly the case in nuclear households where the male head 
is in a position of power as a sole earner, and where he is under peer pressure to 
express his machismo (i.e. being seen to be in control of his wife’s expenditure 
and being seen to indulge in male activities). I found these claims not to hold 
for Rocinha. The arrangements in several households which I knew intimately 
(households which were regarded as respectable in the neighbourhood) confirmed
14She attributes this to the fact that the male authority syndrome (which, she argues, 
keeps members of nuclear households from working) is less articulated in non-nuclear 
households, allowing others to maximise their income potential.
15 Chant does not mention the role of either of these in the internal dynamics of the 
households she examines.
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my impressions of what went on in other households (whether extended, nuclear 
or other), that each earner had the right to decide how to spend his/her income. 
It was seen as the duty of the male household head to provide “enough” for his 
dependents to live off, not to provide an equal share for each of them. In the same 
way, teenage wage earners were regarded favourably if they contributed regularly 
towards major household expenses such as bills and household appliances. Their 
contributions were seen as favours, not imperative. This is also demonstrated in 
my case study in the previous chapter. In fact, Zaluar talks of conflicts “between 
collective consumption of the family and individual consumption of the older chil­
dren.” (Zaluar 1985:103). She says of teenage girls that the problem “‘of parents 
not having money for clothes’ can serve as an incentive to enter into the labour 
market, looking for their own income.” (ibid:103) [my emphasis].16 Caldeira sup­
ports these impressions in her data from a shantytown in Sao Paulo. Although she 
does not possess data with enough detail to show exactly what percentage of chil­
dren’s income is appropriated by the household (as opposed to individually spent) 
(Caldeira 1984:93), she does stress that certain members of the household “work 
to help their husbands or parents. The word help here is not used accidentally: it 
is in this way that this participation into the budget is conceived by the household 
heads, by the children and by the women themselves.” (ibid:92-93).17 As far as 
the parental role in contributing to household income goes, according to Rocinha’s 
residents both parents were responsible to their offspring, but for different aspects 
of their needs, and I concluded that in Rocinha both parents were equally likely 
to neglect these responsibilities. There was good evidence for the existence of the 
stereotypical drunken/gambling male who spent large parts of his wage packet
16Clothes particularly offered the opportunity to escape from being identified as 
“poor”. This is a point (also made by Zaluar) on which I elaborate in Chapter 4.
17We may here have the case supporting Chant. That due to the hegemonic authority 
of the male head, others are not allowed to contribute equally to the household’s income. 
However, that does not take away from the point I am making here, namely, that incomes 
were not necessarily equally pooled in households that had more than one income earner.
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on which the entire family depended on his own vices (of which Chant speaks) 
Equally prominent was the female equivalent (both the stereotype as well as the 
actual examples). Their vices were drink, or (less commonly) gambling, but (more 
often) spending on make-up and unaffordable clothing, at the expense of the rest 
of the household.
In sum, there were many different workable household structures in Rocinha. 
I have given some detail about their workings, thereby challenging some of the 
assumptions made in the literature. Questions need to be answered about the 
reasons for which Rocinha’s residents opted for a certain structure as opposed to 
another one. W hat were the factors which limited their choices, and how read­
ily did households move away from the ideal, normative structure of the nuclear 
family?
My detour on the economic viability of different household structures showed 
that the relative economic efficiency of certain structures is not a strong enough 
factor alone to determine the particular household structure, even though economic 
factors were strong determinants to household members. Particular household 
roles within the household were also shown in the context of other important 
cultural factors.
In Rocinha, the ideal was the nuclear family, and the roles of the members 
within the ideal household structure were those as defined above. Any house­
hold structure that deviated from these normative guides was “less desirable” 
to Rocinha’s people. So, for example, in female-headed single parent households, 
more working members could compensate for the difference in income. They could 
even be economically and socially “better off” than in a nuclear structure. How­
ever, this household structure offended Rocinha’s residents’ sense of order. They 
did not admire a woman running a household by herself. Instead, when the situa­
tion presented itself, the single woman was criticised firstly, for not being a proper 
mother for her children (if there were any), since she was not considered to be 
in a position to do that job properly, and secondly, for depriving the children of 
a father. Gossip accumulated about the reasons for which she did not have a
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male partner like everyone else (she was either a prostitute, gay or “difficult”).18 
Women running households by themselves were not admirable but “m atter out of 
place” (Douglas 1966) and regarded with suspicion. As I mentioned above, the 
women running the action groups were married and publicly recognised to be tied 
down by their husbands. Their roles as political leaders were clearly defined and
— . -,i
limited to certain tasks.
To the residents, a situation of disorganisation (a situation to be avoided) arose 
through a lack of income to meet basic needs. An absent male household head was 
to blame. There was also disorganisation if the patterns of role division within the 
household were disturbed. The absence of key figures also led to disturbance of 
other members’ roles. If the male head was not around, the blame for inadequate 
income was not fully passed on to the female head, since she “cannot be expected 
to cope with everything herself.” It was also disorganisation if the female house­
hold head had to work all day to supplement income, and/or if her absence in 
the home affected her role as the main socialiser of the children, or if the children 
had to spend their time contributing to household income instead of playing,19 in 
education or, when old enough, saving up for their own households. These were 
all situations to be avoided. However, when, due to practical circumstances ideals 
could not be realised, the household structure adapted easily to these circum­
stances. For example, in the case of an absent father, another adult male in the 
household would take on his role. In the case of an absent mother, a neighbour, 
an older daughter, mother’s sister or perhaps a grandmother could take this role.
18I found myself (as a single female household head) constantly in the situation of 
having to answer questions about why I did not have a boyfriend in Rocinha. At one 
stage, rumours went around concerning my alleged weird sexual habits. My neighbours, 
even those I knew intimately, could not understand how I could cope without a male to 
“protect” me during the night, and to carry out all those “male” jobs around the house. 
On occasions, they arranged for someone to take on this role for me (e.g. they insisted 
that someone should sleep in my house during times of shootouts, they recruited men 
to carry water for me at times of water cuts).
19Mothers approved of and encouraged their children to take on odd jobs within 
Rocinha, with which they earned their own pocket money. This was distinct from 
child labour proper, in that it was combined with play and the money earned could be 
substantial, but the household as a whole did not depend on it for its survival.
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In this way, Rocinha’s households were flexible and easily adaptable to changing 
circumstances. As long as these foster household members carried out their job, 
no problems were perceived. This was also illustrated by the ease with which 
different members were adopted into the household.
In terms of the pattern of role division, there were guidelines modelled on 
the nuclear family. These were not flexible. In each respectable household, there 
were some kind of male household head whose responsibility it was to fulfill the 
role of income provider-cum-authority figure. Similarly for a mother figure-cum- 
socialiser.
I conclude therefore, that in Rocinha there were clear ideals as far as kinship 
behaviour was concerned. The ideals (the nuclear household and the large familia) 
provided a normative guide for behaviour for individuals. They prescribed roles 
into which individuals were supposed to slot during their course of life. In ac­
tuality, however, it turned out that few individuals lived out these ideals. The 
structure of the household and wider kinship network was easily changing. They 
were temporary and flexible structures, adaptable to changing circumstances.
Across households, factors like economic status and personality differences were 
very real factors which affected kinship relations. This situation was further en­
couraged by the fact that Rocinha’s people were geographically and economically 
mobile. Their residence, even within Rocinha, was often impermanent, especially 
for the newly married in parental accommodation. Their relative economic mo­
bility also affected kinship relations. And this was encouraged by the fact that 
even within households, incomes were not automatically pooled. These differences 
were allowed to be articulated, adding to the inherent instability of kinship net­
works. Ultimate arrangements depended more on the practical demands of the 
situation. Individual preferences and personality differences counted more than 
abstract loyalties.
The resulting picture is that Rocinha’s families and households were not well 
integrated. Non-nuclear households or disintegrated familias were a common re­
ality for Rocinha and existing structures were flexible. These are all signs that
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in practice, loyalty to kin was not an important priority for Rocinha’s people and 
consequently, it was not well expressed in its social organisation.
Chapter 3
Locality
In the last chapter I looked at people’s loyalty towards their kin. This chapter ex­
amines neighbourhood as socially recognised and distinct, and discusses residents’ 
ties to this locality and the kind of relations they maintained with each other. The 
question which is ultimately important is the extent to which the neighbourhood 
can be used as an analytical tool in the social organisation of Rocinha’s population.
Generally, relations between my neighbours in the beco (alleyway) in which I 
lived were not good. They talked about each other behind their back and com­
plained about each other’s habits. There was a lot of gossip in which bad feeling 
was expressed. It turned out that there was little direct contact between them. 
Each household more or less lived its own life.
Those that had been in the beco for a long time claimed that it had not always 
been that way. There was general agreement among them that nowadays “you 
cannot count on each other’s help any more” (“not even your neighbours”). “In 
the old days” they said, “you knew all the people in your street.” At the time 
of fieldwork, all empty spaces had been filled in with houses. As the people that 
passed through these becos had become increasingly anonymous, locals became 
more suspicious of each other. There was a lot of paranoia about theft. ( “You are 
not safe in your own street any more.”) The plants on the veranda and clothes on 
the washing line were seen at risk. As a result, old-timers nostalgically recalled, 
plants that used to decorate the streets had now been done away with and the 
streets had come to look less friendly. People took precautions against theft by
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building higher walls and bars in their windows and tried to confine themselves 
more to their private space. The separation between private (domestic) and public 
(street) space had grown sharper over time although, as seen below, they still 
considerably overlapped. People attempted to keep to themselves more, behind 
doors, gates, walls and fences. Or, so they said. From my observations, however, 
it was clear that my neighbours (and people throughout Rocinha) extended their 
domestic activities into the public space surrounding their houses. Washing lines 
(always full of clothes) were attached in public space. Roof tops were utilised 
fully. People often sat on doorsteps to pass the time. Washing facilities were 
often located outside the house. The female head of the household (generally the 
person to be at home, if anyone was) spent most of her activities around, rather 
than inside the house.1 The use household members made of their house reminded 
me of the use we make of our tent when we go camping. Crowded conditions and 
bad ventilation inside the house also encouraged residents to do so.
The space immediately surrounding their houses became an extension of these. 
Domestic space overflowed into public space. This is more evidently the case from 
the fact that only when no-one was in, windows and doors were shut. Windows 
were made of wood (seldom with a glass pane) and curtains were rare (if any, 
they were a status symbol and mostly fulfilled a decorative rather than functional 
purpose). There was therefore no further barrier between public and private space.
Additionally,* the livingroom (the space most intensively used) was usually 
located at the front of the house. This room was also the one through which one 
entered from the street into the house and was often the only door into the house. 
In a situation like this, there was a perceived need to encourage the definition of 
boundaries between the inside and the outside of the house.
1Her main activities were washing clothes, cooking, shopping, cleaning the house and 
looking after children. As mentioned above, washing facilities were often located on the 
outside of the house and often shared with other households in public space. (When 
inside the house, there was often a window above the sink.) Children played in the street 
and women spent a lot of their time sitting on the doorstep watching them.
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A high threshold, often marked this boundary. The bottom half of the door 
was kept closed or a knee-high panel was nailed in front of the door.2 Most 
houses had a doormat or floorcloth spread out in the door opening. At informal 
visits, people took off their footwear and left it at the door before entering the 
house. At least once daily, the livingroom floor was swept and mopped to give it 
a shiny appearance. An expensive waxer was a highly valued piece of household 
equipment, and tins of wax took a relatively large proportion of total household 
expenditure. On entry into the house, remarks were often made to apologise about 
the state of the floor. Many people in Rocinha washed their shoes frequently, 
especially their better pairs, which dried on washing lines alongside other clothing.
These cultural devices show the need to mark the inside from the outside of 
the house. Their widespread existence confirms the residents’ attem pt to confine 
domestic activity to the inside of the house and vice versa, to keep dirt out in the 
street, separate from the cleanliness of domestic space (Douglas 1966). This is a 
sign of the precariousness of these boundaries in the first place.
The area immediately surrounding the houses thus was an extension of do­
mestic space which was not quite public space. Other writers have recognised 
the special status of this space. Caldeira (1984), for example, elaborates on this 
idea by using the concept of pedago (Lit: patch of land, turf), taken from Mag- 
nani (1984). Pedago takes its meaning in the contrast between private and public 
space: the space between the city (the strange, the unknown and threatening) 
and the house (the familiar and domestic). It can be used in a geographical as 
well as social sense (Magnani 1984:137). Geographically, pedago is that part of 
the world which its members experience daily because of their similar lifestyles. 
There is something familiar about it because of everyday use. It has a nucleus 
like, for example, the padaria (bakery), the birosca (local pub/corner shop, cafe) 
or the local public telephone which centres residents’ daily activities in certain
2It has to be noted here that these thresholds also served an important practical 
function. They prevented babies and toddlers from crawling out into the street and 
minimised the invasion of rats, mice, cockroaches and many others of a wide range of 
insects, strange dogs and cats and other unwanted visitors.
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ways. Socially, one becomes part of o pedago by exposing one’s family, friendship 
and neighbour ties to other members of one’s pedago and by familiarising oneself 
with those of others.
I am reminded here of Hoggart’s vivid description of the neighbourhood in a 
working class neighbourhood in a British city described through the eyes of the 
little boy who grew up in it. He describes the familiarity of the smells and sounds 
of the streets and the intimacy with which neighbours know each other (Hoggart 
1957:64-68). Caldeira and Magnani argue that this familiarity is reflected in the 
quality of the social relations between members of the same pedago. Among neigh­
bours, they argue, there exists a certain idea of belonging to “us” . These people 
know each other by name and stand in a particular relation to each other ( “friend 
of so-and-so”, “lives in the house next to so-and-so”). There exists a certain con­
tract between them and gossip defines the agreed codes of behaviour. According 
to Magnani, even strangers can become part of o pedago by going through the 
ritual do me (sharing a drink in the local bar during which they could expose 
the familiar to the locals, whose trust and protection they can thereafter enjoy) 
(Magnani 1984:135, 139).
Below, I want to examine to what extent this pedago concept is useful as an 
analytical tool in Rocinha. I will argue that to a certain extent there is always a 
sense of geographical belonging to a particular place of residence. In that weak 
sense, therefore, the concept is a truism. It does not follow that this shared space 
is actively transformed into a clearly visible social space. I.e. the familiarity of 
o pedago is not necessarily reflected in the quality of social relations between the 
members of o pedago. It is the degree to which this was the case in Rocinha which 
is at issue.
The degree to which one shared neighbours’ lives in Rocinha’s becos was high. 
The physical layout of beco space was conducive to this. The narrow becos echoed 
sound, and conversations that took place below, beside or above your house could 
easily be overheard. Anyone passing through could be accurately inspected. In­
deed, many housewives spent a large part of their day in the window or on the 
doorstep overseeing beco life. Children played in these becos, running up and down
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the narrow corridors, chasing insects, sliding on bits of cardboard, making up toys 
from bits and pieces they found. This was especially true since (as seen above) 
households did not confine their domestic activities to the insides of their house.
The familiarity of faces, sounds and smells (of which Hoggart speaks) is very 
clearly recalled in my memory of living in one of Rocinha’s becos. The members 
of my beco knew the faces of most of the people that passed through, they could 
identify the sounds as those of particular people and their activities at certain 
times of the day (c.f. Caldeira 1984:119). Sounds were not anonymous noise. The 
extent to which this was true is illustrated in this diary entry I made at the time.
. . .  The people of my beco have a lot in common: We pass the 
same shop, where the portugues (Portuguese) sits in the window. We 
watch the rats flee when we step over the drain at the entrance of our 
beco. We watch a certain group of individuals drinking and gambling 
at the corner bar. We suffer from the strong stench of the garbage 
dump around the corner. We all queue at the padaria (bakery) for our 
morning rolls and bags of milk. We stand in the same long queues 
for the occasionally working public telephone. We do most of our 
shopping in the same supermarket, and we get our fresh stuff from our 
local Sunday market. We use the same bus stop for going into town 
and we see each other on a Saturday morning on the beach, together 
with all the other folk. We all have sleepless nights when the gangs 
are shooting at each other and complain to each other about them the 
following day. We together speculate about what might have happened 
and when it will end. During times of many shootouts, we are all shaky 
and bounce up at loud noises, paranoid of another attack and ready 
to dive into a safe hideout.
During the hotter nights, we sit up on our verandas, or lean out 
of our windows, whispering to each other and waiting for our houses 
to cool down a bit more so we can go back inside for another attem pt 
to sleep. We collectively listen to crying babies from the neighbour 
and to loud arguments and insults yelled back and forth between the 
couple that lives behind us . . .  We speculate on when our water tanks 
will fill up again. We get up at 4 a.m. to be the first to take a shower 
while the water lasts. We inquire into each other’s ability to cope and 
where we can go for more water, whose tank has filled up first and 
someone’s complaint to the Associagao [Residents Association] about 
these continual shortages . . .
There was always conversation and interaction relating to any of these events 
between neighbours. We had a lot in common and shared many traum atic and
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important events in our daily lives. In virtue of this common experience, we shared 
a certain “us” identity. People from other areas also identified us as a unit in this 
way. They would tell us: “You lot” had a bad time last week (with the shootouts), 
“your beco” is particularly bad for violence, overcrowding, lack of water. In this 
sense also my beco, was a clearly defined unit “o nosso beco” (our alleyway). And 
ours was short, narrow and dead-ending. It had no side streets and it was lined 
with houses on both sides. Those, whose doors opened into this street, belonged 
to “o povo do nosso beco” (the people of our alleyway).
There were other physical factors that were conducive to the formation of the 
pedago as a distinct social space. These were to do with how the pedago fitted 
into the rest of Rocinha and the means by which it communicated with the world 
at large. Communication systems inside Rocinha (e.g. state services such as mail 
delivery and public telephones) were only very partly in place or absent altogether. 
They were largely informally organised and they depended on networks between 
neighbours. Vice versa, they created involvement between members of the same 
pedago. Most of these services had become centered around biroscas (compare with 
Magnani 1984:137). Biroscas had, in that sense, become invaluable little pedago 
centres on which neighbours depended for the fulfillment of these services.
Firstly, birosqueiros (Lit: the managers of the biroscas) had become central in 
the task of mail distribution. Mail was not normally delivered to the door but 
to important land marks such as biroscas, churches or other organisations. Our 
electricity bills, for example, were distributed through the local birosqueiro at the 
end of our beco. The birosqueiro delivered our bills as we passed his shop daily. In 
most parts of Rocinha, birosqueiros served this function. One depended therefore 
on their goodwill and initiative for the arrival of one’s mail.3 An official address 
system had been imposed onto Rocinha by the electricity company (Light) in order 
to work out electricity bills for its customers. However, these addresses were not
3A large pile of out of date mail was searched through to find a postcard that I had 
addressed to a neighbour. This was evidence that in this system many letters remained 
undelivered.
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used by the locals apart from in the delivery of these bills. Indigenous names of 
some becos and main streets appeared in it, but most were labelled and numbered 
by the company. Except for the occasional one in Bairro Barcelos, there were no 
name plates in Rocinha. By far the majority of streets and becos were unlabelled 
and unnumbered.4
Similarly, contacting a particular person in Rocinha inevitably involved biros­
queiros at some stage. As biroscas featured as geographical markers, points that 
stood out in the maze-like unlabelled streets, they were used in explanations of the 
whereabouts of some place (e.g. “Behind so-and-so’s bar” , “Turn left at so-and-so’s 
bar”), and were used as places where people arranged to meet. They also acted as 
local information centres (e.g. to find out where someone’s house was, you were 
told the way to a certain birosca “and you ask there”). If you wanted to leave 
a message for someone who usually followed the same track, or if you wanted to 
know if s/he was in and did not want to bother walking any further uphill, the 
birosqueiro would help you out. If there were any posters advertising local events, 
they would be pinned up around their biroscas. They were usually located along a 
main trail, or where two important ones met, and often they made a good stop for 
those going uphill to catch their breath and rest out of the bright sunshine, while 
the birosqueiro supplied a glass of cold water. S/he would join in while sharing a 
drink with friends and catching up with the local gossip.
These places were also used by locals for commercial purposes. If you needed 
a small repair job done, you consulted them about the local availability of such a 
service and they mediated in such small commercial dealings. The birosca usually 
acted as a local all-purpose shop, where you got your fresh rolls and your sack
4A street sign and door number was a sign of prestige, something that belonged 
no asfalto (Lit: on the asphalt, i.e. in non-shantytown neighbourhoods, where streets 
were usually paved), not no morro. (This was another reason why Bairro Barcelos was 
more like no asfalto and not like the rest of Rocinha. It was the only part of Rocinha 
where street names and house numbers were used and visible.) Towards the end of my 
fieldwork, I discovered (to my surprise) that the building I shared with other households 
(not in Bairro Barcelos), had a street number which someone had chalked onto the door: 
a back-to-front nine, barely legible.
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of milk in the morning. Small children were sent there to collect last-minute 
messages (an ounce of butter, a few cloves of garlic, an onion, a bar of soap). 
Or some major shopping could be done there if you had too little time for an 
expedition to the supermarket. Little children spent their small change there on 
sweets and homemade picole (ice lolly) and they sold single cigarettes and snacks. 
The birosqueiro could even give you a small interest-free loan in desperate times, 
or could sell you small items on credit, to be paid off some time in the future.
Biroscas were usually run by members of the same household, often a middle- 
aged couple, sometimes helped out by their grown up children. They stayed open 
as long as there was clientele, which meant an early rise to serve some breakfast 
on their way to work, until la te  at night when the clientele usually changed as 
the place would be frequented by some of the local drunks. Birosqueiros were 
often brought up in Rocinha and were familiar with local developments. They 
also shared the locals’ preferences and habits (compare with Machado da Silva 
1969). They might have given up their job after many years and decided to invest 
their savings into changing their house into a bar and investing in a small stock 
of goods. Since the cost of living for them was slightly lower (from consuming 
goods bought at reduced prices through wholesale and good contacts) and they 
owned their own little businesses, birosqueiros enjoyed perhaps a slightly more 
secure lifestyle than the average Rocinha person. However, their savings were 
often reinvested into their business, or into the education of their children, and 
their lifestyle was therefore not much different from their customers’.
Birosqueiros were largely self-sufficient except for employing younger children 
in the neighbourhood or others looking for odd jobs, to carry supplies uphill. As 
they were very much rooted into neighbourhood affairs, they often made valuable 
contributions to politically active groups. They were often key figures in such 
groups (see also in Chapter 7). This centralising role was further encouraged by 
the fact that many birosqueiros possessed a telephone. For the purpose of entering 
into contact with people who lived outside Rocinha (especially patrons, employees) 
and vice versa, for outsiders to contact a Rocinha resident (e.g. for an answer to a
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job application), the importance of the telephone cannot be underestimated.5 The 
few existing public telephones were rarely in working order and only occasionally 
got repaired. They were situated along main streets only. Queues in front of 
those that happened to be in working order were long. The need for a secure 
income over a long time was a prerequisite for the purchase of a telephone which 
few people in Rocinha had. Those who acquired one, instantly became “leaders” . 
They could now be reached by major contacts from outside and had first access to 
valuable information. They became the centre from which neighbourhood gossip 
spread, since messages were left for many neighbours, and one could see queues of 
waiting (gossiping) callers in a telephone owner’s living room and around a birosca 
equipped with a telephone.
In all these ways, the birosca served as a kind of local neighbourhood centre. It 
acted as a focus of pedago activity. In the first instance, these geographical units 
much resembled o pedago of which Caldeira and Magnani speak. However, they 
claim that the familiarity and cooperation between members of the same pedago 
creates a sense of belonging which is reflected in the quality of their social rela­
tions and they use the concept of locality to analyse the social organisation of the 
shantytown residents under investigation. Zaluar, for example, explicitly claims: 
“A representagao da localidade e uma das mais importantes na ideologia do pobre 
urbano desta cidade.” (Lit: Locality is one of the most important representations 
in the ideology of the urban poor of this shantytown.) (Zaluar 1985:175). I would 
argue, however, that before any conclusions can be drawn about the importance 
of locality to the social organisation of Rocinha, two further issues have to be 
investigated. The first of these is whether this alleged pedago unity was reified in 
social practice. Given there existed all this potential for neighbourhood coopera­
tion within the pedago unit, was there evidence of mobilisation around these local 
issues? It turned out that (as Zaluar found to be the case in Cidade de Deus) if
5This is especially true since Brazilians who did not live in a morro had a particular 
idea about them. In general, they accused anyone who entered them as mad in view 
of the lethal risks they thought they took when doing so. In many cases, entering into 
contact with a Rocinha resident was thus impossible except by telephone.
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we look at Rocinha’s action groups (as will be clear in later chapters), Rocinha 
was politically divided along territorial lines. I would argue, however, that this 
was not (as Zaluar concludes) evidence for the existence of this loyalty at more 
local levels. This is borne out by the fact that, if we look at the quality of social 
relations between neighbours at the local level (which is the second issue to be 
dealt with below), we find that it was such that the apparent failure to mobilise 
around local issues was not surprising.
There were many problems which the members of our pedago shared. We were 
all subjected to the shortage of water, for example. It affected some houses more 
than others depending on the position of the house in relation to the main water 
network, but it affected everybody to some extent and forced us into cooperation. 
However, no collective action was successfully taken to overcome this problem. 
Solutions were found (e.g. keys were briefly loaned for access to the houses of 
those who did have water temporarily and trips to alternative water sources were 
made), but these measures were only privately undertaken and when collectively, 
only with one’s best friends. Similarly, we were all subjected to the violence and 
the disturbing presence of the drug traffickers in our beco. Instead of the problems 
arising from their presence being solved collectively, they led to conflicts dividing 
neighbours against each other.
There were two points in particular about which long standing disagreements 
existed between neighbours. These were both related to the presence of the traffick­
ers. The first dispute concerned street lighting. This was crucial to the traffickers 
since bad visibility meant that they were vulnerable to attacks from patrolling 
police and rival gangs. The situation with regard to street lighting in our beco was 
“irregular” in that it consisted of bulbs privately fitted onto the outside of people’s 
houses. Residents themselves were responsible for switching these on and off and 
the costs of running these was supposed to be divided between them. There were 
people who never paid their share and there were also sharp disagreements about 
the times at which these lights were to be turned on and off.6
6 On a few occasions people banged on the door of the person in charge (by virtue of
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The other m atter over which neighbours argued was the possibility of fixing a 
gate at the entrance of our beco. This would shut out the traffickers. (This solution 
had been used in other parts of Rocinha.)7 In response to my questions as to why 
no gate had been put up, the blame was put on “certain families at the end of 
the beco who refuse to cooperate” , in the same way as “they refuse to cooperate” 
with the bill for public lights, and in the same way as they demand that the lights 
be switched on at night, which helped the traffickers. The implication was that 
these families cooperated with “them” rather than with “us”. These accusations 
matched the way neighbours accused each other of behaving like “them”.
These examples are instructive about the nature of neighbourhood relations. 
Apparently, neighbours failed to even attem pt to resolve this situation collectively; 
the presence of the traffickers led to mutual accusations instead of unity between 
them. Two possible conclusions can be drawn about the reasons for the outcome 
of this situation. The first one was the most obvious from listening to neigh­
bours’ complaints about each other. That neighbours were divided between those 
who “cooperate with the traffickers” and those who condemned their presence. 
Alternatively, one could argue, that all objected to their presence but they were 
internally divided to such an extent (for other reasons) that they could not manage 
to cooperate over even a subject as serious as that. At issue is therefore the ques­
tion of the extent to which the traffickers were perceived as a threat to domestic 
order and how this threat affected relations between neighbours.
The traffickers’ bocas8 were strategically located in narrow becos, through which
the location of the meter inside her domestic space) and shouted loud demands for the 
fights to be turned on. In response, the latter yelled back that if they wanted them on 
they should also pay for them, showing her resentment and special authority over this 
matter.
70nce in the past this had been done, I was told, but the gate had been demolished 
by the traffickers soon afterwards with warnings to the initiators of the idea.
8One-of-the main drugbarons of Rio de Janeiro was based in Rocinha and operated a 
network of tightly organised and heavily armed sub-chefes who, in turn, were in charge 
of a large number of teenagers (some girls but mostly boys) employed to staff specific 
locations (bocas) where drugs were bought and sold.
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vehicular access was impossible and therefore were sheltered from police patrols. 
One of them was located in my beco.9 The teenagers who guarded these were 
armed, their guns visibly stuck in the rim of their cotton bermudas, and they 
played with them, getting them out for comparison and discussion. Most of them 
grew up in Rocinha. They knew their way around extremely well and this was 
an essential requirement for their job. One of my neighbours often talked of some 
of them as having grown up with her son (21) and as knowing their mothers and 
whereabouts of the rest of their families. They were in our beco most days and 
nights. Mostly they were alone, but at times in pairs, and several times a day a 
group of them got together there. When alone, they flirted with the local girls 
while waiting for a friend to come with news, their food or a drug deal. They 
watched us hanging out our washing, taking care of our children, going shopping, 
chatting to friends. Occasionally we exchanged Smalltalk. Sometimes they asked 
politely to use our toilet. Sometimes (e.g. when the weather was bad) someone 
offered one a glass of water. This communication usually only happened when 
they were on their own. Most of the time, we just looked at them looking at us.
They sat on our doorsteps, and stored bundles of money and drugs under the 
slates, in the drain pipes and behind the window shutters of our houses. We 
disturbed their dealings when we forced them to make room for us to pass. In 
these situations we tried hard to ignore them and not to see what we were not 
supposed to see, and did our best to minimise contact. When they got together, 
we saw them snorting cocaine and we smelled the smoke of their hashish cigarettes. 
We saw them counting their piles of 5,000 Cruzeiro notes (the value of the monthly 
minimum salary at the time was roughly 10 to 16 of those notes) and sachets of 
cocaine and we heard them discussing the instructions from their gerentes (Lit: 
bosses, managers of the bocas) and recent police or gang raids on other bocas.
Neighbours complained about the mess they left (wrappings of take-away 
lunches, empty cigarette packets). They complained about them urinating against 
the house and flattening carefully tended plants. One or two of them were always
9In Chapter 8 I expand on the operation and organisation of these 1 laffickers.
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there. We knew them by name and we could easily identify their mates and their 
regular clients. We knew their bosses and how they related to them. When we 
had not seen them for a while, we speculated on what accounted for their absence. 
This is one of my diary entries:
I wake up with a loud bang of a gun shot. My heart beats like 
mad, and I lie pressed flat on my bed. I reach out for the window 
and push it closed. I am too far away from the door to close it, and 
it worries me but I am too scared to get up to do so. Outside there 
is a dead silence. I calculate the direction from which the shot must 
have come, and lie there waiting for the next one. More shots. I crawl 
against the wall as far as I can and keep thinking about that open door. 
Minutes go by. It seems like an hour, before I can hear some shuffling 
at the end of our beco. Then, light tennis shoes running about, excited 
voices whispering. My heart still beating away, I raise my head a bit to 
hear best what is going on outside. Noises have moved into a different 
direction and they get weaker. After a while, I get the courage to 
get up to the window and I can see neighbours’ doors and windows 
cracking open and heads peeping out, ready to dive back in at the 
slightest noise. Those at the street level stay closed, as they are every 
night, even despite the heat and almost total lack of ventilation. Some 
start whispering across the street, trying to find out what happened.
It takes a while to get back to sleep. Questions are going round inside 
our heads. Whose voices were these? What kind of guns did they use?
Did anyone get hurt? Are the people at the ground level okay?
Shoot-outs, of which this is an example, occurred frequently during the period 
of my fieldwork. They were the consequence of gangwars and police raids and they 
occurred mostly at night, when targets were more easily caught unaware with poor 
visibility.10
At first hand, the account of our experience of the gangs appears paradoxical. 
The teenagers were, on the one hand, publicly ignored and ostracised. On the other 
hand, they were carefully approached and attempts were made to incorporate them 
into our daily lives (a few exchanges of words, or, very occasionally, of favours). 
The fear the gangs inspired, the threat they posed to domestic order and the 
consequent reaction of outcasting them is clearly there. The members of the gangs
10Hence the importance of street lighting.
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conformed to the image of “the men who make themselves respected”. 0  Chefao 
(Lit: The Big Boss, the drugbaron who was based in Rocinha) was said to never 
be seen in public without his team of heavily armed body guards. His sub-chefes 
or gerentes publicly displayed their machine guns and other arms inside Rocinha. 
Assassinations between gang members were known to be extremely violent and 
cruel. One morning, the visibly mutilated dead body of one of those teenagers 
was lying on our garbage dump, exposed for all to see. Indeed o bandido (the 
criminal) has no choice but to relie on his own resources to settle accounts and 
maintain power. He cannot use other mechanisms conventionally used in the 
society with which he is at odds. Among his own resources, violence and cruelty 
are most effective (Hobsbawn 1969).
This image of fear was also clearly illustrated by the belief that the streets 
were unsafe after dark. In the early evening hours the streets were empty except 
for small groups around local bars, and people hurrying home from work. In parts 
of Rocinha with which one was not familiar, it was considered “dangerous” to be 
on the streets at night. Coming back from evening meetings, people accompanied 
each other to their doorsteps and stayed in each other’s houses if they lived too 
far apart. One neighbour forced her daughter to decline a valuable job offer since 
it required her to leave the house in the dark. Only vagabundo (general term to 
refer to those who are “up to no good”) were about on the streets at night; those 
who did not work and drank all night and those associated with the traffickers.
Children from an early age were instructed to stay away from traffickers and 
much of the residents’ conversation centered around how to keep their children 
from associating with them. There were rumours that children were easy victims. 
They were said to be used by the traffickers initially as aviaozinhos (Lit: little 
aeroplanes) carrying messages between the members of the gang or acting as an 
intermediary between the traffickers and their clientele, in return for sweets or 
other small rewards. As their involvement with the traffickers increased, it was 
believed to be inevitable that they became drawn into the gangs’ activities further. 
Sweets became cigarettes and sooner or later payment in kind; a cut from their 
friends’ trouxinho (a small packet of drugs).
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“Drugs” (drogas) were thought to be immediately addictive, and little distinc­
tion was made between the different kinds. There existed an attitude of strong 
disapproval towards the use of drugs. They were believed to make you violent and 
sexually perverted. Bad bandits were those that used their guns not only to rob 
the residents of their possessions on the street, but the worst ones were reputed to 
invade someone’s house for robbery and/or to sexually abuse them. Rumours of 
robbery and rape in the victim’s house were constantly in circulation and clearly 
formed part of the residents’ conception of the traffickers’ wickedness.
Traffickers were also believed to be an extremely bad example to children. 
The trafficker was believed to use bad language, and to have other bad manners 
(urinated in public, did not dress respectably (often went around bare-chested)). 
Most accusations were linked to the more general failure of the bandido to respect 
the worker (o trabalhador) and the values associated with this category.
Those that worked (trabalhadores) were moradores (residents); they were as­
sociated with having a home and belonging to a family. 0  trabalhador, as the 
head of the family was respected as an income provider. The extent to which s/he 
was respected depended on how well s/he provided for her/his family, how well 
mannered the children were, and the state of the house. In the opposing cate­
gory was the bandido who lived on the street ( “Fica por at”) in public space, the 
category of dirt. The bandido thus challenged all the values associated with the 
trabalhador concerning family organisation and social respectability. This is why 
their presence in o nosso beco (which was an extension of our domestic space) was 
perceived as a real threat and communication with them was minimised.11
The traffickers inspired fear and were seen as a threat. Yet, residents also saw 
these teenagers as bored and wasted and suffering all weather extremes. They 
saw them violently maltreated by police and their colleagues, and they knew that
11 There existed another species of criminal in Rocinha, namely those that made a 
living out of robbing richer folk in the streets (no asfalto). 0  pivete was also armed 
(knives, guns) and was generally thought to be only active outside Rocinha. Sometimes 
s/he acted in organised gangs, usually in a pair. Pivetes did not necessarily take part in 
drug trafficking, but posed the same threat to the trabalhador and his family.
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their life expectancy was short. Moreover, they built up a relation with them. 
The fact that these teenagers shared their language and culture might explain 
this sympathy with them. Moreover, according to my neighbours, the sorry state 
of these teenagers could be accounted for by their falta de educagao (they were 
ignorantes): the fact that their mother was not in a position (nao teve condigoes) 
to take proper care of them, which led them into this vice.12 The drugs themselves 
were believed to account for their violence and other disturbing behaviour. Often 
long-term unemployment was seen as a contributing cause of their involvement. 
Unemployment, in turn, was held to be the government’s fault. The government 
(o governo) was also to blame for the low salaries which were inadequate to sup­
port the worker and their families. Working long hours in humiliating jobs, for a 
monthly income which in the end did not even feed the family, was believed to lead 
to revolta, protest. (“A gente tern que roubar assim.” (Lit: People have no option 
but to steal this way.).) These were explanations used by the residents themselves, 
for the loss of faith in the work ethic. The image of the proud worker was grad­
ually transformed into a coward (otario) who passively accepted bad treatment 
for bad pay. There existed a strong sense that one was being exploited and that 
something was wrong. (uAlguma coisa nao esta certof (C.f. Zaluar 1985).)
The teenagers were thus exempted from blame for the state they were in. In 
this way, the bandido was also a rebel who rejected societal values of oppression. 
Other residents identified with him/her, as they were subjected to and disapproved 
of these same pressures. The bandido was therefore an anti-conformist, who was 
free in a sense that the worker was not (Hobsbawn 1969).13 Thus, those who “made
12Because the mother was responsible for moral and school education for their children. 
See also Chapter 2.
13Bandidos, although they were anti-conformist, differed from other types of rebels 
like those that were active in action groups, the “revolutionaries”. Bandidos took on a 
form of self-help within the traditional order. They set up a system which was parasitic 
on the status quo. They were pragmatic and not prophets. The bandido, had no new 
visions, s/he was part of the culture in which s/he acted and essentially shared its value 
system. S/he only rejected that part of it which held up the state hierarchy. This 
distinction clarifies the nature of the bandido’s rebellious status.
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it” in this world of criminality indeed became a kind of hero to the people. Some of 
them corresponded to a Robin Hood-type image; a heroic figure who is universally 
present in all cultures (Hobsbawn 1969). To a certain extent they celebrated the 
opposition between “us” and “them”, between the poor (os pobres) and the rich (os 
ricos), who, in a sense, formed different moral communities (Bailey 1966) (See also 
Chapter 4). The ideal bandit took from o rico (who, in any case, stole their wealth 
from o pobre in the first place) and redistributed it among those who deserved it. 
S/he thus rights wrongs. S/he was the champion, in that s/he (as one of “us”) 
was successful in a society which favoured “them” (and marginalised “us”). The 
law (which treated both as criminals) differed here from public opinion.
In reality however, this distinction was not clear-cut. The shantytown Robin 
Hood left much to be desired and this identification was clearly an ambiguous 
one. However, this hero element was certainly visible. The big Chefao of Rocinha 
threw elaborate parties, where supplies of chope and churrasco (beer and barbecued 
meats) were lavish, on his account.14 He was said to subsidise parties for weddings 
and funeral expenses of his shantytown neighbours, and helped them with the cost 
of essentials like school uniforms. He provided a large part of the costs towards 
the bloco’s (Carnival club) outfit. Rumours had it that he bribed the judges into 
promoting them.15
Despite the picture of them being violent, cruel and fear inspiring, people as­
sured me that the traffickers fought only among themselves and against police. 
They did not involve outsiders against their will in their world of drugs and vio­
lence. (“Eles nao mexem com morador.” (Lit: They do not involve the resident.).)
14On his birthday, the Chefao sealed off the two main entrances to part of Rocinha 
and treated all its inhabitants to a party. As well as providing lavish supplies of food 
and drink (appropriate to a complete celebration), he also displayed a huge collection 
of weapons to the public. In October 1985 he also launched an enormous pre-election 
party (see Chapter 8).
15Rocinha had two blocos carnavalescos, with their own quadras (courtyards where 
they prepared and practiced). During the year the blocos prepared an outfit which was 
displayed competitively at Carnival time (o desfile). The winner of one desfile, was 
promoted to a higher league the following year.
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Once you are involved you cannot change your mind, however. Anyone who got 
assassinated by them had only themselves to blame, so they said. It was only the 
very bad bandit who involved the morador in his world against his will.
The Chefao was also the big patron of the shantytown: he both provided as 
well as protected them. In the absence of state authorities, the bandido filled 
in the power vacuum. They said that in conflicts between residents, the drug 
gangs could be called on for “protection” and/or to settle disputes. O pivete 
who robbed moradores in Rocinha was rumoured to be punished by 0  Chefao’s 
heavies. Similarly, misbehaviour within the gang’s network was thought to be 
severely punished. In a sense then, they acted as an internal police force. And in 
view of the extremely bad image the state police force had in Rocinha (see also 
in Chapter 8), they were “our” armed force against “theirs” . It was mainly from 
this position that the Chefao got his image as a protector. Yet at the same time, 
people were aware of the fact that the more established he became in his position, 
the more ambiguous his image became. His relation to the locals increasingly came 
to be identified as a powerful boss, who was corrupt and ruled over us, just like 
the authorities did.16
The traffickers threatened the order of the domestic world, and moreover, they 
posed a threat against which the residents could not take action. Thus, there 
existed a basic situation of conflict. One possible response to such a situation, 
is to outcast the evil agent. Given that these were enemies who could not be 
challenged by any other means, this was one obvious way to gain social advantage 
over them. And, in fact, the way the traffickers were ostracised was comparable 
to the ascription of witchcraft in some societies. The gangs represented the “stan­
dardized nightmares of the community” (Wilson, quoted in Lewis 1976:84). As 
we have seen, many of the characteristics attributed to them were the  inverse of
16He would always be in opposition to the hierarchy of the authorities and in that sense 
he would never become one of “them”. Yet, to be successful he had to make connections 
with traditional wealth and power. (For example, he needs a stable clientele for his 
drugs, secure financial backing from banks, some sort of agreements with police (to 
ensure the safety of his business).) He therefore inevitably moved towards becoming one 
of “them”.
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the community’s ideals of respectability and decency. Moreover, the image the 
morador had of the bandido exaggerated in many ways their experience of them. 
Charges levelled against them were often irrational and they imputed a degree of 
mystical malevolence. All public association with them was carefully avoided, and 
talk about them had to be hidden (whispered) for fear of the belief that “they 
will get you next” . Whenever something went wrong, people whispered that “ 0  
Chefao is behind this”. There was a morbid fascination with the power associated 
with the gangs and their omnipotence in shantytown affairs. (See also Chapter 
8.) People who did not get along also accused each other of this form of evil. 
Neighbours accused each other of behaving like the traffickers. These accusations 
were highly charged since the values associated with o bandido were the antithesis 
of those of the respectable worker and family person.
The human tendency of playing down the defects of our own behaviour and 
that of people like “us” , while exaggerating the imperfections of people like “them” 
were at work here (Pocock 1975:210). One family, for example, barely communi­
cated with another family. The charges against them were that the adult members 
of that family did not have a proper job (they went to the beach during weekday 
“work” hours), they dressed in a sexually explicit way, they had children with no 
legitimate fathers, and these were allowed to run about lose in the streets. These 
criticisms reflect exactly those values associated with the bandido. (The rejection 
of a proper job, the family structure and other aspects of domestic order.) The 
“inability to find work” of their own offspring became “unwillingness to work” 
and “laziness” of the rival family. The fact that the head of the first family was 
looking after the illegitimate offspring of her own daughter did not make the latter 
“sexually promiscuous” in the way the neighbour’s daughter was condemned. This 
also explains what appeared curiously contradictory at first sight: that one neigh­
bour strongly condemned another (rival) for associating with o bandido, while not 
questioning the fact that they maintained the same kind of contact with the local 
bandit themselves. “Expressing concern for one’s fellow citizen” became: deliber­
ate “flirting with o vagabundo”. Sympathy for the “many families whose houses 
are too small for their children to play indoors”, somehow turned into accusations
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of deliberately “allowing these kids to mix with o bandido”. The accusation of 
“refusing to cooperate” with a collective attem pt to solve the problems arising 
from the presence of the traffickers in our beco, was of the same nature.17 It is 
interesting to note that these allegations were never made in the presence of the 
accused. The accusations therefore never led to confrontations, they stayed in the 
realm of gossip. There were witchcraft accusations, but never any witchhunts. As 
a result, tension in social relations created by these allegations remained and was 
never resolved. (See Chapter 8 for the details on why these accusations, and for 
that m atter, any subject m atter relating to the traffickers and their doings, were 
forbidden public territory.)
This is evidence for the fact that my neighbours were highly divided against one 
another. There existed cliques between them, each accusing members of the other 
of “unrespectable behaviour”. If we look at their actual behaviour, we find that 
they shared the same model of respectability and its antithesis (the behaviour of 
the traffickers). Real behavioural differences and fundamental differences of goals 
were therefore not at the basis of these neighbourhood divisions.
These findings firstly refute our first hypothesis: that neighbours could not 
agree to mobilise against the traffickers’ presence because they were divided in 
kind: between those who condemned and those who cooperated with them. Sec­
ondly, they are evidence against a picture of local neighbourhood unity and the 
social cohesion between the members of one pedago. Magnani and Caldeira’s as­
sumptions about the nature of social relations within the pedago were not true for 
Rocinha. There was a sense of familiarity between members of the same pedago in 
that the relations between them were not anonymous. So, some people, particu­
larly those who had been in the beco for a long time, greeted each other with short 
comments and some even stopped for a few words. All knew some personal details 
about the other and some referred to each other by name. However, most were only
17Rival politicians of different action groups also accused each other of maintaining 
links with the gangs and these accusations were hotly contested. Mere suspicion of 
contact with gang members was enough to ruin one’s credibility in this political scene.
I will elaborate on this in Chapters 7 and 8.
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known through indirect contact, from observation after many hours of leaning out 
of the window, from overhearing bits of conversation and overseeing major events 
like parties, weddings, and visits from relatives or friends. This personal informa­
tion had been gathered indirectly and stayed at the level of stereotypes - a higher 
level of generalisation than that gathered directly (like that between members of 
the same household or close friends). I am referring here to a process similar to 
that of simplification which occurs when any level of society engages with another. 
(For example, the reductionism which occurs when a small community is forced to 
communicate the characteristics of its identity to the members of the larger society 
of which it forms a part (c.f. Cohen 1982:8).) People’s images of each other in 
Rocinha stayed in this impersonal realm. They were highly simplified. They were 
about “W hat people think” and “What they will say” and they were reinforced by 
media stereotypes (c.f. Frankenberg on relations between neighbours on British 
housing estates (Frankenberg 1966) and Bell’s analysis of gossip (Bell 1974)). As 
they talked about each other, rather than to each other, their relations did not go 
beyond this level. These stereotypes caused a lot of speculation between friends 
and were expressed in the gossip which was rife within Rocinha’s pedagos.
My interpretation of this widespread existence of gossip therefore contrasts 
with Caldeira’s. She sees it in a positive sense; as evidence of the existence of a 
collective contract and hence as evidence of the agreement between members of 
the pedago about certain codes of behaviour which are implicitly expressed in this 
gossip (Caldeira 1984:121-123). I would argue that the existence of gossip was 
evidence of the contrary: it was an expression of difference, of singling out those 
who did not conform and hence could be seen as a sign of insecurity about these 
rules. It was not a sign of social cohesion. Moreover, the gossip itself contributed 
to this situation, since the accusations implicit in it had a divisive effect (c.f. Bell 
1974). This was clear in the case of allegations about the associations with the 
traffickers.
Zaluar touches on this point. She recognises the presence of gossip as a strongly 
divisive element in the neighbourhood. She admits that this comes to her as a
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surprise (“ . . .  creating an unexpected conflict area.”) (Zaluar 1985:125)18 and 
admits that it remains a question mark to her (“The disturbing presence of envy, a 
feared weapon, mentioned and criticised by them, but, judging from its maleficent 
effects, also very effective, remained to me a question mark.”) (ibid:125).19 She 
ignores it as important evidence which contradicts her conclusions about the close 
association and social cohesion within the neighbourhood.
When dismissing people’s loyalty to their neighbourhood in Rocinha, we have 
to account for one more question which emerges in later chapters. This is the 
fact that action groups were divided along territorial lines. Each bairro had its 
own “community centre” with a handful of local “leaders” . This evidence has 
been considered by others as evidence for the existence of strong loyalty to local 
neighbourhood and the strength of the locality principle in the social organisation 
of the shantytown. For example, Zaluar uses the concept of pedago in this way 
for Cidade de Deus. She claims that each pedago has its own organisations, and 
locals identify with them. Moreover, the units of gang territoriality correspond 
to the residents’ identification with these units. Each gang has their pedago to 
defend. Pedago is, according to Zaluar, therefore reflected both in community 
organisation as well as gang organisation (Zaluar 1985:175-180). It is from this 
evidence mainly that she deduces the importance of the locality principle at all 
levels of organisation in Cidade de Deus.
There is a confusion of levels of analysis here. Zaluar’s pedagos are Rocinha’s 
bairros. Magnani and Caldeira do not specify their level of analysis, and that in 
itself suggests a confusion of different levels. I would argue that these different 
levels of analysis should be kept clearly separate. One cannot deduce the existence 
of loyalty to the neighbourhood merely on the basis of evidence from material 
about the organisation of action groups (which is what Zaluar does, and others
18“. .. criando uma area de conflito nao esperadoP (Zaluar 1985:125)
19 “A presenga inquietante da inveja, uma arma muito temida, mencionada e criticada 
entre eles, mas, a julgar pelos efeitos maleficos, tambem muito eficaz, ficou-me como um 
ponto de interrogagao” (ibid:125)
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who claim the importance of territoriality in shantytowns’ political organisation). 
In a later chapter, we look closely at the factors which determined organisation 
at this higher level. We conclude that the resulting social formations at this level 
were determined to a large extent by factors which lie outside the shantytown 
and community politics was largely shaped according to the structure of outside 
resources, i.e. there were externally imposed political forces at work at this level.
One cannot claim that in Rocinha locality was a strong organising principle just 
because its action groups united people of the same bairro and their strength was 
derived from the fact that its members had something in common, i.e. they shared 
the historical development of the bairro, fought the same battles and suffered from 
the same infrastructural problems (which were particular to particular bairros, as 
shown in Chapter 1). This is an idea used in the language of Rocinha’s politicians, 
since the externally determined political framework demanded that politicians jus­
tify themselves in this way. The politician in Rocinha had to show representativity 
and also was set up to compete against the action groups of other shantytowns 
and those of other bairros within Rocinha. This above claim responded to both 
of these demands. It justified their claim of representativity. It also allowed them 
to claim their resources on the basis of the needs in view of the historical struggle 
and suffering of their particular bairro. The structure of the resources outside 
the shantytown thus encouraged the use of territorial identification, at least in 
language.
Besides, evidence from action groups’ activities contradicted these claims of 
loyalty to particular bairros and hence the strength of the territoriality principle. 
In practice, people moved around between different action groups based in separate 
bairros, and this was not a problem or even worth comment. (For example, ASPA’s 
key employees were from all over Rocinha. They lived there and socialised there. 
This was true despite accusations that ASPA only catered for the bottom  part of 
the morro).
The centralising role of the birosqueiros at local levels did not manifest itself 
beyond these immediate local functions. I have mentioned that, in a few cases, 
birosqueiros became “leaders”. However, they held this position not on the ba­
Chapter 3. Locality 87
sis of their birosca clientele, nor on the centralising function of their business. It 
was not birosca premises that turned into “community centres” , which were newly 
established premises, or buildings in disuse often belonging previously to organ­
isations or institutions that had moved elsewhere. Besides, some birosqueiros- 
turned- “community leaders” associated with centres in bairros different from the 
one in which they ran their business. Thus there was no analytic continuity be­
tween Rocinha’s pedagos (of which biroscas were the nuclei) and its bairros which 
centred around action groups. In sum, Rocinha’s “community centres” were asso­
ciated with a certain neighbourhood, and territorial identity was expressed in the 
political language used by their promoters. This can be explained by the demands 
imposed by an external framework. However, at a closer look, little about them 
was localised. This issue will be further elaborated in a wider context of political 
rhetoric in Chapter 7.
Finally, it has to be mentioned that geographical mobility is also another factor 
which disrupted the importance of locality in Rocinha’s social organisation. The 
fact that people moved around prevented them from building up long-term stable 
neighbourhood units. This factor mitigated the stability and strength of all social 
formations in this shantytown, but its disruptive quality was especially evident 
when considering the locality principle.
I conclude that the locality principle was not a strongly organising one in the 
social organisation of the neighbourhood. An examination of relations at this 
level shows that neighbours did not express a great sense of loyalty to each other 
on the basis of belonging to the same pedago. Evidently, there was a sense of 
geographical belonging, especially within the beco, whose familiarity and intimacy 
I have described. This was especially true for those who had been in Rocinha for 
many years. However, there were few such old-timers left, and they were spread 
thinly. For many, their networks had fallen apart (if they ever existed) and they 
had not incorporated the large amounts of newcomers.
The high geographical mobility (due partly to the large amounts of rental ac­
commodation that existed in Rocinha) partly explains the weakness of the bonds 
formed at this level. Further factors which explain this will also be revealed in
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following chapters. The sense of geographical belonging was not translated into 
social space. Despite the large potential for collective activity within the neigh­
bourhood, mobilisation and cooperation around these urgent shared problems was 
conspicuously absent. And despite (or maybe I should say; because of) the in­
timacy and familiarity of beco life, social relations between neighbours remained 
static. Communication stayed in the realm of gossip, neighbours talked about 
each other rather than to each other and several conflicts concerning the use of 
beco space were evident in my beco.
W ith regard to the use of this valuable space, People kept a close eye on each 
other over who was using what for what purposes. It was a scene of competition 
and disagreements rather than consultation and discussion. This can be partly 
explained by the fact that housing was a highly valued (often only) source of in­
vestment for these people. Expansion and improvement of their houses was there­
fore a constant preoccupation. In my beco there was always someone at it. Yet, 
at the same time, the availability of space was extremely restricted. The slightest 
alteration seriously affected the living conditions of several neighbours. For ex­
ample, enlarging a window, could have the effect of subjecting one’s neighbours 
to easier access by burglars, endangering the stability of the building, depriving 
them of privacy. The construction of one floor on top of a neighbouring house 
could deprive one of light, privacy, extensively used roof space, and ventilation. 
It could cause drainage problems and one could have to move one’s TV aerial for 
better reception. Competition for an already inadequate water supply would be 
even higher. This was apart from the noises involved in the building process, which 
usually took place at nights and/or in weekends and went on forever. The new 
floor could be sold to new people with whom one had to build up a new relation 
of trust. Personal dislikes could easily become a source of tension within a beco.
Rules regarding building restrictions were laid down by the Residents Associa­
tion. For example, a minimum width of becos and a maximum height of buildings 
had been imposed and, officially, permission had to be granted before anyone could 
build at all. However, in practice people just built often leading to (violent) con­
flicts between neighbours. Officially, neighbour disputes could be referred to the
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Residents Association. In reality the Association was believed to be highly partial 
and “all corrupt” and for most people therefore not a suitable arbiter in disputes. 
(See also in Chapter 7.)
If the pedago concept is applied to a slightly wider circle of social relations, 
we see a birosca unit, centralising neighbourhood activities. However, the birosca 
merely fulfilled the residents’ physical needs and it did not feature as a centralising 
force in social space. At this level too, I conclude that the pedago unit is redundant 
as an analytical tool. We looked at social relations at the highest level, that of 
Rocinha’s politically active groups, and concluded the same again. This last point 
will be picked up again in later chapters.
Chapter 4
Community Identity?
I have considered the nature of social relations between household members and 
neighbours. The question that remains is that of people’s identification with 
Rocinha as a whole, something one could call “community identity”. The chapter 
concerns questions such as those of religious persuasion, colour awareness and ru­
ral association which all make up a person’s identity. These factors affect the kind 
of links that exist between a political leader and his/her followers, and indeed, 
what kind of issues a potential politician can draw on to mobilise people. It is 
clear therefore, that these factors have to be dealt with if the question of political 
organisation of this shantytown is to be understood fully.
I am not concerned with adding to academic debates about what a “commu­
nity” might consist of, removed from its contextual data. The history of this 
debate; the different usages to which the concept has been put and the different 
meanings assigned to it in the process, illustrates that such a debate is endless and 
leads to unnecessary conceptual confusion (c.f. Stacey 1969). Nor am I concerned 
with more recent theoretical questions about the ways in which identity can be 
expressed. To get away from definitions and for practical purposes, I will take the 
“community” , in line with Cohen (1985) as “symbolically constructed, as a system 
of values, norms, moral codes which provides a sense of identity within a bounded 
whole to its members.” (Hamilton 1985:9, Editor’s foreword in Cohen 1985). This 
assertion is useful when answering the question of how people construct commu­
nities and I shall make use of it for this purpose. However, the question of what
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kind of communities they construct, i.e. to what extent these are cohesive social 
units, is not posed. Cohen points out that people create communities by using, 
creating and manipulating the symbols which the group has in common.
People put down their social markers symbolically, using the sym­
bolic vocabulary which they can most comfortably assimilate to them­
selves, and then contributing to it creatively. They thereby make com­
munity. (Cohen 1985:28)
This quote shows that he takes for granted the existence of such a system of values, 
norms and moral codes in common, and assumes that this common system is the 
vehicle with which members build their identity. He is not concerned with the 
possibility of the existence of a group of people constructing their identity with 
social concepts and symbols other than those which they have in common, or with 
the question of whether the way they articulate this system of symbols is cohesive 
or divisive and to what extent they do this at all. It is with these questions that 
I am concerned in this chapter. When speaking of the extent to which Rocinha 
was a “community”, I am thus concerned with determining to what degree its 
members were able to infuse this notional unit with vitality; to what extent they 
constructed symbols which were meaningful to all and from which they derived 
a sense of identity. The chapter will be looking for cultural characteristics which 
Rocinha’s residents shared or failed to share and which were potentially cohesive 
or divisive (such as religious persuasion, colour awareness, rural association). It 
will examine the nature of the residents’ aspirations, the presence/absence of the 
residents’ emotional investment into Rocinha as a whole, the presence/absence 
of a common adversary and the extent to which their daily movements centred 
around Rocinha.
One possible way from which a unit derives its identity is from its difference 
from others (see also Barth 1969). This is most visible when the unit interacts 
with another one considered different by its members. It can also occur when an 
external agent (e.g. society at large or another shantytown) assigns a label to the 
unit. However, the mere existence of these situations (an external agent recognised 
by members, or an existing label assigned to it from outside) is not enough to 
deduce the existence of a collectivity as perceived by the members themselves. An
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answer to the question of the nature of Rocinha as a collectivity is therefore not a 
straightforward one. We have to distinguish between the question of the residents’ 
conception of themselves as a collective category from others labelling them as 
a category. Furthermore, there is the question of whether the residents act as a 
collectivity as opposed to them merely constituting a conceptual unit. Indeed, 
the question of subcommunities occurs. The answer to these questions may not be 
uniform. In some ways the residents may positively encourage a collective identity, 
while in other ways there is an absence or even resistance against the idea. The aim 
in this chapter is to determine the extent to which and in what ways collective 
identity is expressed positively and negatively in all of these spheres, so as to 
acquire a clearer picture of where Rocinha’s residents’ social commitments were 
located.
There were externally assigned labels to Rocinha’s residents. These were: fave- 
lado (favela resident; relating to their place of residence (morro as opposed to 
asfalto)), pobre (poor; relating to their economic well-being), nordestino (from the 
Northeast of Brazil; relating to their origins (rural)) and preto (black; relating 
to their skin colour). I shall examine the values associated with these designa­
tions and the reality they had within Rocinha and the implications of this for the 
assignment of a collective identity to its residents.
The first obvious source of common identity was derived from their common 
place of residence. Rocinha was a morro in the middle of a very affluent neigh­
bourhood (o asfalto). As described in Chapter 1, its boundaries were very clear. 
There was no misunderstanding about one’s whereabouts in Sao Conrado. On the 
Sao Conrado side, the end of Rocinha was clearly marked by a dual carriage way, 
along which o rico sped past at a safe distance in his/her car. On the Gavea side, 
Rocinha was isolated from its wealthy neighbours by a wide (about 200m) band 
of no-person’s land owned by the state water company which was kept strictly 
clear of invaders.1 On both other sides, Rocinha was bordered by unpopulated
2I witnessed one occasion in which the police eradicated a group of invaders from 
this land without mercy. This had not been the first time - the cleared site showed
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mountainous wasteland (the expansive Floresta de Tijuca on one side and on the 
other, the steep rocky surfaces of the top of the mountain on which Rocinha was 
located). Only Rocinha’s people (o pobre) entered Rocinha. The Sao Conrado 
resident (o rico) had no need to and as a rule avoided Rocinha carefully. One of 
the directors of the Residents Association of Sao Conrado mentioned its member’s 
proposal to construct a wall around Rocinha. In many ways this wall between 
Rocinha and its neighbours already existed.
The assignment of identity (i.e. of Rocinha’s residents as belonging to o morro) 
was clearly true not only for Rocinha’s residents but also for most favelados. Thus, 
o pobre belongs to o morro, and o rico to o asfalto, and at first sight the two were 
physically kept apart. To Rocinha’s residents this opposition was not a source of 
strength and in many ways this perception of difference was imposed upon them 
by others, by o rico. This was clear from the fact that the avoidance of each others’ 
territory only worked one way: o rico avoided the morro, but o pobre spent most of 
his/her time no asfalto (most of Rocinha’s residents worked there). If they had a 
choice about it, both rico and pobre would spend their time no asfalto. Rocinha’s 
residents did not show pride or interest in being identified as belonging to o morro, 
but instead, the concern of hiding their real place of residence to friends outside 
Rocinha, was expressed openly. When asked by an outsider where they lived, 
the answer was invariably “Sao Conrado” or “Gavea”. The main reference in the 
official mailing address several people gave to me on my departure was “Estrada 
da Gavea”; it did not include “Rocinha”. The use of this official address itself 
expressed an attem pt to upgrade Rocinha from morro to asfalto (See also Chapter 
3).2
remnants of previous settlers. On the occasion, the government acted in the name of 
safety (“danger of subsidence”) and Rocinha’s Residents Association clearly refused to 
back the invaders’ protests, publicly sharing the government’s concerns.
2The importance of the telephone as an anonymous way of entering into contact with 
someone outside, is again confirmed here and also note the prestige attached to the use 
of official street labelling and house numbering.
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As far as identification with o pobre is concerned, the same observations can be 
made. People hid their economic deprivation by investing in their appearance. For 
many, clothing made up a large part of their total expenditure. They had clothes 
for “going out” (meaning: leaving Rocinha) and a different set of much more basic 
(often dark coloured) clothes for around the house and local expeditions. In the 
case of shoes, this was especially evident; white tennis shoes or light coloured 
high-heeled ladies’ shoes contrasted with chinelos (plastic slippers) worn around 
Rocinha. Some women changed their shoes at the bottom of the hill, on the way 
out or into Rocinha.
The appearance of one of Rocinha’s political leaders (longish hair, bearded 
(unusual in Brazil) and casually dressed, notably always wearing chinelos) caused 
offence to both his adversaries as well as his supporters. His opponents took his 
“deliberate underdressing” as evidence for his alleged two-sidedness and manip­
ulative behaviour. His supporters felt that he was letting them down. To him 
personally, his appearance was a political statement (particularly his chinelos, 
shoes of the poor) but was not shared by his supporters. Similar controversy sur­
rounded another leader. Not only her appearance caused offence; she was also 
known as being “foul-mouthed” (something which Rocinha’s residents very se­
riously condemned) and she gained little sympathy for her public insistence on 
being accepted by the establishment as pobre, with the language and appearance 
of o pobre. This supposedly “indigenous” language (as was her appearance) was 
dismissed by Rocinha’s people as palavrao, sujeira (Lit: swearing, dirt).3
The designation of pobre had connotations of dirt to society at large. Public 
attem pts to demonstrate immaculate cleanliness, (e.g. clean and ironed clothes 
(often of light colours) and houses) showed in themselves efforts to dissociate 
oneself from o pobre and the associations which were attached to this label. This
3These claims were part of her larger political campaign which argued for the recogni­
tion and acceptance of favelado culture in its own right, by the authorities. To the great 
majority of Rocinha’s people, however, this claim was ridiculed and she was dismissed 
as an excentric. The lack of support for her cause was demonstrated in the fact that it 
never got off the ground in the first place. (I will elaborate on this point in Chapter 7.)
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was also expressed in the defensive and apologetic often heard expression: “ Uma 
casa pobre mas limpa” (Lit: A poor but clean house).
To a large extent, the allocation of negative value to categories of pobre/ morro 
can be explained by the fact that this was imposed upon Rocinha by the Brazil­
ian establishment. This externally assigned label was rooted in the concept of 
marginality which to Latin Americans means “on the edge” /  “outside mainstream”. 
Mainstream is defined not in terms of what the majority does (in terms of num­
bers), but what those in power (a small minority) define to be the norm. The 
designation of the label “marginal” therefore involves an element of power and 
privilege. As Perlman points out, the label llmarginar implies the negative stereo­
typing of the poor in all areas of social life (Perlman 1976). Many others have 
pointed out how this negative stereotyping is also reflected in the literature on the 
poor and has (partly because of this) had direct effects on policies towards the 
poor (see Nelson 1979). Thus, in terms of economic contribution, the poor are seen 
as parasitic or non-participating. In terms of political orientation, they are seen 
as pathetically apathetic or dangerously radical. In terms of social organisation, 
chaotic and delinquent, and so on.
This does not explain why the people of Rocinha themselves adopted these 
negative connotations. For them, they had a divisive, not an integrative/cohesive 
effect. They were not questioned in any collective way (or, those who tried to do 
this, did not find much support within Rocinha). They thereby undermined their 
own potentially cohesive symbols. To be po&re, thus, was not something to be 
proud of, but something to be hidden.
It is not surprising then, to find that Rocinha’s people’s ideals involved moving 
out of the favela. Many were ambitious and had expectations to move up the social 
ladder (also confirmed by Caldeira 1984, Cardoso 1978, Durham 1988). For many, 
it was their dream to be like o patrao (Lit: the patron, boss, or, someone who 
belonged to the category of o rico) and they adopted their behaviour as much as 
they could. Those who “made it” often moved out, even if they could only very 
nearly afford the greatly increased living expenses no asfalto.
There is a paradox here, since one also knew from experience that very few
Chapter 4. Community Identity? 96
pobres ever succeeded in making this move. In fact, Caldeira also confirms that 
people actually believed that they could not become rico. The people of the Sao 
Paulo shantytown she examined are said to claim that one is born rico or pobre. 
Only winning a lottery (or a similar miracle) can get one out of this category. 
(And indeed, the pervasiveness of gambling in Rocinha confirms their efforts to 
dissociate themselves from the category in which they belonged.) Social mobility 
was only conceivable within the “us” , pobre category. There was a corresponding 
sense of resentment against o rico, who was blamed for being rico at the expense 
of o pobre. 0  rico was said not to need to work; s/he just enriched him/herself 
on the work of o pobre (“Nao faz nada, so manda” (Lit: Doesn’t do anything, just 
gives orders)). While o pobre worked hard (“Trabalha honestamente”(Lit: Works 
in an honest way)), yet still remained pobre, o rico was stingy (s/he would “rather 
throw something away than give it to o pobre” and “Rouba pra ficar mais rico” 
(Lit: Robs to become even richer)). 0  pobre, on the other hand, was generous 
(“would always divide things with someone who was pobre mesmo” (Lit: really 
poor)). The image of o pobre here is one of moral cleanliness (gente boa) and 
contrasts with that of o rico.
In this contrast, o rico and o pobre belonged to two different moral commu­
nities. (This has also been noted by Caldeira.) Interaction between “us” and 
“them ” who belonged to different moral communities, was evaluated not according 
to the rules governing relationships between “us” (evaluations in terms of “good” 
or “bad”) but in terms of expediency (Bailey 1966). This would explain why 
relations with o rico were exploitative rather than reciprocal. However, I would 
propose that the above evidence is not enough to argue for the existence of two 
clearly defined morally separate communities for Rocinha’s people. Firstly, there 
was no clearly defined “us!’, and secondly, there was no clearly defined “them” 
either.
Rocinha’s people did not see themselves as a uniform category pobre. This 
is illustrated in the frequently heard expression quoted above: that o pobre will 
always divide things with o pobre mesmo. Pobre was made up of different degrees 
of economic well-being. There were those who were menos pobre (less poor) or
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mais pobre (poorer) (see also Caldeira 1984). For example, “Roupa Suja e pobre 
mesmo” (Lit: Roupa Suja [part of Rocinha] is really poor). Bairro Barcelos was 
also an interesting case here since its residents were negatively accused of having 
false pretensions, of trying to be like o rico. “So falta parede” (Lit: Just short of 
constructing a wall between us), people said. And they told me that its inhabitants 
claimed to be living in “Bairro Barcelos”, not “Rocinha”. This kind of subdivision 
of o pobre into further categories showed that people themselves did not allow 
this uniform category to be constructed. This was one attem pt to resolve the 
above-mentioned paradox - namely that they aimed towards becoming o rico but 
recognised that few ever achieved this aim. It also illustrated people’s wish to 
disassociate themselves from everyone else in the shantytown.
0  rico was also not a uniform category to Rocinha’s people. 0  rico in reality 
was someone who acted like one’s patrao. The relationship one had with a patrao 
was not merely exploitative. Bailey’s formula does not work when applied to 
Rocinha’s people’s relations with their patrdes. Standards of good and bad did 
rule these relationships. It was a hierarchical relationship of dependency and the 
point about patron-client relations is that they did not emphasise class antagonism 
(e.g. Eisenstadt h  Roniger 1984). Moreover, these relationships were found within 
the same class of pobre: someone within this category could (and did) become 
patrao of o pobre mesmo. 0  pobre also aimed towards becoming someone like o 
men patrao (Lit: my boss). S/he was not someone whose world was of a totally 
different kind.
The example of Bairro Barcelos further illustrated the tendency to single one­
self out by claiming to be better than or different from the rest of the population. 
This was particularly clear from the often heard claim expressed in many different 
ways that “I live here, but I am not like them”. Those who succeeded, espe­
cially, expressed this clearly as they dissociated themselves in quality by calling 
the majority vagabundo and marginal, implying that “I am not one of them ”.
It emerges that Rocinha’s people themselves assigned negative value to these 
labels. They resisted being classified under these general categories and made 
efforts to escape from being associated with them. The point has already been
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made that this was not only the case for Rocinha’s residents, but for all pobre. 
Rocinha’s residents were in this case no exception. As I mentioned, to a certain 
extent, the negative value assigned to these values can be explained by the way 
they were regarded by society at large, as expressed in the media and in the 
behaviour of the public. This does not explain, however, why Rocinha’s residents 
did not challenge these negative associations in any collective way. This can only 
be because they accepted these values themselves. This also becomes clear if we 
look at further associations related to the marginality concept, namely the question 
of origins.
To be poor is to be a migrant, i.e. a newcomer and hence marginal. Much 
of the literature on urban poor in the 1950s and 60s was preoccupied with the 
idea that the cause of urban poverty and the resulting social delinquency was an 
inability on the part of the poor to cope with “urban ways”. “Peasant mental­
ities” and rural characteristics were seen as the cause of their “backwardness”, 
as “obstacles” to their “development” , and the proper “integration” into the rest 
of society (e.g. Foster’s limited good (Foster 1965), Ray’s aspiring vs backwards 
classes (Ray 1969)). In line with these literary assumptions, we find the popular as­
signment of a common rurality to Rocinha’s residents. By the media, Rocinha was 
often designated as 110  capital do Nordeste” (Lit: The capital of the Northeast). 
This suggests the image of a physically distinct location inside Rio de Janeiro (a 
question with which I have dealt). It also suggests that it was characteristically 
“Northeastern” , i.e. a culturally distinct unit, one of rural character in the (urban) 
centre of Rio de Janeiro.
The assumption that a large percentage of Rocinha’s inhabitants had a rural 
past, was questionable in itself. Many of those who came from rural parts came a 
long time ago. Rocinha dated back to the 1920s and many of its people arrived in 
the 1950s. The migration flow was continuing at the time of fieldwork. Many of 
the earlier generation had raised families in Rocinha. And there were also many 
who were born and reared in other urban places before they came to Rocinha. 
Those of rural origins came from many different Brazilian states, not only those 
of the Northeast. The assumption that Rocinha’s residents were nordestino was
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challenged by individuals in Rocinha. For example, it was said that there were a 
large number of mineiros (Lit: from Minas Gerais). Moreover, the Northeast was 
not seen as a uniform category: there were at least two different kinds of North- 
easterners recognised by them and these (the cearense and paraibano (Lit: from 
Ceara, from Parafba)) had their own stereotyped characteristics (e.g. the latter 
was nicknamed cabega chata (Lit: flat head, as in: no brains) by the former). All 
this was evidence that Rocinha’s residents rejected the assignment of “Northeast­
ern” culture. I would argue moreover, that these origins were not important to 
the people of Rocinha in this sense. They did not feature in conversations and cer­
tainly were not organising principles in a social sense. For example, there were no 
social clubs for paraibanos or cearenses and I was not aware of any active networks 
relating to those of the same origin.4 For those who did come from rural parts, 
the maintenance of this connection was weak. Occasionally, one heard of someone 
returning to visit relatives left behind but the great majority in Rocinha did not 
maintain rural connections in any way. In many cases, they came from rural areas 
voluntarily and left them behind for a good reason. A friend who travelled to her 
place of origin commented on the impoverished living conditions of that place and 
how life was much better having left there.
Consider also the food Rocinha’s residents ate, for example. Again this was 
part of the popular myth of rurality. I would argue that (in contrast to public 
opinion) those foods characteristically associated with the Brazilian Northeast 
were rarely eaten in Rocinha. When they were available in Rio de Janeiro, they 
were prepared and sold by Northeastern people who most likely were favelados, 
but marketed for the middle and upper classes. What people in Rocinha ate daily 
was a basic diet of rice and beans (accompanied by additional dishes if they could 
afford them). This was also the basic diet for the rich (although accompaniments 
like meat were, for them, essential for a complete meal). The food valued especially 
by Rocinha’s people (and bought as special treats) was American-style fastfood.
4In some cases they were used in naming: “Paraibano” was a fairly common nickname,
and 11 Casa do Ceara” was the name of a local shop.
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It was the food of the rich, not that associated with their supposed place of origin. 
This kind of food was not a collectively valued symbol of Rocinha’s identity, nor 
was any other kind of food. Possibly jack fruit could be considered uniquely 
Rocinha food. There were a large number of fruit-bearing jack trees in Rocinha. 
But the fruit was associated with extreme poverty and had negative connotations. 
It was certainly not seen by the people themselves as a collectively valued food 
item. Indeed, the fact that it was not is significant in itself.
I have already mentioned people’s appearance. Women particularly attempted 
to dress like their middle class counterparts.5 “Rural” forms of dress were asso­
ciated with poverty, and as argued above, in Rocinha dress was used as one way 
of ridding oneself of the identity of pobre. Similarly, there was no production of 
traditional crafts or any such other local expertise in Rocinha (or any associated 
with the Northeast, for that matter). A few people produced and sold products 
(such as handbags, cheap cotton clothes, dolls) to supplement their income. These 
products were not distinctive but much resembled the mass-produced ones. Their 
expertise was not collectively recognised, it was not traditionally passed on, nor 
did most of it demand a lot of expertise. The products were largely functional 
rather than elaborately decorated. The people involved in this type of home pro­
duction were largely marginal women (also in Rocinha). Some were commissioned 
by a particular patron who marketed and sold the produce. I would argue again 
that, as was the case with food and appearance, crafts production was not a ba­
sis for identity for the people of Rocinha nor was it important for any collective 
identity in this shantytown.
As far as music goes, traditional country music (forro) was heard much less in 
Rocinha than the music played on the media (often foreign). Its lyrics typically 
addressed subjects like romance and sexual desire. Outside the blocos, few people 
played their own instrument. On occasions one could see a bunch of musicians
5I only saw one Baiana in Rocinha (a person dressed in an outfit of multiple layered 
white lace-edged skirts, a dress considered typically Northeastern). She was visibly on 
her way out of Rocinha, carrying a tray of Northeastern delicacies for sale downtown.
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singing and playing around a birosca. These were very few and mostly the same 
people. I did not come across any publicly organised pagodes in Rocinha (parties 
often with live music, where people dance different patterned dances to traditional 
tunes).
Rurality was (like poverty) something to be hidden. Rural images were neg­
ative and sneered at in line with its associations with marginality. There existed 
the “rural bumpkin” image which had associations with poverty, illiteracy and 
backwardness (defined in contrast to urban sophistication). My impressions on 
this subject contrast very sharply with the existing image of the nostalgic rural 
migrant, trapped involuntarily in the city, waiting for an opportunity to return to 
their place of origin.6
One last most revealing incident regarding the status and significance of rural­
ity in the mind of Rocinha’s people was the response I received to inviting some 
friends and neighbours to accompany me to the Feira at Sao Cristovao. This was 
a weekly Sunday market in Sao Cristovao (on the edges of Rio de Janeiro) where 
one could find all things “Northeastern” (e.g. repentistas (singers who compose 
a song on the spot about you in return for a little money), Northeastern dishes 
of all kinds cooked on the spot, cigarros de palha (strong cigarettes whose con­
tents are cut from strings of tarry tobacco, and rolled in bits of straw), mosquito 
nets, hammocks, literatura de cordel (traditional popular literature) and so on). 
It also offered a large selection of cheap clothes and household utensils. It con­
trasted sharply with the up-market tourist-targeted craft fairs in downtown Rio 
de Janeiro, in that it was large, crowded and attracted a very different much lower 
income clientele. My neighbours declined my invitation and their response was
6It is true that there were a few people in Rocinha, whose preoccupation was to 
emphasise these rural origins. This was in line with external political forces (part of the 
abertura movement (see Chapters 5 and 6)) whose protagonists emphasised the creation 
of a collective identity to encourage direct “community involvement” in political affairs. 
As a result, some funds were made available to encourage these initiatives. Within 
Rocinha there was very little support for these projects. (I elaborate on these points in 
Chapter 7.) This was shown in the fact that these projects practically were non-events 
in Rocinha: they had neither attracted support nor opposition to any significant degree.
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surprise at my interest in going. They described the place as dirty in several 
different ways.
Most of Rocinha’s residents shunned rural associations. They lived in a world 
in which they liked to be seen to be striving forward to follow the example of 
those of higher classes, whose ideals and lifestyles they knew and copied from 
daily interactions with them at work and through the media. The use of these 
(rural) symbols in a positive way by a few politicians in Rocinha can be explained 
by the demands and initiatives of external sources; the content and associations 
of abertura language. (I elaborate extensively on this idea in Chapter 7.) This 
was only a passing phase and was not drawing much support from Rocinha’s peo­
ple. The situation in Rocinha in this respect was strikingly different from that 
of Ceilandia, a low-income settlement in Brasilia7 where people’s origins were a 
constant subject of comment and debate, as was their preoccupation with return­
ing upra minha terra” (Lit: to my homeland) as soon as they had built up their 
fortune (Knottenbelt 1984). This may be explained in part by their much more re­
cent arrival in Brasilia, and the more uniformly rural background of these people. 
In Ceilandia, people wrote letters “home” collectively, to save on stamps and to 
pool news and writing skills. Their rural culture was very much alive: birthdays 
and other special occasions were excuses for the collective preparation of special 
foods, typically Northeastern. While I was there, they celebrated a whole series 
of collectively recognised religiously significant days. These involved traditional 
costumed dancing (quadrilhas) rehearsed and prepared a long time before the ac­
tual day, and the construction of tendinhas and barracas (small decorated tents) 
in which all sorts of Northeastern delicacies were sold at very low prices. They 
proudly exhibited their rural origins in many areas of their social life. Rocinha, in 
comparison, had little to show.
This brings us to the last association related to the marginality concept: the 
question of skin colour. To be black (preto), was to be poor, and there were 
various cultural manifestations (Carnival, Afro-Brazilian religion) which were to
7I spent six months in Ceilandia in 1983 for undergraduate research.
Chapter 4. Community Identity? 103
the general public clearly associated with shantytowns. The first thing to note 
about this issue is the fact that Rocinha’s people were clearly mixed in terms of 
skin colour and recognised to be so by them. There was a range of people from 
black to white. People identified, referred and described others by their particular 
shade of skin colour and, as has been noted in the literature, they possessed 
a large vocabulary for this purpose (Skidmore 1974). The usage of “people of 
colour” (gente de cor) by official spokespersons on the topic was deceiving, as 
they were not seen as one uniform group by the people themselves (Dzidzienyo 
1979). To Rocinha’s people the equation pobre=preto was not valid. No one 
obvious group of people with the same racial features stood out in appearance in 
particular. The situation with regard to the question of race relations in a Brazilian 
shantytown was therefore a different one from that in shantytowns in many other 
Latin American countries such as Peru and Bolivia, where ethnic characteristics 
were visible and emphasised by shantytown inhabitants (c.f. Lobo 1982; Mangin 
1967, 1970; Doughty 1970; Buechler 1970; Stearman 1985).
I did not come across anyone who called themselves “Indio” in Rocinha. Gen­
erally, my contacts shared the media view of the Indian. They were sympathetic 
with the issue of the threat to their culture but the issues were portrayed in a 
naive way. The media image of the Indian was that of an innocent child; naked, il­
literate and beautiful and living in their own world of strange customs and bizarre 
beliefs threatened by the big wide world. The issues were too far removed from the 
reality of Rocinha’s people to treat the Indian other than this media stereotype. 
The issue did not have any practical implications for most of Rocinha’s people.
The situation with regard to “people of colour” , however, was more complex.8 
Black consciousness was explicitly expressed by some individuals who frequently 
raised the question of the marginalisation of o negro and point at discriminatory 
behaviour in conversations. For the majority, however, the official stance (that
8The complexity of the issue of race relations and the question of colour awareness in 
Brazil, is clear from the enormity of the literature on this topic. It is not my intention 
to address this topic in full. Merely to make some prominent observations about the 
situation in Rocinha as far as it was relevant to political mobilisation in action groups.
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there is no racism in Brazil), was clearly accepted. In their eyes black activists did 
not have much credibility. They were dismissed as irrelevant, or as extremists at 
worst. This majority included those who would be most obvious targets of discrim­
ination. Discrimination was denied to exist (e.g. by citing the anti-discrimination 
law drawn up in 1951 and by comparing Brazil with the United States), or ex­
plained away as caused by something else (e.g. class instead of race; this argument 
is also used widely in Brazilian academic circles). Or it was dismissed as racial 
prejudice rather than discrimination (Dzidzienyo 1979). They cited famous black 
heros as examples of the fairness of Brazilian society with respect to colour (the 
most famous one being Pele, the football star), but ignored that these were only 
very few, and only existed in the area of sport and entertainment, not in areas of 
decision-making which could affect the destination of other blacks (points which 
black activist groups elsewhere repeatedly made). Black women in Rocinha (as 
elsewhere in Brazil) went to extremes to whiten their skin and straighten their 
hair, and marriage preferences for a whiter spouse were explicit and unquestioned. 
Mixed couples were few in Rocinha and they attracted negative gossip from the 
large majority.
The fact that all Brazilian people explicitly recognised other shades of skin 
colour and (in line with the official “whitening” ideal) discrimination occurred 
in different degrees towards people of different shades, disarming the person who 
claimed to be a victim of racial discrimination. This may be part of the reason 
why tension between black and white was so well suppressed. This also explains 
in part why, when the issue arose in meetings and conversation, most people 
(of all colours) did not want to know.9 Given this general observation, what of 
the cultural manifestations such as Carnival and Afro-Brazilian religion and/or to 
what extent could these be seen as manifestations of black consciousness? To what 
extent were they important in terms of the political identity of their participants 
or of Rocinha as a whole?
9This became evident to me in a workshop organised by a Church-related NGO for 
“Dia do Negro” (National Negro Day) whose attendance was noticeably low, and the 
participants in the discussions were remarkably indifferent.
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Rocinha did not have one samba school which was publicly recognised to be rep­
resenting it as a whole. In this, it contrasted with shantytowns such as Mangueira 
and numerous others. Instead, it had blocos carnavalescos (much smaller in size 
and of much inferior quality than the samba school proper). The largest of these 
had its own premises, a quadra (an open asphalted square and several shacks 
for administrative and storage purposes). Its location was geographically isolated 
from Rocinha; on the other side of the dual carriage way in Sao Conrado. Through 
the year, this bloco ran weekly discos, and a daycare centre on its premises. The 
latter’s facilities were extremely precarious and often blame was put on the bloco's 
directors to whom (it was said) the daycare centre was only important because 
it served as an obstacle in the government’s plans to remove the bloco from its 
premises. (A first-class hotel was being built right next to it, whose owners were 
unlikely to be willing to put up with the blood's noise and clientele in its immediate 
environs.)
Around Carnival time, activities around the bloco increased. A theme was 
selected in November around which elaborately decorated costumes and a float 
were prepared in the weeks ahead. I received a variety of answers in response to 
my inquiries about the sources of the finances for these materials. Some assured 
me that they raised all funds themselves. Others maintained that a large part of 
it came from the state government’s Tourist Board (through political connections) 
and some rumoured that a bicheiro (owner of the game jogo do bicho (see Chapter 
8)) and even Rocinha’s drug baron) was behind this.10
To many in Rocinha, the bloco brought up associations with corruption and the 
underworld. Rumours circulated about regular drug trafficking on the quadra, and
10It was hard to gain any inside information into the bloco’s workings. I worked in 
its daycare centre on a regular basis, however, this did not allow me into the bloco1 s 
directors’ meetings, or any other inside activities (permission was denied to me). It was 
run by a separate group and operated at different times of the day from the daycare 
centre. Attendance to its social activities (mainly discos starting around midnight) was 
hard because I had difficulties in persuading my informants to accompany me (see also 
in text ahead). Attending alone proved risky (going to and from the quadra at those 
times of the night).
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everyone knew the story about the shootout that happened there during creche 
hours. When I tried to persuade some of my close contacts to accompany me to 
the 6/oco’s disco evenings, their reaction was revealing: “E  coisa do marginaf (Lit: 
That is something o marginal does), “Tern so vagabundo a lf  (Lit: That place is 
only for vagabundo). When I braved the outing alone one night, I discovered that 
I was the only light-skinned person there, disco music (not samba) was played, 
large amounts of beer were available at highly reduced prices (rumoured to be a 
gift from the drug baron), and the majority of the audience was teenage. Many 
of my informants frowned upon my intentions of attending bloco activities, just 
as Carnival itself was shunned by many of Rocinha’s people. In response to my 
inquiries about what my neighbours were going to do at Carnival time, many 
expressed the wish to leave Rio de Janeiro. Most spent these days watching TV. 
They warned me continually about the violence expressed during these days, and 
commented a lot on the distastefulness of the sexuality displayed. When the bloco 
marched through Rocinha on one of the Carnival days, it attracted only very 
little response. Few knew when it was due to perform or what the results of 
these performances were afterwards. Many felt that it was out of hand and much 
exaggerated by the media; it did not belong to them anymore, but was hi-jacked 
by the Tourist Board. (Rio de Janeiro is internationally reknowned for Carnival 
and the state government explicitly exploited this potential income-generating 
opportunity, especially in recent years.)
Among its core group of supporters, the bloco and its activities were seen in 
a very different way. In many ways, these members saw themselves as practising 
and learning an art which was respected for its own sake.11 The 6/oco’s office 
holders were the experts and respected for their “knowledge” (although at least in 
one of Rocinha’s blocos, their claims to expertise were debated and the core group 
of supporters were factionalised sharply under different competing office holders 
and candidates for these offices). These office holders expressed strong opinions
11 Most of the literature on samba schools and Carnival takes this perspective and is 
therefore not helpful for the question addressed in this thesis.
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on “how things should be done”, especially with regard to the public performance 
(desfile), and there were many elaborate rules (see, for example, Leopoldi 1978). 
The bloco*s organisation was an extremely hierarchical affair in which different 
office holders were allocated with specific responsibilities and accompanying sta­
tus, expressed in the choreography and ritual of the desfile itself.12 Differences 
in involvement and expertise were also expressed in the different categories of 
membership which originated mainly in the 1960s as part of the bloco'*s response 
to increased commercialisation. Large numbers were recruited for their member­
ship fees then. Few of these actively participated in the desfiles themselves, but 
attended the quadra for more general social purposes.
In terms of content, therefore, despite the fact that Carnival and Carnival- 
related activities almost exclusively attracted black people, Rocinha’s blocos can­
not be seen as an expression of black consciousness of its black population. Car­
nival was publicly acknowledged to be a black speciality, one which enriched the 
dominantly white Brazilian society. For a small minority of members, the focus 
was on a particular expertise, highly ritualised and in many ways very conser­
vative. For the majority, it was merely a place to socialise. Organisationally, 
it constituted a separate political sphere with its own hierarchical structure and 
leadership problems. Only very few who participated in these activities expressed 
black consciousness explicitly. The bloco was not an appropriate channel for this 
sentiment. Those few who did, argued that to be black meant to be poor and 
therefore to live in a shantytown. But as seen from the above, they did not have 
Rocinha’s support for these claims. The great majority in Rocinha, and the ma­
jority of those who participated in bloco activities, did not explicitly see themselves 
as a group, or as victims of racial prejudice. They did not collectively express an 
identity in terms of skin colour. Skin colour did not serve as a basis on which 
Rocinha’s leaders could mobilise its population, or even part of it.
12Goldwasser talks of different roles in the performance as being strongly invested 
with the 6/oco’s identity. She mentions that some of these roles were even passed on 
along family lines (Goldwasser 1975).
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Moreover, Carnival to the general public, was the festival associated with o 
pobre, and especially with those from the morros. The samba schools were often 
cited as representative and uniting institutions of these poor. Carnival, according 
to the media, was the one time of the year in which their relation with the rich was 
reversed, when they come down from their morros and dictate terms no asfalto. It 
was the only time when the rich admired the poor for the activities in which they 
were seen to excel. In their samba they express their frustrations and forget their 
worries. Many of my informants, however, strongly disagreed. They argued that 
the significance of Carnival for the poor was exaggerated in the media. Certainly 
for Rocinha’s residents, my evidence shows that it is debatable whether it was 
such a big event for them at all. Also in terms of its identity, Carnival in Rocinha 
was not a celebration which drew its residents together, or expressed this notional 
unity in any other way. In sum, Carnival in Rocinha was far from a collective 
celebration in which either “Rocinha”, or “o pobre” expressed their skills and 
solidarity. For one, Rocinha did not have one representative bloco. Secondly, as 
pointed out above, it was strongly disapproved of by many, and seen as a nuisance 
and violent. The marginalisation of the bloco in Rocinha can partly be explained 
by its associations with o pobre and o preto (black). Its status in Rocinha itself 
was clearly dubious and this may have been for this reason.
I have not so far discussed the question of religion and whether it provided 
occasions or symbols in which Rocinha’s people expressed their collectivity. The 
great majority of Rocinha’s inhabitants were Catholics. Most were baptised and 
publicly called themselves “Catholic” . This group contained people with a range 
of practices. Only a very small minority practised Catholicism closely under the 
local priest. These regularly attended mass and were active organisers of the local 
Church activities. Some participated in catechism for youngsters, Bible reading 
groups or in a choir for the Church services. Some attended the monthly Pas­
toral de Favela meetings (organised by the Church hierarchy) and communicated 
with similar such groups in other shantytowns. Members of this category were 
predominantly female.
There was a small group of radical religious activists who were not necessarily
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engaged in these Church-organised activities under the local priest. They also 
called themselves Catholic, and were recognised by others to be so. They were 
politically active and used religious language in their political activities. The 
running of several action groups depended largely on them. Some of the key 
persons who accompanied this group were ex-clergymen/women. There was a 
certain tension between this latter group, whom I will call Liberation Theologists, 
and the priest-linked minority.13
The great majority did not participate in either of these groups. The religious 
beliefs and practices they expressed could be referred to as “Folk Catholicism” 
(c.f. Zaluar 1983). Of these, many also attended consultations with Umbanda 
spiritualists. In the past, the attitude of Church officials towards these beliefs and 
practices (such as the adoration of particular saints, pilgrimages to their place of 
miraculous performances or the use of music, exhaustive dancing, trance and other 
rituals) were that they were seen as inferior kinds of religious practice originat­
ing from the uneducated migrants from rural areas to urban centres. These rural 
tendencies had to be suppressed by educating them into higher, more important re­
ligious beliefs and practices. Gradually, especially post-Vatican II, Church officials 
had become more tolerant of these practices, to such an extent that the situation 
was now practically reversed. These practices were now actively encouraged by 
more liberal clergy in an attem pt to revive religious significance in people’s lives 
(Cleary 1985). The conservative members of the small devout group did not accept 
these liberal attitudes, and their attitudes towards Afro-Brazilian religious prac­
tices were sharply critical and hostile. They were publicly suspicious of Umbanda 
practices and in Rocinha, it was an insult to be called macumbeiro (Lit: one who 
practices Macumba, a popular denigrating term for Umbanda, also used by the 
media). As a result, those who approached these centres or spiritualist consultants 
kept this fact to themselves and allegations of engagement in these practices were 
part of a list of people’s malicious gossip. Practitioners themselves were defen­
13In meetings of one group members divided sharply into these two groups over issues 
such as the use of the Church premises for strictly speaking “non-religious” activities, 
and vice versa, the place of strictly religious activities in other groups.
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sive and apologetic about their practices. My neighbour, a spiritualist consultant 
widely known and respected among Umbanda practitioners in my neighbourhood, 
responded extremely defensively to my continuous enquiries about his profession. 
His answers to my questions were usually in the form of a defence against widely 
prevailing accusations of corruption (gross monetary exploitation and false claims 
of religious expertise) and the use of “black” evil powers for practitioners’ personal 
purposes. His (and several other neighbours’) practices were a source of tension 
among neighbours in my beco.
There was also a religious minority in Rocinha: the crentes (a denigrating term 
which referred to all Protestants only used by non-Protestants).14 Crentes were 
seen as the odd ones out in many ways. They were seen to be living a differ­
ent lifestyle with their own rules of conduct, and isolated themselves from other 
families in my becos (as they did elsewhere in Rocinha) and this created tension 
between neighbours. Rumours circulated about strange practices they engaged 
in and these were linked to exaggerated horror stories about extreme religious 
sects.15 These churches were also associated with interference of external forces 
in shantytown affairs. (“Doing it our way” as opposed to passive acceptance of 
paternalistic help or forced external imposition, was a demand which was contin­
ually emphasised in political dialogue (see Chapter 7).) Undoubtedly, their status 
has suffered because of prevailing anti-Americanism among many new Brazilian 
movements.16
14Most non-Protestants surprisingly did not distinguish between different kinds of 
Protestantism in Rocinha.
15Commonly heard stories were about how “they take a large part” of members’ 
monthly income, how “they indoctrinate” members by manipulating their mind in dan­
gerous spiritualist practices and how “they forbid all good things in life” (exposure of 
skin, dancing/music, consumption of alcohol, which to Rocinha’s people, constituted 
their main sources of available immediate pleasure).
16A slanderous and factually inaccurate article about the American Methodist Church 
of Rocinha in a glossy weekly represented the extreme of negative attitudes towards 
these Protestant churches in Rocinha. Summarily, it characterised the Methodista as 
a powerful wealthy establishment which forcefully imposed itself on Rocinha. It was 
portrayed as part of “American Imperialism” and as making good business by exploiting
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So, in Rocinha, the norm was to be Catholic, like the rest of Brazilian soci­
ety. This meant to call oneself Catholic, to respect the local priest and Church 
establishment, to celebrate one’s most important rites of passage (at death, birth 
and marriage) in this Church, and to recognise the main festivals of this reli­
gion (Christmas, Easter). One cannot justifiably claim “Catholicism” to exist in 
Rocinha in the form of a cohesive church community adhering to an established 
religious persuasion. The large majority practiced bits and pieces of different re­
ligious persuasions (Umbanda and Catholicism); they practised Catholicism nei­
ther in particular, nor with great intensity. There was, for example, little visible 
religious symbolism in Rocinha. I spotted only very few portraits of religious char­
acters in people’s houses. I noticed their absence on the walls of public buildings 
(with the exception of Churches). There were no roadside shrines (apart from 
the Umbanda trabalhos (Lit: works; candles, sacrificed chickens and often flowers 
appeared mainly on crossroads). These were abhorred by Catholic Church-goers. 
Furthermore, public religious festivals such as Easter17 were comparatively low 
key. In comparison with my findings in a Brasilia shantytown (where for exam­
ple, Semana Santa (Holy Week) was a busy week of festivities, mobilising a large 
number of the population (Knottenbelt 1984)), Rocinha’s religious activities were 
practically non-existent.
Those who did practise either of these religions exclusively, were divided amongst 
themselves. For the Catholics, those who adhered to one particular priest were 
divided against those who were explicitly politically active. Similarly, those who 
practised Umbanda intensely were divided according to the consultant they ap­
proached. (These competed publicly with each other for respect and recognition
the very poor financially while corrupting them ideologically with their foreign ideas 
f Fat os June 1 1985). As mentioned above, unlike what may be the case in shantytowns 
elsewhere in Latin America, most of my non-Protestant informants did not distinguish 
between the established denominational churches (e.g. the Methodist Church) and the 
more recently arrived evangelical sects of which there were several in Rocinha (Beeson 
Sz Pearce 1984), and indeed, nor did the author of the Fatos article. Members of both 
were regarded with equal suspicion.
17Unfortunately I was unable to witness Christmas celebrations in Rocinha.
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(c.f. Brown 1986).) The minority of crentes, by contrast, were seen as a separate 
group by non- crentes. This group practiced their religion more intensely than did 
the large Catholic/Umbanda majority. However, they did not see themselves as 
belonging to one religion. They competed very much among themselves and did 
not share any buildings, festivities or other communal symbols or events. None 
of these religions manifested themselves as tight communities, and none mobilised 
Rocinha as a collectivity. On the whole, to the exception of some devout practi­
tioners under all three religious persuasions, Rocinha’s residents could be said to 
be not very religious in practice.
The popular claim that Umbanda was the religion of the poor, often echoed in 
the media and academic sources is misleading for this and several other reasons 
(Fry 1978, Singer & Brant 1980, Bastide 1978). Evidence has shown that most 
Umbanda centros are located not in shantytowns, but in lower middle class subur- 
bial areas where its practitioners, including favelados, frequent them (c.f. Brown 
1986). More importantly, as shown above, Umbanda was seen as something unre­
spectable within Rocinha as much as it was outside it. Perhaps this was explained 
because of its associations with the black movement (its origins from a slave past; 
nowadays it is increasingly reactivated in the context of black consciousness (Singer 
&; Brant 1980, Cleary 1985)). It was marginalised in similar ways as the bloco in 
Rocinha. The extent to which Umbanda was a protest religion and challenged the 
establishment (and its associations with the poor for this reason) is also debatable 
(e.g. Brown 1986).
The question of Afro-Brazilian religion is therefore similar to that of bloco 
activity, in that it suffered from the same associations with marginality. However, 
it also differed considerably in that I found no evidence of any radical expression 
of black consciousness in these spheres, and it seemed for that reason to be more 
accessible to all including non-/ave/a residents. I expect, however, that with the 
increase in organised expression of political protest in many areas of Brazilian 
society, the expression of black consciousness too will manifest itself more in this 
area. I found no evidence which supported these writers’ claims.
So far, I have looked at several potential areas in which we expected to find
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a source of social cohesion among Rocinha’s residents. Labels such as favelado, 
pobre, preto and nordestino imposed upon them by society at large were shown 
to contain largely negative associations, and Rocinha’s residents shied away from 
them. So, although potentially cohesive, their common origins failed to organise 
people into associations which emphasised these origins. There was no evidence of 
any associations organised around rural background or associated manifestations. 
As far as skin colour is concerned, we found some degree of organisation around 
black consciousness. It was more appropriate to talk of a very small marginalised 
subcommunity here. Black consciousness certainly did not act as an organising 
force for the shantytown at large. In similar ways, different subcommunities were 
found organised on the basis of religious persuasion and there was tension between 
these. This was particularly clear in the case of different Protestant sects. To a 
certain extent this was also the case for small groups of devout Catholics, divided 
amongst themselves into more or less radical or conservative and aligned under 
different practising priests. This was less true for Umbanda practitioners. Small 
groups of regular clients gathered around several minor experts. Most practitioners 
consulted a number of different specialists on an ad hoc basis (more as a local healer 
who provides an alternative solution in times of strife) and in terms of religious 
identity, they called themselves and thought of themselves as “Catholic” . Were 
there other further sources of identity which provided a basis on which Rocinha’s 
residents could think of themselves as “Rocinhense”18, or act as a collectivity, as 
belonging to Rocinha, as distinct from the other poor? For example, did Rocinha’s 
population express a collective identity in the form of arts, leisure? Or, did they 
invest in/share a local hero? (The question of political identity and leadership 
will be addressed in later chapters.) I cannot think of one person whose behaviour 
they collectively publicly admired and whose example they followed. The extent 
to which the Chefdo (the drug baron) fulfilled this role is elaborately discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 8. I argue there that his image was too controversial to qualify for
18That the label “Rocinhense” was not used (or any other which denoted Rocinha’s 
population) may be significant in itself.
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this role. Did Rocinha’s people express “community identity” in any other way? 
In the form of arts or leisure?
In weekends, especially on Saturdays, one could see many families descending 
to Sao Conrado beach (only a few minutes walk from the bottom of Rocinha) 
where some got together into teams to play football or volleyball. These teams, as 
far as I knew, did not mobilise Rocinha or any other parts thereof in any lasting 
ways. Their activities only attracted the attention of some passing spectators, and 
their games were ad hoc. There was no organised activity which represented any 
social units.19 Most other leisure activities were very much individual, or between 
close friends rather than institutionally organised. It has to be noted here too, 
that for most leisure did not exist as a separate category (Magnani 1984).20 In the 
area of arts, several books were published about Rocinha, with the cooperation of 
various groups. One of these (Varal de Lembrangas (Lit: Clothesline of Memories) 
(1983)) tells the story of Rocinha from its beginnings. It presents an emotional 
account of the “community’s struggle” in the face of. adverse political conditions. 
The existence of the book can, at first sight, be taken as evidence for the existence 
of a solid community, and indeed this was the original purpose behind the book.21 
According to some informants, however, the book only presented one side of the 
story. It effectively left out large parts of the “community” it proposed to write
19One book on Rocinha mentions the existence of a football club which seemed very 
active at the time. Since it lost its pitch in Rocinha (it was allocated to the victims of 
large mud slides in 1966-67), its activities came to a halt f Varal 1983).
20Most just worked and slept and the time between these two activities was spent 
travelling to and from work and for physical maintenance; activities related to eating and 
cleaning, all activities which took up large amounts of time especially in shantytowns. 
The remaining time was often spent in front of the TV, and many claimed that they had 
neither the time, energy or money to undertake anything else. For most, this pattern 
continued seven days a week.
21 There were several other books published about Rocinha or by Rocinha’s people 
(See Bibliography). Most were of the former type and were compiled by outsiders. (I 
would include Picole, Picole in this category.) As for those written and compiled by 
Rocinha’s people, some were not about Rocinha but addressed particular topics such 
as women’s issues (e.g. Morro Mulher and Rocinha, Maes e Vidas). Or, presented the 
life story of Rocinha’s residents (e.g. de Oliveira 1986). Varal was t herefore the only 
collective effort which attempted to deal with Rocinha as a whole.
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about, according to these informants. This situation is, of course, predictable, and 
theoretically, we can allow for this by arguing that (in line with Cohen) what is 
important is not the content of the symbols the community has in common, but 
the fact that their form is shared (Cohen 1978). Their content can be (and is) 
interpreted differently by different members of the community. Indeed, this allows 
for individuality to exist within a cultural whole. Or indeed, we could take this 
example as a case in which the (commonly owned) symbol is being manipulated
• '• '•••• -;•••• '  -I I
by some. The process of manipulation is essential for keeping these symbols alive 
(Cohen 1985). These arguments save the claim that the book can be seen as the 
symbolic manifestation of a community.
The point about this book, however, was that it was not of much importance 
to Rocinha’s people. (Or, in Cohen’s words, not even the form was shared by 
the people.) The large majority did not know of its existence. Comments from 
those who did know about it were made in a disinterested way. This was especially 
confirmed to me by the fact that it was hard for me to find a copy of it, and people 
were surprised and irritated at my interest in it. When at last I found copies of 
it in the houses of individuals, they competed with each other to sell them to 
me. Some time later the topic came up in a meeting that there were piles of the 
book forgotten in a corner of a classroom.22 The fact that it was put together at 
all was explained by the efforts of some social workers who, in line with Freire’s 
methodology of constructing a “community identity” by keeping its memory alive 
(e.g. Banck Sz Doimo 1987), raised some funding for these kinds of projects.23
In this way, there also existed a Theatre Group in Rocinha, who initiated 
similar projects, with the help of state funding. The group continually ran into 
trouble because of the lack of support from others in Rocinha, on whom they
22When the topic was addressed in a meeting of what to do with these piles of books 
(they were in the way), the issue barely merited any attention. Beyond a few practical 
details, the meeting moved on to the next topic.
23An example of this was the government project under which funding was provided 
to compile the collection of children’s stories Picole, Picole (see footnote J , Chapter 2) 
and Varal de Lembrangas (see Chapter 5).
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depended for space. When they tried to act out a street theatre project, about 
the story of a woman and the difficulties she encounters when moving from the 
Northeast to Rocinha (acting out the rural myth), they were criticised by many, 
firstly, because of the perceived irrelevance of the story for Rocinha’s people, and 
secondly, on the grounds that it glorified the main character of the story. It 
has to be noted that its critics were sceptical, however. They were dismissive in 
a disinterested way, not angry. The play did not provoke a public controversy. 
Nothing of much importance was at stake. (Demonstrated also by the fact that 
the lack of support for the group was not publicly contested.) The second charge 
is constructive in that it shows the tendency of Rocinha’s residents to object to 
one-person shows, which, in the end, was an important factor which influenced 
their willingness to construct a common identity. Rocinha’s people did not easily 
allow one person to be at the centre of attention. Individuals tried to steal the 
show, but they were not allowed to do so by the rest. This pattern was reflected 
in all areas of social life. In Samba/Carnival manifestations, the group as a whole 
performs, each performing individual competing for attention with the others and
i
the performance is highly ritualised. In this, as in other performing activities, 
the emphasis is on participation of the audience. The audience will not passively 
watch. This feature was also apparent in the running of group meetings (see in 
Chapter 7). As Magnani also noted when analysing the content and reception 
of popular circus performances in Sao Paulo suburbs, the degree to which these 
performances were judged a success by their spectators, depended on the way 
they managed to strike a chord in their audience’s own life experience, not by 
the skills of the performers (Magnani 1984). This partly explains the absence of 
a local hero. These observations have wide implications for the dynamics of the 
Rocinha’s leadership (on which I elaborate in the second part of this thesis). As 
for community identity, it again illustrates that we were dealing with a group of 
strong individuals who did not leave any space for the expression of a common 
identity.
To conclude, I return to my initial question. It emerges from the material 
presented in this chapter that Rocinha’s people did not express the unity of their
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“community” to a great extent. Instead, if anything, we have evidence for the 
existence of several sub communities. Rocinha’s population as a whole had few 
uniting symbols. The importance of those that they did recognise was slight and 
many were invested with a largely negative value. The material presented here 
creates the impression that the identity of these people did not greatly depend on 
their residence in Rocinha, but instead, on their personal achievements in other 
ways.
The question of this chapter is significant to my thesis in that it provides the 
analyst with a picture of what it was that the politician in Rocinha could draw 
on (or could not draw on) when mobilising support in the political scene. First of 
all, it confirms the heterogeneity of its population. It is becoming clear that the 
people of Rocinha did not see themselves as part of one category, clearly separate 
from their neighbours or from those for whom they worked (o rico). They did 
not see themselves as sharing the same background, nor did they see themselves 
as a group which was victimised by society at large (either on grounds of skin 
colour or through economic exploitation). Their appearance, the food they ate 
and the music they played did not provide them with a sense of belonging to the 
same group. They shied away from other characteristics traditionally attributed to 
them as a group. Their religious persuasions seemed to motivate the majority only 
weakly and here too they were divided among themselves both within the same 
creed as between the different ones. In terms of activities in the area of sports and 
entertainment, they likewise did not show a great interest in promoting themselves 
as part of a whole. The evidence in this chapter helps to explain why none of these 
issues (poverty and marginality, rurality, skin colour, and so on) were articulated 
clearly in political organisations, and why it was difficult to mobilise Rocinha’s 
people for the purpose of promoting it as a totality. Moreover, it shows that we 
are dealing with individuals whose aspirations were different from those needed to 
sustain a cohesive “community”.
Chapter 5
The Development of Leadership: 
Pre-1976
In the remainder of this thesis, I will present Rocinha’s political organisation as it 
appeared to me at the time of fieldwork. Ultimately, it is the aim of this thesis to 
characterise the different types of political groupings I found and account for the 
particular relations between them.
At first sight, there were two different sets of political activities at work. Firstly, 
there were those associated with the action groups. These action groups were nu­
merous and diverse. They included Rocinha’s Centros Comunitarios (Community 
Centres) of Rua Um, Rua Dois and Cachopa. Each accommodated many differ­
ent groups active in the area of education (adult night classes of several different 
grades, day classes for children of different ages and standards, groups teaching 
basic professional skills such as needlework and other crafts, woodwork, electrical 
repairs) or recreation (film, chess, theatre, dance, gymnastics and other sports). 
Other groups attached to these Centros Comunitarios operated in the area of 
health: basic health provision, home visiting groups targeting pregnant women 
and new mothers, vaccination campaigns or some other public health activities. 
The action groups included the various creches and a handful of independent 
“community schools” . They also included Rocinha’s blocos carnavalescos or the 
Residents Association representing Bairro Barcelos, which ran a small medical cen­
tre and various leisure groups and supported other such action groups in Rocinha. 
Or they included other new groups which emerged around a topical issue such as
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the outbreak of dengue (a disabling tropical disease spread by mosquitos, which 
was widespread in Rocinha towards the end of my fieldwork), or in response to 
media publicity surrounding street children and the mentally and physically hand­
icapped.
Each one of these action groups were publicly concerned with improving the 
different needs of a section of Rocinha. Apart from running their various activities, 
some were engaged in wider political activities. The extent of this wider concern 
varied from group to group. This involved attending meetings which had a direct 
bearing on the finance of the groups (such as those organised by funding agencies 
announcing their future directions or proposals for new projects), or various activi­
ties to promote the voice of low-income populations in higher-level decision-making 
and/or put pressure on government structures in other ways. Many committees 
and federations had been set up and workshops, conferences and pressure group 
meetings were held to this end. They were organised in very different ways. Some 
were large and more professional than others, some were funded by charities or 
government grants, some relied exclusively on volunteers, and some were run by 
religious organisations.
There existed another different set of political activities in Rocinha. The in­
dividuals active in these rarely involved themselves in the activities of the action 
groups (or at least not publicly) but appeared on the scene on different kinds of 
occasions. These occasions were usually events of importance to electoral politics: 
inaugurations, crisis events (such as the removal of a recently-built expansion of 
Rocinha, the outbreak of an epidemic or a recent gang war or wave of police activ­
ities in Rocinha), one-off large-scale government spending programmes such as the 
Brizolao (an enormous school complex initiated by the state government, named 
after the governor himself, Brizola) or a large children’s holiday camp for six weeks 
during the summer break. These occasions were usually better publicised, often 
involving higher levels of government and/or police, and took place often in the 
presence of the press. The above mentioned action groups tried to stay clear from 
these sorts of occasions.
Information about the dynamics of these sorts of political activities was diffi­
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cult to gather. Inside information was denied to me by some of those involved on 
several occasions and indirect rumours about these activities were often contra­
dictory. It was much harder therefore to know anything about them at all, and 
the reasons for this will be clarified below. Yet their influence on the political 
organisation of Rocinha was visibly significant and I cannot therefore ignore them 
in my analysis. I will therefore examine this sphere only where it is of importance 
to the understanding of the activities of the action groups and my focus will be 
on the activities of the action groups.
The political context of the time of fieldwork (1985-86) was post-abertura. 
Abertura officially started in 1979. It was to be the “opening up” of a dictatorship 
which had imposed repressive policies for fifteen years. Once the lid was taken off, 
movements started cropping up everywhere, raising questions which people had 
been forced to keep silent until now. Books and reports were published, posters 
designed, T-shirts printed in a campaign in which everyone was encouraged to 
participate. Debates were organised about the need for real popular participation 
in decision-making, decentralisation of power, the recognition and fulfillment of 
basic human rights, and so on, urging people to speak up about their oppressed 
situation. Research was undertaken, exposing many issues whose publication had 
not been permitted before. Conflicts, so far suppressed, now came to the surface 
(e.g. see Singer 1980).
The period from 1978 to 1980, especially, saw the birth of a large number 
of movements (for example, the Cost of Living Movement, and the movement 
against BNH policies) both Church-related and others. Also it marked the growth 
and reorganisation of other political structures such as syndical movements, which 
were presently run according to a structure established as part of Vargas’ pa­
ternalistic labour laws in the 1940s (Moreira Alves 1987, da Silva 1982). Their 
hierarchical structure prevented effective horizontal organisational links and their 
government-controlled funds defeated their original purpose. The first conference 
linking medical syndicates and health authorities to popular movements was also
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held in 1979 (CEBES 1981, Cordeiro 1983, FAMERJ 1982).1 Throughout 1978 
and 1979, industry was disrupted by many strikes, mainly over salary controls 
which the government now admitted to have manipulated (a loss of 34.1% in the 
salary’s real value over the 1973-1974 period) was now exposed (Moreira Alves 
1984). Success in wage rises in foreign-controlled car industries in Sao Paulo led 
to strikes elsewhere, and even to white-collar involvement (Abramo 1988). In 1979, 
a major party reform was initiated. The existing two-party structure was to be re­
placed by a multi-party system in preparation for the direct elections for state and 
municipal posts in November 1982, the first direct elections the country had seen 
for many years. These changes were within the guidelines set by the regime and 
what was perhaps most notable about these changes was not so much the practice 
of the political institutions (as they stayed much the same), but the change of 
political rhetoric which was perceived in all political activity.2 New jargon was 
suddenly in circulation; new ideas were articulated and current political language 
was challenged. It was therefore a time of political optimism which had profound 
effects at all levels of political activity.
In Rocinha, new groups were founded in response to new financial initiatives 
and many started mobilising to create opportunities for participation and ex­
ploit this newly found political space. By 1985 the initial enthusiasm had worn 
off, although the rhetoric that had come with it had become common currency.
*A financial crisis in the INPS (National Health Service) came to light in 1974, when a 
current crisis was further fuelled by a,widely publicised national epidemic of meningitis, 
which in turn led to investigations into other health conditions. Subsequent reports 
showed the dark side of the “economic miracle”: large increases in infant mortality rates 
in Sao Paulo, Brazil’s main “growth” area. The government reacted with the creation 
and reorganisation of a series of institutions. These measures were evaluated at the 
conference as equally inefficient as their predecessors had been. Additionally, it was 
confirmed that over the previous six years, government support had been increasingly 
used to build, expand and equip a new highly profitable private health industry for the 
rich.
2 “Rhetoric” here is used in its widest sense, to mean the total form in which the 
political process is articulated. I include the particular practices in which political 
discussion is held as well as the jargon used. In this I differ from some authors which 
address the debate on “rhetoric” such as Bloch (1975) and Paine (1981), who merely 
refer to the actual language used in political speech.
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When organising themselves, people compared themselves with what was “before 
abertura” and their main concern was with attacking politically influential forces 
which were formed in the shantytown during earlier times. It is clear, therefore, 
that the political activity I witnessed in Rocinha at the time of fieldwork could 
not be understood without reference to its more general contemporary political 
context. It can also be traced back to certain historical national political develop­
ments (e.g. government attitudes towards shantytowns reflected in their housing 
policies) which encouraged certain forms of shantytown action groups with their 
particular forms of leadership.
A point made repeatedly in the literature (e.g. Caldeira (1984), Eckstein 
(1977), Peattie (1968), Zaluar (1985)), is that shantytowns are politically and 
economically peripheral. While it is clear that Rocinha’s inhabitants were not 
merely passive receivers of these wider processes (such as, for example, the “peo­
ple under tutelage” as described by Honigmann &; Honigmann (1965), Rocinha has 
a number of indigenous “leaders” who were strong individuals), the shantytown’s 
leaderships’ actions can be seen partly as reactions to initiatives taken outside their 
control at higher levels. Leaders can therefore be seen as dynamic entrepreneurs 
learning to become increasingly sophisticated in their attempts to monopolise re­
sources to enhance their own economic and political status (Machado da Silva 
1967, 1969). The current political structure in Rocinha partly depended therefore 
directly on the policies governments adopted towards it in the past. Similarly, the 
strength of the leadership of action groups could be partly seen as a function of 
their funding period (which was in turn a function of the place the project oc­
cupied in the funding agency’s overall plan), of the publicity the project received 
in the media, and so on. But to merely present these external developments as 
given, would disregard the symbolic dimension of the political process in which 
people take part (Cohen 1969). It is the task of these chapters to examine how 
these past developments at these higher levels were interpreted, manipulated and 
used by Rocinha’s politicians and what the power structure in Rocinha looked like 
as a result. These chapters will trace the national context from which abertura 
developed, the political implications for Rio de Janeiro’s local governments (the
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governing bodies with which Rocinha’s population dealt most closely), and the 
kind of policies these governments produced, relating these developments at every 
stage to what consequences they had for Rocinha. The latter also was largely de­
termined by its internal infrastructural development in that the kind of leadership 
that developed within Rocinha was very much based on a historical monopoly over 
certain infrastructural resources. This first chapter will deal with developments 
up to the mid-1970s, which was the more repressive time. The following chapter 
will take up the story from there.
To convey the picture to the reader, I will quote selectively from one partic­
ular source, namely from Varal de Lembrangas. (The translations are my own.) 
Varal de Lembrangas (Lit: Washline of Memories) is a collection of Historias da 
Rocinha (Stories of Rocinha), its subtitle, gathered by a group of social workers in 
cooperation with several different leaders of Rocinha, over the period 1980 to 1983. 
Much of the material in the book is presented in interview form quoting named 
people talking about their past. The explicit aim of the book is to umostrar a 
cultura do morro” (Lit: show the shantytown’s culture) (Varal 1983). It contains 
stories that to the majority of Rocinha’s people represented their every day ex­
periences and it is organised in chronological order under the following headings:3
3Mutirao, referred to in the translation below, is a common form of workteams of 
volunteers mobilised to work on particular infrastructural problems in their free time.
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0  Tempo de Antes da Vinda pra 
Rocinha
Antigamente, ou o Tempo dos Bar- 
racos Cobertos com Telha de Papelao 
Pichado
The Time before Coming to 
Rocinha
The Old Days, or the Time of Shacks
Covered with Tarred
Cardboard
Tempo dos Politicos 
0  Tempo das Enchentes 
Tempo do Medo da Remogao 
Tempo do Mutirao 
Tempo de Hoje em Dia
Time of the Politicians 
The Time of the Floods 
Time of the Fear of Eradication 
Time of Mutirao 
Time of Today 
(Varal:6-7)
Varal (as any text (Clifford & Marcus 1986)) is clearly dated. It was put together 
with the explicit political aim to preserve and reconstruct historical and contem­
porary accounts of deprived “communities” , in the initial stages of the abertura 
period.4 It presents the views of particular leaders in Rocinha. It promotes some 
views, criticises others and omits others. My decision to quote from Varal. how­
ever, does not mean that I commit myself to these views only. I extensively quote 
this material as it provides particularly rich illustration and clarification on some 
topics in a way that I cannot reproduce otherwise.
Looking at the government’s attitudes towards shantytowns as reflected in its 
housing policies, a clear trend is visible which has been spelled out by several 
authors (Portes 1979, Valladares 1978a). The general pattern was an alterna­
tion between, on the one hand, total intolerance of their existence (justified by 
marginality theories which see them as the cause of all social evil (Perlman 1976)) 
leading to attempts at eradicating them with official plans for rehousing their in­
habitants in large peripheral low-income housing estates. On the other hand, there
4It was funded on the same project as Picole, Picole (1983) (see Footnote 1 in Chapter
2).
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were more liberal trends towards upgrading them at times when electoral support 
was needed for the maintenance of political power.
As early as 1886, concern was expressed about the shantytown problem in Rio 
de Janeiro.5 The Zona Sul had started to develop and the demand for cheap labour 
rose. This encouraged the random settlement of poor migrants. The first action 
to be taken to solve the problem was an attem pt to clear them away. Vargas’ cor- 
poratist administration passed a law to limit their growth in 1937, and initiated 
the building of parques proletarios (Lit: low-income housing projects) in the Zona 
Sul to house the favelados temporarily on their way to more permanent subur- 
bial low-income housing estates (Leeds h  Leeds 1972, Salmen 1969). In Rocinha, 
these measures took the form of various restrictions and the appearance of the 
guardas sanitarios. There was confusion over what their role was. According to 
some, they came as part of a sanitation campaign. According to others, they were 
forest guards in charge of controlling the expansion of Rocinha into the forest (JB 
23/5/1973). Whatever they were, they had the reputation of being corrupt:
" . . .  mas faziam ‘vista grossa’, me- “ . . .  but they ‘turned a blind eye’
diante recompensa em dinheiro.” when offered money.”
(ibid.)
Nevertheless, with the presence of these patrolling agents, new residents from then 
on undertook their construction at night during their absence. The inspectors’ ta r­
gets were empty buildings, residences inhabited by single men, and migrants who 
lacked identity and work documents. New residents therefore “borrowed” a family 
and a set of furniture and bribed the officials generously, to prevent their new 
houses from being demolished and their materials from being carted off (and sold 
elsewhere) by the guards (Varal:38).
Those trying to repair or improve their house, needed licences which could be 
obtained from the municipal authorities (Varal:52). Also brick constructions were
5The information on governments’ housing policies in Rio de Janeiro presented here 
is mainly taken from the following sources: Ames 1973, Leeds & Leeds 1972, Perlman 
1976, Portes 1979, Rush 1974, Salmen 1969, Valladares 1978a & 1978b.
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torn down by the authorities. People responded by building brick walls inside 
their wooden huts (Varal:46). The presence of the guardas undoubtedly had the 
effect of stimulating Rocinha’s population growth, rather than restricting it, since 
for the guardas their job became big business. Slowly more people appeared and 
by 1951 there was an estimated 5000 people on the mountain (Varal:50).6
“Em toda parte tinha barraco . . .  “There were shacks all over the place
Cada barraco tinha uma especie de . . .  Every shack had a kind of back-
lote g r a n d e yard.”
(Varal:51)
The stories in Varal hint at the practice of irregular land dealings by a handful 
of individuals (especially the guardas) who enriched themselves rapidly, to which 
others responded by turning this to their own advantage. There is no evidence 
of any collective effort to counteract the less pleasant consequences of these de­
velopments: the chaotic growth of Rocinha (“shacks all over the place”) and the 
consequent infrastructural problems. This picture becomes a familiar one as time 
went on.
Vargas’ ambitious project was discontinued and, at the time of fieldwork the 
parques proletarios were still there. Vargas’ Estado Novo collapsed and the subse­
quent Dutra government introduced a new style of more liberal populist politics 
incompatible with the continuation of these eradication plans. This government 
relied on popular support which took the form of patronage building in all sectors 
of the electorate. As a result construction around the parques proletarios became 
irregular and messy, as governments gave in to the demands of different pressure 
groups. Questions concerning welfare, especially, became increasingly politicised 
and action taken towards favelados was often uncoordinated and contradictory 
(Malloy 1979). In the shantytowns, it also meant the appearance and interference 
of politicians in its internal affairs.
6According to FEEMA, there were 4,513 inhabitants in Rocinha in 1950 (quoting 
Medina & Valladares 1968 (FEEMA 1980:20)).
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The first reference to this interference in Rocinha is again in the question of 
settlement. It was now the politicians who were seen to distribute land titles in 
Rocinha and this time for prospective voters. According to an article in the Jornal
do Brasil (JB) in 1973:
.. passou-os [os terrenos] para o 
Sr. R. C., que durante uma cam- 
panha para vereador cedeu muitas 
terras aos seus eleitores em poten- 
cial. Ele nao se elegeu, mas a favela 
cresceu bastante. Outro politico, A. 
da F., tambem usou a favela como 
reduto eleitoral. . .  com muito exito. ”
“. . .  passed it [the land] on to Mr. R. 
C., who during an election campaign 
for councillor gave many plots away 
to his potential voters. He didn’t get 
elected, but the favela grew amply. 
Another politician, A. F., also used 
the favela as an election stronghold 
. . .  very successfully.”
(JB 23/5/1973)
The immediate result of this was that suddenly Rocinha’s population grew rapidly:
uFoi aquela avalancha. A area “It was like an avalanche. The area
encheu-se de casebres, ocupados de filled with shacks, which were imme-
imediato por gente que chegava de diately occupied by people who ar-
toda parte, nessa avidez de um abrigo rived from all over the place, in their
numa area proxima do trabalho e da eagerness for shelter in an area near
praia!” work and the beach!”
(Varal:63)
The result is predictable: the abundance of the early days was over. Space became 
increasingly cramped, and the pressure of the lack of infrastructure for the growing 
number of people rapidly began to be felt. Basic necessities such as the demand 
for water were not met. The building up of household waste, the drainage of 
sewage and rain water, the attraction of vermin and other basic problems became 
increasingly urgent. This in itself stimulated the influx of politicians, especially 
in 1950-1960, the years just before the military coup (1964). Now they came 
with promises for improvements to basic services: water, roads, electricity, waste 
removal, and so on. This needy population proved a perfect target for election 
purposes.
To maintain links with this population, contacts were established with a cabo-
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eleitoral (canvasser) who was contracted to work for him /her in the shantytown. 
This cabo-eleitoral would preferably be one of the shantytown’s most senior re­
spected people. Such a post not only helped the candidate, it also enhanced the 
cabo’s own prestige greatly. S/He would be seen as the person that succeeded in 
attracting favours to the shantytown otherwise inaccessible. I quote Seu C. at
“Cabo-eleitoral is a friendly person, 
an esteemed person in that area. 
People, you know how it is, people 
come to ask everything of that per­
son. A person who is treated well 
and respected and who also respects 
the others, you know? And this was 
like me. I was brought up here, and I 
had great consideration for the peo­
ple of Rocinha, . . .  always a friend to 
them.”
(Varcd:67-68)
Seu C.’s example also shows how a cabo could serve to build up a large personal 
domain.
length:
“Cabo-eleitoral e uma pessoa amiga, 
e uma pessoa considerada naquele 
bairro. 0  povo, sabe como e, tudo o 
povo vem pedir aquela pessoa. Uma 
pessoa, bem tratada, bem respeitada e 
que respeita tambem os demais, ne? 
E  assim fu i eu. Criado aqui, tinha 
uma grande consideragao pelo povo 
da Rocinha, . . .  sempre amigo. ”
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uCom o passar dos anos, veio o R. 
C. . . .  era candidato a vereador e me 
chamou pra trabalhar com e/e. Na 
epoca e/e me autorizou a deixar fazer 
esses barracos todos ai, no morro, a 
mando dele . . .  A i  /e/e] falou: “C., 
quer tomar conta disso? Eu te pago 
150 contos por mes . . .  tudo dado.” 
E assim eu fu i tomar conta dos ter- 
renos dos Barcelos. Comecei a abrir 
essa rua aqui atraves da politica . . .  
Eles falaram pra mim: “C., o que 
voce quer fazer?” “Eu quero abrir 
essa estrada. ” . . .  Eles me deram 
um trator . . .  A i apareceu um senhor 
com o nome de Dr. E. . . .  e/e disse: 
“C., os Barcelos mandaram lotear 
isso aqui, e e pra voce me ajudar.” 
E  assim eu fui ajudar . . .  Loteamos 
tudo. Comecei a vender a 20, jO, 80, 
100 contos o lote . . .  Eu tinha uma 
comissao de 5% . . .  Ai, daqui, dali, 
vendendo. Vendi tudo.”
“As the years went by, R. C. . . .  ar­
rived . . .  he was standing for council­
lor and approached me to work with 
him. At the time he authorised me 
to have all those shacks on the hill 
there built, at his orders . . .  So [he] 
said:“C., do you want to take care of 
these? I will pay 150 contos monthly 
. . .  cash in hand. So I took charge 
over the Barcelos plots. I started to 
dig out this street here with this kind 
of politics. They said to me: “C., 
what would you like to do?” “I want 
to build a road.” . . .  They gave me 
a tractor . . .  Then a man named Dr. 
E. appeared . . .  he said: “C., Barce­
los sent me here to divide this estate 
into lots, and you can help me.” And 
so I went to help . . .  We allocated all 
of it. I began to sell for 20, 40, 80, 
100 contos per lot . . .  I got a com­
mission of 5% . . .  So here we were 
selling a bit from here, from there. I 
sold everything.”
fVaral:66-67)
The cabo-eleitoraTs job was to do the politician’s “community work”. Not only 
was s/he assigned to “administrate the works” going on in the shantytown, and to 
distribute the favours, s/he also was to organise political events such as speeches 
and parties around election times. Seu C.:
“Tinha bebida, distribuia churrasco. 
Eu dava muita coisa. Dava ar- 
roz, dava feijao, batata. Dei muitas
coisas.
“There was drink, I distributed bar­
becued meat. I gave many things. 
There was rice, beans, potatoes. I 
gave lots of things.”
(Varal:68)
And most importantly her/his job was to encourage people to register and vote 
on the day of the election itself. 0  Chico B.:
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“As vezes, o servigo da gente e facil- 
itar um documento. Levo e/e la na 
regiao, se e/e nao sabe. Se e/e nao 
tiver dinheiro, tiro o retrato do ca- 
marada. Se for possivel, no registro, 
a gente paga tudo ”
“Sometimes it is our job to help get­
ting a document. I take him to the 
Regiao [where one registers to vote], 
if he doesn’t know where that is. If he 
doesn’t have any money, I take this 
pal’s photograph [needed for the vot­
ing register]. If possible, we pay ev­
erything for him at the register.”
(Varal: 64)
They obviously gained a lot of prestige for themselves, but their relationship with 
the outside politician was one of dependence. Cabos, for example, could not cam­
paign for political posts themselves. These were reserved for the better off. I quote 
Seu C., who would have been a likely candidate in Rocinha at the time:
“0  Senhor nunca pensou em se can- 
didatar, Seu C.? . . .  Ja ha muitos 
anos . . .  Mas eu fiz um calculo e o 
meu dinheiro nao dava . . .  Eu nao 
tinha dinheiro pra gastar na cam- 
panha . . .  Tern muitos [gastos da 
campanha], ne? 0  sujeito tern um 
carro, e/e tern que comprar gasolina. 
Se tern uma pessoa doente, ai a gente 
tern que locomover ela para o hospi­
tal. Tudo e gasto . . .  cheguei, mas 
retirei, porque o dinheiro nao dava ”
“Have you never thought of running 
for office, Mr. C.? . . .  Yes, many 
years ago . . .  But I did a calcula­
tion, and my money wouldn’t do . . .  
I didn’t have the money to spend on 
a campaign . . .  This is a lot [cost of 
a campaign], you know. The candi­
date has a car, he has to buy petrol. 
If there is someone sick, then you 
have to take her to hospital. All this 
is expensive . . .  I did it, but with­
drew, because I didn’t have enough 
money.”
(Varal:69:*See also Machado da Silva 1967 & 1969.)
The early cabo-eleitorais in Rocinha, therefore had the appearance of a patron por­
traying themselves as “father-like” figures (Kenny 1960, Silverman 1965). Clients 
came to them with all their problems (“people come to ask everything of that 
person”), to whom they offered protection and wisdom (e.g. telling them how 
to vote) (Boissevain 1966). They presented themselves as being at their clients’ 
service in times of need (e.g. when someone needs a lift to hospital) and as an 
infinitely generous person (“I gave lots of things.”). The image corresponds closely 
to Sahlins’ generalised reciprocity: there is no mention of what they demanded in 
return except for respect and friendship (basic to this kind of relationship (Wolf
Chapter 5. The Development o f Leadership: Pre-1976 131
1966)). Additionally they gained their clients’ trust in virtue of being a senior 
indigenous person (“brought up here”). The tru th  of the statement that “gifts 
make friends” , clearly applies and this picture of them resembles that of a start­
ing patron (Gouldner 1960, Henriksen 1971) creating a basis from which they can 
later draw to their advantage, i.e. dictate the terms under which their clientele 
will later return the favours. It becomes clear that they got a great deal out of this 
in return. The loyalty from their followers allowed them to build up great wealth 
as they used this support to bargain with politicians, who gave them monopolised 
control over the sale of land in Rocinha.
Another basic characteristic of the patron-client relation is clearly identified 
here: both patrons and clients gain access to resources to which they otherwise 
do not have. The patrons attracted “works” to the shantytown (e.g. the paving 
of the street) and carried out numerous small services for their clientele. They 
created a dependence on such resources (these were newly introduced by them) 
from which they could benefit in turn later (Henriksen 1971).7 Key to their status
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was their personal contact with their clientele and their clients’ dependence on 
the resources they offered. From the above, the image clearly corresponds to the 
traditional patron as presented in the works of Barnes 1986, Eisenstadt & Roniger 
1984, for example.
As problems of infrastructure in Rocinha became more urgent, the politicians 
were increasingly criticised and their dealings with the cabos were increasingly 
questioned. The politicians’ promises of great things like infrastructural improve­
ments such as water, electricity, roads, land titles and education (all of which were 
by now desperately inadequate under the strain of the fast-growing population) 
mostly remained promises. And even the small presents which people expected to 
be distributed, remained absent.
7In this sense, therefore, patrons acted as brokers (as most patrons do) (Paine 1971).
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“Ave Maria! o papel dos politicos 
aqui e de fazer vergonha! E  tudo 
conversa fiada! A gente nao acred- 
ita mais nao . . .  Nao vai dar mesmo, 
nao e . . .  Entao e melhor nao prom­
eter. ”
(Varal:78-79)
Moreover, where they did touch basic structural questions such as land titles, wa­
ter and electricity, their interference was usually disadvantageous to most people 
in Rocinha. The question of the distribution of land titles, mentioned above for 
example, had disastrous results. Not only did it lead to the enormous population 
influx at the time, the way they went about dividing and selling off land also led 
to the creation of powerful landlords such as Seu C. (as should be clear from the 
above quotes) whose credibility diminished rapidly because of a number of factors. 
They could not establish personal contact with a large part of the newly resident 
population, the goodies they delivered now began to run in short supply (both 
the smaller favours (for a larger population) and the politicians’ “works” (which 
remained just promises)). In other words, they could not respond to clients’ needs 
any more and expectations began to grow unbalanced. As their personal wealth 
became more obvious as time went on, they were increasingly resented, particularly 
as land and property was in short supply.
Once such a power structure had been established, it was hard to correct it in 
later years, when competition for land increased. The question of land titles in 
some parts of Rocinha remained unresolved throughout its history and led to a 
lot of violence and political divisions cutting right across its population, even still 
at the time of fieldwork. (See, for example, the disputes reported in Rocinha’s 
journals Informativo and Tagarela.) The details of the complex issue of land titles 
becomes clearer in the following chapter.
Similarly, the development of infrastructure like water and electricity led to 
long-lasting conflicts, owing to the interference of these politicians. W ith regard 
to water, for example, the demand was so high that individuals would take the
“By God! The way politicians here 
behave is shameful! It is all just 
words! People here don’t believe 
them any more, no . . .  It is not good 
enough, no . . .  I t’s not good enough, 
don’t you think? . . .  I’d be better if 
they didn’t promise anything.”
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initiative, often sponsored by politicians, to tap water pipes and extend them into 
improvised networks for a clientele who had become members of their “water so­
ciety” (sociedade de agua). High membership fees were charged monthly. Yet the 
supply for the water network would dry up as the number of members exceeded 
its capacity and effectively left its members without the water for which they had 
paid. (See for example Varal:52-53.) The installment of small water networks 
only in some selected places provided opportunities for individuals to exploit their 
neighbours. These conflicts were only resolved in some places, when the water 
supply was “regularised” by the state water company CEDAE (mostly only after 
1980, see Chapter 1). In other places these problems continued at the time of 
fieldwork. In the case of electricity, the pattern was similar.
“Naquele tempo era luz de lampiao. “At that time it was electricity from
So podia ter luz quem estivesse the street lights. The only people
residindo na periferia da Estrada who had access to electricity were
da Gavea, . . .  Dessas cabines, os those who lived around Estrada da
moradores iam pedindo um biquinho, Gavea, . . .  People asked for a con-
e at foi se estendendo . . . ” nection from those electricity meters,
and that way it gradually expanded
55
(Varal:56)
That is when the troubles started. These private illegally extended networks (spon­
sored by politicians) fell into the hands of private “owners” and, like in the so- 
ciedades de agua, some overcharged their customers and made profitable business 
out of it. Customers in turn would refuse to pay which meant that Light (the state 
electricity company) repeatedly intervened by cutting off supplies altogether.
So far, what emerges is a basic power structure of a few individuals who con­
trolled water, electricity and land, and who were often sponsored by outside politi­
cians for electoral purposes. They appeared as powerful bosses whose activities 
were often extremely exploitative. The image of the beneficent patrao was be­
ginning to crumble as Rocinha’s population began to grow fast, when personal 
contacts were lost and space and basic facilities were increasingly becoming more 
scarce. National developments over the following years also affected this leadership 
in several ways. First of all, there was the foundation of the Fundagao Leao XIII
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who became an important agent in social welfare in shantytowns (Leeds k  Leeds 
1972, Valladares 1978a). Secondly, there was an attem pt at creating Residents 
Associations in shantytowns to coordinate the construction of infrastructure and 
to act as a mediator for various welfare programmes (Diniz 1982b).
As far as policies were concerned, governments at different levels failed to for­
mulate clear policies to deal with the growing shantytown problem. As debates 
about the shantytown problem continued, commissions were established to eradi­
cate them, but no action was taken beyond attem pts to take the census of their 
inhabitants (Valladares 1978a). As a result, shantytown populations were tar­
geted with discontinuous, often contradictory projects of an ad hoc nature aimed 
at gaining their support.
The foundation of the Fundagao Leao XIII reflected these contradictory poli­
cies. It was founded with a dual purpose. Firstly, it was to extend state control 
into the shantytowns, by implanting a social centre in the middle of each one. The 
Fundagao Leao XIII was directly linked to the Catholic Church until the early 
1960s which legitimated its actions to the shantytown inhabitants. The initiative 
had come from the federal government and went together with a large-scale at­
tem pt to eliminate the growing Communist movement at the time (Leeds k  Leeds 
1972). Secondly, its purpose was to provide some services in shantytowns to ex­
tend patronage ties. Later, as it was increasingly used as a government tool to 
infiltrate shantytowns and keep control over their political activities (ibid.), the 
Fundagao Leao XIII came to adopt a significant role in shantytown politics.
It was not until 1956, in the growing climate of national populism (after the 
following Kubitschek government was elected) that a more substantive attem pt 
was made to solve some of the urgent shantytown problems. In Rio de Janeiro, 
the organisation SERFHA was set up in 1956 to carry out policies to recognise 
the shantytowns as functional and therefore not to eradicate them but to upgrade 
them in loco instead (Diniz 1982b, Leeds & Leeds 1972). They differed from the 
Fundagao Leao XIII’s practices, in that they tried to keep the favelados’ political 
independence by organising them into co-ops and encouraging self-sufficiency with 
a large Operagao Mutirao (Operation Mutirao) campaign, encouraging collective
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voluntary work teams recruited in the shantytowns to solve the worst of their 
problems themselves (Diniz 1982b). Rios (the secretary under the administration 
responsible for these programmes) , in this way opened channels of communication 
between favelados and the government’s administrators. This temporarily marked 
a significant shift in policies and reflected a trend characteristic of the then rising 
national movement towards a more democratic government. This pattern was 
to be repeated in 1975, when again a repressive government changed its policies 
towards more liberal attitudes.
SERFHA actively pursued its activities in Rocinha in those early years. Rios’ 
urbanising policies were becoming substantiated in Rocinha in the form of the 
appearance of the first brick houses.
“Nao tinha casa de alvenaria. A 
primeira casa foi la em cima, . . .  Ela 
pintou de branco e ficou uma mar- 
avilha! Mas isso tudo comegou numa 
reuniao em que o Dr. Artur Rios 
disse assim: . . .  Faz um buraco ali, 
um aqui, bota uns vergalhoezinhos, 
faz o primeiro pilotis, levanta alve­
naria, bota laje e tal.”
“There were no concrete houses 
[when the Associagao was founded]. 
The first house was there at the top, 
. . .  She painted it white and it turned 
out brilliant! But that all started in 
a meeting in which Dr. Artur Rios 
said this: . . .  You dig a hole there, 
one here, put in a few iron rods, put 
up the first stilt, build up the brick­
work, roof on top and things.”
(Varal:83)
Thus, SERFHA was present in Rocinha, encouraging people to improve their 
houses, and they instructed them how to go about this. At that time, according 
to Varal. there existed another organisation active in Rocinha, CANDE (Asso­
ciagao de Mulheres Democraticas), which carried out similar urbanisation projects 
(Varal:83). However, when Lacerda came to power later, the tables turned. In a 
move against the national Goulart government of the time which supported the lib­
eralising trend, he fired Rios, as shantytowns’ political independence threatened
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his move towards increasing centralisation (Perlman 1976). Lacerda abolished 
SERFHA and revived the Fundagao Leao XIII, which was from now on incorpo­
rated officially into the state’s welfare services. Favelados were now again to be 
treated as dependent masses in need of paternalistic orientation and moral guid­
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ance. His move marked the end of open communication between them and the 
government administration for many years to come (Leeds Sz Leeds 1972).
He was also the first governor to criticise the existence of the shantytowns 
seriously. He urged for national coordinated action in order to eradicate them 
and created the institution COHAB-GB (Companhia de Habitagao Popular da 
Guanabara), which was to be in charge of this job. Lacerda had several motives. 
Firstly, he was working on his own political career for the presidential post, and 
hoped to provide low-cost housing for a large poor electorate (Leeds &; Leeds 1972). 
At the same time he was acting against the current nationalistic Goulart govern­
ment by using COHAB-GB to attract large grants from abroad for the building of 
low-income housing estates (ibid.). His large-scale construction plans encouraged 
private enterprise favouring the housing and property sector and created a large 
number of jobs for technical personnel all greatly extending his patronage to these 
sectors. The creation of COHAB-GB in 1962 marked the initiation of a series of 
programmes towards the eradication of the existing inner-city shantytowns in Rio 
de Janeiro, particularly those located in the wealthy Zona Sul.
In these years, there was a continuing tension therefore between those who 
worked in favour of upgrading shantytowns and those who aimed to eradicate them. 
Simultaneously, all government sectors weire out to tem pt shantytown inhabitants 
with patronage in return for electoral support. It was in this political climate that 
the Residents Associations were created.
In many shantytowns Residents Associations were created in 1960-1961 (Diniz 
1982b). This happened at that time in response to SERFHA’s Projeto Mutirao 
(Lit: Mutirao Project, launched in 1960) which brought a lot of plans and promises 
into the open. These Residents Associations were needed in order to implement 
these projects effectively (Valladares 1977). On the other hand, now that Lacerda 
had taken over the state governorship in Rio de Janeiro, their creation also suited 
his ambitions to strengthen political control inside shantytowns in his attem pt 
to extend the power of his state government. These two political forces acting 
through the Residents Associations in the shantytowns were continually pulling in 
opposite directions. This was especially visible in the implementation of contra-
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dieting projects within the shantytown culminating in a recurrent fight over the 
directorate of the Residents Association. In this situation, a Residents Association 
as an impartial coordinator of shantytown resources was clearly an impossibility. 
Their creation was therefore bound to increase tension. On the one hand, Lac- 
erda’s politicians backed and founded the Residents Association (according to one 
ex-president of the Residents Association):
“A fundagao da Associagao foi em 
agosto de 1960, quando o gover- 
nador Carlos Lacerda entrou. Ele 
teve aquela ideia assim de fazer umas 
reunioes com associagoes de mor- 
ros . . .  At foi aquela briga, negocios 
de politica. 0  politico tal queria o 
grupo ta l . . .  Era tudo ligado com os 
politicos. ”
“The foundation of the Residents As­
sociation was in August 1960, when 
the governor Carlos Lacerda entered 
into office. He had this idea of hold­
ing meetings with favela associations 
. . .  And then it was nothing but trou­
ble, politics. A certain politician 
wanting a certain group . . .  It was 
all to do with these politicians.”
(Varal:83)
And according to Seu I.:
“As Associagoes foram criadas com 
interesse politico, para o politico usar 
as directorias como cabos eleitorais. 
A Associagao aqui na Rocinha foi 
formada por um grupo de pessoas 
simpatizantes ao ex-governador Lac­
erda . . .  ”
“The associations were founded with 
political interests, for politicians to 
use their directors as cabos-eleitorais. 
The Association here in Rocinha was 
formed by a group of people who 
were supporters of the ex-governor 
Lacerda . . . ”
(Varal: 82)
And:
“Quando Lacerda autorizou que se 
fundasse associagao na favela, man- 
dou que se compusesse uma equipe de 
12 homens, para que dirigesse a As- 
sociagao. ”
“When Lacerda authorised the foun­
dation of the Association in the 
favela, he put a group of 12 men in 
charge of the Association.”
(Varal:87)
On the other hand, SERFHA’s personnel, backed by Rios’ policies, tried to make 
a political claim in Rocinha trough the building of its sede (Lit: seat; clubhouse).
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“Entao fundamos a Associagao la em 
cima, no barracao do lado do bar­
raco do Seu M. Botamos uma placa 
com o nome que naquela epoca era 
Servigo de Recuperagao de Favela 
(SERFHA) . . .  *
(Varal:83)
However:
“A i comegou a briga entre o admin- “So then a row started between the
istrador [o Lacerda] e o Dr. Artur administrator [Lacerda] and Dr. Ar-
Rios. ” tur Rios.”
(Varal:83)
The story clearly illustrates the contradictory policies between the different levels 
of government, a situation which caught the new Residents Association in the mid­
dle. Both parties competed for the directorate of the Association to gain access 
to Rocinha to implement their own policies.
At the time, the creation of the Residents Association in Rocinha served a 
purpose for both parties involved (both the donos as well as the politicians): on 
the one hand, it served as a legitimation for outside politicians to continue as 
they had before, except, now with the “permission” of the “representative” body 
of the shantytown behind them. It also worked to the advantage of the shanty­
town’s bosses in that they now had official backing from outside the shantytown 
to continue their exploitative practices. Additionally, they were now officially 
in a position where they could monopolise all the state resources coming to the 
shantytown (see also Machado da Silva 1969).
From the point of view of the rest of the population, it had the effect of 
dividing this leadership politically in a struggle for these resources, on which their 
own reputation and power inside the shanty depended. In effect, the Association 
failed to perform its task as an impartial representative body, coordinating the 
shantytown’s upgrading projects. Instead, it became a battleground for politicians 
of different parties and levels of government in their struggle to gain influence over 
the shantytown’s voters.
“So then we founded the Association 
there at the top, in the big shack next 
to Mr. M. We put a plaque on the 
door with the name which at the time 
was SERFHA . . . ”
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Initial participation in the Association’s activities was high: it claimed a mem­
bership of 939 three months after its foundation in 1961 (Valladares 1977:1398). 
The promise of urbanisation projects for Rocinha, in particular the talk of the con­
struction of schools and a medico-dental centre, undoubtedly attracted this large 
number of members. But after barely one year, the first president stood down, 
having failed to implement any of the promised facilities. Allegations of corrup­
tion helped to discredit the organisation soon after its foundation and during the 
immediately following years many subsequent directors fell.
This is what the situation looked like up until the 1964 coup. After the coup, 
the repressive forces of the military government allowed a similar pattern to con­
tinue for the following fifteen years ahead. Let us look at the details of how the 
coup and the following repressive years affected Rocinha’s political activities.
A military regime took power in a coup in 1964. They saw it as their task 
to rectify what they thought was threatening the nation. The overthrow brought 
an end to the rising democratic trend in Brazil which had been built up slowly 
since 1945 (Skidmore 1967). The overthrow was a result of several factors whose 
relative importance is disputed in the literature (Flynn 1978, Moreira Alves 1984, 
Skidmore 1967). Here it is enough to mention that it was a combination of several 
political and economic factors. The military drew up a plan for the installation of a 
particular development model which was to be implemented in stages. At first, the 
object was to eliminate the “internal enemy” and take control of society by means 
of widespread repression and with the help of a sophisticated Information Ser­
vice. Political parties were abolished, and most grassroots movements eliminated 
(Moreira Alves 1984). Those allowed to exist were co-opted. By 1966, widespread 
economic reforms had started: a series of salary control laws were passed partly 
to attract multinational and foreign-linked national capital. On top of that there 
was open intervention in syndical politics and universities. From several sources, 
we get a detailed picture of what happened in Rocinha as a result of the coup and 
the subsequent period of repressive politics.
The military government abolished the existing party structure and many of 
the politicians who had entered Rocinha with their promises, were now cassados
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(Lit: cancelled, abolished, in practice this often meant that they went voluntarily 
into exile abroad). The immediate result of this was the collapse of the projects 
sponsored by them. Their cabos-eleitorais, or other representatives and admin­
istrators which had run them in the shantytowns, automatically took complete 
charge. The absence of the politicians had the effect of officially turning the di­
rectors of the sociedades de agua and luz into powerful donos de agua and luz, and 
released all previous restrictions on their exploitative activities (Varal). The fear 
of the government’s repressive practices, protected them from public criticism with 
the result that they could only be challenged at a personal level. This situation 
led to violence and arguments deeply dividing neighbours.
Moreover, 1966 was the year of the rains and consequent floodings ( Tempo das 
Enchentes in Varal).
“Foram semanas de chuva, uns 15 
dias por at. Todo mundo desen- 
ganado da vida. A gente desani- 
mou. Parecia que o mundo estava 
acabando . . .  Aqui na Rocinha, foi 
uma calamidade. Muita gente mor- 
reu, muito barraco caiu . . .  Os bar- 
racos nao resistiam porque a terra 
ia cedendo . . .  Quern tinha cabega 
largava os barracos, quern ficava mor-
rta.
“It rained for weeks, about a fort­
night or so. Everybody was disillu­
sioned with life. People lost faith. 
It seemed like the world was com­
ing to an end . . .  Here in Rocinha, 
it was a calamity. Many people died, 
many shacks fell down . . .  The shacks 
couldn’t resist it because the earth 
would give way . . .  Those who had 
any sense left their shacks behind, 
those who stayed died.”
(Varal:94) (See also Ames 1973 and Rush 1974.)
People recall their helplessness in the face of what was happening, the struggle 
to survive and the help they gave each other. There was no mention of collec­
tively organised activities. Several did recall the minimal paternalistic assistance 
provided by the Fundagao Leao XIII. It was the start of a new electoral term 
of the state government and the Fundagao was used as a tool in an attem pt to 
improve the government’s image by increasing its populist, paternalist services in 
these times of need (Leeds &; Leeds 1972). Otherwise the shantytown dwellers 
had to rely on their own contacts for help. There was no evidence of any major 
official rescue operation other than the Fundagao, and the references to the help
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of the madames (Lit: madams; from neighbouring areas such as Gavea and Sao 
Conrado) (Varal:94-95) suggest that there was little more than band-aid type so­
lutions to these disastrous conditions in Rocinha at the time. The rains marked 
the beginning of a series of repressive forces on the shantytowns. Over the fol­
lowing years, the political scene in Rocinha became increasingly repressed by the 
implementation of several federally imposed restrictive measures.
The first measure of direct government intervention in the shantytowns came 
in 1966 in the form of the CEE (Comissao Estadual de Energia) (Diniz 1982a, 
1982b, Valladares 1978):
" . . .  surgiu at uma regulamentagao 
de que as favelas deviam ter uma 
Comissao de Luz. A Comissao filiou- 
se depois a Comissao Estadual de 
Energia (CEE). A CEE foi uma agao 
do Governo com fins de moralizar 
essas leis. Tinha um estatuto uni­
forme para todas as Comissoes de 
Luz. Contavamos tambem com a 
sua assistencia para facilitar a ad- 
ministragao e orientar as comissoes. 
Mas acabou que com muito calouro 
na coisa, a propria CEE teve muito 
problema de ordem jurtdica. ”
“ . . .  then there appeared this regula­
tion that the favelas had to have an 
Electricity Commission. The Com­
mission was later affiliated to the 
State Commission of Energy (CEE). 
The CEE was a measure of the gov­
ernment to enforce these laws. There 
was a uniform statute for all the 
Electricity Commissions. We also 
counted on their assistance with ad­
ministration and they adviced the 
Commissions. But it all ended with 
a lot of troubles in this business, the 
CEE itself had a lot of legal prob­
lems.”
(Varal:56)
government worked for the CEE.One individual chosen by the
UA sua fungao era receber a ener­
gia da Light (por deleg agao da antiga 
Comissao Estadual de Energia) e dis- 
tribm-la na favela.”
“It was his job to receive energy 
from Light (delegated by the old 
CEE) and to redistribute this in the 
favela.”
(JB 7/11/1977)
He was kept in this powerful position with the help of the government and his own 
private protection racket in the shantytown. Inevitably, conflicts over the control 
of the CEE escalated.
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Direct government intervention in Rocinha’s affairs clearly had the effect of 
officially transferring power to and protecting the monopoly over a potentially 
lucrative and exploitative business of one individual. It also had the effect of con­
centrating power over affairs concerning the shantytown as a whole into the hands 
of one individual. The government further enforced this kind of power structure 
in the shantytown with the implementation of two subsequent decrees designed to 
maintain effective control over favela leadership (Diniz 1982a, Valladares 1978). 
Decreto (Decree) N 870 in 1967 effectively placed the favelados’ Residents As­
sociation under direct control of the state’s Secretary of Social Services and the 
Regional Administration.8
The subsequent Decreto E 3.330 of 1969 imposed the official recognition of only 
one Residents Association in each shantytown and officially permitted government 
intervention in this Association. This prevented the creation of dissident associa­
tions to act parallel to the government-controlled associations. From now on, the 
government had to approve the Associations’ statutes and financial planning offi­
cially. Representatives of these government organs obligatorily had to be part of 
election committees founded a certain number of days before elections took place, 
in order for them to be recognised as “valid” . These Associations were known 
as juntas governativas (Lit: governing councils). The Fundagao Leao XIII had 
become the state government’s main tool in this process of maintaining control. 
Its representatives had a physical foundation (a “community centre”) in all shan­
tytowns and attended all political meetings that took place in them. These agents 
took on tasks such as the supervision of elections (the registration of voters and 
the polling procedures), the administration of certain projects (e.g. taking census) 
demanded by the decrees (Diniz 1982a).
8These had been created as a result of Lacerda’s reorganisation of the state’s body of 
social services, in 1963. It was his intention to coordinate all existing organs involved in 
Social Services under one body, CEDES, a step towards the increase of state control over 
social welfare activities (Diniz 1982a). At the time, Fundagao Leao XIII came to function 
under its directorates as well. The Regional Administrations (Regioes Administrativas) 
also were originally created under Lacerda, with the intention to decentralise the state 
government. In effect, they functioned as extensions of state power in local affairs and 
as local branches of party control (Diniz 1982a).
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After the implementation of the decrees, all channels with the outside were 
dominated by a few individuals active in this junta  and during this period Rocinha’s 
political activities virtually came to a halt. Not only electricity networks but all 
other shantytown affairs (water, leisure activities) became directly administered by 
these few. They, in turn, received orders from government institutions on whose 
approval they depended. In the eyes of Rocinha’s inhabitants, this Residents 
Association was discredited and participation was low (Diniz 1982b, Valladares 
1977).
In the absence of any other legitimate channels, this exploitative power struc­
ture was to establish itself more firmly over the years of repressive government 
influences. Elsewhere in the shantytown, there was little going on except possi­
bly for in the churches, which were active at the time. The Protestant churches 
especially (of which there were six different ones with a total membership of over 
600 by 1968 (Valladares 1977)) had a variety of activities on offer from sports to 
a small “community school” . Valladares also reports high levels of mobilisation 
of members of the Catholic Church at times of special occasions in the religious 
calendar (Valladares 1977:1397). Apart from these special occasions, however, 
these religious organisations were run in a highly centralised manner by the priest 
and pastors in charge who delegated tasks to a few key members. Perhaps only 
a central core of fifteen members were actively involved in the organisation of the 
activities of the Catholic Church, whereas all others would attend Church masses 
infrequently (ibid.).
Participation in all action groups decreased rapidly at the time. W hat hap­
pened to SOREG (Sociedade Recreativa e Educacional da Gavea) was typical of 
other organisations:
SOREG was set up in 1965 on the initiative of a teacher who taught 
in the only existing school in Rocinha then run by the Fundagao Leao 
XIII (Valladares 1977). It was a social club and ran a school with 
about 200 pupils. Its membership was high (1363 by 1968) but it 
mainly attracted the wealthier members of Rocinha and it had a large 
number of members from outside. It ran discos, feasts, and sports 
activities mainly, and was essentially non-political in nature. It ran 
with support from paternalistic state-controlled organisations such as
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the LBA and the Fundagao Leao XIII, and from its relatively high 
membership fees.
Under the strain of repression, it started to become increasingly di­
vided internally. A crisis in 1967 led to the resignation of its president 
and the head of the school. The Residents Association’s government- 
linked directors took over its administration, and from 1968 its func­
tions were reduced to recreational activities. Previously active mem­
bers became increasingly passive, and annual elections for new direc­
tors in the following years were only disputed by one party, elected 
each successive year by only a few votes. By 1972, its activities were 
totally paralysed when its terrain (so scarce in Rocinha) was sold to a 
bus company, which today is using it as a fenced off parking space (G4 
on Figure 1-3). Rocinha had now lost its last reasonably sized open 
space for recreational purposes.9
The establishment of government control over the shantytowns’ leadership was 
now complete. This guaranteed the undisturbed continuation of certain economic 
policies which were central to the regime’s plan for many years (Moreira Alves 
1984). With regard to housing policies particularly, there is a clear parallel between 
the implementation of certain policies and the need for popular support. It is worth 
examining this in detail.
Lacerda had initiated the destructive large-scale shantytown relocation pro­
grammes in 1962. These particularly suited the regime’s economic plan which 
favoured the borrowing of large amounts of foreign capital (particularly from the 
USA) to initiate the building of low-cost housing on a massive scale. The mone­
tarist economists in charge saw the scheme as a way of stimulating the economy 
and created the BNH (the National Housing Bank) in 1964 for this purpose (Portes 
1979).10
9The football pitch which existed at the bottom of Rua Dois had disappeared earlier, 
after the government-backed directors of the Association in 1966 decided to settle some 
of the families left stranded by the rains of that year onto it, causing a row, which is 
remembered vividly even today (see also Varal:35).
10This Bank was to be funded by the FGTS, a fund into which workers paid a per­
centage of their wages as a form of forced savings deducted at the source. The aim of the 
BNH was to encourage house ownership among low-income groups and to stimulate the 
construction of low-income housing to meet demands. However, in effect, its workings 
had the reverse effect: these projects were increasingly substituted by luxury housing
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As mentioned above, Lacerda’s government had sacked Rios in 1962 which 
marked the end of SERFHA’S urbanising activities in the shantytowns. Its activ­
ities were paralysed in the following year. The creation of COHAB-GB, in 1962, 
marked the beginning of his favela eradication programme. However, it soon be­
came clear that the newly-built housing estates did not correspond to the favelados’ 
demands. They were inadequate in terms of location (too far away from jobs and 
people’s relations), in terms of quality (badly constructed, no infrastructural sup­
port; basic services were often absent or totally inadequate, like transport, sewage, 
water provision, schooling), and even their design did not correspond to people’s 
needs. Additionally, many buyers simply could not afford the mortgage payments 
on top of the extra transport costs, which were issues ignored at the planning stage 
(see especially Valladares 1978a).
The result was a chaotic situation in the financing of these projects; widespread 
defaults in payments, with no means to enforce payments from people whose wages 
simply could not support these rates. Large-scale parallel speculation and irreg­
ular black market dealings resulted (Valladares 1978b), and gradually, a different 
clientele (salaried with 3 to 5 minimum salaries, not the targeted favelados, many 
of whom had no regular income) moved into the newly-built housing projects. 
This tendency was encouraged by later BNH policies, which specified a minimum 
regular income for eligible candidates to their housing schemes, a measure insti­
tuted in response to the high rates of defaults. (By 1974, the rate of default on 
payments had reached 93% (Portes 1979).) Consequently, as hillside favelas in 
the city centre disappeared, those that remained grew in size to accommodate 
the displaced victims of the eradications. New favelas also emerged (Valladares 
1978a).
Public protest against the large-scale eradication programmes and forced re­
movals was suppressed by the regime’s apparatus. For example, in defence against 
these removals, many new Residents Associations responded collectively by or­
for higher economic sectors. In effect, this scheme could be seen as a machine to make 
money for the government under social disguise (Schwarz 1980).
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ganising themselves into a Federation (FAFEG) in 1962. When they organised 
a demonstration against the removal of Pasmado, a large Zona Sul favela, in the 
following year, its leaders were met with machine guns (Perlman 1976, Valladares 
1978a). Large-scale criticism of these housing policies led to the defeat of Lacerda’s 
candidate in the next elections. Under Negrao de Lima (1965 to 1970) COHAB-GB 
was reoriented towards focussing on improving the recently-built housing estates 
and sorting out its chaotic administration, resulting in a sharp fall in the number 
of projects built (Portes 1979).
A return to what used to be SERFHA’s activities was attem pted by the cre­
ation of CODESCO in 1968, when a group of young enthusiastic architects started 
projects to urbanise three shantytowns. In collaboration with their inhabitants, 
projects were designed to improve their living conditions, employing local residents 
and financed with grants, paid back by the inhabitants in long-term installments 
calculated within their means. These types of projects were contradictory to the 
assumptions behind the BNH and the government’s monetarist policies. They 
also did not support the civil construction industry or the finance and savings 
companies (Leeds & Leeds 1972).
Later in 1968, CHIS AM (created by federal decree overriding state domain) was 
to solve the favela problem at a national level. Under the pretext of coordinating all 
housing policies CHIS AM restarted an intensive programme of the “rehabilitation” 
of 66 shantytowns in the short term, both by replacing existing barracos (Lit: huts, 
shacks) by houses, a task given to CODESCO, as well as by relocation. In fact, 
CHISAM allocated little money to the former and took control over CODESCO 
and other active agencies. From 1969 to mid-1972, CHISAM’s policies of forced 
relocation dominated all action taken in Rio (Valladares 1978b). The extremely 
paternalistic attitudes behind CHISAM’s proposals were that favelados were in 
need of rehabilitation because their environment was the cause of their social evil. 
They had to be “integrated” into housing schemes to become properly part of 
Brazilian society (Perlman 1976, Rush 1974).
Other motivations behind their eradication programmes became increasingly 
obvious. The objective had been to remove all irregular settlements from the
. r l
Chapter 5. The Development o f Leadership: Pre-1976 147
expensive land in Rio’s Zona Sul. Their presence delayed the construction of 
luxury residences and interfered with the idea of an “orderly city” , involving the 
isolation of the poor from the rich. The fact that CHISAM largely stopped its 
activities in mid-1972, when almost all Zona Sul favelas had been removed, also 
demonstrated this. This also coincided with the end of Chagas Freitas’ term as 
governor of Guanabara (wider Rio de Janeiro) whose personal interests in the 
property business were publicly known (Diniz 1982a).
Since 1973, when CHISAM’s activities came to an end, eviction programmes 
have only been carried out as part of specific programmes (e.g. as a result of land­
slides or the building of a tunnel/highways). In 1975, COHAB-GB was disbanded 
and CEHAB, now essentially an instrument of the BNH, took its place. But the 
BNH’s building programme was bankrupt and CEHAB received loans instead of 
grants. The building of new settlements virtually came to a halt. By 1976, the 
end of its last phase of eradications, its programmes stabilised at around 25% 
of its intended budget for low-income housing. Most of its efforts still went into 
attempting to sort out the chaos created over the past years (Portes 1979). By 
1976, CHISAM’s last intensive phase of eradications had left the Zona Sul of Rio 
de Janeiro virtually stripped of morros. The only remaining visible larger ones at 
that time were Rocinha in Sao Conrado, and Santa M arta in Botafogo. Both grew 
enormously during that period.
In Rocinha, the threat of removals also became a reality. In 1968, there were 
plans for a tunnel to be built through Pombal, the lower part of Rocinha.11 This 
tunnel was to provide access to a new neighbourhood (Sao Conrado) for the de­
velopment of luxury residences and tourist accommodation. The presence of these 
nearby luxury residences would later provide Rocinha’s population with many 
jobs, mainly in the service sector. At the time, however, people’s most immediate 
concern was with a further removal threat, since it meant an increasing likelihood
11 This explains the sudden high participation rate in 1968 elections for the Residents 
Association’s fifth directorate (Valladares 1977).
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of Rocinha’s total removal as part of the government’s general cleaning up of the 
affluent Zona Sul of the city. (See e.g. Camerman 1981 and Oliveira 1981.)12
Protest as pointed out before, was risky business at the time. In that same year, 
the leaders of FAFEG were imprisoned during a peaceful protest against removals. 
In the following year (1969) Praia do Pinto, a favela on the list to be removed but 
well organised and predicted as problematic, burned down. Arson was suspected 
(Perlman 1976). Not surprisingly, the activities of the Residents Associations came 
to a total halt during the following five years (1970-1975) (Valladares 1977).
Later in 1970 Pombal was removed and during the following year, the con­
struction of Hotel Nacional was completed. People clearly remember firstly, that 
many construction workers died during the building of the tunnel and secondly, 
the way the project was carried out:
12In fact explicit reference was made to this threat in one of the Residents Associa­
tion’s leaflets distributed in August 1980:
“Todos na Rocinha sabem que as 
construtoras de Sao Conrado, quando 
vendiam um apartamento a alguem, 
prometiam que a Rocinha seria re- 
movida dentro de dois anos. No tempo 
do prefeito M. T., estas imobilarias tin- 
ham muita for5a junto ao governo, e 
a Rocinha foi ameagada de remogao 
varias vezes.”
flnformativo no. 71, 30/8/1980)
“Everybody in Rocinha knows that 
when the builders of Sao Conrado 
sold an apartment to someone, they 
promised that Rocinha would be re­
moved within two years. At the time of 
Mayor M. T., these estate agents had 
a lot of power in the government, and 
Rocinha was threatened with removal 
several times.”
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“Depois, quando foi urn bel dia, sem 
eles esperarem nem nada, chegou o 
carro ai da Policia Militar. Eu sei 
que chegou ai o carro da policia pra 
apanhar todo mundo, pra remover 
tudinho. Ah! minha gente! Comegou 
a chorar todo mundo. Eles pegam 
sem do nem compaixao. Vai pe- 
gando. Vai jogando la . . .  E  se e 
televisao e todas essas coisas, vai jo ­
gando do mesmo jeito . . .  Quando 
foi ja agora proximo, esse pessoal foi, 
como diz o outro, remanejado. Nao, 
foram jogados la pra Santa Cruz, pra 
outros lados distantes. Ja voltaram 
quase todos, ja estao aqui na Rocinha 
novamente . . .  0  pessoal voltou, to- 
dos ai devendo o BNH, ne? A 
prestagao da casa la, e de morte.” y
“And then, suddenly on a certain 
day, without anyone expecting them, 
the car of the Policia Militar arrived 
here. I know that this police car ar­
rived to pick up everybody, to re­
move everything. Oh! Dear! Ev­
erybody started to cry. They loaded 
everything without any compassion. 
And they loaded. And they threw 
things around . . .  Whether it was 
a television or any of these things, 
they threw them in the same way 
. . .  At the time, these people were, 
as the others call it, re-housed. No, 
they were thrown out, all the way to 
Santa Cruz, and other distant places. 
Already almost all returned, they’re 
here back in Rocinha again . . .  Peo­
ple came back, all in debt to the 
BNH, you know. The mortgage for 
a house there kills you.”
(VaraklOl)
These were times of general repression when people disappeared without trace and 
when the government exercised repressive measures in a general policy of terror. It 
was a time when each had to rely on their own resources and fight their problems 
on their own, when salaries lost their value sharply and Social Welfare facilities, 
already shaky, were dismantled (e.g. see footnote 1). Life in Rocinha became 
increasingly tense, with exploitative practices given free reign. The floodings rep­
resented the climax of those sufferings of a period during which everything had 
gradually got so much worse for everyone.
People remember them as the dark days of fear of government policies which 
presented an immediate threat to their livelihoods. Yet they could not mobilise a 
response to these threats. They came from above, just as the rains had come from 
above just like the search lights from the helicopters. The floods, like the regime’s 
repressive politics, were invisible forces threatening people who could only appeal 
to each other privately for comfort. Indeed, to the people themselves the rains
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were explicitly associated with the repressive measures: 13
“Esse tempo de enchentes teve essas 
explicagoes. No governo do Castelo 
Branco, e/e tirou o dia de Sao Se­
bastiao, o feriado. Na posse do 
governo Negrao de Lima, quando o 
Castelo ja  tinha passado o cargo, 
foi o maior toro. Parecia o maior 
diluvio! Foram semanas de chuva 
. . .  Isso foi castigo dado por Sao 
Sebastiao. Depois, nenhum gov­
erno quer tirar o feriado de Sao Se­
bastiao. Nesse tempo, toda a Rocinha 
chorou. ”
“That time of the floodings had 
these explanations. During the time 
of Castelo Branco’s government, he 
cancelled the holiday of Sao Se­
bastiao. When the governor Negrao 
de Lima took office, after Castelo 
Branco had left office, there was a 
huge down pour. This enormous 
flood happened! It rained for weeks 
. . .  This was punishment given by 
Sao Sebastiao. After this, no govern­
ment wants to cancel that holiday. 
At that time, the whole of Rocinha 
cried.”
(Varal:94-95)
The rains and consequent floodings of 1966, became the concrete experience by 
which the repressive years of the regime were remembered by these people.14
So far, then, we can draw the following conclusions. As far as government 
attitudes towards shantytowns were concerned, it emerges that they fluctuated 
between the two extremes of eradication and upgrading. Moreover, these policies 
reflected the nature of the government which promoted them; eradication was pur­
sued only by a more repressive regime, whereas upgrading suited a government 
which relied more on popular support. In the shantytowns, repressive policies had 
the effect of encouraging powerful bosses who dominated the shantytown’s politi­
cal structure with the result that other political activities ended. The politicians 
who appeared in the shantytowns tempting inhabitants with promises of small up­
grading projects which revitalised other potentially active entrepreneurs remained 
absent in these repressive times.
13Castelo Branco (referred to in the following passage) headed the first military gov­
ernment in 1964.
14This explains the fact that the book Varal lacks any other major reference to the 
coup and the repressive government practices which followed it, despite the traumatic 
consequences it had for these people.
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If we look in more detail at this leadership, we find powerful donos who sup­
plied their clients with services, and forced them into dependency. These donos 
differed from earlier “patrons” in that they had lost their ideological hegemony 
over their clientele. A close look reveals that the relationships between these 
donos and their clients was not a contract in which relations were reciprocal and 
entered into voluntarily (e.g. as portrayed in Foster 1977). This relationship was 
“lop-sided”. It had reached an imbalance, but not in the sense as Pitt-Rivers en­
visaged (Pitt-Rivers 1954:140) (see Paine’s criticism of Pitt-Rivers (Paine 1971)). 
Expectations had been violated and it was not a patron-client relationship any 
more, since the patron had lost his/her ability to set the terms over the relation­
ship with his/her clients (Paine 1971). The obligation of the receiver to return 
with respect and loyalty, paid back in the form of dutiful support (Wolf 1966) 
had also disappeared. My example therefore confirms claims in the literature that 
how the relation is evaluated depends on people’s own (emic) ideologies and can 
change over time (Gilsenan 1977, Scott 1977, Silverman 1977). Henriksen’s ob­
servations, following Barth’s model (Barth 1966), that the patron-client relation 
can be seen as a transaction between two people at a particular moment, i.e. as 
part of a series of transactions (Henriksen 1971), is helpful here in overcoming 
previous accusations in the literature of the patron-client model as unable to cope 
with conflict (see especially Eisenstadt & Lemarchand 1981, Gellner h  Water- 
bury 1977). The coercive factor in this relationship is clearly important and had 
been overlooked by many authors (Hall 1977).15 Indeed, in Rocinha the nature of 
this relation changed over time. In the later years of repression, the relation be­
tween patrons and clients lacked conventional associations of respect and loyalty. 
Clients were forced into this dependence. These donos offered services which could 
not otherwise be obtained and they regarded their bosses as exploitative (see e.g. 
the vicious campaigns reported in Informativo and Tagarela challenging particu­
lar donos). They did not gain respect from this position, as Seu C.’s quotation
15This does not preclude the possibility that people in this relationship search for 
dependence and protection, and hence spontaneously attach themselves to patrons 
(Hutchinson 1966).
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might lead us to believe during earlier times, when Rocinha was still small and 
infrastructural problems were not pf the same urgency.
The term “patrao” there had positive connotations, whereas the latter term 
(dono) had strongly negative connotations. Dono for example, was not used as a 
reference term in the person’s presence. They were associated with politico,, and 
referred to as politicos in some instances. They are associated with “propaganda”, 
“conversa fiada” (Lit: useless talk, idle chatter) (see e.g. Varal:78-79 and 83 
quoted above), suggesting distrust and suspicion which was in fact the opposite 
to the defining characteristic of the conventional patron-client relation (loyalty). 
They cannot therefore be sources of respect.
On the basis of the above observations, we can draw some preliminary con­
clusions about the nature of leadership which emerged over the time described so 
far. In sum, leadership with a stable following remained absent. The position of 
existing leaders was created through the interference of outsiders associated with 
a widely feared regime during repressive times.16 The residents’ reaction to these 
donos later (the fact that they were totally discredited in the post-repression years) 
shows clearly that there was no other basis for their position as “leaders” of the 
Residents Association.
Moreover, these donos, even if they qualified otherwise, could not rely on per­
sonal contacts with their clients as a solid basis for leadership. As far as the 
clients were concerned, they represented a highly mobile and fast-growing popu­
lation which made it impossible for any “leader” to establish personal links with 
his/her “following”. Clients also did not mobilise into a collectivity. The large 
growth rate and the constantly changing composition of the population discour­
aged people to invest in the unit as a whole. In short: it gives the impression
16These “leaders” established themselves through outside interference, be it through 
the undiscriminating and highly personalistic way in which outside politicians imputed 
influential individuals in Rocinha with real exclusive power (as described in the beginning 
of this chapter) or be it through repressive policies which actively sought to exclude 
certain protesting voices and actively protected the position of these individuals who 
were disliked by many in Rocinha. These early “leaders” formed the basis of what was 
later to become the Chagas machine (see ahead).
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that no one really “belonged” there, and this was encouraged by the question of 
land ownership. Property owners were variable and often remained anonymous to 
Rocinha’s people. When known, they were mostly outsiders (e.g. a construction 
company, various politicians, others who settled some personal deals. There were 
even allegations of Fundagao Leao XIII officials engaging in land sales in Rocinha 
(Oliveira 1981)). Besides, the whole shantytown, in the face of widespread erad­
ications of similar settlements in the city centre, was threatened with demolition 
giving a strong sense of impermanence.
All these factors add up to a picture of impermanence and division, generating 
the opposite to the impression of a collectivity supporting itself and possibly a 
handful of “leaders” . There is evidence of the opposite tendency: of individuals 
acting in their own interests, competing with each other to make their own stakes 
in the temporary opportunities offered to them. Rules were bent and evaded 
(“borrowing” families and furniture, building inside fake screens). Deals were 
made between individuals pushing the situation to their own advantage and they 
played each other off when challenged on these matters. Collective projects were 
sacrificed in the process, such as the football pitch and the recreational society 
SOREG. Indeed, in times of repression, the authorities promoted these tactics of 
divide and rule.
The developments of the political scene post-repression with the influx of politi­
cians and the establishment of many different factions, revitalised the picture in 
the shantytown, as portrayed in the next chapter. It will be clear that these fur­
ther developments confirm this picture of fluctuation and division, of “leaders” 
with no following, w;ho appeared and disappeared in quick succession.
Chapter 6
The Development of Leadership: 
Post-1976
By 1976, opposition groups had gained support from all sectors of society, includ­
ing the elite, and led to mass demonstrations and riots throughout Brazil. The 
stability of the regime depended solely on its high economic growth rate and when 
the economy began to run into difficulties it had great problems maintaining itself. 
The discourse of the subsequent president (Geisel) in 1974 changed accordingly in 
an attem pt to ease the tension (Moreira Alves 1984). The crisis sparked off talk 
of liberalisation (distensao) and increased attem pts at negotiation with opposition 
groups. Local elections were staged as proof of these relaxation policies. However, 
as the opposition party (MDB) proved to be unexpectedly strong and turned out 
to have a good chance of winning the elections, the government introduced re­
strictive measures to prevent themselves from losing control over local political 
posts. It soon became clear that this plan for “liberalisation” was threatening 
the implementation of the government’s economic plan: demonstrations on the 
streets of Sao Paulo in 1975 and 1976 in defence of basic human rights (denounc­
ing torture, disappearances and random imprisonments without trial) were met 
with repression and the regime had launched another intensive national campaign 
to find members of two underground Communist parties. Just before the 1976 
elections for municipal posts (which threatened another MDB victory), the gov­
ernment passed Lei Falcao which forbade the expression of polii i< al ideas on TV 
and radio. The election campaign was thereby restricted to the presentation of
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a photograph, name and party of the candidates, suppressing debates and secur­
ing a government party majority. Formal opposition at higher levels was made 
impossible by other measures (such as the “bionic senators” and the Pacote de 
Abril). The Church (through the CNBB (National Brazilian Council of Bishops), 
the MDB (the formal opposition party), and all other remaining official organisa­
tions (such as the independent voice of lawyers, OAB (Ordem dos Advogados do 
Brasil) and the Brazilian Press Association) had now joined together in opposition 
to the regime. And soon, the weight of the growing external debt and the rising 
inflation rate were also beginning to affect business and industrial interests who 
demanded decision power in economic spheres.
The above is a story of an oppressive regime intent on implementing a partic­
ular economic plan at all costs. Pressure from strikes, riots and other incidents 
repeatedly developed temporary crises. To off-set these crises, it introduced talk 
of liberalisation to prevent the total loss of legitimacy. Towards the late 1970s, 
when the regime itself did not have an economic basis from which to act, overall 
social conditions had eroded to such an extent, that pressure gave way to a more 
substantial opening up of government structures, abertura (Moreira Alves 1984). 
Gradually, since 1974, political pressure was forcing the regime to use increasingly
\ ---. .  -i i ■ - ■
more sophisticated means of control. This time it was less through violence as 
through the control over political structures. It was during this time that the 
Chagas machine, which firmly controlled all political outlets at local levels, gained 
a lot of strength in the state of Rio de Janeiro. It is worth examining how it came 
to establish itself and what sort of tactics it employed to maintain support at these 
very local levels, i.e. at the levels which most affected Rocinha’s politicians.
The party political context was the following: with the 1964 military takeover, 
the multi-party system ceased to exist. By the end of 1965, it had been re­
placed with a two-party system. The heterogeneous “opposition” party, which 
dominated the political scene in Rio de Janeiro from 1965 to 1979 (the duration 
of the two-party system) (Diniz 1983) was represented by one faction under the 
leadership of Chagas Freitas. “Chaguismo” was a classical example of patronage 
politics in operation. Central to its success was the creation of personal links
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with its electorate reflected in the priority given to their “community politics”.1 
The Chaguista politician associated him/herself with a certain locality by keeping 
in touch through personal links with its leadership, becoming their patron. In 
Rocinha, these consisted of the cabos, installed in earlier political processes, as 
described elaborately in the previous chapter.
Links were reactivated and maintained through the distribution of favours 
(granted in return for political support) which created relations of dependence 
rather than competing with groups and other parties (stimulating critical debate) 
as described in Chapter 5. In this way, local political groups were co-opted and be­
came linked to a highly centralised structure of personal relations built up through 
the granting of favours (e.g. Eisenstadt Sz Roniger 1984). One way to maintain 
control was by the creation of the Conselho de Desenvolvimento Economico e 
Social (CEDES) in 1975, which was constituted by all secretaries of the state 
government and presidented by Chagas, the governor himself (Diniz 1982a) (see 
footnote 8 in Chapter 5). All social welfare questions passed through this Con­
selho. The Fundagao Leao XIII, which had firmly established itself in shantytown 
leadership during the repressive years, was used as a state government tool for 
the implementation of this kind of machine politics and the maintenance of con­
trol over dissidents.2 The Regioes Administrativas also served this function. They 
were staffed with party personnel and acted as intermediary and potential dis­
tributor of favours for the electorate. The way the Regioes Administrativas and 
the Fundagao Leao XIII created jobs and goodies to distribute to prospective vot­
ers was in the form of “works” for certain shantytowns (e.g. the asphalting of a
1 Election results support this fact too: Chaguistas in general did better in more 
local elections (for example, in state, not federal, elections support for them was more 
marked) (Diniz 1982a).
2The extent to which Chaguista politicians were involved in Fundagao Leao XIII’s 
activities came to the surface in later years. In 1979, the president of the Fundagao 
Leao XIII was publicly accused of having dismissed 300 of its employees previously “for 
no just cause” and substituted them with his own people (Diniz 1982a). Evidence that 
this affected Rocinha comes from the reports in one of Rocinha’s newspapers about a 
campaign to reinstall a Fundagao Leao XIII social worker who had been working for 
Rocinha for more than six years (Tagarela no. 9, May 1978).
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road, the implementation of a small water network, the building of a “commu­
nity centre”, as described in the previous chapter). The Chaguista politician’s 
main target was the shantytowns’ Residents Associations’ directors (who were es­
tablished in their position through the government-controlled juntas through the 
interference of the Fundagao Leao XIII) who could organise public meetings to 
introduce the Chaguista politician to “their community” so that each project was 
personally associated with a particular “donor” . These directors presented them 
with a list of the “community’s” demands and the politician’s credibility rose as 
s/he succeeded in “resolving the community’s problems”. In most cases, of course, 
as before, these “solutions” never proceeded beyond mere promises. The design 
of the projects (if carried out at all) was limited to the bargaining power of the 
involved favelados. They were uncoordinated and limited to temporal cosmetic 
changes, often reflecting the wishes, of the few individuals involved in the bargain­
ing. The projects seldom addressed any structural long-term problems. Popular 
targets were the blocos carnavalescos who received generous donations publicly 
acknowledged in the press. The Chaguistas’ enormous wealth was also clearly a 
key to their election success. There were no official channels to criticise these 
clientelistic practices. They were in line with policies of keeping strict control over 
the shantytowns.
The style of these politicians was charismatic. Their language was populist 
and non-ideological. Public debates were avoided and they relied instead on per­
formance and action and its correct timing. Grand inauguration ceremonies were 
carried out since these were opportunities for eloquent speeches and grand promises 
emphasising particularistic links of confidence and loyalty. The aim was to set up 
amicable relations with as many groups as possible. Chagas built those diverse 
links as a large property owner with other business interests (how he enormously 
increased his wealth through large-scale irregular property dealings was later ex­
posed) and kept amicable relations with the military. Additionally, he owned 
and dominated the largest local newspapers which evidently facilitated this too. 
Chagas himself kept a daily column in his newspapers (maintaining personal com­
munication with his readership) and, to capture the widest possible audience, other
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Chaguista politicians daily covered the interests of different sectors (e.g. Sandra 
Salim addressed the middle-classes, Atila Nunes Umbanda practitioners). (For a 
detailed account of Chagas’ career, see Diniz (1982a).)
The building of the Chaguista machine was encouraged by the national context 
of fear of repression which discouraged ideological debate and criticism of devious 
political practice. Especially after Institutional Act 5 in 1968 any movement which 
represented a threat to the regime was eliminated and gradually all potentially 
challenging leaders within the opposition party disappeared.
Distensao politics clearly represented a change in the government’s strategy. 
As far as housing policies and attitudes towards shantytowns were concerned, the 
language had also changed. Large-scale forced relocation programmes had be­
come economically and socially inappropriate. From then on the attention given 
to favelados was in the interest of gaining their political support. The focus was 
on questions of upgrading. Grants became available for small projects and many 
promises were made for such favours in the future, in the same style as the politi­
cians of the populist governments of the 1950s and 1960s, just before the coup.
Participation remained restricted. Some pressure groups gradually became 
active again, but participants were swallowed by the co-opting mechanisms of the 
state to prevent them from any real independent participation. The key to the 
building of the Chagas machine in Rio de Janeiro was at the time its success 
in reactivating the personalistic bonds set up in earlier years and its ability to 
win over new shantytown groups and recruit their leaderships into the machine in 
similar ways.
Newly available funds and relaxed restrictions to participation encouraged a 
new type of political activity in the shantytowns. From 1976, we saw the growth of 
mutirao groups in Rocinha. The mutirao groups were largely initiated by Church 
agents.3 Mutiroes started up in several areas of Rocinha. On free evenings and
3As seen above, during the earlier repressive years of the regime, the Church was the 
only legitimate outlet for government questioning and gradually it had become a base for
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weekends some volunteers got together to solve the most urgent problems of their 
neighbourhood. Often on such occasions food for these workers was provided as a 
form of payment.
The first of their activities in Rocinha was the organisation of a petition, to 
campaign for the building of a footbridge across the dangerous dual carriage way 
(built as part of the new tunnel in 1970 at the bottom of Rocinha). At the time 
it claimed several victims a week (sic) and was everyone’s immediate concern. 
The large turnout for this campaign motivated a handful of organisers into more 
ambitious projects such as the distribution of a “community newspaper” . Its first 
issue was distributed in August 1976. It already mentions the existence of a youth 
club, cineclub and theatre group, a small medical centre, a group starting off a 
daycare centre, a night school, a choir to accompany religious ceremonies, the 
running of professional courses (sowing, cooking and craft making) and a group 
which volunteered the reconstruction of the Catholic Chapel (Tagarela no. 1, 
Aug 1976). Most of these projects were based at the newly built Community 
Centre or the Chapel and were still in their initial stages, slowly gaining more 
support during the following year, growing to a handful of supporters for each. The 
groups had outside administrative and financial support from private institutes 
with religious links. These supplied information and helped find funding sources 
and other infrastructural support for the groups (e.g. the journal was printed on 
a stencil machine belonging to one institute).
Towards the end of 1977, these groups decided to launch a Campanha da Vala 
(Lit: Campaign for Sewage Canals) (ASPA 1982). For a short time they managed 
to mobilise groups of up to fifty people on Sundays digging rubbish out of canals 
to prevent them from overflowing in the rains. The Theatre Group performed a 
piece to attract support and composed songs to accompany the workers. Food was 
organised by others. Blocked drains were cleared in this way and the mutirao cam­
paigns were seen as a success. According to C. (one of the organisers at the time):
challenging government propaganda in the climate of widespread academic repression 
and media censoring.
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“0  mutirao foi o momento grande da “The mutirao was the great moment
comunidade. Todo mundo se interes- of the community. Everybody took
sou na limpeza das valas!” an interest in cleaning the drains!”
(Varal:120)
The campaign consisted of different committees each responsible for different as­
pects of the job (e.g. the organisation of the work teams, plotting the existing 
drainage system on maps, an educational campaign, pressurising officials respon­
sible for the provision of clean water, the removal of household waste and sewage 
canals).4
Soon, however, the participants began to question their efforts. It was too 
much hard work on their only days off, the media appeared to film the activi­
ties (the possibility of appearing on TV while submerged in sewage put many off) 
and there was no real response to the groups’ demands from government officials.
uPor que a COMLURB [Companhia 
Municipal de Limpeza Urbana] re- 
sponde devagar? Foi uma comissao 
grande na COMLURB . . .  A COM­
LURB chegou a fechar as portas 
com medo de uma invasao de tanta 
gente da favela . . .  nunca acontecia 
nada por parte da municipalidade, da 
prefeitura. ”
(Varal:121)
Participants became especially discouraged as new loads of household waste ap­
peared in the valas, and the strenuous cleaning work began to look like an endless 
process, fighting against forces which could never be resolved unless something 
structural changed first.
As the mutirao groups learned about these questions, the nature of their work 
changed.
“Why does COMLURB [the munici­
pal street cleaning service] respond so 
slowly? A large delegation went to 
COMLURB . . .  COMLURB ended 
up closing its gates, afraid of an inva­
sion of so many people from the fave­
las . . .  Nothing ever happened on the 
part of the municipal authorities, the 
City Hall.”
4Various authors on Urban Social Movements refer to these movements as bringing 
about notions of “community” among their participants (e.g. Durham 1984, Cardoso 
1983, Boschi 1982, Santos 1981).
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teForam muitos os momentos onde “There were many moments in which
a gente comegou a aprender como people started to understand how to
tratar essas repartigoes. Que a gente deal with these barriers. That people
tem mesmo direitos, coisas que talvez do have rights, something which we
a gente ja tivesse ate esquecido . . .  ” had maybe even forgotten . . . ”
(Varal:121)
The initial manual collective effort , solving short-term urgent problems with large 
numbers of people turned into a few dedicated people, focussing on long-term 
planning and acting as a pressure group. Some especially focused on educational 
and preventive issues. After some of their physical achievements, they now saw 
their main task to be “consciousness-raising” (conscientizagao) (I will go into more 
detail on the ideology behind this approach in Chapter 7).
W ith these changes taking place, it is not surprising that towards the end of 
the 1970s, the Chaguista machine had lost political support nationally. Geisel’s 
distensao politics had let the lid off a lot of criticism and pressure from independent 
voices. Lei Falcao prohibited public debates about election issues just before the 
1976 elections and, together with a new wave of repressive measures, somewhat 
contained the pressure. Towards the end of 1978, when the crisis became more 
evident in all sectors, a new attem pt at liberalisation was made with the talk of 
abertura. This sparked off the birth of a large number of new pressure groups in 
all sectors in 1978-1980. Official political channels were subjected to criticism and 
their “leaderships” were challenged. The government-controlled labour unions 
and the shantytowns’ Residents Associations (both representing large numbers 
of people) were particular targets of criticism. Since “Community politics” had 
been essential to the workings of Chaguismo (i.e. its relation to the large poorer 
suburbial population was critical), it is not surprising that favelados were the 
first to oppose Chaguista leadership openly. They exposed its corrupt practices 
alleging interference of Chaguista politicians in shantytown organisation which led 
to serious public disputes (Diniz 1983). This criticism, exposed publicly for the 
first time, led to widespread distrust and dislike for this government.
In federal politics in Rio de Janeiro, the Chaguista/non-Chaguista crisis be­
came apparent in the 1978 elections for federal posts. The national MDB-line
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moved increasingly towards the left, and by 1980, Chaguismo had lost most sup­
port there. At state level, it took some time to dismantle the clientelistic network. 
The state governor who defeated Chagas in 1982 (Leonel Brizola) won the elec­
tion campaign on the basis of anti-Chaguista slogans (see e.g. the language in 
his Plano de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social 1983). Political dialogue had 
clearly changed. Chagas’ pragmatic language offering promises of great works 
changed into ideological debates about individual “rights”, demanding “participa­
tion” in the political process and the abolition of “corrupt personalistic links” .
The Chaguistas’ language used in Rocinha had also changed. People, already 
cynical about the influx of Chaguista politicians promising upgrading projects in 
return for political support, now publicly challenged them. Rocinha had gone 
through the experience of large-scale mutirao campaigns confronting them with 
questions about the state’s responsibility to carry out basic improvements in their 
shantytowns, and their rights to basic necessities, or, in Durham’s words; the com­
munity work had created a space for its members to become aware of collective 
needs which then turned into a new realisation of the rights of the individual - a 
new notion of citizenship in relation to the state (Durham 1984). Politicians could 
now not get away with their naive performances as used during the times when 
criticism was always threatened with repression. This change of rhetoric is clearly 
visible in two newspaper articles describing two separate appearances of politicians 
in Rocinha documented in Varal. The first of these articles is dated 1976. The 
cynical journalist describes the short visit of a candidate to Rocinha shortly before 
the elections (JB 16/11/1976). The candidate is described like a caricature: his 
appearance is anxious and sloppy (“Shirt hanging out of his trousers . . .  ”)5 and 
his tour around Rocinha is poorly planned. He spends several “long minutes” on 
the payphone in Rocinha arranging his next stop and ordering his cabo eleitoral to 
round up an audience. His political “discourse” is largely inaudible ( “The noise 
covered up his voice . . .  ”),6 and when he resorts to using a megaphone (which
5“Camisa para fora da calga . . .  ”
6uO barulho abafou sua voz . . . ”
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belongs to a local taxi driver), he reveals his real intentions by mistake:
“Um possivel eleitor fala com o can- 
didato e sua resposta, certamente por 
distragao, e revelada a todos pelo al- 
tofalante: “Pode deixar que o saco 
de cimento vem ai. As 5 horas eu 
vou para casa descansar e voce vai 
comigo buscar o saco de cimento.”
“A potential voter talks with the can­
didate and his response, certainly by 
mistake, is revealed to all through 
the megaphone: “Leave it to me, the 
sack of cement is coming. At five I’m 
going home and you come with me to 
collect the sack of cement.”
To a group of teenagers he promises:
✓
“0  jogo de camisetas esta dado. E  so “The set of football shirts is for you.
ir comigo buscar. ” . Just come with me to pick them up.”
for all to hear. His political naivity and emphasis on personal contacts with the 
shantytown (to come across as a “friend”) is confirmed in his “speech”:
u . . .  sou o candidato do povo. Gente “ . . .  I’m the candidate of the people.
que nem a gente . . .  Volto ja. Ate People like we all are . . .  I’m coming
logo pessoal, vamos la, para a uma. back soon. Until then, folks, le t’s go
Votar para ganhar. Eu volto . . . ” to the polling booths. Voting to win.
I’m coming back . . . ”
This rapid appearance was a non-event, especially since:
“By the end of the afternoon, F. had 
not stuck to his promises.”
An inauguration of fifteen public fountains by Chaguista politicians shortly before 
elections six years later (in 1982) was in many ways a similar event. From the 
details, it is clear, however, that both parties have become more sophisticated.
A well-organised party of:
uAte o final da tarde, F. nao havia 
cumprido a promessa. ”
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“mais de 10 deputados federais, es- 
taduais, vereadores e candidatos do 
PMDB chaguista . . .  protegidos por 
dezenas de soldados da P M . . .  ”
“more than 10 federal representa­
tives, state congressmen, councillors 
and PMDB chaguista candidates . . .  
guarded by dozens of Military Police 
officers . . . ”
arrived. Their cabos had arrived earlier to distribute election materials, and or­
ganised a raised platform from which well-prepared speeches were performed. The 
intentions were clear: they had come to Rocinha to claim personal responsibility 
for reinforcing the image of the “caring patrons for a community in need”. For 
better dramatic effect, they had brought along a public personality:
“Uma das atragoes principals foi a 
atriz V. G.} mulher do ator e can- 
didato . . .  J. V., que aproveitava os 
“santinhos” distribuidos por 
dezenas de cabos eleitorais para dar 
autografos as criangas.”
“One of the highlights was the ac­
tress V. G., the wife of the ac­
tor and candidate J. V., who took 
advantage of the “santinhos” [Lit: 
little saints; leaflets with the pic­
ture and name of the candidate, 
named after the religious leaflets with 
saintly pictures widely distributed in 
Brazil] distributed by dozens of cabo- 
eleitorais to give out autographs to 
the children.”
The audience, however, is also better equipped to decipher the effort:
uO povo comentava com um ar de- “People commented in a suspicious
sconfiado e experiente: “So quero ver and experienced tone: “I just want
se quando acabar as eleigoes nao vai to see if when the elections come to
acabar tambem a aqua . . . ” an end, the water too will come to an
end . . .  ”
(JB 2/8/1982)
Instead of individuals attempting to plead personal favours from the politicians 
in private (such as the saco de cimento and the jogo de camisetas pleaded for by 
the individuals from the audience in the 1976 appearance), the politicians in 1982 
were met by Rocinha’s organised leadership to receive the speeches with a critical 
attack and plead for further collective demands.
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“Nao adianta agua na bica da 
estrada. Queremos a agua dentro de 
casa, na bica da cozinha. Queremos 
a posse da terra, que reivindicamos 
ha 3 anos, pois . . .  ”
“Water in public street taps doesn’t 
solve any problems. We want water 
indoors; from kitchen taps. We want 
land ownership, which we have been 
claiming for 3 years, and also . . . ”
(ibid.)
The politicians were quick with their answers. Their language is sophisticated and 
picks up the points the shantytown people want to hear. For example, one of the 
politicians responded: .....
“Eu admiro esse povo que prestigia a 
inauguragao de 3 bicas de agua. Mas 
o favelado nao e bicho e nao deve 
se contentar com isso, deve tutar e 
reivindicar pela agua em casa. ”
“I admire these people who honour 
the inauguration of 3 public water 
taps. But the favelado is not an an­
imal and should not be content with 
this, he should struggle and demand 
water for inside his house.”
However, their strategies remained very similar to their predecessors in 1976, as 
illustrated in the journalist’s remark: The Secretaria de Obras, to the demand for 
water in people’s houses promised that:
“estudos estdo sendo desenvolvidos “studies are being done . . .  while
. . .  enquanto os politicos ja prome- politicians already promise and plead
tern e pedem votos por essa possibili- for votes for that possibility.”
dade.”
The point is that the aims and methods of the politicians of both occasions were 
the same: ideological issues were avoided, dramatic methods were used to spread 
the propaganda, personal contacts were established and promises for future favours 
were made. Even though criticism of such policies was now publicly expressed in 
very sophisticated rhetoric, basic practices had not changed. W hat had changed 
was the rhetoric in which this was delivered in line with the audience’s expectations 
and challenges.
In this respect one is reminded of Parkin’s shift from “plan” to “ideology” in 
his analysis of the language used by bureaucrats to address a group of Kenyan
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farmers (Parkin 1975).7 The politicians in 1982 make much more extensive use of 
symbols: they now draw on officialdom (the presence of a large number of people 
representing different levels of government, backed up by police, and they use a 
carefully prepared platform and speeches, to persuade the audience of their im­
portance). The presence of the actress shows that they are now selling themselves 
to a widely divergent audience (even children are present for autographs) rather 
than ordering people to converge (on the previous occasion the politicians used a 
much more explicit command). Reference is made to opposing parties (“o favelado 
doesn’t have to be content with this . . .  ”) and attem pts are made to avoid com­
mitments and direct references (“studies are being done . . .  ”). In summary, the 
whole event is designed to be more persuasive than that of the previous occasion. 
In Turner’s terminology, the rhetoric makes more extensive use of symbols than 
of signs (Parkin 1975).
So far, I have discussed and illustrated the change of rhetoric and the practices 
of the state government that national political developments brought about. What 
remains to be discussed is the effect of these changes on Rocinha’s “leadership”, 
i.e. what the effect was of the influx of Chaguista politicians promoting upgrading 
projects (and the way they did this in Rocinha) on the latter’s power structure.
To recap, the establishment of the political machine in Rocinha happened as 
follows: politicians approached a handful of individuals in Rocinha (most of these 
were cabos in the early days) with the promise of projects and other personal 
favours with the aim to win their political support. This meant that the person 
that responded, enjoyed the politicians’ support and established him/herself in 
charge of these projects. S/he was then challenged by others who demanded a say 
in the m atter, which developed into endless arguments between different individ­
uals claiming to be the “legitimate representative” of Rocinha, and hence claimed 
the right to decide about the allocation of resources. How this caused immediate 
problems between particular people is vividly illustrated in Varal:
7Parkin focuses only on the language used in their speeches, something which I re­
grettably cannot do as my data do not provide this detail.
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(CEntdo a Associagao passou a fun- 
cionar dando Ucengas . . .  Por causa 
disso, ate um dia nos tivemos urn 
problema . . .  Daqui a gente via la 
do outro lado uma pessoa cobrindo 
. . .  Nos fomos la e embargamos. A i  
o cara disse que era ordem do A. 
F. . . .  Nos dissemos a ele que nao 
atendiamos a ordem do A. F.: “Aqui 
na Rocinha, nos so atendemos or­
dem do governador do Estado e mais 
ninguem!” Derrubamos o barracao 
do cara, e/e nao teve saida. Sabe 
que o A. F. fez? Tentou comprar 
a Associagao. Politico, ne? Ele 
chamou alguem la em baixo . . .  per- 
guntou: “A Associagao esta em difi- 
culdades?” A i ele disse: “E  de uma 
maquina de escrever que nos estamos 
precisando. Entao voces compram a 
maquina que eu pago. ”
“So the Association started to issue 
licences . . .  Because of this, one day 
we even had trouble . . .  From here 
we saw a person cheating, there on 
the other side . . .  We went there and 
stopped him. So the guy said that 
it was by permission from A. F. We 
said to him that we didn’t answer to 
A. F .’s orders: “Here in Rocinha, we 
only answer to the orders of the State 
governor and no-one else!” We took 
down the guy’s house, he couldn’t es­
cape from that. You know what A. 
F. did? He tried to bribe the Associ­
ation. Politics, you know. He called 
someone down there . . .  asked: “The 
Association has any problems?” And 
then he said: “We need a typewriter? 
Then, buy a typewriter and I’ll pay.”
(Varal:87-88)
Another complicating factor in this power game was the police.
“A policia tinha direito de impedir 
[obras]. Mas eles nao so impediam 
como autorizavam quando davam 
dinheiro . . .  ”
“The police had the right to obstruct 
[works]. But they didn’t just do 
that, they also authorised works if 
you paid them . . . ”
(Varal:87)
The case of Cachopa clearly illustrates in detail the chaos it created on a larger 
scale: the case study illustrates the clever infiltration of politicians into Rocinha, 
the clever use of rhetoric by all parties to legitimate their claims, and the confusion 
it created for Rocinha, dividing whole neighbourhoods against each other.
In 1976, a Protestant minister claimed to have “bought” the land 
of roughly half of Cachopa, to accommodate members of his congrega­
tion and their families, most of whom had already been living in that 
area for some time. A conflict over land trespassing soon mobilised an 
opposition to these land claims from the other half of Cachopa’s resi­
dents. The question of religion was clearly articulated in the conflict. 
The suggestion for a plan “to disappropriate this area for social inter-
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est” (one way in which the question of private land ownership can be 
solved in shantytowns) attracted hoards of Chaguista politicians into 
Cachopa to claim personal responsibility for what they called “the 
only solution” to the area’s problems, and eventually for the whole of 
Rocinha.
As can be expected, this move led to many problems. Claims that 
Cachopa had been “opened up for the use of the community” encour­
aged some individuals to distribute plots in Cachopa for “needy fam­
ilies”, and issue “building licences” on newly opened plots under the 
name of the Residents Association enriching themselves enormously in 
a very short time. In no time Cachopa tripled in size expanding into 
the forest (which forms part of a protected National Park).
The result was predictable. The new building activities led to a 
series of serious conflicts between newcomers and original residents, 
whose neighbourhood was suddenly invaded. Particular antagonism 
against the members of the minister’s congregation, who were labelled 
as “thieves who stole the land of the people” , led to conflicts focus­
ing on religious differences. Endless, often violent, fights developed 
between different individuals claiming to be the only one that could 
legitimately issue “building licences” by calling themselves directors 
of the Residents Association. A series of public campaigns were or­
ganised by rivalling “directors” accusing each other of “corruption”. 
Violent conflicts became an everyday event and involved policemen 
who were instructed to disallow or destroy newly initiated building 
projects. These police officials collectively received contradictory or­
ders from different governing structures, and individually also made a 
fortune out of this business.
When the problem had caught the eye of the press, some “directors” 
grabbed the opportunity to make official complaints about police vio­
lence at these scenes. These arguments went back and forth, involving 
a lot of political manoeuvring on the part of all the parties involved (the 
state and municipal government, different police forces, and various ri­
valling “directors”). They led to the replacement of several officials at 
higher levels of the police and governing structures. Additionally, this 
expansion and land dealing in Cachopa encouraged some to initiate the 
same process elsewhere in Rocinha. Parts of Laboriau, Favelinha da 
Paula Brito, Almir and Vila Uniao were created out of nothing during 
this same period, causing similar conflicts in those areas.
These problems developed into full-blown conflicts, involving the 
whole shantytown. In Paula Brito, for example, the directors of the 
state-run school were black-listed after they voiced protest against the 
growing favela on its neighbouring terrain. Accusations of all kinds 
against the school’s directors were spread around in one faction’s abu­
sive leaflets, criticising the school’s recruitment policies, teaching m eth­
ods, etc. They succeeded in creating a lot of hostility against the school 
and its activities (some of which still prevailed in Rocinha at the time 
of fieldwork).
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In order to defend themselves against rivals in the Association, these “directors” 
also used another tactic.
“Tivemos a preocupagao de criar o 
que a gente chamava de diretores de 
areas. Depois de realizar reunioes em 
determinadas areas, os moradores in- 
dicavam o nome de uma pessoa pra 
ser representante. Isso porque se a 
agao fosse julgada desfavoravel pra 
nos, se a sede caisse nas maos da [op­
posed faction], como ela estava pre- 
tendendo, nos perdenamos a sede, 
mas nao perdenamos o espago den- 
tro da comunidade.”
(Varal:113)
The “directors” of these areas thus appeared on the political scene, with an inde­
pendent voice claiming “local representativity” and competing with other similar 
“regional directors”. This further encouraged the split of Rocinha as a political 
unit. This strategy also explains how regionality became (and still was at the time 
of fieldwork) an important issue in these factions’ language. (This point confirms 
my argument in Chapter 3.)
As these individuals launched public campaigns to be able to claim “popu­
lar support” in their efforts to present their case over rivalling directors, these 
tensions led to chaotic alignments of different factions within Rocinha. A hand­
ful of opposing factions started distributing their own literature and papers, and 
leaflets began to circulate regularly. Some of this consisted of single sheets of pa­
per distributed irregularly around times of controversial events such as the letters 
typed on “Uniao”-headed note paper.8 Some were more professionally done. The 
development of Tagarela is an example.
It was launched to document the progress and encourage the work of the mu- 
tiroes. Its frequency increased in 1978, the time in which the strength of Ch-
“We tried to set up, what we called 
“area directors”. After holding meet­
ings in certain areas, the residents 
put forward a name of a person to 
be their representative. This was 
because if the court case came out 
against us, if the seat fell into the 
hands of [opposed faction, identified 
by the name of a woman], as she had 
in mind, we would only lose the seat 
but not our space in the community.”
8This was the official name of Rocinha’s Residents Association.
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aguismo began to reach its peak. It explicitly promised more commitment in 
February 1978 and from March 1978, it became independent, not published by 
the Youth Club any more. News about the activities of mutirao groups still pre­
dominated but it catered for a more sophisticated readership. For example, it 
increasingly mentioned outside political activities such as removal threats in Vidi- 
gal (March 1978), the implications of BNH policies (May 1978), the workings and 
effects of the FGTS system (May 1978),9 information about the Pastoral de Fave- 
las (May 1978), and FAFERJ (Rio’s new Federation of Residents Associations) 
(Dec 1978). The cooking recipes and religious rhymes of earlier issues became less 
frequent.
These leaflets and journals were highly personalistic; their language was highly 
emotive. They made abundant use of exclamation marks and provocative headlines 
(e.g. “Enemies of the People Want to Demolish Rocinha’s Shops” (Informativo no. 
103, 6/2/1982),10 “Squatter is Defeated Once Again” (ibid. no. 72, 13/9/1980),11 
“Police Violence in Rocinha” (Circular no. 60, 10/10/1980)).12 Some used car­
toons with caricatures of the targeted “enemies” and referred to their rivals as 
“enemies of the people” , “exploiters of the people” , “squatters” , “swindlers” (m-
9I have mentioned the FGTS in Chapter 5. It was introduced in 1966 as a general 
move in the direction towards a “social salary” (which, critics have argued, produces 
an increasingly inegalitarian system in the long run (Malloy 1979)). It was a form of 
forced savings in which employees paid a percentage of their salaries into this fund, 
which they could claim back with interest at the end of their employment with the firm. 
The fund was administered by the BNH. In theory, this was meant to increase house 
ownership among workers, who could use the fund to finance their mortgage. However, 
as these projects were increasingly unviable (the reasons for this have been mentioned 
in Chapter 5), it gradually began to target higher economic sectors of the population. 
In effect, therefore, the lower economic sectors were subsidising housing projects built 
for higher income sectors. The introduction of the fund also overrid union agreements 
about rights of dismissal and thereby seriously affected employment stability. (It was 
now possible to dismiss workers before they had a chance to build up their credits.) It 
thus eliminated the unions’ bargaining power as employers could (and did) fire anyone 
who actively participated in their activities (Schwarz 1980).
10“Inimigos do Povo Querem Derrubar Lojas da Rocinha”
11 “ Grileiro e Derrotado Mais Uma Vez”
12 “ Violencias Policiais na Rocinha”
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imigos do povo, exploradores do povo, grileiros, pilantras), and so on. They openly 
accused each other for committing crimes against “the people” and simplified 
highly complicated issues. They also frequently denounced some and promoted 
other government institutions openly.
The dynamics of this tension between the different factions was also clearly il­
lustrated by the occasion of the inauguration of a new footbridge, the first achieve­
ment of the mutirao groups and therefore a time of extreme symbolic importance.
“No dia da inauguragao, a gente 
tinha teatro, fizemos uma pega so- 
bre as pessoas que morriam na pas- 
sarela . . .  Nos fizemos um palco 
la perto da pista, celebramos uma 
missa pelas pessoas que morreram 
atropeladas. Depois nos fizemos 
uma procissao, todo mundo cantando 
. . .  e dangando. A gente levou 
umas faixas, tinha bateria, batucada 
e tudo . . .  Eu sei que teve gente 
que ate chorou. Aquilo foi uma 
coisa muito linda! . . .  No outro 
dia eles marcaram que era a in- 
auguragao do governo. Veio tanta 
gente! Aquela deputada toda! Era 
deputado, era vereador . . .  Ai, foi 
deputado chegando aqui, se exibindo 
. . .  dizendo: “Eu fiz a passarela pro 
povo da Rocinha! Eu botei a pas­
sarela! Eu fiz nao sei o que!” Mas 
nao foi nada disso. Nao foi nem 
aquela Associagao, nem deputado. 
Foi trabalho da comunidade in teira”
“On the day of the inauguration, we 
had theatre, we composed a piece 
about the people that died under the 
footbridge . . .  We set up a plaque 
near the road, we celebrated a mass 
for the people that died run over. 
After that we marched, everybody 
singing . . .  and dancing. We had 
banners, there was a steel band, 
rhythmic dancing and everything . . .  
I know that there were even people 
crying. That was a really beauti­
ful occasion! . . .  On another day 
they organised what turned out to be 
the government’s inauguration. So 
many people came! All these govern­
ment officials! There were congress­
men, there were councillors . . .  And 
then there were all these M P’s com­
ing here, showing themselves off . . .  
saying: “I organised the footbridge 
for the people of Rocinha! I arranged 
the footbridge! I did I don’t know 
what else!” But it wasn’t like that 
at all. It was the work of the whole 
community.”
fVarakl l  0-111)
Different groups claimed success for the realisation of the footbridge and ended 
up celebrating its inauguration on different days and in very different ways. One 
group celebrated on a Thursday night, accompanied by folk cultural events and
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with full participation of the Church. The following morning at 9.00 a.m. many 
government officials were invited by a rival faction.
This faction denounced the mutirao campaigns and labelled their organisers 
as “subversive” (dangerous at that time, when “communists” were being head­
hunted). According to the first faction, the latter became a mouthpiece of the 
government in the shantytown. For them they were the symbol of “government 
interference” in Rocinha’s politics. They spread rumours that one of the rival 
leaders’ brother ran for a political office.
“Acabou que esse trogo dessa E. Ji- 
cou aqui mesmo na Rocinha, cate- 
quizando o pessoal com a forga dos 
deputados. Tudo que a comunidade 
faz, ela corre la no governo e coloca 
que foi ela e o beleza do irmao dela 
que fez. . . .  Ela chegou ate distribuir 
uma carta dizendo que a gente era 
comunista. Foi tanta gente chamada 
pro DOPS, minha filha!”
“It ended with that bigwig E. stay­
ing in Rocinha, indoctrinating people 
with the power of state government 
officials. Everything the community 
did, she ran off to the government to 
claim that it was her and that beauty 
of a brother of her who had done it 
. . .  She even went as far as distribut­
ing a letter saying that we were com­
munist. Many people were called up 
by the DOPS [Intelligence Unit of the 
Military], oh dear!”
(Varal:112f
It has to be pointed out here, of course, that rumours about the other factions were 
equally vicious and of the same character: suspected involvement with electoral 
candidates, appropriation of public funds (see e.g. Inform at ivob
Looking at the situation globally, Rocinha’s power structure was beginning to 
change as the old-style “leaders” (the electricity, water and landlords) were now 
challenged from two sides. Firstly, the new influx of politicians made this kind 
of business available to more such individuals and they became more numerous, 
although their total number did not exceed a dozen or so. This forced them to 
compete with each other and had the effect of decreasing the size of their personal 
gain. (This is especially clear from the Cachopa case study.) In the mean time, 
Rocinha had grown rapidly and its population had become much more mobile 
as the rental market increased. Together these factors add up to an impression
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that these donos were increasingly moving further away from the conventional 
patrao-type and their activities were shifting to a less public sphere.
The second challenge to their leadership came from the emergence of new 
politically active individuals in the mid-1970s. These openly criticised the donos’ 
exploitative practices, their alliances with the party structure and their approval 
of certain projects to be carried out in Rocinha without collective consultation. 
Different parties (the competing donos and the different kinds of action groups) 
expressed these tensions in the form of circulating leaflets. The language they 
used corresponds to the new rhetoric: all appeal to the same ideas circulating 
nationally (as illustrated in the example of the campaigning Chaguistas).
At first, the action groups were sponsored by the Church and other similar or­
ganisations from outside the shantytown. This sponsorship gave these groups some 
continuity and encouraged their influence in the shantytown’s political structure. 
Later, however, these groups also emerged independently, especially in response to 
a change in policies in the later abertura years (e.g. the creation of the SMDS) (see 
ahead). At their peak, the total number of these groups must have been around 
twenty. The battleground of much of this activity was the Residents Association, 
as it was used by different bodies to gain legitimation for certain types of political 
activity.
So, as these Church-linked mutirao groups became more influential in 1978- 
1980, they had also become more preoccupied with increasing their political control 
over the whole of Rocinha. The reactivation of the Residents Association, whose 
activities had virtually come to a halt ever since the junta  had taken over after the 
passing of the decrees in 1968-1970, was their main target.13 The arrival of abertura 
caused these conflicts to come out into the open. Firstly, because for the first time 
conventional leaderships were challenged (even with the fear of persecution). And 
secondly, language had changed and different priorities were emphasised. Since it
13The first issue of the Tagarela, for example, mentioned preparations for an election 
for a new directorate for the Residents Association and actively promoted a candidate 
who was closely related to the Sanitation Group (Tagarela no. 1 Aug 1976).
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was crucial for each group to present the others as less “representative” , parallel 
organisations were founded at that time challenging the leadership of their pre­
decessors on these terms. So around 1979-1980, the struggle over the Residents 
Association in Rocinha exploded:
uPra fazer as eleigoes, nos criamos 
o M ORA, no sentido de reorgani- 
zar a Associagao de Moradores da 
Rocinha. A sigla MORA quer dizer 
Movimento de Organizagao e Ren- 
ovagao da Associagao. A gente 
pretendia realizar eleigoes na Asso- 
ciagdo dos Moradores porque a di- 
retoria anterior, . . .  tinha prorro- 
gado o mandato. De tres anos pas- 
saram para 5 anos . . .  Tinha la uma 
pessoa que nao era da comunidade 
e que estava assessorando a presi- 
dente da Associagao. Era a que de- 
cidia tudo, . . .  Ela estava levando um 
movimento de afastar as pessoas da 
Associagao. Alguns moradores foram  
ate desligados do quadro de associa- 
dos. Tudo manobra politico. A gente 
nao podia concordar com isso. Dai 
preparamos as eleigoes. Houve ate 
ameagas de prisao feitas para que os 
moradores nao votassem na chapa do 
M O RA.”
“To hold elections, we created 
MORA, with the intention to re­
organise the Residents Association 
of Rocinha. The acronym MORA 
means Movement for the Organisa­
tion and Renovation of the Asso­
ciation. We tried to hold election 
in the Residents Association because 
the previous directors . . .  had ex­
tended their mandate. Three years 
became five years . . .  There was a 
person there who was not from the 
community and who was assisting 
the president of the Residents Asso­
ciation. It was she who decided on 
everything, . . .  She was setting up a 
movement to drive people out of the 
Association. Some people were even 
crossed olf the membership list. All 
political manipulation. We couldn’t 
comply with this. So we prepared 
elections. There were even threats 
of imprisonment made so that people 
wouldn’t vote for the MORA ticket.”
(Varal:112)
The reference to “political manipulation” refers to claims that these tactics were 
purposely employed by Chaguistas in power to destabilise these shantytown leaders.14 
And these problems occurred in most shantytowns. According to one of the ex­
presidents of the Residents Association at the time:
14This was known as one of the tactics through which the machine established itself. 
It is clear that the use of this kind of tactic in itself shows the unstable basis on which 
the machine rested in shantytowns. The ease with which it was demobilised later and 
the intensity in which dislike for this government was expressed later, was therefore also 
not surprising.
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“Nao foi so aqui. Esse tipo de 
manobra pra dividir e controlar a or- 
ganizagao dos moradores das fave- 
las aconteceu em varios lugares. Na 
propria FAFERJ o pelego J. R. en- 
trou pra valer nas comunidades com 
o fim  de boicotar a FAFERJ le- 
gitimamente eleita por nos, criando 
uma suposta FAFERJ 2. Tambem 
foi notoria a fraude e a coagao nas 
eleigoes da favela na Rua do Bispo 
para garantir uma diretoria contro- 
lada pela Leao XIII. Da mesma 
forma, no morro do Santo Amaro, 
onde conseguiram impor uma chapa 
com garotos de 1\ anos, quando a 
gente sabe que ate para ser socio das 
associagoes de favela, por estatuto, 
e preciso ter 18 anos. E  assim foi 
em Bangu, Vila Kennedy, Lagartixa, 
Cidade de Deus, etc. . . .  ”
“It didn’t just
happen here. This kind of manipu­
lation to divide and control the or­
ganisation of favelados happened in 
various places. In FAFERJ itself the 
corrupt government-supported J. R. 
infiltrated into the communities with 
the aim to boycott FAFERJ, legit­
imately elected by us, setting up a 
supposed FAFERJ 2. Also notori­
ous was the fraud and coercion in 
the elections of Favela Rua do Bispo 
to guarantee the seat controlled by 
Leao XIII. In the same way, in morro 
Santo Amaro, where they succeeded 
in installing a faction with 14 year- 
old boys, when everyone knows that 
to qualify for Residents Association 
membership even, by statute, one 
has to be 18. And it was the same 
in Bangu, Vila Kennedy, Lagartixa, 
Cidade de Deus, etc. . . . ”
(Vanik 112-113)
The arrival of abertura was therefore a final phase in the history of the political 
scene of Rocinha as it was at the time of fieldwork. Changes at the national level 
were limited. It was clear that some changes had to happen to contain the pres­
sures that were building up. The military government itself showed up a deep 
internal split which had become increasingly obvious since 1976. A strong core 
of hardliners (Linha Dura) was operating independently and the infamous Death 
Squads (also associated with the Linha Dura) were also reemerging on a larger 
scale during this period. There was also widespread disagreement about who was 
to follow up president Geisel in 1979. The “transition to democracy”, however, 
was to be done without threatening the basic idea on which the regime’s economic 
development rested. It was limited to the Military’s definition of liberalisation. 
Strikers were violently repressed by government forces, and union leaders were dis­
missed and imprisoned. 1980 consequently saw fewer strikes, followed by a better 
organised and strengthened restart of activities. The party reform of 1979 effec­
tively forced the strong rising opposition party (the MDB) to de centralise into 5
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smaller parties, left to compete against each other. These tactics guaranteed an 
overall government party (now PDS) victory in most states. Some (such as Rio de 
Janeiro, Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais), where the “opposition” won, became in­
creasingly subject to clandestine paramilitary resistance. The victory of the PDT 
in Rio de Janeiro in 1982, for example, sparked off more Linha Dura terrorism 
there. By 1983, the recession had deepened significantly with high unemploy­
ment and a rising inflation rate (now over 150%). Additionally, the drought in 
the Northeast entered its fifth year, and large scale floods in the Southern states 
destroyed a large part of the national agricultural crops for export. Austerity mea­
sures were called for, as the IMF was approached for loans, and resulting industrial 
protest was repeatedly violently suppressed in the terrible conventional ways.
In terms of housing policies towards the shantytowns, the rhetoric of abertura 
brought the foundation of the SMDS (Secretaria Municipal de Desenvolvimento 
Social). Its foundation showed an official commitment to the shanty dwellers’ 
rights, in that they had been guaranteed a place in the municipal government’s 
budget. Until now, shantytowns had survived on the favours of the establishment. 
The SMDS was created to coordinate programmes at municipal levels to serve 
low-income groups especially favelados, and was a final commitment to the end of 
removal programmes and the beginning of the upgrading of shantytowns. It also 
provided an institutional link between the shantytowns and the state organisations 
responsible for the upgrading programmes and thereby facilitated the administra­
tive and other obstacles which had conveniently stood in the way of any significant 
structural improvements of shantytowns. For example, shortly after its creation 
the state electricity company (Light) was contracted (largely with foreign money) 
to carry out large “regularisation” projects for many of the larger shantytowns in 
Rio de Janeiro’s city centre.15 The creation of the SMDS also marked an impor­
tant political change in that it increased local decision-making power, since the 
SMDS (a municipal organisation) transferred the responsibility over low-income
15Significantly, Light’s director at the time clearly promoted these policies as part of 
his personal election campaign (personal communication with IPLANRIO).
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policies from a state organisation to a municipal level, reversing the trend towards 
centralisation which had started in 1964 (Malloy 1979, Neto 1984).16 The lan­
guage with which the SMDS described its aims and purposes is that of abertura. 
The key words in its plans for Rocinha are “participation of the community” in 
the upgrading process and the “usage of local resources” (SMDS/UNICEF 1980).
The content of its proposed projects was ambitious. It included proposals 
for the regularisation of all Rocinha’s land titles and proposed the building of a 
large open sewer to drain excess water with a road to service it, including the 
resettlement of about 70 families whose houses were located on the proposed site 
of the project to a location elsewhere in Rocinha (later known as Laboriau). It had 
various proposals for solving the general problem of household waste in Rocinha. 
For education, it proposed the training of locals for teaching posts in existing 
primary school projects, and it suggested the development of a large network 
of private daycare (SMDS/UNICEF 1980). The first overwhelming reaction of 
Rocinha’s people was scepticism as most just could not see how this time would 
be any different from previous times (Oliveira (1981), Varal). A second response 
was fear, since they knew from previous experience that “urbanisation” could 
mean part removals or could be costly.
In effect, the creation of the SMDS meant that from now on the shantytown 
groups could by-pass the party structure more easily in their pursuit of funds 
(Brasileiro et al. 1982). It also meant the realisation of funding for projects which 
were running on a voluntary basis before, and could establish themselves indepen­
dently of outside sponsors like the Church. It had the effect of spreading funding 
more widely; over a larger number and range of groups (with different motiva­
16Since the establishment of the regime in 1964, the state had gradually become 
responsible for all aspects of the social welfare system. This reversed the changes which 
happened before the coup, when all issues of social welfare had become politicised making 
the state less able to change certain policies counter to the interests of certain key groups 
whose political support was needed to maintain the current regime in power (Malloy 
1979). After the coup, all “political” posts in the social security system were substituted 
with government appointed “technocrats” who responded only to government guidelines.
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tions and ways of operating). The payment for services which had previously been 
carried out virtually voluntarily also had profound effects on the running of these 
projects. The payment of project workers meant that they increasingly began to 
see themselves as (badly paid) employees of the state, which affected morale. The 
control over the funding by the SMDS also meant that effective control over the 
nature of the work was now taken out of their hands. The next chapter elaborates 
extensively on how these factors affected the operation of the few groups that 
remained active.
The projects themselves were also criticised on many points much as they were 
previously. They were badly administered and managed, and lacked commitment. 
The payment for salaries and materials had to be renegotiated annually, involving 
masses of paperwork, endless meetings and many trips to the offices of the fund­
ing agencies. Even after they were agreed on, delayed payments (of both salaries 
and materials) for months, in some cases, caused serious hardship to some action 
groups and did much to lower the morale of the groups. Funds for one project 
could be diverted to another, more topical and/or politically important, depriving 
the workers of a sense of continuity. (E.g. see the stories of the battles for sup­
port in Oliveira 1986.) On the whole, funds became increasingly inadequate: the 
salaries of the agents rapidly diminished in value to well below a national minimum 
salary level, and the training they were offered did not meet the national teach­
ing standards. The aims of the projects themselves, too, were doubtful. They 
showed a band-aid approach, rather than solving any real aspects of Rocinha’s 
urgent problems. Despite the emphasis on “community participation” in project 
proposals, the participants complained widely about the projects arriving readily 
designed and the absence of opportunities to  influence the decision-making at the 
planning stage. (There is an interesting discussion drawing attention to this prob­
lem in Perini 1986.) On top of all this, scandals were revealed about diversion of 
funds and building materials, especially during the building of Rocinha’s big sewer 
project.
The creation of the SMDS also had an important effect on the relations be­
tween different groups. The SMDS put renewed emphasis on the need for the
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shantytowns to “organise” themselves (Hoffmann 1984), by which they meant the 
effective operation of a “representative” body in the shantytowns through whom 
they could implement their plans. Its policy of just targeting “representative” 
organisations clearly increased conflicts between different groups over the title of 
officially recognised organisations such as the Residents Association.
In this chapter, I have traced the difficulties the Residents Association faced 
in this kind of political situation. The impossibility of resolving such fundamen­
tal contradictory interests within an organisation of this kind led to many in the 
shantytown to complain that outside agents deliberately pursued certain tactics 
so that conflicts within Rocinha’s leadership could be used as an excuse for not 
going ahead with upgrading programmes.
“Assim, o governo do Estado foi “In this way, the state government
fazendo seu curral nos morros e did its round in the morros and even
ainda tirava partido dessas brigas in- took sides in these internal rows so
ternas pra nao encaminhar os proje- that they wouldn’t have to direct up-
tos de urbanizagao, as melhorias . . .  grading projects, improvements . . .
A i eles nao faziam nada.” In that way they did nothing.”
(Varal:113)
Abertura promised to come into full swing with the change of the state govern­
ment in 1983. The new government lavishly indicated its intentions to implement 
“democratic” policies by widely criticising the previous pre-abertura-sty\e gover­
nor. The emphasis was again on “democratic” decision-making involving “the 
communities” (“seeking a dialogue with all sectors of society”(Plano 1983:5))17 in 
an attem pt to do away with the “technocratic spirit” (“in accordance with the 
government’s policies, we seek to escape from the technocratic style which tra­
ditionally characterised Brazilian planning activity” (Plano 1983:i)).18 For the 
shantytown inhabitants, it all looked much the same. Many new projects were 
started up, especially in the areas indicated in his State Plan (e.g. education)
17“procurar o dialogo com todos os segmentos da sociedaden
18uprocuramos fugir de acordo com a orientagao do Governo, do estilo tecnocratico 
que caracterizou tradicionalmente a atividade de planejamento no BrasiP
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(Plano 1983). However, funds for these were often redirected from projects ini­
tiated by a predecessor. Despite its language, then, the SMDS soon became to 
be seen as another tool for the recruitment of clientele in the shantytowns (Gay 
1988). The creation of numerous Conselhos (Councils) (soon monopolised by cer­
tain individuals as another clientelistic link into government funds), was perhaps 
the only real difference.
The role of the shantytown entrepreneur had become to frequent as many of 
these meetings as s/he could find, to develop a network of personal contacts to 
maximise his/her chances to attract funding to the shantytowns. Once successful, 
a project could be revitalised or expanded, and some.personal resources could 
be generated. The running of a creche, for example, meant a secure place for 
the children of relatives, friends and neighbours. It brought in funds to feed 
employees, their families, some of the children’s families and possibly also some 
needy neighbours. Moreover, it brought the local population into direct contact 
with the establishment and therefore increased their chances to find new patrons, 
much like it happened in the days before the SMDS.
The picture we end up with is one of a divided scene. Firstly, there was a 
handful of old-style donos diminished in power after the widening of opportunities 
for others to establish themselves in similar ways (i.e. through dealings with land, 
property and other scarce resources), often by means of direct sponsorship of 
politicians out for electoral support, and discredited by the rhetoric of abertura. 
Secondly, there was a wide range of action groups which emerged in the mid- 
1970s and added to the former’s demise. At first these groups appeared with the 
sponsorship of outside institutions like the Church. Later, the creation of the 
SMDS gave them an opportunity to establish themselves more independently of 
the Church. Their range increased as a result and their total number rose to 
around fifteen to twenty. Each group, however, still had no more than a handful 
of active individuals, and many of their members were active in several groups 
simultaneously. The total number of activists was therefore still small.
The nature of the leadership of these two kinds of groups differed significantly. 
As rhetoric changed, the basis of the credibility of the old donos was eroded, and
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this forced them underground. Public association with politicians now became 
suspicious and a source of criticism. “Autonomy” and “independence” were now 
key words. For the researcher, it therefore became harder to expose the dynamics 
of their operations accurately.
A detailed look into the nature of the funding structure also gives us important 
clues about the character of leadership in Rocinha. Projects were promoted by a 
variety of bureaucratic and other outside institutions which often remained anony­
mous to most group members. Many of the projects promoted in Rocinha were 
short and discontinuous, and often with contradictory aims. There was confusion 
over who was implementing them and indeed over what it was that was being im­
plemented (opposing parties interpreting them in different ways). As a result, the 
leadership of these groups shows up as unstable, discontinuous and divisive. In this 
respect, those sponsored by non-governmental institutions (such as the Catholic 
Church, the Methodist Church) less subject to political manipulation were in a 
different position. They were more likely to maintain some kind of continuity. 
However, even in these last groups, few participants maintained their positions for 
longer time periods, and If it were not for their non-governmental sponsorship, 
these groups also fell apart rapidly, like their counterparts. These groups were 
divided against each other in competition for funds. The almost total absence 
of collaboration between the different groups and the problems between different 
leaderships (and the violent conflicts between some of them), partly due to their 
common involvement in a confrontational historical development, was striking. As 
far as action groups were concerned, Rocinha was demobilised and divided into 
rivalling groups, each of temporary nature with unstable leadership, and individ­
ually competing against the other for a small channel of irregular and unreliable 
funds. It was a picture of division and fluctuation, of temporary “leaders” with 
few committed “followers” .
In these last two chapters, I have shown how wider political developments 
have shaped the developments of Rocinha’s political power structure. I traced the 
developments of Rocinha’s main political agents in the context of these political 
developments and consequent policies aimed at shantytowns, i.e. the repressive
Chapter 6. The Development of Leadership: Post-1976 182
measures and consequent direct intervention in Rocinha’s political activities; the 
development and operation of the state political machine in this context; the effect 
of the repressive regime on policies (i.e. eradication); the changing rhetoric and 
the consequent discrediting of clientelistic practices, and the resulting change of 
policies (from eradication to upgrading); and the creation of different channels of 
funding for shantytown projects.
In the following chapters I will examine the actual operation of these groups 
and their interrelations. There, different dimensions of this political activity will 
be examined which will refine the picture that has emerged so far.
Chapter 7
Leadership and Action Group 
Activities
The aim of this and the following chapter is to present the political scene of 
Rocinha. I will identify the general characteristics of the political forms I witnessed 
and will attem pt to deconstruct their complexity to give an insight into questions 
such as: what kind of leadership existed in this shantytown, on what basis did 
leaders recruit and maintain their following, how stable were the groups, and 
what was the character of relations between the few groups that were active? This 
partly allows us to draw together some of the points made in earlier chapters, and 
ultimately to comment on other authors’ claims about the character of shantytown 
politics. v /
There were several “leaders” in Rocinha whose “leadership” was based in a 
particular locality. There were only a handful of them and most of these were 
active in several groups simultaneously. They were the same personalities which 
reappeared over Rocinha’s history, yet their leadership did not necessarily origi­
nate in their seniority in Rocinha. Often their occupation helped them become 
central figures. Typically, they centralised important services for the operation of 
the shantytown around their house for a time, and thereby monopolised commu­
nication with external agents (e.g. in Chapter 3 I noted that some of Rocinha’s 
“leaders” had been or were birosqueiros or local shopkeepers). A claim over these 
resources obviously put them at an advantage. However, the first requirement 
for any substantial “leadership” was a claim over an infrastructural base for their
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activities. It was the action groups’ buildings which provided them with a sense of 
continuity. The acquisition of a physical base for one’s project was the first major 
achievement (especially since space was extremely scarce). There were examples 
of enterprising individuals who failed to get their projects off the ground for lack 
of a physical base (see, for example, the case of Chica da Rocinha (Oliveira 1986)).
The buildings acted as a centre from which individuals could run a variety of 
groups. These groups had little stable support, and their most active members 
were often active in various other groups as well. They were dependent on a 
core group of individuals who effectively controlled the centre for allowing them 
space there. Petty arguments over cleaning, noise or electric bills could become 
determinant factors in the future of a project and hence the future of a potential 
“leader” (c.f. the case of the Theatre Group, described in Chapter 4). Bringing 
funds to the centre raised one’s claim over it. However, those that succeeded 
in raising funds were often already part of the core group that controlled it or 
were closely related to this group: one project in operation generated funding for 
another one as the individuals running it established connections with patrons in 
funding agencies. Members of their close network would be the first and most 
likely ones to receive information about potential funding for new projects, and so 
were in an advantageous position to qualify for it. As a result, the newly available 
funding would be passed on to the same group based in the same locality.
To become a leader, one had to establish and maintain one’s authority over this 
space. This explains why we observed the central importance of at least one key 
personality in each organisation. The buildings were seen as “belonging” to these 
individuals, a small core group of people who often started the “community cen­
tre” . They may have been participants in groups of relatives, friends or neighbours 
who put up the building in their spare time, perhaps during the tempo do mutirao 
(see Chapter 6), or given a grant to have one built from government agencies or 
other funding bodies through connections with useful patrons. Indeed the groups 
were often referred to and known by the name of that person (e.g. 11A creche da 
M.” (Lit: M.’s creche)). When I was introduced to Rocinha’s different groups by 
a social worker, it was noticeable how, at the mention of each new group, he be­
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gan by explaining the personality of that central person, arguing when questioned 
about this, that one could not understand what the group was really like without 
first clarifying the character and views of that key person. The question is then 
how these leaders maintained their central position in these groups.
They maintained their central role by monopolising decision-making and con­
trolling and centralising the distribution of resources. The most influential activists 
often had a say in various groups simultaneously. As far as decision-making was 
concerned, there were a large number of groups whose activities coincided. Many 
of these competed with each other for the same resources and they often attended 
the same meetings which dealt with the way these resources were allocated. Dur­
ing my year of fieldwork attending such meetings took increasingly more of my 
time, as indeed it did for Rocinha’s politicians. As explained in Chapter 6, these 
individuals spent increasingly more time lobbying funding agencies and admin­
istrating their grants, rather than participating in the work, as they had done 
before. These meetings were the stage for the shantytown’s political drama. They 
showed the way the groups related to each other in public and how they went 
about handling internal matters.
The bulk of the groups’ meetings can be summarised as being anarchic, gen­
erally inconclusive and ineffective. As a rule, they started between half an hour 
and 45 minutes late. The different topics came and went in no particular order 
so that the meetings were lengthy and confusing and often failed to produce any 
conclusions. People interrupted each other adding viewpoints on anything that 
came to mind. Parallel conversations went on around the different corners of the 
room raising noise levels to such a degree that it made a systematic collective de­
bate impossible. The topic often came back in the same form in the next meeting. 
Many of the points addressed were therefore seen as old hat and irresolvable and 
irrelevant or unimportant to the participants. Meetings would run on for two and 
a half hours, and often ended when participants declared to be fed up and threat­
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ened to leave, with the last topics untouched. Periodically, I witnessed meetings 
ending in fights between individuals.1
“Voting” was the standard decision-making procedure. However, in many ways 
it did not work. There was confusion about who was allowed to vote and what 
exactly one was voting for. The options were not clearly spelled out, and the 
consequences of the decisions taken were not clearly discussed (if addressed at all) 
before the voting took place. Often a full realisation of its implications would 
reverse the decision after the voting procedure. In fact, meetings were not the 
place where decisions were made. They only slightly influenced the action taken 
in the end.
The participants lacked the interest, discipline and perhaps skills required to 
run meetings: order would be necessary to carry out a debate systematically and 
to carry through a “democratic” voting procedure. This is partly explained by 
the fact that these people generally had little decision power over any aspect of 
their lives. Many lived in total dependence on others in an environment over 
which they themselves had no control. Any decisions they made were at best 
short lasting and had to be revised in changed circumstances. At worst they were 
reversed continually by others on whom they depended. The daily running of the 
groups reflected a pattern of decision-making appropriate for such circumstances. 
Members made routine decisions by themselves effectively in on-the-spot situations 
solving problems which emerged at the time. The idea that someone had to be 
informed and consulted or the issue had to be discussed in meetings with equals, 
ran counter to their usual procedure and in some cases offended their sense of 
self-worth and independence. In these meetings, they often insisted on their own 
way of doing things, not permitting this way to be discussed, considering the 
m atter closed. Among the visiting social workers, conversation often centered
10ne meeting was organised in the Catholic Chapel, for lack of other available space. 
Some of the participants were reluctant to agree with this idea. When the meeting 
deteriorated and one member had to be physically restrained from attacking another 
with a chair, several participants walked out angrily and fearfully. They said that this 
had been predictable and they knew beforehand that “community meetings should never 
be allowed to take place in the Church”.
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around their inability to convince tias (Lit: aunt; used as general reference term 
for mostly indigenous staff of action groups (see also reference in Chapter 2)) of 
different ways, or the tias’ refusal to accept certain decisions made “by consensus” . 
It became a standing joke that during a meeting x, y, and z was decided and 
everyone appeared to agree. After the meeting, tias carried on with a, b, and c as 
before. These observations also go along with a wider point (already mentioned 
in a Chapter 4), namely, the strong sense of independence and self-defence which 
individuals expressed was striking.
This was also clear in the practice of the groups. Each was extremely defensive 
of his/her own “rights”.2 Among the group members, no one was allowed any 
special privileges or attention by the others. In a creche whose work I accompanied 
closely, none of the workers emerged as any sort of “leader” for any length of time 
in their daily creche work. The tias came across as strong individuals who, during 
my visits to their homes, confided their grievances against almost every other tia 
in the group to me. Some quarreled over long standing conflicts. Others grouped 
and regrouped over the years. This made the creche work difficult for them and 
the creche was a stressful place to be. Several times during the year the work was 
completely paralysed because of impossible work relations in the classrooms (the 
place where tias were most forced to cooperate and rely on each other as a team). 
It was also no surprise that the rotating coordinator’s job did not work in practice 
(see below for details).
This pattern was true for most of these groups. It showed in the groups’ appar­
ent difficulty to organise anything and anyone. Arrangements either fell through 
by their lack of commitment and loyalty from supposed supporters (e.g. not turn­
ing up at meetings or not fulfilling their part in other agreed commitments). When 
there was a good reason for joining a group (e.g. a potential amount of funding)
2And indeed, this sense of pushing their “rights” can be seen as a result of an aware­
ness of the lack of rights. For them, this was the case in most spheres of their fives.
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the group self-destructed in a very short time period. I wonder how any lasting 
leadership could emerge out of this type of situation.
The chaotic dynamics of these meetings allowed core individuals to manipulate 
the meetings to their own advantage. The meetings were often led by these central 
people, who kept control over the information necessary to assess the topic accord­
ing to their wishes. Tactics were employed to secure the smooth outcome of the 
decision, such as secrecy over certain issues, the introduction of false or confusing 
information or gossip outside meetings. The meetings were often more like grand 
speeches, consisting of meaningless catch phrases, sometimes followed by applause 
of supporters. They were designed to generate emotional appeal as opposed to 
systematic discussions in which all had an equal opportunity and time to voice 
their opinion. Opponents were attacked on personal grounds, and occasionally 
abused in highly emotive language.
It is clear that these leaders promoted themselves through these public appear­
ances in meetings by manipulative speeching. The importance of just “appearing” 
in as many meetings as possible was also significant, and they spent a lot of their 
time literally running from one to the next meeting securing their contacts, setting 
up new ones and gathering information about potential opportunities. Meetings 
were arranged in parallel to others or rearranged at short notice, several times in 
a row so as to divert interest and ability to attend. Long periods were spent in 
meetings arguing over who had the right to be invited to the following meeting, 
or in fierce attacks over the exclusion of some parties in the last meeting. At the 
end of the meetings, endless delays occurred over the timing and the locality (e.g. 
on whose home ground) of the next meeting, each party ensuring their ability to 
attend (or not to do so, whichever was more advantageous). It has to be remem­
bered also that since these leaders were often the initiators of the project, they 
had the personal contacts with patrons and funding agencies and many decisions 
were typically made in personal meetings with these contacts rather than in these 
meetings at all.
Besides these tactics a myth existed around these personalities. These were 
about the details of their attempts to become successful and the suffering they
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underwent along this path. For example, they could be stories of how extremely 
poor they used to be (inadequate family structure (death of parents, runaway hus­
band)), the large number of dependents they had to support (younger siblings or 
infant offspring), how unsettled they had been geographically (forced migration to 
strange urban centres), the humiliating occupations they had to take to survive 
(prostitution, or begging). These stories often incorporated a religious element. 
God or a particular saint helped them out of their suffering through revelations 
of certain miraculous happenings (like the appearance out of nowhere of a sympa­
thetic patron). This divine attention accounted for their reason for their genuine 
commitment to “the community”. a,nd to others suffering similar fates as they had 
in the past. They often contained an elaborate account of the long hard strug­
gle they underwent for the benefit of “the community” , and they competed with 
each other to portray their leader as the worst sufferer. Their current status was 
justified in their past suffering.
These myths were publicly known and often repeated. (Varal and other “com­
munity literature” specialises in such stories.) They were promoted by increasingly 
sophisticated means. Some had written them up in an autobiographical account 
(e.g. Chica da Rocinha (Oliveira 1986)), another acted it out in a theatre piece. 
People criticised these myths, casting doubts on their tru th  by producing counter 
versions in which they portrayed each other in a different light.
These myths were not only used for self-promotion, they also centred in per­
sonal pleas to prospective patrons. Their portrayal of themselves as sufferers was a 
means to win the donors’ sympathy from which paternalistic help could be drawn. 
This private approach to patrons contrasted sharply with the rhetoric used in ap­
proaching potential donors publicly. They then appeared with a critical attitude 
of an equal (not a pathetic sufferer) demanding “rights” to certain funds (not 
favours as a result of sympathy). In these public meetings, they stressed the inad­
equacy of the contribution and the lack of aid for other groups with equally worthy 
ambitions and rights instead of gratitude for the special attention received from 
patrons. (See e.g. the inauguration of the public fountains, described in Chapter
Chapter 7. Leadership and Action Group Activities 190
As decision-making remained centralised in the ways described so far, so did 
the distribution of resources. The important tasks of the group which were not in 
the hands of the key person, were delegated to a few others who were often close 
friends or relatives of the central person. The repeated criticism these groups held 
against donors from outside was that they were “paternalistic” . This criticism 
could be used to press for aid in the form of cash with no restrictions as to its use. 
Total independence from donor agencies was, of course, essential to any effective 
one-person leadership. Paternalism, was one of the main targets of the abertura 
rhetoric and therefore was guaranteed to receive the sympathy from an uninformed 
audience.3
The leaders above described resembled personality cults of the “big man”-type 
(as described by Strathern (1971), for example). Their aim was to build a small 
empire in the shantytown and establish their influence. The emphasis was on 
the quantity instead of the quality of visible works attracted to the shantytown. 
Some of these leaders were seen to attract large amounts of funding, yet, in many 
cases, relatively little of these had a lasting beneficial effect on Rocinha as a 
whole (excluding the personal benefit it brought to friends and relatives closely 
involved in the enterprise at the time). The label “big man” also fits, because these 
“leaders” rose and fell in rapid succession. This was partly due to the unreliability 
of the funding (as explained in previous chapters). Their leadership was based on 
achievement (not ascribed). They were abandoned and forgotten soon after their 
utility to a fluctuating clientele diminished. Their clientele was unstable as clients 
came and went and their relationship with their patrons was largely utilitarian. 
The Papua New Guinea parallel ends here, as there was one real difference too: 
that Rocinha’s big men were not allowed to exert their influence to the same degree 
(and many of them were female, too'). They tried but could not publicly celebrate 
their status as the audience would not allow this to happen.
3An extreme version of this was one of those leaders’ campaign to promote what was 
known as her “pedagogia da favela”, the idea that the favela has its own ways and these 
should not be dictated by outside sources.
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When looking at Rocinha as a whole, there was a handful of clusters of groups 
with key leaders. Physically, these clusters centered around a building, in which 
project activities took place. When they attracted more funding (and more groups 
collected around the building and possibly expanded in space), it became to be 
known as Centro Comunitario of the bairro in which it was located. In this way 
Rocinha had a Centro Comunitario da Rua Um, da Rua Dois, and da Cachopa 
and the clusters were associated with these particular bairros. This is how in meet­
ings which united the whole of Rocinha’s leadership, the leaders of groups were 
addressed as “representatives” of a certain bairro, not as representatives of their 
particular project area (e.g. health, education or daycare). Hence, territoriality 
became a factor used to justify one’s claim on resources: that “our bairro needs 
this particular project more than your bairro” (e.g. some groups claimed that 
state aid was unfairly targeted to one bairro at the top of the hill in virtue of its 
poorer appearance). Leaders could thus claim “representativity” over a certain 
locality, thereby responding to the requirements of the political rhetoric. Mem­
bers of different clusters accused each other of monopolising resources “for their 
own people” , and of not being “representative of the whole community” . A lot 
of emphasis was put on the uniqueness of each of Rocinha’s bairros. Rocinha’s 
topographical characteristics and the historical pattern of its population settle­
ment were stressed as reasons for the diverse development of each bairro, each 
confronted with their particular problems. (See, for example, the layout of the 
different municipal documents on Rocinha according to its bairros.)4
Indeed, clusters approached different kinds of funding sources. Among the 
range of official funding agencies available, some had closer contacts with mu­
nicipal agencies than with the state administration.5 This led to often repeated
4This further clarifies the argument in Chapter 3.
5For example, relations between ASPA leaders (Agao Social Padre Anchieta, one 
cluster in Rocinha) and LBA (Legiao Brasileira de Assistencia) and DEC (a federal Ed­
ucation organisation) social workers were plainly hostile in comparison to their relations 
with the SMDS staff. In contrast, the LBA and DEC social workers had comparatively 
friendly relations with several other leaders in Rocinha and channeled most of their 
resources to those groups (at ASPA’s expense), and vice versa.
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accusations such as “For LBA, Rocinha equals [one particular leader].” What hap­
pened at a series of public meetings about the proposed building of a new state 
schooling complex (a Brizoldo) in Rocinha, illustrated how these different clusters 
competed with each other for resources and the mechanics behind this process. 
The meetings soon became a battleground for the competition for potential jobs 
and other resources which the building of the Brizoldo guaranteed to attract to 
Rocinha. But not all groups competed on an equal basis. The meetings were 
strongly monopolised by certain groups. These were strongest represented in the 
meetings, they had personal relations with key representatives in the proposals, 
and information about its progress was distributed in their groups’ meetings to 
the exclusion of others.
These comments again verify the effectiveness and workings of clientelistic 
relations with bureaucratic agencies. This, combined with a strong sense of indi­
vidualism (which allowed certain chaotically competing individuals to rise above 
others in this environment of fluctuating and unstable support), gives us a picture 
of the basic political practice that took place in Rocinha. This kind of clientelism, 
however, only partly explains the dynamics of the political scene. The question 
arises, for example, why the groups bothered with these meetings (especially in 
view of their chaotic and unproductive character). The national political rhetoric 
(the content of which has been developed in Chapter 5 and 6) has to be drawn 
back into the analysis to understand the picture fully. Partly for illustration of 
the points made so far, and partly to refine these points and introduce this new 
dimension, I present a case study of one group which was politically active in 
Rocinha.
ASPA Creche is one of many groups run by the organisation ASPA.
It is an example of one of the action groups which emerged in Rocinha 
under the guidance of the Church, as described in the previous chapter.
It was reactivated in 1976 in the spirit of tempo do mutirao. Funding 
for the group at that time came partly from the Church and partly from 
the work of shantytown and outside volunteers periodically organising 
parties, jumble sales and the like and setting up personal contacts with 
donors contributing a little,on a day-to-day basis. Gradually state 
funds became available. At the time of fieldwork, yearly renewable 
contracts paid for the food, and some other running costs of the creche
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and some financial (albeit small) support for the tias who ran the 
place. Some equipment had also been provided (sowing, washing and 
typing machines, cupboards): All this was the result of persistent 
campaigning (petitions, frequent visits to central offices and endless 
writing of applications). Political activities continued throughout the 
year to secure the renewal of the contracts at the beginning of each 
financial year. At the time of fieldwork, a considerable amount of time 
was spent in these activities.
Although now financially more independent from the Church, ASPA 
retained close contact with these sponsors (and it was untypical in this 
respect): its activities were closely accompanied by an organisation 
called IBRADES (Instituto Brasileiro de Desenvolvimento), a religious 
research/social work institute which set itself up as an information and 
resource centre for shantytown leaders. Through its contacts with char­
ities abroad, IBRADES also managed to channel significant resources 
to Rocinha’s groups.6 It employed various qualified social workers who 
accompanied projects in some shantytowns. During most of the year of 
my fieldwork, one visiting social worker employed by IBRADES spent 
much of her time in Rocinha in the company of ASPA’s “coordinator” 
(see ahead). In the creche, as in other groups, she adopted a crucial 
role in the running of the tias’ weekly meetings, chairing them and 
providing the key material for discussion. IBRADES also organised 
workshops with invited speakers for shantytown groups to discuss top­
ical issues such as “The Constitution”, “Violence in the Shantytowns”, 
“Race Relations”. Apart from general “consciousness-raising”, the ob­
ject of these workshops was to establish communication between dif­
ferent shantytowns and to teach communication skills. Members of 
IBRADES kept me informed of the “progress” some of their active 
participants were making in terms of ability to organise, evaluate and 
articulate. Rocinha’s attendance at these meetings was comparatively 
high. Members of groups other than ASPA also usually appeared.7
The aims of ASPA Creche were to cater for the poorest and most 
needy in Rocinha (often single parents in irregular employment in the 
informal market, mainly diaristas). The recruitment of new clients 
was done after home visits by the tias who were supposed to take
6With short notice, a member of IBRADES would announce the arrival of foreign 
representatives who intended to visit, .Rocinha’s groups. Members would be asked to 
come along to show these visitors around (a job which was taken up reluctantly and 
jokes were made about these foreigners in question). Groups could put in proposals for 
financial or other help in a hurry, to be handed in for the IBRADES’ secretary to type 
up and hand on to the visitors on the spot.
70ther organisations also organised such workshops (e.g. Fe e Alegria ran one specif­
ically for creche workers) which some ASPA tias also attended. Topics discussed here 
would be, for example, child sexuality, hygiene or stages in child development.
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turns doing this. ASPA also employed one person specifically for home 
visiting and promoting parents’ involvement into the activities of all 
of ASPA’s groups. The recruitment of the tias went according to this 
same procedure. In theory, the day-to-day running of the creche was 
such that each of the tias had involvement and knowledge of all the jobs 
associated with the creche.8 Administrative work was also supposed 
to be shared as in theory, every month tias rotated to do the office job.
Routine decisions were supposed to be made by consensus in the 
groups’ weekly meetings which were held outside normal work hours. 
Periodically, meetings were organised with the parents to involve them 
in issues which concerned them. (e.g. fees, opening times, holiday 
closures, health problems). The activities were accompanied by a “co­
ordinator” employed by ASPA to circulate the activities of all of its 
groups. It was this person’s job ideally to feed an element of education 
and critical evaluation into the work of the groups. In practice, this 
person also took on much of the paperwork and all other tasks of the 
“office job” of the groups.
All tias also were supposed to attend meetings of the members of 
ASPA’s board of directors (the Diretoria). These were also weekly, and 
were reserved for dealing with issues which concerned ASPA as a whole 
(e.g. ASPA’s relation to other groups, to funding agencies, the organ­
isation of collective activities (fund-raising parties, holidays)). Each 
group was to be represented in these meetings. Apart from the usual 
offices of Treasurer, President, Secretary, the Diretoria included one 
“spiritual” member (who was the local Catholic priest): ASPA was 
formally linked to the Catholic Church. Members of this board also 
included office holders of other action groups of Rocinha. At these 
meetings (as in all meetings) the agenda was supposed to be set at the 
beginning and all present could vote on each m atter. Minute-taking 
was supposed to rotate among those present. In practice, a few of the 
most literate members took on this job much more frequently. This 
was also the place where other groups could approach ASPA, and this 
meeting also acted as an important vehicle for information exchange 
(e.g. about meetings called by authorities, notices of potentially avail­
able funding, information on political developments at all levels).
ASPA Creche was thus part of a larger social work movement in Rio de Janeiro, and 
the assumptions behind its policies stemmed from a group of critical religiously- 
linked social workers. It was their preoccupation to challenge state paternalism, 
to remain autonomous so that the groups were not merely a substitute for or a
8There was one permanent kitchen staff member and one other tia had opted out of 
classroom work to take charge of the laundry by herself.
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supplement to inadequate state services run by individuals who were exploited to 
the extreme. It was their explicit aim to help the shantytowns organise them­
selves. The groups which they accompanied were designed to carry out these 
aims: decision-making was brought to meetings (where, in theory, all could de­
cide) following the assumption that the people who ran the groups were the experts 
themselves. This way, in theory, each group member was made to feel responsible 
for the success of the group as a whole. Specialisation of tasks was avoided as 
much as possible, so that each could be aware of their colleagues’ parts. As one 
key member of IBRADES expressed it:
“Trabalhamos com o povo, nao para “We strive towards working with the
ou como o povo. ” poor, not for them, but also not like
them .”
The ideals which ASPA as an organisation upheld, and which were defined and 
redefined in its meetings, therefore,' came from this (external) group of Liberation 
Theologists closely linked to the Catholic Church. The accompanying methods to 
which they subscribed originated in the works of Paulo Freire (known as the Freire 
Method among social workers). The ideals of this method were introduced into 
Rocinha through abertura language (I have traced its contents and development 
in Chapters 5 and 6). They were reflected in the state agencies’ changing rhetoric. 
In this way, Rocinha’s people kept close links with developments external to the 
shantytown and they could be seen as part of an historical paradigm into which 
Brazilian politics was moving. This rhetoric was for the shantytown population 
a set of normative values and ideas wrapped in a complex system of jargon and 
symbolic practices. In order to participate in the political scene, they had to learn 
to manipulate these; to learn the language and adopt its values and practices to 
fit into this national paradigm. They took on these values as models for political 
behaviour and publicly evaluated and criticised each other’s behaviour according 
to them.
In this sense, Liberation Theology, which historically developed hand in hand 
with abertura (since the Church’s rhetoric responded to and in turn helped define
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the course of development of the national political direction), affected the dynamics 
of Rocinha’s political process and the norms and values used by all groups. A closer 
look into the workings of these groups will give us an insight into the question of 
how this rhetoric acted as a normative framework and ultimately how this affected 
the interaction between different groups in Rocinha. The issues that came up time 
and again in the tias’ meetings illustrate the internal contradictions which the 
groups faced in their daily routine of putting this rhetoric into practice. A closer 
look at these meetings and the workings of the Creche shows why and how these 
contradictions were not resolved effectively and continued to hinder the smooth 
operation of the Creche.
The relation between the tias was problematic. Sometimes, it 
reached the point where emergency meetings were held because work 
relations between particular tias had broken down.9 Conflicts often 
centred around certain perks of the job, each tia stretching the system 
as far as it would go to her own advantage, therein closely watched 
by the others. E.g. tias accused each other of “skiving off too much” , 
or “leaving the worst jobs” . As one summed it up: 11 Tern so ciume 
e desuniao.” (Lit: “There is just jealousy and disagreement between 
us.”) Relations with maes (Lit: mothers; parents of the children, in­
cluding some single male parents) were tense, and many disagreements 
between tias centered around questions involving maes. They were 
identified as abusing tias (using the creche for their self-interest) (e.g. 
accusations of dirty, and sleepy or hungry kids (often the issue of lice 
came up)), all creating extra work for the tias and not obeying the 
creche’s rules (like providing and marking their children’s clothes, de­
livering their kids or paying fees on time). The times when the two met 
resulted in considerable tension. The arrival and departure of the kids 
were chaotic occasions in which contact between the two parties was 
minimised and there were repeated attem pts to formalise it. At meet­
ings between tias and maes, many tias did not turn up. These meetings 
(occasions in which maes voiced their criticism of the tias) were even 
more disorganised than their own weekly meetings and often ended in 
chaos without any issues resolved or topics debated. Their complaints 
were typically about the health and well-being of their kids (e.g. worry 
about hygiene standards, and tias were accused of carelessness).
9This again illustrates the strong sense of individuality of the tias.
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The tias’ relation to the maes was a situation of two warring parties, emerging 
from a structural clash of interests and in practice was very far removed from 
the ideal of “community work” as defined in ASPA’s rhetoric. Theoretically, the 
Creche’s weekly meetings were the mechanism in which these problems were to be 
resolved. However, these could only work with adequate communication channels 
between group members, which, from what I have described above, were clearly 
not there. Some issues were discussed in the Diretoria1 s meetings. In practice, 
attendance to these meetings was low, and those that did attend, were often the 
same people: those who held elected offices, and some interested social workers 
attached to ASPA or IBRADES (and me). Representatives from the groups them­
selves generally only appeared if a particular issue central to their group was on the 
agenda. The Creche could also draw on the social worker attached to IBRADES 
to work out its problems.
As part of my case study, I will provide extracts of these meetings to illus­
tra te  the mechanics of these meetings, and the relations between the different 
participants.10
ASPA HOLIDAYS. When the topic of holidays was raised in a 
meeting, tias opted overwhelmingly for ferias coletivas” (Lit: collec­
tive holidays, the Creche would close for one month around Christmas 
time). The social worker immediately raised the question: “But what 
about the maes?” They would have to pay someone to look after their 
kids for all that time, or lose their income. They would almost cer­
tainly not agree with that decision and it would have to be discussed 
with them. The alternative was a system of rodizio (Lit: rotation), in 
which each tia takes a month off in turn. “Let us vote on the issue.”
Tia: “What if the Diretoria says NO?” Others join in: “This happens 
all the time. We decide one way and when we take the issue there, we 
get torn to bits. We can’t defend ourselves properly there. How then 
do we persuade the Diretoria? I am not going to try either. C. T. and 
M. [directors] will just tell us to think about a comunidade (Lit: the 
community) and the maes carentes (Lit: Poor mothers), as coitadinhas 
(Lit: Those one feels sorry for). We should think of our problems. We
10The issue of Creche opening times came up repeatedly throughout the year in differ­
ent forms. It is interesting as it challenges the Has’ commitment to the Creche (i.e. how 
much to work), and was a major point of disagreement between the different parties.
Chapter 7. Leadership and Action Group Activities 198
need to defend ourselves, have one viewpoint and present it in front 
of the Diretoria.” They decide to vote, and everyone agrees that they 
are going to close for the whole month of December. Now tias again:
“I am sure that they will never agree. Last year we closed for 14 days, 
so why not now? What about working until the 22nd, but not on the 
following Monday? [Details of pros and cons of other dates discussed.]
After a few suggestions, each tia presenting her own preferences, tia 
angrily: “I’m going on a journey until the 3rd of January. Full Stop.
I’m not working those days.” And she gets up to leave. The social 
worker reminds the others: “We will need to discuss these dates with 
the Diretoria.'''’ And social worker: “When do the maes have holidays?”
One tia tries unconvincingly: “I never worked between Christmas and 
New Year when I was diarista.” Another tia: “I always did.” Discus­
sion of dates goes on chaotically, some suggesting closure between 23rd 
and 2nd of January. But several tias have left by now and others have 
started discussing other topics.
In the Diretoria meeting the following week several Creche tias 
are there. (They had agreed to bring up the topic.) Alternatives are 
presented by the directors. Someone suggests discussing it with the 
maes. One of the tias angrily and resigned: “Okay, we will have a 
meeting with them!” President: “But in front of the tias, the maes 
have no defence! I know how they deal with these things!” Social 
worker: “Apart from these holidays, the Creche also shuts many other 
days throughout the year.” Secretary: “Should this subject be brought 
up in front of the maes at all?” Director: “Let us go through the 
reasons that count seriously. What reasons were presented in favour of 
not closing for one month last year?” They dismiss the reasons which 
are suggested by the tias, such as needing (four!) days for Christmas 
shopping, or needing travel time (“Not everyone goes on a journey 
then.”). One of the tias is by now really fuming and ready to cry.
Two others have walked out angrily. Tension, and silences. President: 
“What to do now? Decide now? Take it to the maes?” Then someone 
from another group points out that several tias have already had their 
holidays by rodizio for this year. That closes the subject: It is suggested 
by several directors that the Creche will close for Christmas and New 
Year’s day. Work as normal in between, and close to kids on January 
2nd and 3rd, for cleaning purposes. “Any objections?” “Nobody?” 
(There are no more Creche tias there.) Restlessness among the others, 
but no-one voices it. On to the next subject.
These extracts show firstly, how chaotic and ineffective these tias'' meetings 
were. Timing was badly kept, topics and people came and went, decisions were 
made and then reversed without producing conclusions, and so on, neatly illus­
trating many of the points made above. Secondly, the extract of the Diretoria 
meeting shows the existence of different interest groups within ASPA with dif­
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ferent relative status, and that communication between these parties had broken 
down. They were “us”, tias against “them”, the Diretoria. The tias felt strongly 
that the Diretoria always defended the maes or “the community” against “us”, 
the tias. The Diretoria, instead of it being an entity that represented the groups 
and in whose meetings they decided about their own fate, had become a species 
of supervisor of clearly higher status. They dictated the tone of the discussion, 
suggested the topics to be discussed, passed on the word, provided the jargon11 
and discussed the topics among themselves. The layout of the meetings themselves 
reflected that pattern: the two sides confronted each other at different ends of the 
table and “they” usually took the meetings’ minutes. They also took almost all 
final decisions while most group members stayed quiet. Tias complained about 
this. They felt that their voices did not count in these meetings. Moreover, their 
own meetings were perceived as redundant since crucial decisions could be (and 
were) overruled by Diretoria members in a later meeting. They could spend their 
time better catching up with family obligations.
In practice, ASPA consisted of an elite who was acting as a supervisor over 
those who worked in the groups. Within the egalitarian framework of the organ­
isation, they had no right to take this role, and they were deeply resented for 
it. Tias’ main complaints were similar to those heard in traditional work places: 
about their low pay and work conditions (e.g. not having a carteira assinada (Lit: 
signed contract); as part of the National Security System). Their work, as in a 
traditional job, had become something unpleasant which had to be minimised, 
and the numerous lengthy meetings they had to attend were seen as unpaid over­
time. As in conventional work relations, personal relations with those higher up 
in the system (with the visiting social worker and the coordinator) were formed 
for unofficial perks. These vertical ties destroyed the basis for cooperation needed 
to make the Creche’s egalitarian system work.12
11 They talked of “immediatism”, “state paternalism”, “pedagogic input”, “production 
centered”, and so on, which the tias caricatured among themselves.
12The most serious complaints that the tias had about each other were about these
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In the Diretoria1 s jargon, these complaints were easily dismissed. The tias’ pay 
was not a “salary” but merely an “ajuda” (Lit: help) to support their “community 
work”. To replace this by a proper salary with carteira assinada would be to prop 
up the inadequate system of state provisions and promote this highly exploitative 
system. The success of a project was measured not in terms of its material benefit 
to the workers involved in the project, but of the benefit to “the community” at 
large. Besides, all could participate in meetings and take it upon themselves to 
improve the quality and conditions of their work, since each had “equal status” 
and shared responsibility for all aspects of the project and it was up to the group 
members to take action against each other’s abuses, as a group. These were 
unlikely to occur in the first place, since the individual would be disadvantaging 
the whole, of which s/he her/himself was made to feel so much part. When accused 
of making decisions in the Has’ absence, the Diretoria members were quick to point 
out that meetings were open for all to attend, and all were free to speak their 
viewpoints.13
So, despite its egalitarian organisational model, in the practice of ASPA’s ac­
tivities, there was a clear informal hierarchy which operated much like the conven­
tional clientelistic practice. There were authorities (the Diretoria and members 
attached to it) which acted much like the traditional patrao, with whom the tias 
set up vertical relations in much the same way as they did with bureaucrats in 
funding agencies. This was one way in which the tias extracted personal benefits 
and also showed acceptance of the conventional clientelistic structure. The patron 
(in this case the ASPA elite) presented something respectable to their clients. The 
dynamics of this subordination process works exactly as Paine points out about
privileges e.g. that the coordinator always took one particular tia with her on fun trips 
or that some could get away with washing their family’s laundry in the Creche during 
work hours.
13Diretoria members undertook measures to encourage groups’ attendance, by propos­
ing that elected group representatives would attend weekly in turn. However, in practice, 
most groups simply took no notice of the new proposal, since many felt that weekly at­
tendance was unnecessary since most topics discussed “had no relevance” to their groups 
anyway.
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what constitutes a “patron-client relationship” (Paine 1971). Basic to this re­
lationship is the fact that the patron chooses the values and sets the standards 
which the client affirms and lives up to and the values at work in this relationship 
m attered to the clients. They belonged to dominant Brazilian society, the domain 
of the patron. The ultimate aim of this shantytown population was to fully partic­
ipate in this domain, to leave the shantytown and establish oneself as one of them 
(as noted in Chapter 4). ASPA’s organisational model confronted this clientelistic 
practice and tried to replace it with an egalitarian system in which there was room 
for individuals, where their individualism was recognised and a legitimate topic 
for discussion. In this sense, it contradicted conventional ways, something which 
was clearly expressed by the tias who repeatedly said: “Falta homem aqui.” (Lit: 
This place lacks a man.), uPrecisa patrao.” (Lit: We need a boss.), or uFalta 
organizagao.” (Lit: There is a lack of organisation here.). They expressed exactly 
that absence of authority which could give them direction.14 This resulted in the 
tension articulated so strongly in the Creche’s meetings.
There were other organisations in Rocinha where this was not the case, as 
these hierarchical relations were institutionalised. The Methodist Church complex 
(“Methodista”), was a particular example. Although it superficially appeared to 
operate according to very different rules, it could be seen to be a variant of these 
same models we have so far highlighted. I will take a close look at one of the 
Methodista’s groups (its creche), contrasting it with the ASPA Creche, to illustrate 
the different workings and show at the same time, its similarity with ASPA.
The Methodista was another cluster of groups: it ran several dif­
ferent groups in the area of daycare, health, education and leisure, 
much like the other clusters. Its creche was situated on the Church’s 
premises. It ran according to a routine in which all members fitted 
in their own well-defined place and was planned by those higher up in
14When a new coordinator set out to take strong initiatives against certain practices 
in the Creche (talking of the need for discipline), his style was much criticised privately 
among the members of the Diretoria, who generally saw authoritarianism as a “disease”. 
The tias> reaction, however, was positive at first. As time went on, it became clear, 
though, that his authoritarian role had no structural backing, and the tias went ahead 
as before using the system which best served their own needs.
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the hierarchy of the Church: the minister, his wife, and assistant clergy 
members. The minister’s wife was mainly responsible for the running 
of the creche. She supervised the tias. Unlike the ASPA coordinator, 
she was a recognised authority, and respected as such. Reference to 
her carried a term of respect (“Dona N.”), whereas the rest of the tias 
were addressed by their first names. The minister and his wife resided 
outside Rocinha and had a foreign background, which also added to 
their status in the Church. In her absence, there was an appointed 
second supervisor. She had a high status within the Church and was 
addressed with the same reference term. Her age in itself demanded re­
spect. The creche employed members of staff for particular jobs: there 
was a cleaner, a number of kitchen staff, a number of tias who in pairs 
looked after particular groups of children, and had the responsibility 
over this group all year. All were employed with carteiras assinadas. 
Days were rigidly timetabled, and a sheet of Rules for Tias’ Behaviour 
and another of Aims and Objectives of the Creche were distributed to 
tias. These Rules strictly forbade tias to use the creche’s resources to 
their own advantage and thus the perks (over which the ASPA tias 
fell out) were avoided.15 As far as the type and amount of work was 
concerned, each tia had a well-defined set of responsibilities towards 
their own group of children, and it was up to them to fulfill these and 
conform to the standards as laid down in the Aims and Objectives.
Routine decisions were made in has’ meetings, which were held 
weekly before work hours. Kitchen and cleaning staff did not partic­
ipate in these meetings. The agenda for these meetings was mostly 
set by the minister’s wife, although tias were welcomed to suggest 
additional discussion material to her before the start of the meeting. 
Topics which involved personal conflicts between tias (which took up 
much time in the ASPA Creche’s meetings) were not allowed to in­
terfere with the progress of the meetings, as they were filtered out in 
advance. Topics discussed dealt mostly with creche discipline and or­
ganisational matters and were decided on with a voting procedure in 
which each tia present had an equal vote. However, each was aware 
that decisions were subject to final approval of the minister himself.16 
Formal chairing by the minister’s wife avoided the problems noted in 
ASPA. The meetings went smoothly and were effective: topics were 
well-timed and discussions were kept to the essential points. Meetings 
started on time and their length was limited automatically by the ar­
15For example, the sewing machine could only be used outside creche hours, creche 
food could under no circumstances be taken home (left over milk and other perishables 
were distributed systematically).
■I ‘ J -V.
16The issue of holidays, for example, was therefore barely discussed in the tias' meet­
ings: their preferences were taken note of, and passed on to the minister who took the 
ultimate decision which was accepted as final.
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rival of the children. They were obligatory and the weekly turnout 
was high. In terms of the creche’s infrastructure, the Methodista tias 
themselves had no responsibilities towards guaranteeing the continua­
tion of their creche’s work; this job was done by those higher up in the 
Methodist hierarchy. Discussions of political developments of funding 
agencies came up in the tias’ meetings, but only as information, rather 
than demanding the Has’ urgent action. The tias’ salaries were fixed 
and although funds for creche materials were no more secure than they 
were for the ASPA Creche (a lot of it came from the same sources), 
they were more directly worries for the management than for the tias. 
Relations with the maes were formal. The maes were seen as “the 
customer” , who had to be satisfied and treated with respect. The two 
coordinators received and delivered the children formally at the gate, 
dealing with each mae on an individual basis and much emphasis was 
put on the importance of this encounter, which provided an opportu­
nity for the maes to air their grievances and for the tias to remind 
the maes of the creche’s rules. Monthly, the maes were invited to a t­
tend a Sunday afternoon meeting in which invited speakers lectured 
on relevant issues (e.g. domestic hygiene, nutrition, child education).
In many ways this creche operated more smoothly than ASPA Creche. This 
was due to the rules which provided the tias with a specific task for which they 
saw themselves responsible. The acceptance of the rules was encouraged by the 
fact that they were imposed by the Church’s hierarchy, made part of the Church’s 
philosophy which strictly emphasised obedience, hard work, and other values which 
echoed the creche’s objectives. (See for example, Willems 1967.) Most of the tias 
were recruited from the Church’s membership and some lived on the premises. The 
security of their job content and income and the relatively good working conditions 
further contributed to a sense of commitment of the tias (something which was 
present among the ASPA tias to a much smaller extent).
In many ways, the creches were very similar, though. Both aimed to put into 
practice the rhetoric of abertura. Both employed policies of serving the poorest 
and most needy (single parents mainly).17 Both saw it as their task to “educate” 
their shantytown clients (conversation centred around the emphasis on uconscien-
17Even though the Methodist Church’s fees were higher than those of ASPA, they 
recruited children selectively according to need and used a policy of home visiting in 
much the same way as the ASPA groups.
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tizagao” and the threat of “accommodated paternalism”) and much of the political 
content of their teachings was the same. They differed in their strategies to achieve 
these aims as the Methodista operated through a hierarchical structure .18
The Methodista’s organisational model was structurally closer to the clientelis­
tic practice. It recognised an authority like the traditional patrao and the “clients” 
of the Methodista formed vertical relations with this patrao. This hierarchical or­
ganisation institutionalised these vertical relations. To the clients, the choice was 
clear: they accepted the rules and exploited the benefits from it, or rejected it. 
Acceptance of the rules was again partly encouraged by the promise of beneficial 
returns (as it is in the case of patronage relations) and partly by the fact that 
the Methodista (preaching domestic order, the work ethic, and so on) was seen as 
an instrument of social mobility in the ideological sense (see e.g. Caldeira 1984, 
Willems 1967). Assertive independent individuals were forcefully eliminated from 
the Methodista’s practice.
Apart from the Methodista, there were several other groups in Rocinha which 
operated according to this type of hierarchical model. Most of these had their own 
funding sources and did not compete with the other groups. On these grounds 
they related differently to the other groups. They kept a low profile in meetings 
which concerned other groups and did not initiate projects which involved others. 
They had their own particular clientele and their organisers too kept themselves 
to themselves.19 All this was true for the Methodista too, and this follows partly 
from the logic of their organisational model in that their domain was only that 
covered by their imposed hierarchy.
18ASPA members often commented critically on “the Methodista” although few had 
any personal knowledge of what took place there. (They queried me about this.) They 
ridiculed the authoritative role of the minister and his wife and the impact of the “rules” 
on the tias. They dismissed o pastor (the minister) with the ultimate sin of “paternal­
ism”, as did all other groups in Rocinha. The tias of the Methodista Creche similarly 
stereotyped ASPA Creche’s practices.
19Due to the wider range of available state funding in later years, the Methodista was 
becoming more visible in Rocinha’s collective meetings.
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It is clear from the case studies that an analysis which does justice to the com­
plexity of the political process in Rocinha must expose the dynamic between these 
organisational models. On the one hand, there was the clientelistic model, basic to 
all political practice in Rocinha. On the other hand, there was the abertura rhetoric 
which set a standard for all public action group behaviour in Rocinha. In ASPA, 
these values were defined and redefined each week (especially in Diretoria meet­
ings). The practices which came with this rhetoric were: holding “democratic” 
meetings in which “all can voice an opinion”, “voting” as the standard decision­
making practice, “exchanging experiences” between members within groups as well 
as between different groups so as to “stimulate collective awareness and respon­
sibility”, anti-“technocratic elitism” (which is not appropriate for “community” 
affairs) and anti-“paternalism”. One became respectable by using the rhetoric 
and practices associated with this model. It can be seen as a political resource 
used by leaders in Rocinha and became signs of their political respectability. This 
explains why a public attem pt was made by all to impose these practices. It 
also explained why they all used the same labels to evaluate each other’s prac­
tices (groups accused each other of being a “panelinha” (Lit: small pan; clique of 
political insiders), of not having the “support of the people” , of “exploiting the 
people”, or being “paternalistic” , and so on). These terms referred to packages 
which contained the values and practices belonging to this rhetoric.
An example of the language with which the groups criticised each other is 
well illustrated by the following transcription from a conversation with one of the 
groups’ leaders criticising another group.
They always portray themselves as the most deprived area of Rocinha 
in order to win the sympathy of the LBA and other agencies. Thereby 
they isolate themselves from the rest of Rocinha. She always wants to 
do everything herself. Her so-called groups are only her, herself. There 
are no operating groups. When she approached us in 1979, criticising 
us for keeping to ourselves and not allowing the whole of Rocinha to 
benefit from the resources allocated to us, we proposed to lend them 
two of our night school teachers to work with them. They did not stick 
it out for long: they clashed with her demands of doing things her way, 
and besides, she was not interested in our proposals. She just wanted 
cash. The problem with her is her personality. She manipulates peo­
ple with her favelado language and her extroverted personality. They
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like that. They think it is authentic. The other thing is that she tells 
everybody all these lies about us. None of them are true. [He refers to 
a particular incident in which she told O Globo (one of the National 
newspapers) a version of an incident with which he did not agree.] We 
do not do that to her! . . .  In Rocinha there are right wing and left wing 
groups [grupos da direita and grupos da esquerda]. She, for example 
has the language of the left, but she is right wing. She shows that in 
her action.
The speaker complains of the groups of the other faction being a one-person rule, 
with all the symptoms there: no effective meetings were held to discuss changes; 
no ties to spending accepted; a strong personality which dominated all interac­
tion with the groups; a personal myth promoted; secrecy and gossip spread about 
other groups, reflecting all the points made in a previous section about patronage 
building by key individuals. This interview is clearly a criticism of the conven­
tional political practice (i.e. of clientelism) by someone who upholds the abertura 
rhetoric. The criticism here was made by a member of the ASPA Diretoria about 
a group from another bairro. The argument that “we” have a clear idealistic aim, 
whereas “they”, despite their claims, show that they are merely self-interested en­
trepreneurs, which makes them different in character, is problematic because the 
very same criticism was voiced by everybody else, including, for example ASPA. 
And indeed, a close look at the ASPA case study confirms that this same criticism 
applied to the practice of the ASPA Creche.
The point was that all groups in Rocinha followed this rhetoric. It would 
be hard (given the evidence from the case study of the practices in the ASPA 
Creche, for example) to argue that some groups were more “democratic” or “con- 
scientizised” than groups of the other factions. These labels could not be used as 
analytical tools to characterise organisations, since we were dealing with a situa­
tion in which these labels were part of the game itself. People accused each other 
of these evils, even within organisations. It is therefore confusing to talk about 
“grupos da direita,” and “grupos da esquerda,” as if they actually were more or less 
right/left wing, democratic, representative or conscientizised.
It is true that ASPA, as a group had close contact with the social workers and 
pastoral agents (the advocates of the abertura and Liberation Theology rhetoric).
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These had an active role in the operation of the groups. (ASPA was, in this re­
spect, unusual in comparison with other action groups in Rocinha.) ASPA, in 
some ways, acted as a leadership training centre, from which the rhetoric spread 
in Rocinha. The Catholic Church established itself in Rocinha to “organise” its 
population (Neto 1984), and it aimed to do this through the ASPA action groups. 
In that sense, ASPA served as an ideological and organisational example for other 
groups. This is evident from the relations of group members within ASPA (as 
portrayed in the transcription of the meetings), as well as from the relations be­
tween the different groups. One woman, for example, left ASPA in order to set up 
her own school. (She attracted funding from an international agency whom she 
convinced to clear a plot to set up a school.) The director of Rua Dois Community 
Centre, was also trained in ASPA’s groups. These groups, and several others like 
them maintained contact with ASPA (e.g. by attending its Diretoria meetings) 
and there existed other institutional links between these groups. However, this 
was not automatically the case. Indeed, this reflected the visiting social workers’ 
main worries: the fact that many of the “trained” locals established themselves 
independently. Inevitably, after links had been severed, these individuals “deteri­
orated” in the eyes of the social workers. They set themselves up as a local boss 
in their newly gained empire, in the traditional “exploitative” style. They felt 
that they were being abused and betrayed by such individuals. They disapproved 
of their leadership style in the same way as they criticised their own groups. It 
meant the “waste” of valuable resources, because inevitably these groups would 
break up and self-destruct, contributing little in the sense of long-term continuous 
improvements.
However, this does not mean that ASPA as a group was more “conscientizised”, 
or in any sense more “democratic” or “left wing” in practice than any other group. 
The “ASPA example” refers to values which some members of the Diretoria dic­
tated in their weekly meetings, not the actual practices of the ASPA groups. If it 
were not for the directors’ strong influence and the supply of funds, more or less 
guaranteed by their link to IBRADES, the groups would split up in the same way 
as the others. Further evidence of this was the fact that during the time that I
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accompanied the ASPA groups, there were several crisis meetings with members 
of the Diretoria in which they reevaluated their whole programme threatening the 
complete dissolution of the groups.
We have a situation where parallel factions have emerged, as explained in the 
first section of this chapter. The factions were also apparent in the way the groups 
criticised each other and communication between them was avoided and hostile 
where it existed. The members of the different factions could not agree it together 
to collaborate for the common good of Rocinha (if there was such a thing).20 
Each accused the others of the same evils. The language used to disgrace their 
opponents was language which all used and understood. The members of the one 
faction had nothing in common other than its opposition to other factions.
This confirms the point about factionalism (as expressed by Barth (1966, 1969), 
Salisbury Sz Silverman (1978)), that one cannot analyse factions structurally and 
that in a discussion of factions, it makes more sense to look at the process of 
factionalism. We were dealing with groups competing for the same resources. For 
historical and other reasons (explained in the previous sections) different “leader­
ships” have emerged each eager to gain more economic and political status. What 
distinguished these groups were not tangible differences between them, but differ­
ences in self-identity in a context of strong competition. Each constructed their 
own identity in order to draw up boundaries in defence against the others. These 
identity-markers were phrased in terms of the language of the dominant abertura 
rhetoric.
Why these factions emerged in the first place, has to be answered not by looking 
at structural differences between the different groups (for example, the approach
20For example, a state agency approached certain groups with the intention of organ­
ising a children’s holiday camp during the summer break proposing to involve members 
of each sector of Rocinha to collaborate in the project, so as to “integrate the commu­
nity as a whole”. Yet, the summer camp went ahead with the involvement of only a few 
groups. According to the one of the leaders of a group that had opted out: “There is no 
point in trying to collaborate in any project in which those groups are involved.” And 
according to another leader: “There are too many different interest groups at odds with 
each other now that those groups have started to appear again.”
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Gay (1988) ultimately ends up taking, yet, he considers the scene in considerable 
detail) (he attempts to characterise the political activities of a neighbouring favela 
in this way), because upon closer examination, it becomes clear that the groups 
were much the same as far as the character of their organisations and the con­
tent of their dialogue was concerned. Instead, one has to look at the personal 
relations between the leaders of the different groups. Within the ASPA faction, 
for example, we can see that the leaders were linked in a close network. They 
socialised together and moved in and out of each other’s circles. They filled in for 
each other, attended each other’s meetings and discussed each other’s problems 
together. Some individuals who joined the groups became part of this network (or, 
panelinha as non-members called it critically) over time. The majority did not. 
Their behaviour corresponded to what the literature calls “cliques” (e.g. Riches 
1977). Factions were held together by the dominating positions of key members 
of this clique in its member groups.
Thus we have cliques of leaders who each ruled over an infrastructure and 
attracted funds to set up groups. The membership of these groups was unstable. 
Some fitted in, many did not. Of the latter, some stayed on despite this because of 
the beneficial returns (this can be the only explanation for the continuation of the 
situation in ASPA Creche, for example). The leaders in the faction had a following, 
but it was not very stable and they did not enjoy an ideological hegemony. For 
example, if the ASPA Diretoria withdrew, the groups would almost certainly cease 
to exist with them .21
These conclusions are supported by the fact that these factions mutually ac­
cused each other of the worst things they could think of: of having links with the 
drug traffickers, the symbols of disrespectability and marginality. Their opponents 
were characterised as being the reverse of the respectable politician.
There is no choice: you are either left wing [“da esquerda'1'1] and you 
don’t collaborate with police and bandits, or you are right wing [“da 
direita”] and do. All these other groups do.
21 This was the explanation for the apparent stability and continuity of the ASPA 
faction relative to other factions in Rocinha.
Chapter 7. Leadership and Action Group Activities 2 1 0
These accusations flew around indiscriminately. They can be seen in a similar 
spirit as witchcraft accusations in other societies. (This parallel has already been 
drawn in Chapter 3.) In Rocinha, the important analytical point was not to prove 
who did or did not maintain links with the gangs (as will be clear in Chapter 
8, they all did in some ways, and besides, the exact nature of these connections 
can never be traced), but the fact that they all accused each other of this, and 
the implications of these accusations for the relations between the action groups. 
For the researcher, to divide Rocinha’s political groups up into “groups that have 
links with the gangs” and “groups that do not” (as the interviewee suggested) is 
to miss the point. These accusations played an important role in group identity; 
to draw the boundaries between “us” and “them”. They kept tensions between 
groups alive, as over these matters, cards were never laid open on the table. These 
accusations were never explicitly voiced in the presence of the accused. In almost 
every meeting in which several factions were represented, the issue of “coopera­
tion with the gangs” came up. Yet, whenever this topic was explicitly addressed, 
communication broke down and the meetings inevitably ended in chaos. One of 
the groups’ leaders made an attem pt to organise a meeting to discuss this issue 
to which other groups’ leaders were to be invited. Reactions towards the attem pt 
to organise the meeting were confrontational. And on no account could other 
groups be persuaded to participate. According to the police sergeant responsible 
for Rocinha:
“Imagine! Polxcia de um lado, “Imagine! Police on the one side,
marginal do outro lado, e morador no marginal on the other, and morador
meio!” in the middle!”
The reasoning of the groups was automatically that such a meeting could only be 
motivated by self-interest on the part of the organiser. The sergeant summed this 
up accurately: uEla tern marginal dentro da casa dela!>' (Lit: “She has marginals 
in her own house!”). (Not surprisingly, the proposed meeting never came off.)
In this chapter I have focused on the operation and relations between the 
various action groups. We have ended up with a picture of competing groups,
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small in number, especially if we consider the total population of Rocinha, and 
with a small overlapping and unstable membership. Each group was geographically 
clustered around centres associated with particular bairros. Additionally, there 
were other groups, self-sufficient in terms of funding on the periphery of this scene. 
It is a picture of fluctuation and division; of “leaders” mobilising a small temporary 
clientele in response to unstable funds.
My analysis covers the action groups but leaves out the Residents Associa­
tion. Evidence for, the Residents Association strengthens the case I argued above. 
Its official task (assigned by agencies outside Rocinha) was to represent Rocinha 
as a whole. This covered the territory of the leaderships of the different bair­
ros. Possessing an effective Residents Association was politically important (as 
explained in Chapter 6) because it was recognised by various external agencies 
officially as the representative body for Rocinha and many government projects 
targeted Residents Associations exclusively. In theory, the effective functioning of 
a Residents Association was also important in that any significant infrastructural 
improvements (e.g. the regularisation of land titles, the organisation of household 
waste removal) would need one body with the authority and means to act in all 
areas of Rocinha and coordinate the project. Yet, at the time of fieldwork, the 
Residents Association of Rocinha was almost wholly inactive.22 In response to my 
question of why it was not functioning, directors gave evasive answers (that the 
sede was under construction, that there was a summer break, that someone was 
ill). When pressed, they admitted that there were fundamental disagreements be­
tween different individuals. Although I never found out the exact nature of these 
“disagreements” one can guess why it did not (and could not) function. Control 
over this “representative” body was in the personal interest of all groups. As they 
did not communicate with each other in general, there was no reason to believe 
that they would in the Residents Association. From Chs. 5 and 6, it is clear that
22In the beginning of my year of fieldwork, there were several meetings between certain 
directors to which permission to attend was denied to me by one of the directors (he 
claimed that they were “not public”). Soon after that, the organisation was totally 
paralysed, and I realised that I had missed my chance to get personally involved.
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the Association’s history was a succession of fights over its presidency which were 
about monopolising control over Rocinha’s scarce resources. A series of directors 
had been forced to resign after accusations over exploitation of these resources for 
personal gain and/or to the disadvantage of the rest of the population. The Res­
idents Association had effectively become a battleground for successive factions 
fighting over the control over Rocinha as a whole.
The exception of Bairro Barcelos, which had its own (active) Residents Asso­
ciation at the time of fieldwork, strengthens my argument. The fact that it was 
able to function can be explained by the fact that it was the only active group 
in Bairro Barcelos and faced no challenges from within bairro. The other cluster 
groups similarly had their own territory. Historically, it had split off from the 
rest of Rocinha, when a key activist argued for Bairro Barcelos to form its own 
organisation in view of its different land ownership situation. Since that time, this 
group campaigned independently and successfully for many projects, choosing to 
dissociate itself from the problematic rest of Rocinha. Conveniently, it made a 
point of claiming to be part of Rocinha when this was potentially advantageous. 
This was one of the reasons why Bairro Barcelos was better serviced than other 
parts of Rocinha. Significantly it was not allowed to act on behalf of Rocinha as 
a whole.23
23In the campaigns for an election for posts in a new independent Regiao Adminis- 
trativa for Rocinha, the president of the Residents Association of Bairro Barcelos was 
widely condemned for his claims to representativity over the whole of Rocinha.
Chapter 8
Behind the Public Front
The previous chapter raised further questions which have to be resolved if our 
analysis is to attain its complexity. How do these action groups accommodate the 
drug traffickers (whose influence in Rocinha we have seen, for example, in Chapter 
3)? And, what about electoral politics (a question raised in Chapter 5 and 6)? 
There is more to Rocinha’s politics than the activities of the action groups which 
we examined in detail. However, these topics did not come up for discussion in the 
groups’ public meetings. We have seen, for example, how the topics of “violence” 
and the drug trade were taboo in the action groups’ meetings (Chapter 7), and 
how groups publicly emphasised their autonomy from party politics (Chapters 5 
and 6). Yet, it was also clear that operative connections between action groups and 
these political agents did exist and that these affected their activities significantly. 
It is my argument, that these belonged to a different political sphere, in which all 
political agents in Rocinha participated. This was a hidden, private sphere as this 
material was considered inappropriate for the “front” stage (Goffman 1971). This 
sphere operated according to a different set of rules. The aim of this chapter is to 
examine these claims and to explore how this hidden sphere affected the activities 
of the action groups. First, we have to establish what kind of phenomena we were 
dealing with, and I will begin with the traffickers.
Reports in newspapers and weeklies confirmed what was generally known - 
namely the rapid growth and establishment of a drug traffickers’ stronghold in 
Rio de Janeiro during the years immediately preceding my fieldwork. This was
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partly due to international developments. Traditionally, the bulk of the drugs 
they traded (mainly cocaine but also marijuana) or their raw materials (coca 
paste and leaves) were transported from the producers (mainly in Bolivia, Peru 
and Columbia) through Central America to the lucrative markets in the USA 
and Europe. The US presence in Central America and their recent intensive 
efforts to repress production and distribution of these drugs in the North West of 
the Latin American continent forced both distribution and production, but also 
consumption into Brazil to an extent not known before. In the Amazon Region 
supervision was virtually non-existent. Its vast water network and many small 
hidden airstrips provided transport to and from many recently built laboratories 
along the Brazilian border, and centres such as Manaus, where the coca paste 
was refined and distributed to other centres in Brazil (Recife, Rio de Janeiro 
and Sao Paulo mainly) or flown straight to international markets. The Amazon 
also started supplying raw materials for the refinement of coca paste in recent 
years at more than 30 times the legal market price to neighbouring producing 
countries where the production of these chemicals was illegal. The region also 
started growing a variety of the coca plant (epadu, indigenous to the forest) whose 
leaves proved equally effective for the production of cocaine. In attem pts to repress 
the drug trade in recent years, large plantations of epadu have been discovered and 
eradicated (Veja 17/8/1988).
This involvement in production at first instance for foreign markets, caused 
the stimulation in the demand for drugs (especially for cocaine) in Brazilian urban 
centres such as Rio de Janeiro, with the help of clever marketing techniques on the 
part of the bigshots (e.g. at Carnival about 20 years ago, they were said to have 
allowed the price of cocaine to drop, while raising the price of marijuana, a drug 
much more commonly used and cheaper at the time (Veja 1/6/1988:24)). However, 
the presence of the traffickers and their drugs in Rocinha had only recently become 
so publicly apparent. Visibly armed teenagers were a common sight in Rocinha, 
something which distressed my informants and they claimed that this was not 
the case only a few years before. As far as the consumption of drugs in Rocinha 
was concerned, their market was located mainly outside. With the exception of
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the traffickers themselves, whom I witnessed using both cocaine and marijuana 
commonly, there could not have been a large clientele in Rocinha itself, given the 
price of these drugs - especially cocaine.1 If it was consumed by anyone other 
than the traffickers themselves, it was done strictly in private. (In Chapter 3, I 
elaborated on pervading attitudes towards these drugs.)
How they actually operated their highly lucrative business and what was known 
about them to the public is well illustrated in the following case study. It also 
reveals a lot about the drug traffickers’ relations with the establishment and the 
political party structure in particular.
ESCADINHA CASE STUDY. On Sunday January 5 1986, one of 
Brazil’s drug traffickers made the British Sunday papers. The Ob­
server reports: “ROBIN HOOD DRUG BARON’S NIGHT FLIGHT 
FROM JAIL. Escadinha, beloved benefactor of Rio de Janeiro slum 
dwellers, escaped to prepare for the Carnival - boom time for drug 
dealers.” (Observer 5/1/1986). Escadinha escaped from a Brazilian 
high-security prison for the third time by organising a helicopter to 
pick him up from the roof of the prison during visiting hours on New 
Year’s Eve 1985. He continued his journey in a car later found in a 
garage whose owner was arrested on charges for servicing stolen cars 
belonging to Escadinha’s gang and other charges. The owner of the car 
was an ex-sergeant in the Military Police (PM) who ran a business of 
trading “black gold” in the same street (JB 8/1/1986). For the follow­
ing three months, Escadinha managed to stay out of prison. He was 
back in business and reports claimed that cocaine supplies were soon 
back to normal. During that time the press reported his whereabouts.
For example: On 10/1 he was reported to have been in the company of 
his friends (other bigshots) Gordo and Meio Quilo (Lit: The Fat One, 
and Half a Kilo) in a favela where they “ate, drank and smoked” (JB 
10/1/1986).
On 18/1 he was reported to have stayed in a village about 150 
km from Rio de Janeiro, in one of Gordo’s three luxury houses, where 
frequent meetings and parties with other major bigshots such as Bag- 
ulhao (slang to refer to a large lump of hashish), Meio Quilo and oth­
ers were held. According to the villagers, the mansions were recently 
bought and had been partly rebuilt (walls were erected and swimming 
pools dug into their extended gardens). The article reported on the 
exact whereabouts of Escadinha since his escape, information which
1Around Carnival, the price of one gramme of cocaine cost $Cr 300,000 or roughly 
half of a monthly minimum salary at the time.
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was no secret to most villagers (JB 18/1/1986). On 19/1 Escadinha 
was reported to have dined in a road side churrascaria (Brazilian steak 
house) in the company of about twenty of his friends (JB 19/1/1986). 
On 18/1 Escadinha’s colleague Gordo telephoned into a popular radio 
programme, and gave a 15-minute life interview in which he claimed 
that Escadinha was in Bolivia “attending to some financial business” , 
with his friends Meio Quilo and Apache (Lit: Gangster). In this inter­
view he also praised the current state governor: “The traffickers not 
only voted for Brizola, they also actively campaigned for him. He is the 
best one around.” (JB 19/1/1986).2 He also appealed for the release of 
the pilot involved in the escape, who had been arrested.3 The articles 
commented each time that: the police arrived on the scene too late, 
circled the place afterwards, or decided not to intervene at the time. 
They turned the story into a real-life soap opera glorifying the hero, 
Escadinha, by stressing his role as a benefactor in Morro do Juramento 
(his “home” favela) where he was reported to give elaborate parties, 
pay for funerals, weddings, a school, and generally maintain “order” .
Escadinha’s father, Chileno (Lit: The Chilean) (an 83-year old ex- 
centric character, who claimed to have joined a series of revolutionary 
movements in different countries) also played an important part in the 
stories. He revealed a series of details to the press about the physical 
and financial abuse the traffickers suffered in the hands of the police, 
and he claimed to be finishing a book in which he exposed the worst 
sides of the authorities’ corruption (JB 6/1/1986). He also repeatedly 
claimed that the activities of his son and colleagues were an important 
key to the “liberation of the people” and the ultimate overthrow of the 
authorities (JB 2/4/1986).
Editorial columns expressed outrage about the failure of the pe­
nal system to combat organised crime (widespread bribery, political 
manipulation and physical maltreatment, as a m atter of policy, by 
members of the police force, prison authorities and the penal bureau­
cracy). Claims by Chileno (that Escadinha and his friends were “too 
rich to be caught” (JB 22/1/1986)) and the publication of statistics 
about escaped prisoners (in Rio de Janeiro in 1985 alone more than 
540 (JB 19/1/1986)) evidenced these criticisms.4
211 Os traficantes nao so votaram no Brizola, como fizeram campanha para e/e. E o 
melhor que ha por a t”
30n 14/3 the pilot was reported to be judged guilty of conspiracy and charged for 
two years imprisonment (JB 14/3/1986).
4These articles also pointed out that the glorification of such bandits as heros could 
lead to them being increasingly socially accepted and the public interviews in the me­
dia with these bandits lately were quoted as evidence that this had already occurred 
(JB 22/1/1986). Moreover, they accused sociologists for philosophising to justify the
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On 10/1 newspapers reported an armed robbery of a licenced weapon 
store, in whose organisation Escadinha was involved.5 Days later, a re­
port claimed that the police uncovered a plan for the stolen weapons 
to be infiltrated into a prison for use in a mass prisoners’ escape at­
tempt. Information revealed elsewhere during the episode spoke about 
Escadinha’s role of leadership during his previous 11 months inside 
the prison. He was said to organise groups who “command, from 
inside the prison, gangs of bank robbers and drug traffickers, and, 
not infrequently, [the members of different groups] enter into war, 
causing deaths and riots throughout the penitentiary system.” (JB 
23/1/1986).6 On 23/3 almost three months after his escape, the papers 
reported the news of his defeat by the police. Different aspects of the 
event were emphasised. Some stories claimed that the police (informed 
by Escadinha’s enemies) had launched a large-scale operation in Jura- 
mento where Escadinha was visiting. After stalking him for three days, 
the situation escalated into an intense 20-minute shootout, after which 
the police team withdrew (uncertain of their success) following appeals 
from panic-stricken favelados. A few hours later, Escadinha was de­
livered at a state hospital nearby by two heavily armed colleagues, 
camouflaged and with two bullets in his chest. The police (the hero 
in these stories) promised further operations to capture Meio Quilo in 
another South Zone favela in the near future. Other reports claimed 
that Escadinha was shot at pointblank range while coming down a 
shantytown alleyway unarmed. He had spent that day participating 
in a mutirao to clear an area which was destroyed by recent rains and 
floods and was attending to the organisation of a party for the favela 
which was to take place the following day. One story claimed that 
it was done by an internal enemy well before the launch of the police 
operation (JB 25/3/1986). Following Escadinha’s capture, newspapers 
reported daily on the progress of his recovery (e.g. JB 30/3/1986). In 
the mean time, an enormous security scheme had been erected around
behaviour of these marginals in their Marxist theories of social rebellion (JB 8/1/1986) 
(only “slightly more sophisticated than Chileno’s theories”). They also pointed at the 
“mito da chacincP (Lit: “myth of the bloodbath” (The reason which the authorities 
often gave to justify their refusal to circle the shantytowns to catch the traffickers was 
that “it will lead to a bloodbath in which many innocent moradores will die”.)), and 
how it served as an excuse for total passivity on the part of the authorities.
5More than 200 weapons and significant quantities of ammunition were stolen. Ru­
mours had it that Escadinha was “planning to arm the favela against the police”.
611 Esses grupos comandam, de dentro da cadeia, quadrilhas de assaltantes de bancos 
e traficantes de toxicos e, nao raro, entram em guerra, provocando mortes e rebelides 
em todo o sistema penitenciario.”
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the hospital, disrupting normal procedures.7 Chileno featured again 
in these stories, angrily complaining about the hospital bills he was 
expected to pay8 and throwing insults at the security men standing 
guard around Escadinha.9 From the start, Chileno maintained that 
it was a mistake to have handed his son to this hospital. “My son’s 
friends had already drawn up a plan to bring him to some unknown 
place in case he was shot one day, like it happened . . .  There are so 
many hospitals for criminals around. I paid 40,000 Cz for his oper­
ation here. With that kind of money, I could buy all the hospitals 
in Nova Iguagu.” (JB 23/3/1986).10 The existence of many hospi­
tals “attended by people in hiding from the police for consultations 
and operations in which the doctors often work under threat [at gun 
point]” (JB 31/3/1986)11 was later confirmed by the surgeon who car­
ried out the operations on Escadinha.12 Chileno’s main concerns were 
clearly about his son’s safety and soon an angry debate started about 
whose responsibility it was to decide about Escadinha’s transferral to 
the Penitentiary Hospital. According to Chileno: “Zequinha13 can’t go 
to the Penitentiary Hospital because they will kill him there, like they 
burn archival evidence. He knows a lot about the corruption and dirt
7It caused the paralysis of a primary school for the full duration of Escadinha’s stay 
in that hospital (JB 26/3/1986).
80n the night of admission, his two armed colleagues paid out $Cz 8000 (equivalent 
to about 10 monthly minimum salaries at the time) as a bribe (from the kitty for the 
party) (JB 25/3/1986).
9At one stage: “. . .  he was warned . . .  that he would be arrested if he insisted on 
calling the policemen “gorillas”. Chileno said to the commander that they could then 
arrest him because he would not stop speaking in this manner.” (JB 28/3/1986).
1011 Os amigos de men filho ja haviam montado um esquema para leva-lo a um local 
ignorado caso e/e fosse baleado algum dia, como aconteceu . . .  Ha tanta policlinica de 
bandido por ai. Paguei 40.000 Cz pela operagao dele aqui. Com esse dinheiro, comprava 
todas as policlinicas de Nova Iguagu.”
llllatendem pessoas procuradas pela policia em consultas e cirurgias nas quais os 
medicos, muitas vezes, trabalham sob ameaga”
12The surgeon was personally contacted at home by Escadinha’s colleagues during the 
night of the incident (JB 28/3/1986).
13This name (or “Sen Zequinha” (Lit: Mr. Zequinha), uTio Zequinha” (Lit: Uncle 
Zequinha)) was the name for Escadinha used by the inhabitants of his home favela. 
“Escadinha” was the name given to him by the police and referred to the steps that led 
up to one of his bocas (Fatos 27/1/1986:51).
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of the Military Police.” (0  Globo 27/3/1986).14 When he arrived at 
the Penitentiary Hospital on 1/4, most of the 80 inmates had formed a 
queue, bringing him presents; a fan, a portable TV, a radio, and little 
presents such as drinks, biscuits and fruit (JB 2/4/1986).
The case study reveals a lot about the organisation and scope of the traffickers at 
the top level of their hierarchy and their relation to the establishment.
The bigshots in the drug trade were involved in many other types of businesses. 
Among those that appeared in the case study and were of significance to Rocinha 
are, for example, their involvement in stolen car dealing, which was confirmed in 
many different sources:15
“Denis controla 7 bocas de fumo na “Denis [one of the bigshots, based in
Rocinha; tem um grupo especializado Rocinha] controls 7 bocas in Rocinha;
em roubar carros na Zona Sul, para he runs a group specialised in steal-
trocar por drogas no Paraguai e na ing cars in the South Zone, to trade
Bolivia . . .  domina varias oficinas for drugs in Paraguay and Bolivia . . .
mecanicas que trabalham com carros he manages several garages that work
roubados na favela . . .  ” 1 ,  ^ on stolen cars in the favela . . .  ’
(JB 17/10/1985)
Or:
“da quadrilha de . . .  Gordo, ligado 
ao trafico de cocaina e roubos de car­
ros. Esses carros, segundo a juiza, 
sao roubados no Rio e levados para 
Campo Grande e Corumba, onde sao 
trocados por cocaina que abastece o 
Rio de Janeiro.”
“from Gordo’s gang . . .  involved 
in cocaine traffic and car robbery. 
Those cars, according to the judge, 
are stolen in Rio and taken to Campo 
Grande and Corumba, where they 
are traded for cocaine which supplies 
Rio de Janeiro.”
(JB 13/1/1986)
14 “O Zequinha nao pode ir para o Hospital Penitentiario porque la vao mata-lo, como 
queima de arquivo. Ele sabe muita coisa sobre a corrupgao e a lama da Policia Militar.”
15This explained the number of auto-mechanics workshops in Rocinha where vehicle 
access was barely possible and few households could afford to own one. The majority of 
those who did own cars were taxi drivers who often serviced their own vehicles.
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The importance of independent transport for the traffickers is obvious. Often car­
rying weapons illegally, they could not travel <?n public transport, where they risked 
getting body searched. Effectively, this meant that most olheiros (teenagers em­
ployed to staff bocas where drugs were bought and sold) would have to remain in 
Rocinha were it not for their own cars.
Property dealing also appeared frequently in these sources. In the case study, 
Gordo’s three mansions in the village illustrates the point. A newspaper report 
about property ownership in Rocintia mentioned the existence of absentee property 
sharks who collected rent from large numbers of kitchenetes (Lit: bedsits) and 
apartamentos (Lit: apartments, flats) through hired lawyers (JB 24/11/1985). One 
was said to claim ownership over 2,800 kitchenetes accommodated in about 40 large 
buildings. Another 26 were quoted as owning 300 buildings. The rent charged was 
extortionate and the quality of the accommodation varied, but the large majority 
was well below the normally already low standards of accommodation. Officially, 
letting accommodation in shantytowns was illegal. Even though I have no firm 
data to assess the extent of the involvement of the traffickers in Rocinha’s property 
market, it would be surprising if they did not do so. Not only was accommodation 
extremely scarce and dealing in this business therefore extremely profitable, also, 
influence over property development was crucial for those whose success depended 
on the possession of strategically located quarters. Informants confirmed rumours 
that gangs used their influence over the members of the Residents Association to 
acquire large numbers of strategically located buildings in the past, and there were 
stories of residents who were forced out of their houses by the traffickers.16 It was 
also clear that many of these large property sharks used methods similar to those 
of the traffickers.
The catering industry was another area in which traffickers were known to 
have vested interests. Note that Escadinha entertained twenty friends in a public
16The question of control over land ownership and the issuing of building permits 
played an important role in the development of Rocinha’s leadership (as seen in Chapters 
5 and 6) and allegations of “irregularities” in these matters led to a series of replacements 
of members of the leadership of the Residents Association.
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restaurant while he was on the run. Hotels, restaurants and discotheques were cited 
as businesses in which bigshots laundered their money (e.g. Paulinho da Matriz 
was known to possess luxury hotels in the South of Brazil (Fatos 27/1/1986:50- 
51)). In Rocinha, biroscas and lanchonetes (cafes) provided places where members 
of the gangs socialised did business. Their owners supplied them with their food 
and drink, sheltered them and communicated with them about local goings on. 
They were also the only places which stayed open after dark, when the underworld 
came to life. Birosca owners could not select their clientele and some (invaded by 
“undesirables”) were forced out of business for this reason. Others either enjoyed 
respect or special protection from the traffickers through agreements, or adopted 
the clientele and their demands, and in a sense became part of their business.
Gambling was also commonly associated with drug trading. Even though it 
was strictly illegal, many (especially poor) Brazilians took part in a gambling 
game (jogo do bicho).17 This game was regarded as different from the “serious” 
gambling that took place in casinos. Its results were publicly discussed (there 
was talk about them appearing on TV) and women and students were employed 
to sell tickets for the game openly on street corners. The owners of the game 
(bicheiros) were known to be wealthy and some of them were public personalities. 
For example, Castor de Andrade, one of Rio’s biggest bicheiros, was a name with 
which most cariocas were familiar. The bicheiros’ financial involvement in Rio de 
Janeiro’s Carnival processions was widely publicised. Bicheiros had also become 
politically active in recent years. Their financial support for the PDT candidate in 
the 1982 elections for state governor and for the municipal elections in 1985, was 
no secret at the time. The elected governor’s proposals emphasised the need to 
legalise the game, and his government’s Plano for 1983-1985 devoted many pages 
to the development of Rio’s tourist industry in which Samba, Carnival and sports 
played a central role (Plano: 4, 10, 116-121).18
17It was similar to a lottery game, where participants put small amounts of money on 
a particular animal.
18Castor de Andrade publicly announced his intentions to develop the amusement
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In many ways, bicheiros shared interests with the traffickers. As an illegal 
business with a lot of wealth to protect and invest, they relied on similar meth­
ods of operation even though these uglier sides of this business did not draw the 
same attention of the press. Evidence of their existence, however, was there. For 
example:
“ . . .  Federal Police officers discov­
ered a range of arms in Maninho’s 
house, son of the jogo do bicho 
banker. As it is, the surprising sit­
uation would have been one in which 
the bicheiro did not have weapons in 
his house.”
(Veja 27/7/1988:42)19
Like the other mentioned businesses, bicheiros did not mix with traffickers pub­
licly. They were concerned with keeping a clean image and the politicians and 
other authorities seemed happy to collaborate with their business.20
In Rocinha, my informants told me that they did not know the answers to many 
of my questions about the bicheiros and they did not publicly express an interest 
in them in the same way as they did in the traffickers. There were several busy 
pontos de bicho in Rocinha and many of my informants frequently participated 
in the game. In weekends and evenings, a common sight in Rocinha was also the 
card and dice games played in front of certain biroscas showing stacks of money 
openly on tables. These games provoked heated arguments between players and
sector in Brasilia with plans to build nightclubs, luxury hotels and a sports complex, 
and particularly to stimulate the Samba phenomenon there (JB 24/1/1986).
20When the Civil Police raided a large number of pontos de bicho (places on the street 
where bicho tickets are sold) under the pretext of allegations of their involvement in drug 
trafficking, bicheiros readily received the sympathy of the press and officials, alleging that 
the operation was politically motivated (a move against the state government whom 
bicheiros politically supported). The Civil Police could not get the cooperation of the 
Military Police (commanded by the state governor), whom they accused of collaboration 
and deliberately ignoring the law, nor of some judges, who expressed their loyalty to 
the state government by refusing to start processes against the bicheiros arrested in the 
incident (JB 10/11, 13/11, 14/11, 27/11, 30/11/1985).
" . . .  agentes da Policia Federal de- 
scobriram um arsenal de armas na 
casa de . . .  “Maninho”, filho do ban- 
queiro do jogo do bicho. No caso, a 
situagao surpreendente seria a de um 
bicheiro que nao tivesse armas em 
casa.”
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caused passers-by to speed up and look the other way. These latter activities were 
regarded as serious gambling and fell in a different category.
To protect their stronghold, the traffickers engaged in arms trading, often with 
individual police members, although some arms were also obtained through rob­
bery (as illustrated in the case study). Police were commonly accused of swapping 
their weapons for drugs, which they then sold. For example:
" . . .  segundo Cosme, alem de fa - 
cilitar os negocios dos traficantes, 
os policiais tambern se encarregavam 
de manter o grupo de “Zaca” bem 
guarnecido em termos de armas e 
munigoes - desviando e revendendo 
inclusive armas de uso restrito das 
Forgas Armadas. ”
a . . .  according to Cosme [who was 
caught in a bust and therefore de­
cided to reveal everything since he 
had nothing else to lose], as well as 
facilitating the traffickers’ business, 
police also took it upon themselves 
to keep “Zaca”’s gang well supplied 
with arms and ammunition - divert­
ing arms and selling them, including 
arms restricted for use of the Armed 
Forces.”
(Senhor 8/9/1987:52)
Among the harvest of a raid on Santa Marta (another morro in the Zona Sul) de­
tectives found:21
" . . .  um precioso trofeu: um cadern- 
inho em que "Cabeludo” escriturava 
as quantias em dinheiro e os pa- 
pelotes de cocaina com que renumer- 
ava guarnigoes da Policia Militar, 
em troca da impunidade e do desvio 
de armamento da corporagao.”
" . . .  a precious trophy: a booklet 
in which “Cabeludo” [Lit: Hairy, ob­
scene] noted the sums of money and 
cocaine sachets with which he paid 
the Military Police garrisons, in re­
turn for impunity and the diversion 
of weaponry from the corporation.”
(Visao 2/9/1987:33)
In terms of their organisation, it was my impression from the evidence from these 
diverse sources, that the traffickers operated according to a rigidly hierarchical 
model at these top levels. At the very top there were a handful of bigshots (like
21 These were only two of the numerous references to direct instances of swapping arms 
for drugs with police that I came across.
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Gordo, Meio Quilo, Denis and others who appear in the case study), who man­
aged the supplies of drugs for a particular part of Rio de Janeiro, and spent a 
lot of their time taking care of financial matters, managing their investments in 
these other businesses in which we have seen they invested their wealth and/or 
staked an interest for other reasons. They were known to be extremely wealthy 
and reputed to be living in luxury mansions situated in affluent suburbial areas of 
Rio de Janeiro, far away from where the _actual drug trading took place. (Denis 
da Rocinha, known as “0  Chef do” (Lit: The Big Boss) in Rocinha, was one of 
those bigshots, allegedly in charge of supplying the majority of lucrative bocas in 
the Zona Sul.)
These bigshots delivered to the “donos” (or “gerentes”) de bocas (Lit: owners 
of the bocas) who remained in direct contact with those who staffed the bocas and 
dealt with the clientele. These donos were each said to control a handful of such 
bocas and often resided in the shantytowns in which they traded. Bocas were staffed 
by olheiros (Lit: overseers) whose job it was to defend the bocas from possible 
threats of enemies. These were the teenagers who sat On my doorstep night and 
day (as described in Chapter 3). The olheiros made use of aviaozinhos (Lit: little 
aeroplanes; who were sometimes very young local children) acting as messengers 
for them. Positions of donos were appointed by the bigshots on whom all depended 
for supplies and success within the organisation depended on performance. Each 
dono had to build his own pedago (establish and maintain control over a certain 
area with outlets, into the market) with the aim towards expansion, by either 
conquering bocas belonging to other donos, or setting up new profitable outlets 
for their trade, which would pose a similar threat to other donos and indirectly to 
other bigshots. Donos were therefore divided against each other, and hence, also 
the olheiros they commanded were divided into gangs whose interests clashed. In 
these clashes (gang wars) many were eliminated. Alliances were vulnerable, since 
each gang competed with another gang commercially and alliances at the top could 
be realigned by attempts at expansion. Given the lucrative nature of the business 
and the wealth these bigshots appropriated ultimately, their organisation at higher 
levels must have been rigid. Relations between these bigshots and between them
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and certain donos were personal and relatively stable. They needed each other to 
make their business work. This explains their cooperation (illustrated well in the 
case study). There was a sense of “having made it” if you had reached this level, 
and Escadinha (doing the jobs associated with being a dono) was one of these 
rising stars.
In order to climb to the top of this hierarchy, one competed with others for 
promotion at lower levels. Promotion could only happen when rivals were elimi­
nated through external interference of police or competing colleagues, or one could 
organise a trambique no Chef do (Lit: conspiracy, plot to overthrow o Chef do). The 
following article reports on one of these incidents. It illustrates the character of 
the relations between the traffickers particularly well.
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“Ha alguns meses, Beto Falcon e sen 
irmao Ricardo chegaram a Rocinha e 
procuraram Denis Leandro da Silva 
para um papo de negocio. Estavam 
interessados nas bocas redondas de 
Denis epretendiam compra-las. Tin- 
ham obtido informagoes, atraves das 
quais estaria disposto a se livrar 
das bocas que possuia para instalar- 
se na Cidade de Deus. . . .  Con- 
versa daqm, conversa dali, pros e 
contras, acabaram chegando a um 
acordo: Beto daria uma entrada das 
mais gordas e pagaria a quantia de 
30 mil cruzados por mes; sempre no 
ultimo dia. Era pegar ou largar. 
Denis pegou. Ficou de receber a
tal entrada, porem, em determinado 
dia, apesar de Beto e seu irmao as- 
sumirem, a partir daquele instante a 
diregao geral das bocas existentes na 
favela. . . .  Verdade que um dos seus 
gerentes tentou colocar um marim- 
bondo em sua cabega, no sentido de 
que ele nao deveria ter entregue as- 
sim, de bandeja toda as suas bocas 
sem ver a cor do dinheiro que de­
veria receber na mao como entrada. 
. . .  No prazo estipulado para receber 
a entrada, Denis foi ao encontro de 
Beto. La chegando, foi recebido a 
bala. Beto disse que otario nao tinha 
vez e que ele fosse receber noutra 
freguesia. Tiros. . . .  Procurou socor- 
ros e, fora de perigo, jurou vinganga: 
todos morreriam; Beto Falcon e to- 
dos os seus comparsas. Ninguem fi- 
caria vivo para contar a historia. Era 
a guerra . . .  ”
“A few months ago, Beto Falcon and 
his brother Ricardo came to Rocinha 
to find Denis Leandro da Silva for 
some business talk. They were in­
terested in Denis’ bocas and intended 
to buy them. They had heard some 
rumours according to which he was 
planning to get rid of the bocas which 
would enable him to install himself 
in Cidade de Deus . . .  The conversa­
tion went this way and that way, the 
pros and cons, and they ended with 
reaching an agreement: Beto would 
make a fat down payment and pay 
the sum of 30,000 Cruzados monthly: 
each time on the last day. It was 
paying or nothing. Denis caught on 
to the idea. He was still to receive 
that agreed down payment, on a cer­
tain day, even though Beto and his 
brother assumed from that instance 
the total management of all the bo­
cas existent in the favela . . .  Now it 
happened that one of his chefes got 
him worried about the fact that he 
should not have handed over all his 
bocas in this way - on a platter- with­
out seeing the colour of money which 
he had agreed to receive in his hand, 
as a down paym ent. . .  On the agreed 
day for receiving the down payment, 
Denis went to his meeting with Beto. 
Arriving there, he was met with the 
bullet. Beto said that a wimp like 
him didn’t have a chance, and that 
he was used to dealing with a differ­
ent kind of clientele. Shots. . . .  He 
went for help and once out of danger, 
he swore his vengeance: all of them 
would die: Beto Falcon and all of his 
mates. No-one would remain alive to 
tell the story. It was war . . . ”
(O Dia 24/2/1987)
In less than a week, Denis’ gang killed “at least 15” of Beto’s gang. The bodies
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of some were paraded around Rocinha to show victory and then disposed of in lo­
cal rubbish dumps. Days after his death, local residents uncovered the mutilated 
body of Beto himself in Cidade de Deus (a suburb of Rio de Janeiro) only after 
its smell had become intolerable to neighbours. The incident described involved 
higher levels of organisation and was an all out gang warfare. Two incidents of this 
scale happened in my neighbourhood during the year of my stay. Other smaller in­
cidents involving rivaling olheiros or unauthorised police officials, happened more 
frequently during that year. It is obvious from these examples that this kind of 
gang rivalry worked against stable long-term alliances. The whole structure was 
motivated by a combination of ruthless individualism and hierarchical dependence 
in which, at these lower levels especially, only allowed alliances to form in short­
term cooperative efforts which were easily reversed. Indeed, this follows from the 
logic of their organisational structure, as described above.
That the character of these alliances within this hierarchy was more stable and 
less competitive at higher levels of operation is further demonstrated by the fact 
that at higher levels the organisation of bigshots allowed them to maintain direct 
links with developments in the drug business outside even when imprisoned. This 
meant that when they were released from prison they fitted back into the structure 
as before. Escadinha’s case was an example of this. The release of a prisoner 
previously active at lower levels often meant the destabilisation of relations and/or 
a chance for revenge, which exploded into a major realignment of relations. The 
case study in which Escadinha appears well cared for by an effective cooperative 
group of peers gives a misleading picture. The collaboration and tight personal 
network between colleagues at the top cannot be taken as representative of the 
way their business operated at lower levels. Further evidence for the instability of 
relations within this hierarchy at lower levels comes from the fact that the turn 
over rate of olheiros, and even donos was extremely high and the great majority 
were eliminated by rivals in their own trade (as illustrated in the above report).22
22This also explains why most of them (even the bigshots) were so young.
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The links through which the traffickers did their business with others were 
highly personalistic and apparently quite random and operated with little loyalty 
and/or permanence. One could never predict whom would in the end back whom. 
The links varied according to different situations and came about suddenly, of­
ten to serve the personal interests of one influential character, to be suddenly 
abandoned or completely reversed in response to a change of circumstances. In 
the case study ahead, for example, the links between a gang leader and a political 
candidate suddenly broke and commitments were reversed due to the gang leader’s 
reevaluation of his personal situation (his brother in prison was perceived to be at 
risk). In such a situation, each individual involved in the incident could influence 
the outcome of the event to match his/her own interests. This is facilitated by the 
secretive manner in which these decisions were made at all levels of this system.
W hat experience the people had of these traffickers and how their presence in 
Rocinha affected the activities of the action groups is particularly well illustrated 
in the following case study.
NOVEMBER ELECTIONS. Six weeks before the November elec­
tions for municipal authorities in 1985, the presidency of the current 
Residents Association threw a party “to celebrate its first anniversary” .
The party had been advertised on posters all over Rocinha and on the 
night, there was an unlimited supply of free drink and a large number 
of guests were entertained with an elaborate sound system. One of the 
candidates for the coming elections (Medina, PFL/PS) and his vice­
candidate (Nery), and a large number of their cabos were at the party. 
There were also a large number of armed members of Denis’ gang (fur­
ther referred to as o Chef do). In protest against what they saw as 
turning out as a massive election campaign, one opposing faction in 
the Residents Association distributed leaflets, backing this candidate’s 
main rival (Saturnino, campaigning on the PDT ticket, the party of 
the state governor in power at the time). They were “invited to leave” 
the party and failure to do so was understood to be a serious threat 
to their safety. Taking offence to this, they met the following day to 
compose an open protest letter to the public and the press. The letter 
was never circulated in Rocinha, but an interview to a leading news­
paper (published soon thereafter) reported the incident at the party 
(JB 17/10/1985).
During the following two days, several people were hassled by mem­
bers of o Chefao's gang. Two directors belonging to the opposing fac­
tion were visited at home during the night by heavily armed men and 
were told that “the only candidate for Rocinha” was Medina. They
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received warnings about the newspaper report, and were told that o 
Chefao had not liked what had been written about him .23 They were 
released with a warning that those active in the counter campaign 
would be killed if caught again inside Rocinha before the elections. The 
two fled immediately and stayed in different places outside Rocinha for 
about two weeks.
Soon after these incidents, three other members of this faction ap­
proached o Chefao and his gang in an attem pt to ensure them of the 
neutrality of their groups in the election campaign. They failed to 
contact him. During tha t week, an employee of a creche (one of the 
groups run by this faction) was also hassled in the street by armed 
gang members for information about the whereabouts of the group’s 
president and at the end of the week (while a party was being pre­
pared for a large number of children in the creche) a number of men, 
exhibiting an impressive selection of sophisticated weaponry, appeared 
outside the creche, shouting abuse and threats at the tias on the patio. 
This included a message from o Chefao ordering all officeholders of this 
organisation to appear at a meeting that night, warning that those who 
remained absent risked being killed. The tension in the creche became 
intense. As it turned out, they themselves did not appear at the meet­
ing that night. The reasons for their absence became clear later, when 
it was discovered that the police had circled Rocinha with instructions 
to capture o Chefao later that same day.
In response to this police effort, the presidency of the Residents As­
sociation (clearly headed by another faction) lobbied the police head­
quarters, questioning their motivations for capturing o Chefao. A few 
days later, newspapers reported on “Rocinha’s efforts to protect their 
leader from the police” by organising barricades, stopping police vehi­
cles from entering Rocinha’s main roads (0  Globo 15/10/1985, O Dia 
16/10/1985, JB 16/10/1985). The barricades were constructed in the 
name of “protest against police violence towards favelados”. Witnesses 
at the scene predicted bloodbaths “involving innocent workers” if the 
police effort were to continue. It emerged later that the newspapers had 
been informed of the incident by Nery (the candidate for vice-major in 
Medina’s campaign) who reported the police raid as an example of the 
current state governor’s (his rival party) abuse of power since (in his 
opinion) it represented a politically motivated move against someone 
who happened to be campaigning for an opposition candidate fO Dia 
16/10/1985). The police raid was conducted largely by the Military 
Police who were said to be commanded by the state governor.
The following day (in search of publicity) this same faction of the 
Residents Association mobilised a large protest march to the governor’s 
palace, demanding to speak to the state governor himself. The group
23In fact, the report had not mentioned him.
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(accompanied by one of Rocinha’s (noisy) blocos) demanded a stop to 
the police effort to catch o Chefao on grounds that he (as all suspected 
criminals) had the right to be prosecuted in freedom in front of proper 
court proceedings. Newspapers of the following day reported the full 
extent of his police record (eleven homicides, various charges for drug 
trafficking, and other illegal business, unlicenced weapon possession, 
etc. (different papers gave quite different details)), and reported the 
gang’s threats to the other groups involved in the election campaign 
in Rocinha (Q Dia 16/10/1985, JB 17/10/1985). The group (led by 
the president of the Residents Association) was also reported to have 
come to the governor to negotiate o Chefao? s freedom in return for 
Rocinha’s vote (i.e. for his (the state governor’s) candidate). They 
were also reported to have threatened the continued closure of the PDT 
(his party) election quarters in Rocinha as long as the police presence 
in Rocinha remained, which would effectively prevent the PDT from 
campaigning.
A newspaper two days later reported the end of the police operation 
in Rocinha. It claimed that the raid had largely been unsuccessful, in 
that only two minor offenders (neither of them linked to o Chefao? s 
gang) had been arrested. The police commander in charge of the op­
eration denied reports that the aim of the operation had been to catch 
o Chefao. Instead, he suggested, the operation had been routine “with 
the objective to inhibit criminal activity and to infuse a state of se­
curity . . .  Today it was Rocinha. The day before we were on Praia 
de Botafogo. Every day this operation is done in a different place.” 
(JB 18/10/1985).24 Rumours in Rocinha suggested that the president 
of the Residents Association (who apparently had inside information 
from the police as well) had warned o Chefao and his gang of the po­
lice intentions the night before the raid took place, thereby frustrating 
their attem pt to catch him by surprise.
By the middle of the following week o Chefao made clear his deci­
sion to withdraw his support from the Medina campaign and permit 
public support for the opposition candidate in Rocinha, by flying the 
PDT flag from one of the buildings known to be among the gang’s 
“headquarters” . Latest opinion polls had shown Medina’s slim chances 
of winning the elections. Rumours had it that o Chefao had become 
worried about the safety of his brother who was currently in the hands 
of the authorities. Moreover, to be backing a losing candidate would 
not only put at risk his own safety, it also was likely to have adverse 
consequences for the future success of the Residents Association. The 
PDT campaign in Rocinha resumed as normal.
24“com o objetivo de “inibir a atividade criminosa e infundir sensagdo de seguranga” 
. . .  Hoje foi na Rocinha. Na vespera estivemos na praia de Botafogo. A cada dia, a 
operagao e feita num lugar diferente?’
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The case study illustrates cooperation between action groups (sometimes through 
the Residents Association) and the gangs. For example, the president of the Res­
idents Association made a move to protect the gang leader by mobilising support 
which involved the participation of the bloco and many others. If we look at the 
situation structurally, we can see that some sort of dealings were inevitable and to 
the advantage of both. A priori, the traffickers favoured some sort of agreement 
with the Association (or any active group that crossed their paths) through which 
they could influence developments in Rocinha to pursue their business smoothly. 
From the Association’s point of view, the same was true. Part of its job was to act 
as a peace keeping force. The marginalised shantytown population has no access 
to state mechanisms which maintain public order. Legal facilities were well outside 
their financial limits, and other state provisions (such as the police force) did not 
represent an adequate option. They were not considered impartial, and certainly 
did not offer protection against the powerful drug traffickers. As I have pointed 
out above, police were known to take part in their illegal activities and had a 
large stake in their business. Members of the police force were badly paid (barely 
higher than the national minimum salaries set for the lowest classes of manual 
workers) and were said to be barely literate. Their highly ambiguous image was 
further blackened by their reputation for violence and their associations with the 
Death Squads, especially active during the dictatorship years of heavy oppression. 
The Death Squads were said to consist of off-duty police men, operating at night, 
who assassinated the “undesirables” of society in extremely violent ways (Istoe 
1/7/1987, Senhor 8/9/1987). The category of “undesirables” potentially included 
any member of the marginalised sectors, and by extension anyone who lived in 
the shantytowns. A particular target was the black adolescent male, who could 
be seen to be harassed violently (and often for no apparent reason) by police in 
public (e.g. body searches on buses). Nightly police raids on gangs were more 
often personally motivated than officially ordered “to restore public order” . To 
Rocinha’s people the rule was: “Where the police are, there is trouble.”
The Residents Association needed friendly relations with some leaders in the 
traffickers’ hierarchy to be able to approach them in the case of a problematic
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situation. My informants recognised the inevitability of such links and in some 
ways they defended particular directors accused of such links by maintaining that 
they were decent people before they got mixed up with “this business of the 
Association”. For example, it was widely known that one of the former presidents 
of the Residents Association was assassinated by a member of a gang (Ultima Hora 
24/1/1985, JB 24/1/1985, 0  Globo 24/1/1985) and the president in office at the 
time of fieldwork was murdered under similar circumstances a year and a half after I 
had left the field (JB 12/11/1987). During my fieldwork too, there were widespread 
rumours of her active involvement with the traffickers. This was also reflected 
in the ambiguity which surrounded people’s stories about these (two) incidents. 
According to some sources, the assassinated directors were the only leaders who 
were prepared to stand up against the gangs (the assassinated presidents were 
portrayed as heroes), while according to others, they had encouraged the traffickers 
to find a stronghold in Rocinha in the first place, and died in gang wars.25 Yet, 
even though evidence suggests the contrary, public efforts were made to deny 
allegations of these links by the members of the Association and their supporters 
(e.g. in front of authorities). We have come across repeated denials of links with 
gangs from action groups in the previous chapter. In the case study, mobilisation 
to prevent the arrest of o Chefao occurred under a different motto, namely, in 
the name of “police violence against favelados”, and in the name of “justice for a 
suspected criminal”. ....
So, in Rocinha, conflict situations involving the traffickers inevitably emerged. 
Yet, we have also seen in the previous chapter that these potential conflicts could 
not be resolved through the standard procedures of public meetings. Whenever 
the prominent topic of “Violence in Rocinha” was publicly addressed, groups’ 
communication broke down. Any problems that came up with the traffickers 
had to be resolved at a highly personal level, using key individuals to mediate
25Press coverage at the time also fluctuated between these extremes (see references 
cited above).
Chapter 8. Behind the Public Front 233
privately between the two interested parties. The incident at the Rua Quatro 
school illustrates what happened in such a situation.
RUA QUATRO SCHOOL. Staff at the school became worried about 
the fact that the gangs had initiated the building of a boca next to the 
school. The children’s safety was perceived to be threatened and wor­
ried parents were considering the withdrawal of their kids from the 
school. At first, the teachers called a meeting with the local gang 
leaders (the dono of the boca), i.e. using the procedure through which 
problems were usually resolved in this small group. The gang leaders 
did not show up and, on the occasion, it was decided that the m atter 
had to be resolved by sending a group member off to speak to the 
president of the Residents Association. They agreed on who was the 
most “suitable” person: the one who knew her best through personal 
connections. She visited the president’s house on the spot. The latter 
promised to deal with the m atter as soon as possible.26
The standard practices for action groups did not function in their dealings with the 
gangs. It was also noticeable that, although the members of the group themselves 
were all involved in the issue and it was very much on their minds, it did not 
reach the group’s meetings. Outside meetings (just before they started, after they 
had ended and during other activities of the group) members discussed the issue 
extensively. Instead of discussions in public meetings, the issues were dealt with 
through personal contacts. Situations in which there was no solution beneficial to 
both parties which could be agreed on in private, inevitably led to a communication 
breakdown and (threatened) violence (as was the case in the election campaign 
incidents). Without personal channels the chance of a breakdown was much higher 
and this could have dangerous consequences for all parties involved.
Why these procedures had to be used can be explained with reference to the 
previous chapter. The activities of the action groups obeyed certain rules defined 
by the national rhetoric of abertura. In many ways the traffickers represented the 
antithesis of these ideals. I have shown in Chapter 3 how the trafficker him/herself
26The matter solved itself temporarily when the dono in charge of the boca was elim­
inated in a shootout the following day and the project appeared to be abandoned.
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stood in direct opposition to the morador. S/he represented the opposite to the val­
ues associated with domestic order: that of the work ethic, the family, home, and 
others which made up social respectability. In this sense, the traffickers stood for 
the antithesis of “community” which was the focus of the political rhetoric. To be 
publicly approaching the traffickers therefore damaged one’s political credibility.27
In the way they operated their business, they similarly represented the antithe­
sis to the practices advocated by the rhetoric. My data on how the gangs actually 
operated is mainly based on popular newspapers and my own impressions from 
what I saw and heard through gossip and rumours. For the purpose of this chap­
ter, what counted ultimately was not the exact details of their operation (which is 
in itself interesting), but how they were perceived to be doing so by the members 
of the action groups with whom I spent most of my time. It were these perceptions 
which caused them to dissociate themselves publicly from the gangs.
It is clear from the evidence that their operational structure was highly hier­
archical individualistic, idiosyncratic, unstable and secretive. These features were 
in obvious contradiction with the emphasis on cooperation, collectivity, public 
consultation, education and information-sharing, long-term planning and egalitar­
ianism promoted by the rhetoric of the public domain. Dealings with these agents 
could not be accommodated under the rules of the political rhetoric which dom­
inated this public activity, and hence they were relegated to a different political 
sphere, a “back stage” (Goffman 1971).28 Although connections existed between 
the action groups and the political agents of which everyone was aware, these con­
nections could not be publicly activated or even recognised. They belonged to a 
different private/hidden political sphere.
27They also threatened violence and represented raw power, which caused others to 
remain at a safe distance.
28In view of these comments, the common reference term “organised crime” becomes 
more descriptively “disorganised crime”, especially if one is talking about their lower 
levels of operation.
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For this reason also other authorities publicly dissociated themselves from the 
traffickers despite the obvious existence of cooperative links. For example, with 
regard to the police: despite the evidence of arms trading with traffickers which I 
have already cited, it is obvious from other sources that cooperative links between 
police and traffickers existed. In the case study, the police readily responded to 
the efforts of some protesters to protect the gang leader’s safety. One could argue 
that they cooperated with the construction of the barricades set up to prevent a 
clash between police and gang leaders, after instructions had been given to capture 
them. And indeed, how else could the traffickers trade so freely in Rocinha? Yet, 
in public, such allegations were repeatedly denied.
The above argument also explains the absence of influential political agents 
such as the donos de agua and luz, big property sharks and other big businessmen, 
such as the bicheiros and car dealers, in the public scene in Rocinha. As pointed 
out in Chapters 5 and 6, these were forced underground during the late 1970s 
because of the political rhetoric, which focused its criticism on such practices.
In this similar way, electoral politics and reference to party politics was con­
spicuously absent in public meetings. Chaguismo had been a central target for 
those who promoted the new rhetoric and it was still fresh in people’s minds. A 
history of co-optation and patronage relations had forced them underground. The 
electoral process was referred to with the terms “politico” and “conversa fiada”, 
which were derogatory terms, as illustrated in the quotations in Chapters 5 and 6 
(Varal:83. 87-88 and 78-79 resp.). Campaigning politicians, were publicly avoided 
by all groups as the political rhetoric demanded, even though in private, alliances 
with certain politicians were obvious (as, for example, in the election case study). 
The rhetoric advocated action group autonomy from party politics and contact 
with any one political party was regarded as suspicious. One could, in theory, 
establish “neutral” contact with politicians, in the same way as one could, in the­
ory, organise a workshop which involved traffickers. However, in practice, such 
attempts were dismissed as suspicious. Contact with specific political parties was 
publicly denied in a similar way as contact with traffickers was denied. In the case 
study, for example, the president of the Residents Association denied the allegation
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that she had intended the anniversary party to be in support of Medina’s election 
campaign. She maintained that she had invited all the candidates, but only one of 
them had showed up .29 Groups mutually accused each other of having such links, 
in the same way as they accused each other of having links with traffickers, and 
communication about these matters was difficult and usually broke down, as was 
the case with the traffickers. For example, one group attempted to organise a pub­
lic debate a few weeks before the elections, in which “the public” could question 
candidates from different parties about their political agenda. When planning and 
careful mediation with several candidates for the event started, other groups in­
sisted on participating, and arguments over the venue, the procedure of the event 
(the order in which the politicians would speak, the length of time allocated to 
each, the chairing of the platform) or the date, soon escalated to such a degree 
that the initiators and with them several politicians pulled out. The event did not 
take place. This example portrays a similar situation as the one described earlier 
about the groups’ attem pt to organise a workshop about “Violence in Rocinha”.30
The groups’ attitude towards party politics may have changed since the time 
of my fieldwork, in line with a change of rhetoric (which continually changes). 
Increasingly there was talk on the part of the political parties of “incorporating 
grassroots organisations” , especially by, for example, the Workers Party (PT), who 
prided itself on this issue. During the time of fieldwork, however, they too (or I 
should say: they especially) were conspicuously absent in Rocinha. The groups’ 
activists’ increasing concern with articulating their demands in more formal ways 
through the party structure is also reflected in the literature. (See, for example,
29AMABB’s to FAFERJ which was publicly acting in cooperation with the PDT (its 
president was publicly involved in electoral politics on this party’s ticket) was strongly 
disapproved of both by members of the group as well as rivals, and this fact was fre­
quently mentioned to confirm the group’s flaws.
30Note that also other authorities, such as the police, were negatively regarded if 
seen to cooperate publicly with party politicians and hence publicly denied any such 
connections. In the case study, for example, the police commander denied the allegation 
that his orders to capture o Chefao had been politically motivated, claiming that this 
was just a routine operation.
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Levine (1986), Slater (1985) and Cleary’s (1985) discussions about the relation of 
the Church and “Base” groups’ organisers vis-a-vis the party structure during the 
strikes of the metal workers in Sao Paulo in the early 1980s, and Banck & Doimo’s 
discussion of the role of the PT in the activities of action groups in a shantytown 
in Vitoria (Banck Sz Doimo 1987).) These authors express the groups’ activists’ 
concern about the need to find a suitable relation with the party structure whilst 
preserving their autonomy. Again, this concern was conspicuously absent from 
the discussions in the public meetings of the groups in Rocinha. The topic was 
perceived as too risky. None of the groups’ leaders could at that time afford to 
become involved in “politica”.
To see how exactly these barriers are broken down with a change in rhetoric 
(if indeed they are, a point which I doubt, given the deep suspicion of these 
formal structures which existed at the time of fieldwork) would be an interesting 
question in itself, but is clearly beyond the scope of this thesis. At the time of 
fieldwork, the party structure was a strong target of criticism. Political parties 
were disrespectable and mobilisation around such entities was not an option for 
the leadership. They were therefore of no positive structural importance to the 
dynamics of the action groups’ activities.
Tying together this information about the drug traffickers and electoral pol­
itics; what then was the influence of this hidden sphere on the activities of the 
action groups? The case study establishes the importance of the traffickers on the 
outcome of political events in Rocinha. It shows their influence over the directors 
of the Residents Association (motivating them to mobilise against the police in 
the name of “protest against police violence towards favelados”). It shows their 
influence over other groups (the traffickers managed to intimidate the groups’ lead­
erships enough to cause them to flee from Rocinha). Their success in bringing the 
political campaign of the opposition candidate to a stand-still alone shows their 
prominence and ruling hand over all organisations operating in Rocinha. Intim­
idation on the part of the gangs worked. It had the effect of forcing people into 
obedience.
Negative comments about the gangs and their activities were usually ignored,
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brushed away or silenced.31 There was an attitude of resignation and feeling of 
powerlessness in the face of these gangs. The fear of negative repercussions was 
strong and kept alive by the traffickers’ intimidating moves towards “dissidents” . 
There was an acute awareness that Rocinha had a history of leaders assassinated 
by the gangs following their active support for policies which threatened their 
domain. The assassination of the former presidents of the Residents Association 
(mentioned above) produced a sense of shock in Rocinha at the time. Clearly the 
threat of physical violence alone (the sheer number of weapons they possessed and 
exhibited) was an important factor.
However, their “rule” over Rocinha had its limits. The case study, for exam­
ple, shows their failed attem pt to dictate people’s voting behaviour, among other 
things. Their presence was positively supported by only a small minority of the 
population. These could be participants in the drug trade (like the members of the 
gangs themselves) or people who gained direct benefits from them (such as those 
involved in related businesses), or people who enjoyed their protection or financial 
support (e.g. rumours suggested that the blocos did), or perhaps relatives and 
neighbours who had personal links with gang members. These people ultimately 
acted as mediators between the traffickers and the action groups in situations such 
as the Rua Quatro case study. Most people positively disapproved of them, but 
few expressed these views in public. The media accused favelados of supporting 
the traffickers.32 This accusation was particularly substantiated with and perhaps 
based on the shantytown populations’ apparent refusal to collaborate with police. 
This allegation gave an impression which did not match my experience. The refusal 
to collaborate with police was motivated by their experience of these authorities 
who, on this basis, ranked equally low or lower than the traffickers themselves. The 
answer to the question of how the drug bosses managed to recruit people into their
311 was surprised to find a total silence about the traffickers even in a workshop about 
“The Problems in Community Politics” which took place outside Rocinha, with the 
participation of many Rocinha people.
32They attributed to them similar motives as those reflected in Cliileno’s “theories” 
of “the People’s Revolution”.
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business in Rocinha, then, must lie in part in the promise of beneficial material 
returns (the profitability of the drug trade brings immediate returns for the newly 
recruited dealer), the easy access to drugs for consumption, and the cumulative 
effects of frequent, drug use. Partly the cause must be found in the socio-economic 
context of this phenomenon (as Blok argues when he tries to account for the ex­
istence of the Mafia in Sicily (Blok, 1974)). The combined effects of the erosion of 
the value of the minimum salary, the scarcity of available paid employment and 
the general decline in living conditions of the worker had brought about a decline 
in the faith of the work ethic and stimulated general revolta against the status 
quo (Zaluar 1985). It was a conflict situation in which participation in the drug 
trade momentarily offered an easy way out. I conclude that any claim that the 
traffickers dictated what ultimately happened in Rocinha was better rephrased 
negatively. A more accurate description of the situation was that the traffickers 
would not allow anything to happen which threatened their interests, at all costs. 
And, only in that sense could they be seen to “rule” Rocinha.
As far as politicians were concerned, in the public domain, groups emphasised 
their autonomy from party politics, as they were strongly critical of it. This 
criticism was not only based on memories. Contemporary developments too were 
blamed on the corruptive nature of party politics. For example, they blamed the 
recent boom in the drug trade on the policies of the current state governor (whose 
name, incidentally, was one of the names drug users commonly used to refer to 
cocaine, a fact which may be significant in itself). This view was frequently echoed 
in the media (which was predominantly anti-state governor in many respects). 
The state governor propagated support for the bicheiros and many other drug- 
associated businesses. As I have mentioned above, he proposed to legalise the game 
and emphasised the development of tourism in Rio de Janeiro (closely linked to 
the amusement and catering industry). The financial support the current governor 
enjoyed from bicheiros was well publicised and there were also strong rumours that
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the traffickers financially supported his campaign for the 1986 elections. (Gordo 
confirmed this in his radio interview, described in the case study.) 33
Politicians’ corruption was a lively topic of debate which disturbed (not amused) 
my informants. The appearance of politicians of any party in party broadcast on 
TV provoked angry reactions. They were deeply suspicious of them and political 
parties were not respectable enough to allow public association. There is enough 
evidence to conclude, however, that in private short-term alliances between action 
groups and politicians were set up. For example, in the case study the Residents 
Association shows its willingness to use the occasion of its first anniversary as an 
opportunity to promote an election candidate. Rumours had it that there were 
personal motivations for this (career prospects for some of its members). As to the 
nature of these links, this last example illustrates this well again. Partly because 
of their secretive nature, they were random, idiosyncratic and unstable. They 
were easily reversed as they were motivated by short-term personal interests of 
particular individuals (e.g. the personal careers of individuals involved). As such, 
their overall effect on action group activities was hard to characterise in any other 
way than by looking at specific examples.
The activities of this hidden sphere were difficult to expose, partly because 
of the nature of their operation (unsystematic, idiosyncratic, unstable and hence 
unpredictable), and partly because of their secretive nature (i.e. the fact that they 
belonged to a hidden, unofficial realm of politics). I have mentioned the problem 
of collecting accurate data on these activities and hence the difficulty of analysing 
the overall picture for the researcher in my introductory chapter. This problem is
33The governor who succeeded him in 1986 responded to these claims by staging 
attempts to combat the traffickers publicly (even to the extreme of allowing a TV crew 
to film a raid on a shantytown (Veja 1/6/1988, 8/6/1988, 2/9/1987, Visao 2/9/1987)). 
Criticism on this publicity campaign, however, showed other sides to the story. It showed 
how ineffective the campaign was (none of the bigshots were caught in these operations), 
it exposed more details about the real extent of the cooperation between the authorities 
and the drug traders at other levels (against which no campaigns were launched), and it 
pointed at one of the seriously damaging effects of these campaigns: namely the way in 
which it encouraged police corruption and gave them a licence to use deliberate violence 
against not only those involved in drug traffick but the whole shantytown population.
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reflected in the literature. Drug traffickers or other “organised crime” are either 
totally ignored or mentioned briefly on the side (Zaluar 1985). Some literature on 
Colombia has recently emerged which is correcting this trend (e.g. Pearce 1990). 
The real difficulties they pose for researchers, however, should not justify their 
systematic neglect from analysis. This chapter establishes clearly their crucial 
importance for the outcome of political events in Rocinha. I have delineated what 
kind of influence the traffickers had on the activities of the action groups and the 
complexity and scope of links they established with other political agents. Their 
importance to the political scene in Rocinha is now beyond doubt.
W ith regard to the electoral process, a lot has been written which simplifies this 
hugely complex issue. In this chapter I have delineated only some of the dimensions 
which come into this question. What my data showed above all, was the complexity 
of characterising political activities in terms of electoral politics and hence the 
impossibility of simple forecasting of electoral results and/or prescribing political 
party strategy aimed at mobilising support in a shantytown such as Rocinha.
The most important conclusion we can draw from the evidence presented in 
this chapter is that there is participation of all politically active agents in Rocinha, 
regardless of their public claims, in this hidden political sphere, whose dynamics 
I have attempted to characterise.
CO NC LUSIO N S
It was my aim to deconstruct the picture of Rocinha’s political organisation. In 
earlier chapters, I looked at potentially organising principles (kinship, locality, 
religion, skin colour, economic interests, origin) and to what extent these were 
effectively operating at local levels. In later chapters, I expanded my analysis to 
see if these principles were expressed in the organisation of action groups.
As far as kinship was concerned, Rocinha’s people expressed clear ideals. In 
practice, the composition of their ,households and the roles individuals took on 
within these were easily changed to suit circumstances. Geographical and social 
mobility further destabilised and changed the character of the ties that could be 
formed between parentes outside the household. In the face of the extreme short­
ages of living space, it was often impossible to keep relatives at a distance within 
which intimate communication could be maintained. The existence of opportu­
nities for social mobility and the resulting increase in economic heterogeneity of 
Rocinha’s population also clearly affected the unity of the family.
This was expressed in the absence of “ruling families” or the relevance of kinship 
as an organising principle in Rocinha’s politics. Kinship, in this context, acted 
as a bond through which patronage was passed. For example, a woman could be 
recruited as a coordinator in an action group because she had privileged access 
to information about the vacant post and was recommended for the job by a 
relative already active in the group. There were examples of this kind of practice, 
but it was not widespread. The low incidence of this was a sign of the small 
role kinship played in individuals’ lives, and the limited size of their active kinship 
network. Additionally, kinship was for this purpose as effective as residence (being 
a neighbour) and/or friendship. Individuals were not selected or deselected by
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virtue of being member of a certain family. In fact, there were examples of relatives 
who were recruited by competing action groups, a fact which was quite insignificant 
to my informants.
In terms of people’s ties to their neighbourhood, we found that neighbours 
were in fact deeply divided against each other. Despite the common experiences 
of neighbours (due to extreme proximity of their living spaces and the hardships 
they shared (water shortage and the presence of drug traffickers, especially)), com­
munication remained at an impersonal level and was hostile between some. What 
superficially appeared to act as neighbourhood centres (the biro seas) turned out 
to serve little more than the necessary functional purposes. The concept of pedago 
could not meaningfully be used as an analytical tool to understand social space. 
Territoriality expressed at higher levels of organisation (i.e. politically active mem­
bers of “community centres” made claims to representativity over the bairros in 
which they were based) could be better seen as a result of external factors. The 
central importance of public space as a base for action groups, and on the other 
hand, their extreme scarcity in Rocinha, set groups up in competition against each 
other. This was encouraged further by the rhetoric of abertura, which stressed “lo­
cal represent ativity” as one of its main criteria for evaluation. Again, geographical 
mobility and the consequent recent and temporary nature of people’s residential 
arrangements further contributed to the weakness of a sense of belonging to a 
particular neighbourhood and the expression of this sense in social formations.
It emerged also that Rocinha’s people did not express the unity of their “com­
munity”. In fact, subdivision and the negative values attached to commonly ap­
plicable labels were so apparent that it was hard to justify the usage of the label 
“community” at all. People went out of their way to dissociate themselves with 
their morro as a place of residence. They acted to cover up and/or differentiate 
their common heritage and their economic characteristics. Poverty, rurality and 
morro-residence were factors to be ashamed of rather than positive assets. On the 
issue of skin colour, they were divided, but not in such a way as to provide leaders 
with a common cause around which they could mobilise the different groups. A 
small minority who expressed “black consciousness” were marginalised. Religious
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practice provided little structure for the lives of the majority. Common worship 
was only practised by small groups who were factionalised around a handful of 
religious leaders. It failed to provide common symbols that tied Rocinha’s pop­
ulation together. I could find no other such symbols which served that purpose. 
There were no local heroes, no celebration of common festivals (Carnival, as we 
saw, did not provide this opportunity, as the media claims).
A repeated theme in the early chapters is the weakness of these organising 
principles. Strong ideals were expressed in people’s language and preferences. 
However, in actual arrangements, little of these was articulated. There was in­
stead a strong sense of individual expression, which was in contradiction with the 
character needed for the formation of a cohesive community. In accordance with 
the conclusions from earlier chapters, what emerges in later chapters is the same 
picture of atomisation, instability and flexibility. There was a lack of clear prin­
ciples which operated effectively to hold these groups together. For these groups 
too, ideals clearly existed, but in practice, these were easily rearranged. Partly 
these arrangements were forced through in response to the need of the moment. 
Flexibility was thus the result of people’s vulnerability which, in turn, was the re­
sult of being marginalised by all sectors of society. Partly, flexibility developed as 
part of a constant strategy for maximisation in this situation of scarce resources. 
This, in turn, generated individualism: ego-centric and ad hoc decision-making; 
little willingness to commit oneself wholly or at all, or only in the short term; a 
willingness to retain independence and keep one’s options open. These tendencies 
run counter to an ethos of collectivity, based on co-operation and consultation 
from groups of people volunteering to engage in the solving of long-term problems 
of a notional collective unit.
The flexibility and individuality in these groups was also encouraged by and 
expressed in people’s geographic and economic mobility, which, in turn, had a 
destabilising effect on social relations. A constant stream of recent arrivals into 
the shantytown, the difficulty for most to find continuous employment (the tem­
porary nature of the informal labour market) and residence (the lack of space and 
the particular historical pattern of settlement in Rocinha forced many to rent tern-
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porary unsatisfactory accommodation) made any social formation more difficult 
to continue undisturbed. Most groups had the appearance of being put together 
recently. Small parties came and went in meetings and activities. Evidently, it 
was hard to establish leadership over such unstable recruits.
The kind of external support for these groups encouraged this same instability 
and individuality. The lack of coordinated planning generated contradictory inten­
tions within implemented projects and even reversals in policy, causing confusion 
and lack of direction for the groups. Their reluctance and incapacity to commit 
themselves financially resulted in insufficient funding (leading to an impression of 
a half-hearted effort on the part of the group organisers) and the periodic col­
lapse of on-going projects. Then, there were always the usual obstacles of the 
bureaucratic process, making funding difficult to get and causing project leaders 
a lot of work and problems, lowering morale and subsequent commitment on the 
part of the whole group. These factors added to a general lack of continuity and 
were disincentives to group cohesion. They also encouraged individuals to initiate 
and pursue personal projects. This was logistically so. Ad hoc decision-making 
in bureaucracies requires flexible arrangements for repeated and unexpected visits 
and personal contacts with key individuals for the approval of funds or other co­
operation needed from them. The clientelistic nature of such contacts encouraged 
this too. They were often the distribution of favours between two interested in­
dividuals and required personal contact, in which commitment can be negotiated 
and manipulated, and idiosyncrasies can be smoothed over in private.
Instability and lack of commitment were also partly the result of a general 
sense of pessimism which seemed to me the result of a mixture of factors. There 
was a lot of talk around about “the good old days”, when salaries were worth 
more (as documented in Chapter 1) and jobs were more plentiful (Chapter 1). 
Economic well-being, as I have argued above, had an effect on people’s tendency 
to operate as a collectivity. The quality of life inside Rocinha itself was also 
perceived to have deteriorated sharply. Prominent among people’s complaints 
was the question of safety and violence linked to the recent visible emergence 
and establishment of the traffickers in Rocinha (now openly active in alleyways,
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frequently causing havoc during their shootouts and by the public exhibition of 
the cruel practices against each other). Rocinha was also much less crowded 
in the old days. Population growth had increased and as a result aggravated 
problems of cohabitation. Problems between neighbours (e.g. about the position 
of a window, the draining of waste water, the loss of light, shade, ventilation or 
rooftop space) were common subjects of discussion. Previously familiar problems 
such as waste dumping (with the noted increase of insects and other vermin) and 
water access were now aggravated. A common complaint was also that “people 
don’t even know their neighbours any more”. There was a sense of conditions 
having got so much worse that many talked about moving away, yet they were 
often unable to do so because of ties to their jobs or residence and general lack of 
options for establishing themselves elsewhere. Many people communicated a lot 
of negative feeling towards their place of residence, something not conducive to 
the “community ethos” advocated by the new rhetoric.
There was also a general lack of faith in any kind of authority The optimism 
of the early 1980s (if it was ever there) was gone, both on the part of the shanty­
town leadership and group members as well as on the part of the social workers 
and pastoral agents. Especially damning were their comments on Rocinha’s best 
known characters. These were accused of being corrupt, out to enrich themselves 
and mixed up with the drug mafia. People repeated stories to justify their con­
demnation of them. Their attitude reflected a strong sense of scepticism about any 
initiative and widespread contempt for any official structures. Their experience 
told them that (any) authorities’ promises usually did not come to anything, and 
time and again their contact with authorities was negative: being ignored, mal­
treated and/or dismissed by officials in hospitals, schools, banks or voting regis­
ters, were common occurrences for most. Political parties, especially, headed their 
blacklist. Years of grand promises with very little concrete result, smooth-talking 
politicians’ speeches (of any party) with little content, and stories of corruption in 
these areas had made people sceptical and dismissive of these official structures. 
Contact with official structures was avoided, and people expressed a strong sense
CONCLUSIONS 247
of being abandoned by the authorities. This was clearly another obstacle to any 
self-help initiative or community organisation.
People were also remarkably ignorant of the mechanics and availability of these 
agencies and their services. Neighbours showed an almost total lack of interest in 
any “community” events or services which were not of direct apparent use to 
them. This was encouraged by the fact that they did not expect these services 
to bring them any good: they were dismissed as irrelevant, out of their financial 
reach, or inadequate somehow even before investigation. Some community ser­
vices were underused as a result, and events sometimes only attracted a handful 
of people. Within Rocinha, only a handful of politically active characters were 
generally known. Most remained unknown to the large majority. As to their 
dealings with political party structures, even around election times party names 
were confused. This was not surprising, given that parties frequently merged and 
split or disappeared altogether (sometimes forced by government as a tactic for 
confusing the electorate (e.g. the 1979 Party Reform mentioned in Chapter 6)), 
and the media largely focused on personalities rather than party lines. The clien- 
telistic practice also ensured the playing down of party ideology. Party lines were 
either non-existent or unknown. Besides, they were highly temporary and easily 
reversed.1 Apart from a handful of key characters, politicians (like their parties) 
were also little known. And again, this was not surprising as their presence was 
temporary. There were many of them and they came and went in quick succession. 
They moved between parties and set up their own. People’s dealings with these 
political structures were not very sophisticated. It was also clear to me, however, 
that there was little to be sophisticated about in most cases.
W hat emerges constantly from my work is the same theme of instability, fluc­
tuation, and eventually atomisation at every level. This picture is the result of the 
combination of factors I have argued above: in part, it was undoubtedly people’s
1The PT (Workers Party) may be an exception to this rule, as it was closely affiliated 
to labour unions and the Church-based groups. However, it too had failed to establish 
itself in Rocinha by the end of my fieldwork. As far as I could see, their politicians were 
treated and perceived as no different from those of other parties.
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response to a situation of poverty and constant marginalisation. It is produced by 
the need to survive in this kind of environment, as part of a strategy of maximisa­
tion, which here required flexibility, diversification, and individualism. In part, it 
is the result of the nature of their external support. This communicated a general 
lack of commitment and discontinuity and encouraged division among its clien­
tele. People’s attitudes towards any form of authority (a mixture of pessimism, 
scepticism, ignorance and contempt) furthermore worked against any effort to or­
ganise long-term problems of a notional collectivity. Additionally, there was the 
economic and geographic mobility of this population which gave potential group­
ings a sense of recency and temporariness in the face of a high turn-over rate 
and changing composition of its participants. The result is the picture we see in 
Rocinha: of small temporary groupings mobilising against each other temporarily 
to defend contradicting interests with attempted leadership rising and falling in 
quick succession. These were the result of the cognitive and organisational pat­
terns described above and in direct contradiction with the advocated models of 
strong indigenous leadership which,, can draw and keep together a loyal following, 
dedicated towards the collective setting up and running of work groups, cam­
paigns and constructive contact with institutional structures. Attempts on the 
part of pastoral agents and social workers to make groups work according to this 
alienating rhetoric, logically resulted in chaotic redundant meetings and badly-run 
demoralised groups with high staff turn-overs. I do not want to belittle the tireless 
efforts and indisputable achievements of some individuals. But what is in question 
here is the character of this political activity and the degree to which the ethos of 
collectivity and co-operation was there, as the rhetoric led us to believe.
In sum, the later chapters of my thesis show that there was a discontinuity 
between this rhetoric and the practice of the groups. The point clearly illustrated 
in my thesis is the coexistence of this collectivist rhetoric and the clientelistic 
practices it explicitly criticises. My findings allow one to label the groups as 
“clientelistic” , “conservative”, “right-wing” (da direita), and yet, at the same time, 
their practices correspond exactly to the criteria emphasised by the rhetoric. They 
hold “meetings” , they use a “voting procedure” , they emphasise the “educational
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aspect” , they “target the most needy”, they “aim to remain autonomous” and 
so on. The evidence presented shows that one cannot assume that community 
ethos and collectivity exists merely by examining the discourse of the participants. 
These labels are extremely misleading and are indeed rendered meaningless when 
one examines the character of political activities in detail and in the context of 
the reality of the shantytowns in which they take place.
My argument is particularly relevant to recent debates about Urban Social 
Movements. Urban Social Movements are “popular struggles” which take place 
at a local residential level, and can appear in a variety of forms, i.e. they can be 
anything from a temporary mobilisation such as a petition, to a highly organised 
land invasion or longer-term action groups such as daycare centres, health or ed­
ucation groups (Moser 1983). They are centred around issues involving collective 
consumption and have been explained as being the consequence of the failure of the 
State to provide housing, services and infrastructure for low-income populations 
(e.g. Slater 1985). At more abstract levels, they have been seen as an expression 
of the contradictions of a particular form of capitalism (Roberts 1978). Their 
existence is often taken as an indication of the degree of popular involvement in 
the national political process and their significance and character is often defined 
by a mixture of related questions such as the level of “popular participation”, the 
groups’ “success at challenging government structures”, the degree to which they 
remain “autonomous”, the “character” of their discourse (e.g. Boran 1989).
It is my argument that the discontinuity between the rhetoric and practice 
makes it extremely difficult to attribute the characteristics singled out above. I 
recognise that there exists a lot of informal political activity which is aimed at pres­
surising government structures for changes in favour of the urban poor; in support 
of improvements in service provision such as housing, infrastructure, transport, 
land rights, health and education centres, to mention but a few. However, count­
ing the number of people “involved” in these activities or looking at the character 
of their discourse (their “leaders’” claims of “representativity” , the “democratic” 
practices of running their groups, their self-professed “educational emphasis” , the 
degree to which they are “critical” of government practice, and so on) and without
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examining these in detail in the setting of the local groups’ practices, outside the 
context of the shantytown’s power structure, can be misleading. In this sense, I 
would be reluctant to call Rocinha’s action groups “popular movements” , as some 
of the above mentioned authors would. This would attribute to them a dimension 
which has implications well beyond what we can witness at local levels. The ex­
amination of the discourse alone, does not allow us to draw conclusions about the 
extent to which collectivity and the community ethos exists in the shantytown in 
question. My findings allow one to label these groups as “clientelistic” , “conserva­
tive”, or “right wing”, yet, at the same time in many ways they correspond exactly 
to the criteria emphasised by these theorists. And indeed, also to the “activists” 
themselves, their activities are examples of Urban Social Movements. In order to 
fully understand them, however, one has to consider the context in which they 
operate (the power structure of the shantytowns in which they appear and the 
resource structure on which they depend), and the daily problems which emerge 
when individuals try to put their ideals into practice (e.g. as Durham (1984), 
Cardoso (1983) and Santos (1981) have tried to do).
These two aspects of the problem have, in my view, not received appropriate 
attention in much of the literature. Indeed, very little has been written about the 
particulars of a shantytown’s political structure. This partly reflects the difficulty 
of gathering this kind of information by means of the research methods most 
commonly used in this field. As I mentioned above, participant observation in its 
proper sense is virtually unheard of fin studies that investigate the urban poor.
Some recent theorists are increasingly recognising this problem and are them­
selves moving in this direction. In several ways they have expressed the need for a 
focus on “social practice”. For example, Kowarick’s most recent collection, which 
attem pts to summarise and review the work done on Urban Social Movements in
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Brazil, features several articles with a specific historical dimension which provide 
detail on the practices of action groups (Kowarick 1988).2 He concludes3:
Finally, the interlinkages between micro and macro events would 
be very limited indeed - I repeat this as often as is necessary - if they 
remained suspended in structural terms: everything indicates that it is 
necessary to fill them out with the so-called “cultural reality” , symbols, 
values, norms, discourse, ideals and practices . . .  (Kowarick 1988:325)
The collection serves as a caveat against high-level theorising and the quest is for 
data that moves away from its reductionism. This was the purpose of my thesis.
The danger of oversimplification is enhanced because of the current climate of 
great optimism with regard to the potential of these “movements” and the fact 
that their significance has been much emphasised. This can partly be explained 
by the reaction against “marginality” theories in the 1960s and 70s and the sub­
sequent emphasis on the positive characteristics of the social organisation of the 
urban poor (see for example Lloyd’s “slums of hope” (Lloyd 1979)). The crisis 
in conventional Marxist theories in explaining grassroots activity and the poten­
tial of this new framework to deal with these action groups also contributes to 
this optimism. Apart from this, we are writing at a time when faith has been 
restored in popular religion and authors emphasise the importance and growth 
of “consciousness-raising” groups and the impact of Liberation Theology. Simul­
2An example of this is Durham’s article which discusses shantytown inhabitants’ 
aspirations and expectations of social mobility (i.e. bringing in the question of the 
rationale behind such movements) (Durham 1988). Similarly, Abramo focuses on the 
daily experience (working conditions) of individuals involved in the Sao Paulo strikes 
of 1980, which contributed to the erosion of their dignity and resulted in their decision 
to mobilise (Abramo 1988). Another more recent example is Machado’s article, which 
argues for the understanding of Urban Social Movements in terms of the motivation of 
the women who participate in them (Machado 1988) and participation in Urban Social 
Movements can thus be seen as an extension of gender roles, something also argued by 
Evers (Evers 1982).
3“Finalmente, as interconexoes entre micro e macroacontecimentos seriam bastante 
limitadas - repetimo-lo quantas vezes necessario for - se ficassem penduradas nas deter- 
minagoes estruturais: tudo indica que e preciso rechea-las com o assim chamado ‘mundo 
da culturasimbolos, valores, normas, discursos, utopias e praticas . . .  ”
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taneously, it is a time of hope for great political changes in Brazil as a military 
dictatorship has given way to a process of “redemocratisation” or abertura.
Several interesting questions still arise concerning my historical findings. For 
example, what are we to make of the Tempo do mutirao, as portrayed by social 
workers now and the literature at the time, in the face of these conclusions? Did 
the optimism and the “community spirit” ever exist in Rocinha, as some authors 
and the social workers in Rocinha had it? The late 1970s were, according to this 
literature, the great momentum of “the community”. Social workers in Rocinha 
at the time of fieldwork saw themselves devoted to the recreation of the lost “com­
munity spirit” of that time.
There is no doubt that rhetoric had changed dramatically at the time (as I have 
set out in Chapters 5 and 6). This was partly the result of an escalation of contem­
porary problems to an extent where protest could no longer be contained. Talk 
of abertura ignited a lot of dissatisfaction, some of which translated into action. 
The character of a lot of this output was negative: it was mobilisation against 
the governing structures which had suppressed this mood for many years. The 
outbursts in protest rallies against the rising cost of living and transport costs, for 
example, have a common denominator: they targeted the same enemy, the state, 
o governo. Events like a price rise in basic foods and bus fares were catalysers for 
these feelings to be expressed. As Santos perceptively argues, Urban Social Move­
ments do not happen without these catalytic events (Santos 1981). However, from 
these manifestations, we cannot draw conclusions about the extent to which the 
“community” existed or the existence and character of social groupings and lead­
ership within shantytowns. A careful reading of Rocinha’s literature (e.g. Varal 
or Oliveira 1986) shows the familiar scepticism and disillusion with authorities at 
that time. It shows persistent in-fighting, contradictory interests and the familiar 
contempt and suspicion against politicians and other rising leadership (including 
indigenous). (I have illustrated these points throughout Chapters 5, 6 and 7.) 
Some dedicated individuals managed to translate their rhetoric into action effec­
tively. They assembled workteams to solve immediate urgent problems (water 
shortages or floods, especially). There is no evidence that these efforts lasted or
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spread beyond groups of neighbours that were directly involved, however. In fact, 
what I find remarkable is not so much that these did come off the ground, but that 
so few of them actually did on such a small scale given the apparent desperate 
need. These remarks both qualify and support other authors’ claims about the 
creation of “community” through the expression of collective needs (Durham 1984, 
Santos 1981, Cardoso 1983).
Tempo do mutirao, therefore, was largely the beginnings of the then recent 
change of rhetoric which resulted from short-term optimism, in turn, a reaction to 
a perception of changes carefully planned and imposed from above. This rhetoric 
was necessary, like the periodic rituals of recovery discussed so vividly by Stronach 
(1990). They are important in that they are seen to address “the problem”, and 
they are effective in that they appeal to basic nostalgic traditional values for a 
“solution”, thereby undertaking spiritual recovery. As for the social workers work­
ing in Rocinha at the time of fieldwork, it is not surprising that they upheld the 
Tempo do mutirao “community spirit” . Conceivably it was an expression of nos­
talgia contrasting the “then” with the difficult demoralised mood of the “now”, 
but also therapeutically it was a means to reify their goals. Their goals were 
exemplified in a concrete instance of the way things were (and therefore could 
become) and the “then” could therefore be relied on for reference and encour­
agement. Similar to Kundera’s “organised forgetting”, the contradictory evidence 
was easily reworked in their minds (Kundera 1982).
We are still left with the apparent contradiction of people talking according to 
a certain model (of co-operation and collectivity) and working according to an­
other (of individualism and competition). (How) Did they reconcile this apparent 
contradiction? I have explained the historical emergence of the new rhetoric. This 
explains partly why it was adopted in that, to a certain extent, it was enforced 
upon the individual historically. At a cognitive level, I believe that the answer 
lies in the operational and effective power of the symbols contained in and created 
by the rhetoric. An examination into this question could look at the symbolism 
implicit in its imagery (for example, research such as Banck is undertaking at 
present (Banck 1990) or the kind of analysis Stronach hints at (Stronach 1990))
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and can be illuminated by theological debates such as that between Scannone and 
Segundo, as set out by Candelaria (1990). This undertaking, however, is material 
for another thesis project.
As a final task we have to consider the practical consequences of my conclusions. 
If my findings are correct, what implications do they have for action? In principal, 
the need for infrastructural improvements in a place like Rocinha is a priority. The 
human costs of allowing the perpetuation of a situation like Rocinha’s are immense. 
Its residents are left to fight a losing battle against a range of diseases caused by 
the lack of sanitation, for example. These are the cause of the enormously high 
infant mortality rate, the low life expectancy rate and significantly incapacitate 
people throughout their lives. It struck me time and again that the most common 
topics of conversation were about sickness and health: expressions of ill-being and 
worry about access to and satisfaction from professional advice,4 the cost and 
availability of prescribed medicine, the fear of being unable to carry on working, 
and worry about others with similar problems.5 The general attitude to this 
concern was resignation over the lack of control over these issues expressed by 
the very commonly heard disturbing expression: “5e Deus quiser.” (Lit: If God 
wants it) used after expressions such as “See you later!” (Ate logoi). These are the 
reasons why upgrading programmes often focus on sanitation as a central issue.
If sanitation is to be improved in Rocinha, one has to address the interre­
lated problem of its extreme population density. Lowering population density is 
essential to create space for vehicular access, which is the key to the systematic 
removal of household waste, the building of larger structures which can handle wa­
4When to go? (Can it be put off? How serious is it?) Where to go? There was a 
range of options. After checking with colleagues, friends, relatives and neighbours, they 
would approach the local chemist shop. Then they hunted around cheaper but crowded 
and badly equipped community clinics, perhaps trying an expensive consultation with 
a recommended spiritual advisor, or as a last resort, taking days out to undertake time- 
consuming and costly bus journeys to battle with bureaucratic hospitals which brought 
one back to the local chemist shop.
5It is not coincidental that the common expression with a toast is a wish for good 
health (“Saudel”).
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ter provision and drainage adequately, and eventually make health care and other 
services possible on a larger scale. In fact, lowering the density of the population 
in Rocinha is clearly essential to any upgrading programme, not just sanitation, 
as there simply is no space to build any larger structures which can resolve the 
problem of landslides and other social services on a scale which could handle this 
population.
From my findings it is clear that any attem pt at implementing such goals will 
face immense practical problems, such as the extremely complex property owner­
ship structure, to be tackled in any attem pt at reducing the population density 
in Rocinha. It is also clear that there are many different people with contra­
dictory interests in the status quo which can stand in the way of implementing 
strategies. For example, creating space for developmental programmes in Rocinha 
would undoubtedly displace a large number of people who would have to be per­
suaded to give up what is often their complete livelihood, and would have to be 
rehoused elsewhere. A large-scale attem pt at providing education would threaten 
the numerous community schools in existence at present.6 Another particularly 
problematic example of such contradictory forces within the population of Rocinha 
are also the all-powerful drug traffickers. Their interests lie in keeping the state 
out of the shantytown. They rely on Rocinha’s maze-like geographical make-up 
for strategic reasons, and additionally maintain powerful financial interests in the 
current pattern of property ownership.
These are but a few factors. I have set out the complexity of contradictory 
interests which occur in a shantytown with this history and size in the chapters 
above. One could think of numerous objections to potentially any initiative in 
Rocinha, given the heterogeneity of its population and the corresponding com­
plexity of the contradictory interests existent at all levels. This is clearly not only
6Talk of the Brizolao, for example, was opposed by some, who were fearful of los­
ing their small incomes from community teaching, as official certificates would then be 
introduced for those teaching in Rocinha in the future, and funding for these smaller 
projects was likely to stop.
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true for Rocinha, but for any shantytown, as the tendency towards stratification 
is basic to all human social organisation.
At a more general level, there is ultimately also the real danger of the sub­
stitution of the poorer population by a richer sector of society, as a direct result 
of upgrading. This is already happening in Rocinha (e.g. the residents of Bairro 
Barcelos and Curva do S, the best provisioned sectors of Rocinha, were visibly 
better off than the average resident of Rocinha) and in other shantytowns (e.g. 
Vidigal, similar in appearance and location to Rocinha, recently had an influx 
of middle-class students in its upgraded bottom part). This effect is particularly 
undesirable as it merely shifts the housing problem to elsewhere. Given this com­
plex structure of contradictory interests within Rocinha, it is not surprising that 
much mobilisation appeared periodically against potential upgrading programmes, 
expressing exactly these points.
The difficult dynamics of leadership itself is also a real problem that limits any 
attem pt at implementing an upgrading programme. I have elaborated above on 
the scepticism and distrust of authority. This reaction is only logical in the context 
of general marginalisation in every sphere of society. I have illustrated the unwill­
ingness to commit oneself in the long run and the preference for short-term flexible 
dyadic relations, as opposed to commitment to group co-operation. Again, this 
was logical as a system which functions according to a patronage model, demands 
an individualist response and actively encourages division within its clientele. In­
deed, the tensions created by the prominence of the armed traffickers at war with 
each other, the presence of a hostile police force (itself a problem of a different 
kind), the tensions of the exploitative relations between certain individuals result­
ing from the particular settlement pattern which guaranteed monopolisation over 
certain scarce resources without central control, and the material costs of these 
relations have an effect on the kind of political climate that results.
As far as the present political party structures are concerned, Brazilian politi­
cians had little to offer to their poorer electorate. And again, it is only logical 
that a patronising, personalistic and constantly changing political scene was met 
with an unstable individualistic and instrumentalist response on which little of
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long-term consequence could be built. If any party were serious about change (for 
which it had limited options, given the character of its financial ties to the rest of 
the system (e.g. a political career starts with a hugely expensive electoral cam­
paign)), it would have to confront the poor’s deep-rooted contempt and suspicion 
for authorities, consolidated through decades of negative experience.
I share Berger’s scepticism about the need for “consciousness raising” (consci- 
entizagao) as a solution to such problems (currently advocated and emphasised 
in all developmental approaches). The problematic nature of this concept is ex­
pressed well in his “Twenty-five Theses”:
It is, in principle, impossible to “raise the consciousness” of anyone, 
because all of us are stumbling around on the same level of conscious­
ness - a pretty dim level. (Berger 1974:13, 1977 edition)
And since:
Every human being knows his own world better than any outsider 
(including the expert who makes policy) (ibid.),
he concludes that:
Policies for social change are typically made by cliques of politicians 
and intellectuals with claims to superior insights. These claims are 
typically spurious, (ibid.).
In sum, the particular history of settlement, and the consequent formation of 
extremely complex fundamentally contradictory interests between many different 
kinds of people in this shantytown; the problematic nature of leadership dynamics 
in such a context; the mobility of this population and the nature of their aspirations 
in this context, throw into doubt the question of how and to what extent a social 
unit (and/or parts thereof) of this kind is capable of acting in unison at all. We can 
conclude therefore that any notion of mobilisation of the “urban poor” or “popular 
movements”, or any implementation programme which requires this mobilisation 
to some extent, which fails to take into account the complexity of a shantytown’s 
social structure, can only be based on wishful thinking.
A ppendix A
Acronyms
AMABB Associagao de Moradores e Amigos de Bairro Barcelos
ASPA Agao Social Padre Anchieta
BNH Banco Nacional de Habitagao
CANDE Associagao de Mulheres Democraticas
CEDAE Companhia Estadual de Aguas e Esgotos
CEDES Conselho de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social
CEE Comissao Estadual de Energia
CEHAB Companhia Estadual de Habitagao
CHISAM Coordenagao de Habitagao de Interesse Social da Area
Metropolitana do Grande Rio
CNBB Conferencia Nacional dos Bispos Brasileiros
CODESCO Companhia de Desenvolvimento de Comunidades
CGHAB-GB Companhia de Habitagao Popular da Guanabara
COMLURB Companhia Municipal de Limpeza Urbana
DOPS Departamento de Ordem Politico e Social
FAFEG Federagao das Associagoes de Favelas da Guanabara
FAFERJ Federagao das Associagoes de Favelas do Rio de Janeiro
FEEMA Fundagao Estadual de Engenharia do Meio Ambiente
FGTS Fundo de Garantia do Tempo de Servigo
IBGE Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia
IBRADES Fundagao Instituto Brasileiro de Desenvolvimento e Estatfstica
IMF International Monetary Fund
INPS Instituto Nacional de Previdencia Social
IPLANRIO Instituto do Planejamento Municipal
JB Jornal do Brasil
LBA Legiao Brasileira de Assistencia
MDB Movimento Democratico Brasileiro
MORA Movimento de Organizagao e Renovagao da Associagao
OAB Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil
PDS Partido Democratico Social
258
Appendix A. Acronyms
PDT Partido Democratico Trabalhista
PM Policia Militar
PMDB Partido Movimento Democratico Brasileiro
PROFACE Programa de Favelas da CEDAE
PT Partido dos Trabalhadores
SERFHA Servigo Especial de Recuperagao das Favelas e Habitagoes
Anti-Hygienicas
SMDS Secretaria Municipal de Desenvolvimento Social
SMP Secretaria Municipal do Planejamento
SOREG Sociedade Recreativa e Educacional da Gavea
A ppendix B
Glossary
abertura opening up; redemocratisation of political structures
apartamento flat, apartment
asfalto asphalt; paved streets; affluent neighbourhood
bairro district, neighbourhood
bandido criminal, bandit
barraco hut, shack
beco alleyway
bica publica public water point
bicheiro owner of the game jogo do bicho
birosca bar, cafe; local shop
birosqueiro owner or manager of a birosca
biscateiro odd-jobber
bloco (carnavalesco) small samba club
boca place where drugs are traded
cabo-eleitoral canvasser
cabo short for cabo-eleitoral
carioca belonging to Rio de Janeiro
carteira assinada signed contract, work agreement
casa house
cearense belonging to Ceara (a state in the Northeast of Brazil)
Centro Comunitario Community Centre
0  Chefao The Boss; nickname for drugbaron
chinelo flip-flop sandal
churrascaria Brazilian steak house
conscientizagao consciousness raising
crente derogatory term for Protestant
da direita right wing
da esquerda left wing
desfile Carnival parade
diarista worker for a daily income with no further guarantees
Diretoria Executive Committee of action group
distensao relaxation; liberalisation (politics)
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dono owner; political boss
drogas drugs
familia family, relatives
favela shantytown
favelado resident of shantytown
gerente owner, manager (of drug trading post)
governo government
grileiro squatter (term of abuse)
grupo group, team
guarda guard, inspector
guarda sanitario sanitation guard
jogo do bicho popular gambling game
kitchenete bedsit
lanchonete cafe, lunch bar
lixeiro skip for the disposal of household waste
macumheiro practitioner of Afro-Brazilian religion
marginal marginal, drop-out; criminal
mineiro belonging to Minas Gerais (a state in Central Brazil)
morador resident; decent citizen
morro hill; vertical shantytown
mutirao voluntary workteam
nordestino belonging to the Northeast of Brazil
olheiro teenager who staffed the bocas where drugs are bought and sold
palavrao bad language
panelinha clique
paraibano belonging to Parafba (a state in the Northeast of Brazil)
parente relative
parentela extended family
parque proletario temporary low-income housing estate
passarela footbridge
patrao patron, boss
pedago patch of land, turf
pilantra swindler
pivete mugger
pobre poor
politica politics
politico politician
ponto de bicho place in the street where tickets are sold for the 
gambling game jogo do bicho
quarto room
revolta revolt, protest
rico rich, wealthy
rua street
salario minimo minimum salary
sede seat; clubhouse
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sociedade de agua 
sociedade de luz 
Tempo das Enchentes 
tia
trabalhador
uniao
vagabundo
water society
electricity society
Time of the Floods
aunt; employee of action group
worker
union, cooperation 
up to no good, criminal
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